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Abstract 
Mapping the Risks and Risk Management Practices in Islamic Banking 
Wael Kamal Eid 
 
Although risk management in Islamic banking is one of the major as well as controversial issues 
of the sector, it is still an under-researched area of study. A lot of uncertainties still exist in risk 
management in Islamic banking, for which the answers are not yet necessarily clear, but which 
will play a part in shaping the industry’s future. Effective risk management in Islamic banking, 
thus, deserves priority attention: unless the industry develops its own genuine risk management 
architecture, it cannot achieve the dynamism that provides the viability needed for a more 
resilient financial system than the failing Wall Street model. Therefore, the study of risk 
management issues of the Islamic banking industry is an important but complex area.  
 
This study, hence, explores and analyses risk management practices in the Islamic banking 
industry through the perceptions of participants who were drawn from the banking and finance 
industry. The research maps out the opinions and attitudes towards risk and locates the practices 
of the industry related to risk management. This study provides an up-to-date overview of current 
market practices, issues, and trends in risk management for Islamic banks. It focuses on practical 
applications and discusses a wide range of unique risks facing Islamic banks from the perspective 
of different range of practitioners. 
 
To fulfil the aims of the research study, first, the present thesis analyses a number of issues 
concerning the subject using secondary data. Second, the unique risks facing Islamic banks and 
the perceptions of banking professionals regarding these risks are surveyed through a 
questionnaire. The final survey sample comprised 72 surveys from 18 countries. The data were 
analysed using various statistical analysis techniques ranging from simple frequency distribution 
analysis to the more advanced analyses such as non-parametric statistical analysis, factor analysis, 
and MANOVA multivariate analysis of variance. Third, semi-structured interviews were 
subsequently conducted with 33 leading Islamic banking professionals from 9 countries in order 
to develop an in-depth understanding of the underlying issues. Focused coding technique is used 
to analyse and sort the findings. 
 
In general, the findings from this study identified weaknesses and vulnerabilities among Islamic 
banks in the area of risk management and governance. Risk management, monitoring, reporting, 
and mitigation need to be enhanced across the entire industry. The study has also shown that the 
majority of respondents consider liquidity, asset-liability management, and concentration risks as 
the top risks facing Islamic banks. In addition, regional risk perceptions were crystallized by 
conducting inferential statistical analysis. The findings also show that, although Islamic banks 
have shown resilience, they are not immune to financial shocks. The study asserts that the root 
drivers of the prevailing financial system have to be challenged and replaced by a more 
transparent and ethical alternative, for which Islamic finance is a serious yet underdeveloped 
option. The real issue in Islamic banking is the excessive reliance on form at the expense of 
substance. 
 
It should also be noted that the findings of the study have policy-making implications which 
could benefit regulators, policy makers, Shari’ah scholars, practitioners, academia, and 
institutional stakeholders. Furthermore, this study has filled a gap in the literature by empirically 
exploring risk management issues from an Islamic banking perspective. 
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GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS USED IN ISLAMIC FINANCE 
 
adl: a trusted and honourable person, selected by both parties to a transaction. Somewhat 
analogous to a trustee. 
amana/amanah: literally means reliability, trustworthiness, loyalty and honesty, and is 
an important value of Islamic society in mutual dealings. It also refers to deposits in trust, 
sometimes on a contractual basis. 
bai/bay: contract of sale, sale and purchase. 
bai al-salam: advance payment for goods. While normally the goods need to exist before 
a sale can be completed, in this case the goods are defined (such as quantity, quality, 
workmanship) and the date of delivery fixed. Usually applied in the agricultural sector 
where money is advanced for inputs to receive a share in the crop. 
fatwa (pl. fatawa): an authoritative legal opinion based on the Shari’ah. 
fiqh: practical Islamic jurisprudence. Can be regarded as the jurists’ understanding of the 
Shari’ah. 
gharar: uncertainty in a contract or sale in which the goods may or may not be available 
or exist (e.g. the bird in the air or the fish in the water). Also, ambiguity in the 
consideration or terms of a contract – as such, the contract would not be valid. 
hadith: the narrative record of the sayings, doings and implicit approval or disapproval of 
the Prophet (Peace be upon him). 
halal: permissible, allowed, lawful. In Islam, there are activities, professions, contracts 
and transactions that are explicitly prohibited (haram) by the Qur’an or the Sunnah. 
Barring these, all others are halal. An activity may be economically sound but may not be 
allowed in Islamic society if it is not permitted by the Shari’ah. 
Hanifite laws: an Islamic school of law founded by Iman Abu Hanifa. Followers of this 
school are known as Hanafis. 
haram: unlawful, forbidden (see halal). Describes activities, professions, contracts, and 
transactions that are explicitly prohibited by the Qur’an or the Sunnah. 
hawala: bill of exchange, promissory note, cheque or draft. A debtor passes on the 
responsibility of payment of his debt to a third party who owes the former a debt. Thus, 
the responsibility of payment is ultimately shifted to a third party. Hawala is used in 
xxi 
 
developing countries as a mechanism for settling international transactions by book 
transfers. 
ijarah/ijara: lease, hire or transfer of ownership of a service for a specified period for an 
agreed lawful consideration. This is an arrangement under which an Islamic bank leases 
equipment, a building or other facility to a client for an agreed rental fee. 
ijarah wa iqtina/ijarah muntahla bittamleek: a leasing contract used by Islamic financial 
institutions that includes a promise by the lessor to transfer the ownership of the leased 
property to the lessee, either at the end of the lease or by stages during the term of the 
contract. 
ijtihad: literally effort, exertion, industry, diligence. As a legal term, it means the effort of 
a qualified Islamic jurist to interpret or reinterpret sources of Islamic law in cases where 
no clear directives exist. 
istisna’a/istisna: a contract of sale of specified goods to be manufactured with an 
obligation on the manufacturer to deliver them on completion. It is a condition in istisna 
that the seller provides either the raw material or the cost of manufacturing the goods. 
maisir/maysir: the forbidden act of gambling or playing games of chance with the 
intention of making an easy or unearned profit. 
mudaraba/mudarabah: a form of contract in which one party (the rab-al-maal) brings 
capital and the other (the mudarib) personal effort. The proportionate share in profit is 
determined by mutual consent, but the loss, if any, is borne by the owner of the capital, 
unless the loss has been caused by negligence or violation of the terms of the contract by 
the mudarib. A mudaraba is typically conducted between an Islamic financial institution 
or fund as mudarib and investment account holders as providers of funds. 
mudarib: the managing partner or entrepreneur in a mudaraba contract (see above). 
murabaha: a contract of sale with an agreed profit mark-up on the cost. There are two 
types of murabaha sale: in the first type, the Islamic bank purchases the goods and makes 
them available for sale without any prior promise from a customer to purchase them, and 
this is termed a normal or spot murabaha; the second type involves a promise from a 
customer to purchase the item from the bank, and this is called murabaha to the purchase 
order. In this latter case, there is a pre-agreed selling price that includes the pre-agreed 
xxii 
 
profit mark-up. Normally, it involves the bank granting the customer a murabaha credit 
facility with deferred payment terms, but this is not an essential element. 
musharaka/musharakah: an agreement under which the Islamic bank provides funds 
that are mingled with the funds of the business enterprise and possibly others. All 
providers of capital are entitled to participate in management, but are not necessarily 
obliged to do so. The profit is distributed among the partners in a pre-determined manner, 
but the losses, if any, are borne by the partners in proportion to their capital contribution. 
It is not permitted to stipulate otherwise. 
qard al hasana/qard hassan: a virtuous loan in which there is no interest or mark-up. 
The borrower must return the principal sum in the future without any increase. 
rab-al-maal: the investor or owner of capital in a mudaraba contract (see above). 
rahn: a mortgage or pledge. 
riba: interest. Sometimes equated with usury, but its meaning is broader. The literal 
meaning is an excess or increase, and its prohibition is meant to distinguish between an 
unlawful exchange in which there is a clear advantage to one party in contrast to a 
mutually beneficial and lawful exchange. 
riba al-fadi riba al-buyu: a sale transaction in which a commodity is exchanged for the 
same commodity but unequal in amount or quality, or the excess over what is justified by 
the counter-value in an exchange/business transaction. 
Salam/Salaam: a contract for the purchase of a commodity for deferred delivery in 
exchange for immediate payment. 
Shari’a/Shariah/Shari’ah: in legal terms, the law as extracted from the sources of law 
(the Qur’an and the Sunnah). However, Shari’ah rules do not always function as rules of 
law as they incorporate obligations, duties and moral considerations that serve to foster 
obedience to the Almighty. 
Sukuk: participation securities, coupons, investment certificates. 
Sunnah: the way of the Prophet Mohammed including his sayings, deeds, approvals and 
disapprovals as preserved in the hadith literature. It is the second source of revelation 
after the Qur’an. 
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takaful: a Shari’ah-compliant system of insurance based on the principle of mutual 
support. The company’s role is limited to managing the operations and investing the 
contributions. 
tawarruq: literally monetisation. The term is used to describe a mode of financing, 
similar to a murabaha transaction, where the commodity sold is not required by the 
borrower but is bought on deferred terms and then sold to a third party for a lower 
amount of cash, so becoming “monetised”. 
ummah: the community or nation. Used to refer to the worldwide community of 
Muslims. 
wakala: agency, an agency contract that generally includes in its terms a fee for the 
agent. 
zakah/zakat: a tax that is prescribed by Islam on all persons having wealth above an 
exemption limit at a rate fixed by the Shari’ah. Its objective is to collect a portion of the 
wealth of the well-to-do and distribute it to the needy. The way it is distributed is set out 
in the Qur’an. It may be collected by the state, but otherwise it is down to each individual 
to distribute the zakat.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
 
“Risk knows no religion” 
Michael Ainley  
Head of Wholesale Banking, FSA (2007) 
 
Was Michael Ainley right when he assumed that risk management is similar across 
different cultures and religions, in this case Islamic and conventional banks? Are Islamic 
banks just like any other bank that provides financial services, and hence have similar 
risk management requirements?  
The subject of risk management in Islamic banking has many facets. On the surface, the 
frequently repeated story that Islamic banks are more resilient than conventional ones is 
attractive in a world torn by a financial tsunami. Unfortunately, at least in the current 
form in which Islamic banking is practiced, this is not entirely true. The assumption at 
one point early in the crisis was that the Islamic market would be entirely unaffected and 
would sail through the crunch, and people thought that the financial crisis would be the 
lift-off platform for Islamic banks. On the contrary, the crisis exposed a number of areas 
in Islamic banking that needed to be dealt with.  
This study examines different aspects of risk management issues in Islamic banking. At 
the heart of this paper is the question of whether Islamic banks are more or less risky than 
their conventional peers. A review of the existing literature does not provide a clear-cut 
answer to this question. The majority of the relevant literature provides conflicting views 
using theoretical arguments rather than a formal empirical analysis. This is clearly an 
empirical question, the answer to which requires feedback from the market place. The 
study, thus, attempts to fill this gap in the empirical literature on risk management in 
Islamic banking through a survey-based questionnaire and in-depth interviews. 
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The difficulties afflicting conventional financial markets since mid-2007 have led to more 
attention being paid to Islamic alternatives. While the modern Islamic finance industry is 
still young, it has been growing rapidly for several years, largely on the back of an oil-
fuelled economic boom in the Middle East. Much demand came from non-Islamic 
investors who were simply attracted by good investment opportunities. With awareness 
of the industry rising, Islamic banks have expanded their operations, especially in the 
core markets of the Middle East and South Asia, but also in newer markets with 
substantial Muslim populations, including Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Europe.  
At the same time, risk management is receiving increased attention everywhere due to the 
financial crisis, and risk management products and methods for Islamic banking and 
finance are certainly a hot issue. The market turmoil of the past few years has triggered a 
wide-ranging reassessment of the global financial system and a need to understand the 
causes that led to a financial crisis of a severity not seen since the Great Depression. One 
of the main areas of attention has been the failure of many financial institutions to 
manage their risks adequately. In most cases, the industry debate has focused on pure risk 
management failures, particularly the shortcomings of risk models in measuring risks 
accurately, without addressing the broader issue of how risk is managed at the highest 
macro-economic levels and how the whole financial system is based on greed and lack of 
morality. Since then the credit crunch has afforded advocates of Islamic finance an 
opportunity to emphasize Shari’ah principles relating to debt and risk, while finding a 
receptive audience beyond the Muslim world. For Islamic financers, highly complex 
structured products such as subprime and toxic assets were seen as unacceptable because 
they were so far removed from their underlying assets. 
There appears to be great potential for further growth in Islamic banking, which is still at 
a relatively early stage. However, there are also a number of challenges associated with 
developing a new industry with a different approach to risk management. It is notable that 
although Islamic banks were unscathed by the subprime crisis, many have since suffered 
from the negative effects of the broader recession, including a collapse in property prices 
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in Dubai, where many Gulf Islamic banks had substantial exposure. The first sukuk 
defaults occurred in 2009 from two Gulf-based corporate institutions: Kuwait‟s 
Investment Dar and Saudi Arabia‟s Saad Group; others followed shortly after. 
This research provides an up-to-date overview of current market practices, issues, and 
trends in risk management for Islamic banks. It focuses on practical applications and 
discusses a wide range of unique risks faced by Islamic banks from the perspective of 
different range of practitioners. The paper asserts that the weaknesses of many financial 
firms in managing their risks have to be looked at in a comprehensive fashion. The root 
drivers of the prevailing financial system have to be challenged and replaced by a more 
transparent and ethical alternative. 
This research combines conceptual frameworks with „hands-on‟ practical perceptions 
about risk management in Islamic banking in a pioneer research that Shari’ah scholars, 
policy makers, practitioners, academia and researchers may find relevant and motivating 
to conduct more research in this vital but under researched area. Although a few Shari’ah 
opinions are included in the paper, religious and Shari’ah discussions are beyond the 
scope of this research.  
1.2 SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE OF ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE 
Islamic finance is the fastest growing sector in the financial industry at present. Launched 
to reconcile the financial with the theological needs of a global community of 1.5 billion 
Muslims, Islamic finance today offers a broad and sophisticated range of products and 
services. Double-digit growth rates for Shari’ah-compliant assets over the past decade 
have naturally driven Islamic financiers to look beyond historical boundaries to explore 
new territories, both within and outside the Muslim world.  
The increasing international interest in Islamic finance is a reflection of the success that 
this industry has achieved during its short history. Moreover, Shari’ah principles which 
place emphasis on providing economic added-value to stakeholders and aim to create 
equivalence in benefits and costs, free from harmful speculation, are gaining more 
attention and better understanding globally. Several Western supervisory bodies are 
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incorporating amendments to their supervisory and regulatory legislation to allow for 
Islamic institutions and Shari’ah-compliant products, which will reinforce the role of 
Islamic finance globally. Nowadays, in European, American, and most Western markets, 
financial institutions are offering more products and services to cater for Islamic finance. 
Moreover, a great number of financial institutions in GCC countries and Asia are 
managing funds of over USD 300 billion and are encouraged by their markets to provide 
Islamic financial services (Moody‟s, 2011a).  
Islamic banking, being the main sub-sector within Islamic finance industry, has been 
pioneering this exponential growth. According to Moody‟s (2011a), the total assets held 
by Islamic banks globally amounted to more than USD 1 trillion by the end of 2010. 
While Islamic banks have been hit by the economic downturn, they have been 
considerably less affected than most conventional banks. This is mainly because, unlike 
conventional banks, the Islamic banks have not been exposed to losses from investment 
in toxic assets, nor have they been highly dependent on wholesale funds. Furthermore, 
Islamic instruments are highly useful alternative investments for the diversification of 
portfolios, as they have low correlation to other market segments, allow the selective 
underweighting of particular sectors, and seem to be relatively independent even from 
market turbulences like the subprime crisis. As a consequence, the increasing 
standardisation for derivatives and sukuk, as well as the growing liquidity and 
organisation of the Islamic capital market, offer many opportunities to innovative 
investors. 
With such a background, it is obvious that Islamic banks have come a long way. The 
future of these institutions, however, will depend on how they cope with the rapidly 
changing financial world. With globalization and the information technology revolution, 
scopes of different financial institutions have expanded beyond national jurisdictions, 
particularly for investment and wholesale banks. As a result, the financial sector in 
particular has become more dynamic, competitive, and complex. There has been an 
unprecedented development in computing, mathematical finance, and innovation of risk 
management techniques. Moreover, the financial crisis is likely to challenge the global 
risk management foundations. All these developments are expected to magnify the 
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challenges that Islamic financial institutions face, particularly as more well-established 
conventional institutions have begun to provide Islamic financial products. Islamic 
financial institutions need to equip themselves with the up-to-date management skills and 
operational systems to cope with this environment. One major factor that will determine 
the survival and growth of the industry is how well these institutions manage the risks 
generated in providing Islamic financial services. 
The last three decades have witnessed a shift of focus on the development of Islamic 
banking. The original issue in the sixties and seventies of developing an interest-free 
financial system is no more the primary objective for Islamic bankers. The current core 
issue is to develop an Islamic financial industry which does not suffer from the 
weaknesses of the conventional banking system, particularly after the current credit crisis. 
Thus, the focus has shifted to risk management and mitigation, financial engineering, 
innovation, and providing common standards in Islamic finance. 
Banking, in all its forms, contains risks that pose a challenge to all stakeholders. Islamic 
banks, like their conventional counterparts, are financial institutions which provide 
services to depositors and investors on the one hand and offer financing to companies, the 
public sector, and individuals on the other. They are, therefore, subject to many risks that 
are similar to those confronted by conventional banks. There is a growing concern that 
the risk management practices of Islamic banking are not keeping pace with the global 
financial market. The rapid growth of Islamic banking on all fronts calls for proactive 
responses to risk management issues. In addition, Shari’ah-compliant banks have their 
own unique set of risks that differ from those borne by conventional banks. In principle, 
there is a range of activities through which Islamic banks can work in different ways that 
enable them to provide funds. These activities are adapted to meet the Shari’ah principles 
that govern Islamic banking, the most important of which is the principle of risk sharing.  
Managing risk especially in the current perilous times is nothing but an easy task. The 
events of mid-September 2008 challenged financial institutions‟ preconceived ideas of 
how to view risk. Until 15 September 2008, few bankers would have thought a 
systematically important and highly rated financial institution such as Lehman Brothers 
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could have failed, let alone failed as quickly as it did. However, risk management in 
Islamic banking is a hot issue as little is yet understood in many aspects, where IFIS are 
facing significant challenges when measuring and managing risks. Effective risk 
management in Islamic banking, therefore, deserves priority attention because the future 
of Islamic banks will highly depend on how they will manage their unique set of risks. So 
far, Islamic banking has been free-riding on financial theories and instruments developed 
within the context of the conventional debt- and interest-based system. Unless the Islamic 
banking industry develops its own genuine risk management architecture, it cannot 
achieve the dynamism of the Islamic finance system that provides the security and 
viability needed for a more resilient financial system than the debunked Wall Street 
model.  
1.3 RESEARCH AIMS, OBJECTIVES, AND QUESTIONS 
This research attempts to fill the gap in the empirical literature on risk management in 
Islamic banking. It recognises upfront that Islamic banking offers its own unique 
approach to risk management. Following a structured approach, first the research aim and 
objectives were identified and then research questions were developed within the context 
of the broader objectives. 
The aim of this research is to explore and analyse the risk and risk management practices 
in the Islamic banking industry through the perceptions and opinions of participants 
drawn from the banking and finance industry. In doing so, this research maps out the 
attitudes towards risk in the Islamic banking and finance industry and locates perceptions 
of the various stakeholders on risk management related practices in the industry. 
In fulfilling the identified research aim, the following specific objectives are developed: 
(i) to ascertain the fundamental principles underlying risk management in Islamic 
banking and the unique risks facing the IFIs; 
(ii) to investigate the effect of different control variables like region, country, 
respondent‟s position, nature of FI, nature of operations, and accounting standards on 
the participants‟ perception of the nature of risks, risk measurement, and risk 
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management and mitigation approaches of IFIs in comparison to those of 
conventional banks and with reference to the market conditions in which IFIs 
operate; 
(iii)  to evaluate the applicability of IFSB Standards and Guidelines with respect to risk 
management and capital adequacy, and how they could operate in a Basel II (and 
potentially Basel III) era; 
(iv)  to investigate the real roots of the recent crisis with a view to draw some lessons for 
IFIs; 
(v) to examine the dichotomy between the theory and practice of Islamic banking; and 
(vi)  to explore the next chapter for risk management in Islamic banking. 
The following specific research questions are developed to address and investigate the 
broader research objectives: 
(i)  What are the top risks facing IFIs? 
(ii)  What is the risk appetite associated with each Islamic finance contract? 
(iii)  Does risk management in Islamic banking differ from conventional banking? 
(iv)  Are Islamic banks more or less risky than their conventional peers? 
(v)  Are Basel II (& potentially Basel III) standards suitable for Islamic banking? 
(vi)  What are the appropriate capital requirement levels for IFIs? 
(vii)  Is Islamic banking actually more resilient than conventional banking? 
(viii)  Could the recent crisis have occurred under an Islamic banking system? 
(ix)  How developed and significant is hedging to Islamic banking? 
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(x)  Is there divergence between the current practice and moral principles of Islamic 
banking?  
(xi)  How does the future look for Islamic banking?  What strategies should IFIs follow? 
In answering the research questions, the impact of various categories of respondents and 
their profile indicators on risk perception are also investigated. 
1.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Based on the dichotomy that exists between the theory and practice in analyzing risk 
management in Islamic banking, this research aims to explore and study the opinions and 
risk perceptions of various groups of Islamic banking professionals with the aim of 
answering the identified research questions. 
The following research hypotheses were formulated to determine the parameters of the 
research questions: 
(i) The main risks facing Islamic banks are reputational risk, Shari’ah non-compliance 
risk, asset-liability management risk, liquidity risk, and concentration risk. 
(ii) Islamic bankers prefer mark-up based contracts and shy away from profit sharing 
contracts. 
(iii) Profit-sharing contracts are perceived as more risky than mark-up based contracts. 
(iv) There is no substantial difference between risk management in Islamic banking and 
conventional banking. 
(v) Capital requirements levels should be lower in IFIs than in conventional banks. 
(vi) Basel II was drafted with conventional banking very much in mind. IFIs should 
follow their own standards, e.g. IFSB Principles on capital adequacy. 
(vii) Islamic banking is more resilient to economic shocks than conventional banking but 
not recession proof. 
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(viii) Not many Islamic banks use the more technically advanced risk measurement and 
reporting techniques. 
(ix) The use of risk measurement techniques is less advanced among Islamic banks than 
among their conventional peers. 
(x) Islamic banks use a number of risk mitigation tools that are intended to be Shari’ah-
compliant and that are less advanced from those utilised by conventional banks. 
(xi) Most IFIs abandoned conservative risk management Shari’ah principles in favour of 
copying conventional structures. 
(xii) There is strong potential for Islamic banking provided that it goes back to its roots.  
(xiii) Perceptions of Islamic and conventional bankers differ significantly, as Islamic 
bankers are more biased towards their business model, and vice versa. 
The above hypotheses are further broken down into more refined sub-hypotheses for 
testing purposes later in this research; these are presented in the research methodology 
chapter (Chapter 6). 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This paper has a particular significance as it attempts to provide a complete overview of 
risk management in Islamic banking. This makes it a valuable source for both 
conventional and Islamic investors, as well as for IFI, researchers, consultants, and 
policy-makers who are faced with an increasing complexity of Islamic instruments. Risk 
management is getting more attention all over the world due to the subprime crisis, and 
for most IFIs, risk management presents specific challenges.  
 
The existing body of knowledge demonstrates that research on risk management in 
Islamic banking is still scarce. Globally there has been a significant increase in the 
literature on risk management over the past decade, especially during the past two years. 
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This has emerged largely because of a combination of developments: first, there has been 
greater refection on risk mitigation and management in the wake of frequent episodes of 
financial crises; second, financial diversification and product innovation have brought 
new dimensions and types of risks to the forefront; third, the endeavours of the financial 
community to develop and innovate financial architecture have resulted in different types 
of risk facing financial institutions. Cross-segment mergers, acquisitions, and financial 
consolidation have blurred the risk of various segments in the industry. However, these 
developments have revolved around the conventional banking system, benefiting 
incrementally from the financial engineering and innovation of esoteric products and 
structures. While Islamic banking has grown substantively in the last few years, 
appreciation of its risk architecture and profile is still evolving (Greuning and Iqbal, 
2008). 
Reflecting the increased role of Islamic finance, the literature on Islamic banking has also 
grown in the last decade. There is now a considerable amount of research on the topic of 
Islamic banking and finance; nevertheless there are still large gaps in the coverage of 
topics related to risk management. A large part of the literature focuses on Islamic 
finance contracts, structures, roots of Islamic finance, comparisons of the instruments 
used in Islamic and conventional banking, and the regulatory and supervisory challenges 
related to Islamic banking. This is expected because the initial focus of the whole Islamic 
finance industry was to create awareness of perception of Islamic finance and its basic 
concepts among a riba-dominated financial world. Nevertheless, the last few years have 
witnessed a shift of focus in the literature on Islamic banking towards more specialised 
areas like capital markets, mergers and acquisitions, asset management, sukuk, structuring 
and product development, innovation, and standardisation. There is, however, relatively 
little research conducted on the risk management and capital requirements for Islamic 
banking; this includes studies by Haron and Hin Hock (2007), Iqbal and Mirarkor (2007), 
Akkizidis and Khandelwal (2007), Grais and Kulathunga (2007), Greuning and Iqbal 
(2007), Mahlknecht, M. (2009), and Sundararajan (2007), and others as explored in 
Chapter 3.  
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Given the lack of sufficient research about risk management in Islamic banking, there is 
even less empirical research available in this vital area. A limited number of papers 
discuss risks in Islamic financial institutions, but they do so in academic terms instead of 
pragmatic analysis of data. On the other hand, empirical papers on Islamic banks focus on 
issues related to efficiency and financial stability, such as Yudistira (2004), Moktar et al., 
(2006), Heiko and Cihak (2008). But risk management in Islamic banking has not been 
thoroughly analysed in an empirical fashion, with the exception of only a handful of 
sources like the profound work done by Khan and Ahmed (2001), Noraini et al. (2009), 
and Mahlknecht (2009).  
In addition, the previous studies on risk management in Islamic banking only highlight 
the issues without offering any feasible solutions. Therefore this paper is considered as 
distinct and departs from previous studies by offering practical and feasible 
recommendations to improve risk management architectures within Islamic banking. 
Moreover, this study provides a larger sample size within the wider populations in the 
Islamic banking industry, and includes a very well diversified sample of respondents 
(geographically, by background, nature of activities of their organisations, as well as 
other control variables) in order to enable the researcher to obtain better findings by 
conducting significance tests on the differences between various groups. The survey 
findings are further enhanced by in-depth interviews with senior Islamic banking 
professionals, which allow more room for interviewees to express their views in a less 
formal and more open way than in the structured questionnaire. The interview sample is 
also well diversified. 
Finally, while a few scholars have researched the practical implementation of risk 
management in Islamic banking, this paper is the first of its kind to do so after the recent 
credit crisis. The dissertation extracts empirical evidence from the perceptions of Islamic 
banking professionals and from the current crisis to substantiate the research process and 
the findings of the research.  
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1.6 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In responding to the research questions outlined above, this paper undertakes a 
combination of two research methods: firstly, a comprehensive review of the existing 
literature and theory, and secondly an empirical study to elicit the opinions and 
perceptions in responding to the theory which is discussed in the literature. Both 
quantitative and qualitative data analyses are used for this part. 
In the first part of the research, the theoretical framework of this study was constructed 
through the literature review, which is presented in a series of chapters. The main 
literature sources were journals, conference proceedings, books, reports, theses, and bank 
regulators‟ papers. Due to the fact that literature on risk management in Islamic banking 
is scant, information and quotations from interviews are used in the literature review to 
substantiate the argument. This may not be according to convention; however, this 
strategy helped to provide a better understanding by combining primary and secondary 
material on the subject matter together. 
The second part of the thesis is concerned with an empirical study, which investigates the 
respondents‟ perceptions towards risk management issues in Islamic banking. A survey 
technique using questionnaires is used in this context to obtain primary data from the 
target sample of bankers, financiers, and Shari’ah scholars. The data was analysed using 
SPSS statistical software. In addition, semi-structured interviews are used to substantiate 
and compare the questionnaire findings. The detailed description of the research process 
is presented in Chapter 6. 
1.7 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
This study consists of two major sections, namely background and empirical work. The 
first five chapters are the foundational chapters for the next five chapters, which form the 
empirical part of the thesis. 
Following this brief introduction, the thesis continues with the remaining ten chapters, 
which are closely interrelated. There is unavoidably some overlapping of discussion and 
cross-referencing. The overview of Chapters 2 to 11 is as follows: 
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Chapter 2 (Principles of Islamic Banking and Finance) is the first chapter that reviews 
the existing literature, text and other relevant reference materials. In order to understand 
the risks that Islamic financial institutions face, this chapter first briefly discusses the 
nature of these institutions with the objective of providing an introduction to Islamic 
banking and its instruments, which it is not intended to provide a detailed description of 
how Islamic financial products are structured. This chapter is divided into three sections: 
the first explains the basic tenets of Islamic finance and the most commonly used terms 
and contracts, the second discusses the important financial instruments available and the 
market size, and the third looks at the international standardisation bodies. 
Chapter 3 (Risk Management in Islamic Banks: A Theoretical Perspective) 
commences with an overview of risk management in general. After defining and 
identifying different risks, specific issues related to risk management and mitigation in 
Islamic banking are discussed. Risks are classified into two main categories: risks which 
Islamic banks have in common with traditional banks as financial intermediaries, and 
risks which are unique to Islamic banks due to their compliance with the Shari’ah 
principles. The risk characteristics of Islamic products and the complexities of some of 
these are rigorously examined. This chapter is based on both academic desk research and 
practical views form the open interviews conducted. 
As for Chapter 4 (Capital Adequacy for Islamic Banks: A Survey), realizing the 
significance of capital in today‟s Basel-dominated era, a designated chapter is allocated to 
analysing capital adequacy for Islamic banks. This chapter examines the need for capital 
and provides the rational and historical background of the Basel I, II and III frameworks. 
It then highlights the detailed analysis of credit, market, and operational risks that has 
been given by the Basel II Accord. Proposed amendments to the Accord after the current 
crisis and the proposed Basel III standards are discussed. The chapter then examines the 
applicability of the three Pillars of Basel II to Islamic banking. The chapter also signifies 
the link between the role of social responsibility of Islamic finance and market disclosure. 
This chapter further identifies the key role the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) 
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plays in the development of standards for risk management in the Islamic financial 
industry. 
Chapter 5 focuses on Islamic Banking and the Financial Crisis. In theory, Islamic 
banks are more resilient to economic shocks than conventional banks. Sadly, close 
mimicry of western products in the pursuit of easy profits caused Islamic banking to 
divert from the basic principles laid down more than 1400 years ago. Hence, Islamic 
banks are currently feeling the effects of the recession despite their limited exposure to 
higher risk financial products. The current crisis acts as a wake-up call; if Islamic banks 
learn the right lessons, they could bounce back strongly. This chapter combines evidence 
from the current crisis with the principles discussed in the previous chapters to prove that 
the Islamic financial system, specifically with its different approach to risk, can act as 
panacea for economic woes. 
Chapter 6 (Research Framework and Methodology) discusses the research strategy 
and methodology adopted for the data collection process. It presents in great detail the 
recommended research procedures by making reference to the various research 
methodology textbooks on the appropriate research process and technique to be used. The 
rationale and justifications for each of the tools and techniques used throughout this study 
are also presented. In addition, the chapter also presents more closely the refined research 
sub-hypothesis which is to be tested in the analysis chapter. 
Chapter 7 (Profiling Perspectives on Risk Dimensions in Islamic Finance: 
Descriptive Questionnaire Data Analysis) takes the research to the market place by 
analysing data and presenting the results from a survey on risk management issues in 
Islamic financial institutions. It includes a demographic profile analysis and also the core 
variables for the research. The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview analysis of 
the findings from the survey. The descriptive analysis benefited from a frequency 
analysis, which also includes the frequency percentage, mean, and standard deviations 
value for each of the variables; this provides the readers with the grounding knowledge of 
the overall results.  
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Chapter 8 (Analysing Perceptions on Risk and Risk Management Dimensions and 
Issues Inferential Statistical Analysis) presents further analysis of the views and risk 
perceptions of respondents using inferential statistical tools such as Kruskal-Wallis test, 
factor analysis, MANOVA multivariate analysis of variance, and Chi-square tests. The 
results of the analysis are discussed, interpreted and justified in great detail. The aim is to 
explore the results in as much detail as possible from the data in order to respond to the 
research questions.  
Chapter 9 (Exploring the Perceptions on Risk and Risk Management Practices in 
Islamic Banking: Interview Data Analysis) is an analysis of the semi-structured 
interviews conducted with a number of Islamic banking professionals from banking 
institutions, consulting and law firms, academia, and rating agencies. Focused coding 
technique is used to analyse and sort the findings. This chapter represents the findings of 
the qualitative analysis. 
Chapter 10 (Contextualising the Findings: An Interpretative Discussion) presents the 
overall discussion of the findings in chapters 7, 8, and 9 by responding to each of the 
research hypotheses. The chapter provides an in-depth discussion of each of the 
hypotheses, and also makes cross-references to the theory and findings of previous 
studies in order to link all the pertinent main findings in this study together. The outcome 
of this chapter helps to derive the overall conclusions of the study. 
Being the last chapter, Chapter 11 (Conclusion and Research Recommendations) 
presents a summary of the major findings, recommendations, limitations, and offers 
suggestions for future research.  
To give a visual dimension to the structure of this research, Figure 1.1 provides an overall 
picture of the structure of the study: 
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Figure 1.1: Contents and Structure of the Thesis 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Until the global credit crunch hit the capital and financial markets in the middle of 2008, 
Islamic finance had enjoyed uninterrupted growth since the start of the decade to become 
an industry with about USD 1 trillion in assets (Moody‟s, 2011a). In terms of the size of 
the world‟s finance industry as a whole though, this is still very small, with less than a 
1% share; but with nearly 25% of the world‟s population being Muslim, it is obvious that 
the potential for growth is enormous (Eedle, 2009). The global potential market for 
Islamic finance is conservatively estimated at USD 4 trillion, whereas the actual size of 
the market is USD 1 trillion, or a market share of 25%, which means that there is still 
around 75% of the market to capture (Moody‟s, 2011a). 
 
Despite being presented as a new phenomenon, Islamic finance has been practiced since 
the Middle Ages. It has risen in prominence over the last 30 years. This is largely due to 
the growing financial resources of oil producing countries where Islam is the main 
religion, an increase in wealth and financial sophistication, and an increasing demand for 
financial services. In recent times, the emerging Islamic banking sector has achieved 
acceptance in the western world where there is an increasing interest in ethical finance, 
and funds managed by Islamic institutions continue to grow. 
 
In order to understand the risks that Islamic banks face, this chapter first discusses the 
nature of Islamic banking. It also provides a brief introduction to Islamic banking and its 
basic contracts, defines default in Islamic finance, and distinguishes the elements of an 
Islamic bank‟s risk profile that need to be evaluated differently as compared to 
conventional banking. As an initial foundational chapter, it paves the way to the 
following chapters analysing risk management in Islamic banking. This chapter, however, 
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is not designed to provide a detailed history of the origins and evolution of the industry, 
nor an in-depth analysis of how Islamic financial products are structured. 
 
2.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE 
 
In western and central Europe, modern financial institutions in both banking and 
insurance started to evolve during the 17th century, notably in Britain, prompted, as a 
response to the development of capitalism, and in part due to the development of 
mathematical techniques in finance. The industrial revolution in the late 18th and early 
19th centuries provided the basis for their further growth. With the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire, Britain and France established settlements in a number of Arab 
countries that had formerly been part of it, and western-style financial institutions were 
introduced. In the absence of Islamic financial institutions, those in need of financial 
services in these countries turned to the western-style or conventional banks and 
insurance companies, without paying too much attention to their non-compliance with 
Shari’ah rules and principles. In the case of savings, an alternative was simply to hold 
them in the form of cash (AbdelKarim and Archer, 2005). 
 
This institutionally passive financial behaviour began to change in the 1950s and 1960s 
after these countries achieved political independence, which also brought the 
development of Muslim identity to the agenda. In fact, the initiation of modern Islamic 
finance dates back to 1962 with the establishment of Tabung Haji in Malaysia, and the 
Mit Ghamr bank in Egypt in 1963 (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). However, the 
institutionalization of Islamic banking was not achieved until the 1970s, when a global 
network of Islamic banks started to emerge.  
 
In the post-independence period, changes took place in the political climate of most 
Muslim nations and many Arab oil-exporting countries which experienced a tremendous 
economic growth following the 1973 sharp rise in oil prices. Most of the earnings from 
the sale of crude oil were surplus to the immediate needs of these countries, leading to an 
increase in the circulated currency and commercial activity. This increased wealth gave 
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rise to a major need for financial intermediation for investment of the petro-dollars, 
mainly outside the Middle Eastern and Muslim countries, which had limited capacity to 
absorb such a volume of investment. The situation constituted a major impetus for the 
development of Islamic banking institutions (AbdelKarim and Archer, 2005). This 
coincided with the growth in Muslim identity construction which emerged from religious 
passion in several Muslim countries, calling for reform and for a return to basic Islamic 
principles. Recent examples of such a Muslim identity search through various Islamic 
movements include Egypt, Iran, Syria, Sudan, Algeria, Jordan, and Palestine. In line with 
the Muslim identity search, the substantial Muslim populations increasingly sought to 
direct their financial surpluses and businesses into Shari’ah-compliant or Islamic banks 
and financial institutions (Lewis and Algaoud, 2001). Thus, although the principles of 
Islamic finance have had its roots in the Holy Qur’an for the last 1400 years, modern 
Islamic banking only emerged in the 1970s. 
 
Islamic banking grew rapidly throughout the 1990s, and during the past few years there 
have been significant developments in the world of Islamic banking and finance (IBF). 
As a result, the industry has evolved from a regional business into one of global scale. As 
part of this process, Islamic and Western financial institutions (such as HSBC, BNP-
Paribas, Citibank, Standard Chartered Bank, etc.) have focused their attention on the 
growing customer demand for Shari’ah-compliant financing, investments, and insurance 
products. It is a fact that international banks and other service providers are aware of the 
significant liquidity available in the Middle East. The choice of Shari’ah-compliant 
investments has also broadened and includes structured products, mutual funds, direct 
investments in initial public offerings, leasing and real estate projects, discretionary 
portfolios, and alternative investment strategies like hedge funds, private equity, venture 
capital and Islamic insurance (Takaful). Development in consumer financing has been 
unprecedented as well, and consumer financing products today include Islamic 
mortgages, credit cards, car finance, personal loans, and lease finance. 
 
Islamic banking, today, is viewed as one of the fastest growing segments of the Islamic 
financial industry. It has experienced double-digit growth, spurred by the licensing of 
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new banks, largely in local markets, the establishment of Islamic windows and 
subsidiaries by major international banks, and partial or full conversion of conventional 
banks into Islamic banks. Table 2.1 summarizes the considerable progress that has been 
made in almost all aspects of Islamic finance over the past three decades. 
 
Table 2.1: Modern History of Developments in Islamic Finance  
 
Time Period Development 
Pre-1950s  Barclays Bank opens its Cairo branch to process financial transactions 
related to construction of the Suez Canal in the 1890s. Islamic scholars 
challenge the operations of the bank, criticizing it for charging interest. 
This criticism spreads to other Arab regions and to the Indian 
subcontinent, where there is a sizable Muslim community. 
 The majority of Shari’ah scholars declare that interest in all its forms 
amounts to the prohibited element of riba. 
1950s – 60s  Initial theoretical work in Islamic economics begins. By 1953, Islamic 
economists offer the first description of an interest-free bank based on 
either two-tier mudarabah or wakala. 
 Mitghamr Bank in Egypt and Pilgrimage Fund in Malaysia start 
operations. 
1970s  The first Islamic commercial bank, Dubai Islamic Bank, opens in 1974. 
 The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) is established in 1975. 
 The accumulation of oil revenues and petrodollars increases the demand 
for Shari’ah-compliant products. 
1980s  The Islamic Research and Training Institute is established by the IDB in 
1981. 
 Banking systems are converted to an interest-free banking system in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan. 
 Increased demand attracts Western intermediation and institutions. 
 Countries like Bahrain and Malaysia promote Islamic banking parallel to 
the conventional banking system.  
1990s  Attention is paid to the need for accounting standards and a regulatory 
framework. A self-regulating agency, the Accounting and Auditing 
Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions, is established in Bahrain. 
 Islamic insurance (Takaful) is introduced. 
 Islamic equity funds are established. 
 The Dow Jones Islamic Index and the FTSE Index of Shari’ah-compatible 
stock are developed. 
2000 – the present  The Islamic Financial Services Board is established to deal with regulatory 
supervisory and corporate governance issues of the Islamic financial 
industry.  
 Sukuk are launched. 
 Islamic mortgages are offered in the United States and United Kingdom. 
 
Source: Greuning and Iqbal (2008: 13) 
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With the internationalization of Islamic finance, further progress was made in developing 
capital markets. The pace of product innovation has increased, and Islamic banking is 
currently the fastest growing segment of the credit market in Muslim countries. Recently 
IFIs have started moving towards equity funds, sukuk funds, advanced treasury services, 
balance sheet management, and innovative asset management.  
 
Of notice is the recent rash of new Islamic bank start-ups, even during the current market 
turbulence. In fact, there are many reasons why new IFIs have been mushrooming across 
the board as provided by Moody‟s (2009a): 
(i) Microeconomic theory informs that a booming and profitable market naturally attracts 
new entrants because excess demand needs to meet by additional supply; the Islamic 
finance market is driven by demand;  
(ii) Financing needs in the retail sector are far from being optimally served by the 
banking industry, especially in the Arab countries of the Muslim universe: retail banking 
in the Middle East was discovered in the 1990s and there is still a lot to do, especially in 
the mortgage sub-sector, where IFIs can offer attractive solutions;  
(iii) Governments have been very supportive of the Islamic financial industry, mainly for 
two reasons: one is symbolic and consists of sponsoring one or more institutions to show 
some form of state proselytism, and the other is purely economic, as IFIs are a powerful 
means to fund large infrastructure needs. Asset-backed, infrastructure, and project finance 
is naturally in line with the principle of Islamic finance, just like mortgage lending.  
 
As part of the developments, conventional banks that have been offering Shari’ah-
compliant products for years through Islamic windows in Asia, especially in Malaysia, 
are now establishing specialised Islamic subsidiaries. This provides more visibility and 
clarity to the whole banking market, while contributing to the doubtless success of 
Islamic finance in the country, following more than two decades of government support 
to such an alternative financial model now controlling more than 15% of the country‟s 
banking assets (Moody‟s 2009a). 
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2.3 SIZE OF THE INDUSTRY 
 
One of the most visible gaps in the infrastructure of the Islamic financial services 
industry is the limited availability of systematic and reliable statistical information (IFSB, 
2007). Most resources like Standard & Poor‟s (2010a), Bloomberg, and Oliver Wyman 
(2009) agreed that Islamic finance represents 1% of global assets. These resources 
suggest that half of the 1.4 billion Muslims worldwide would opt for Islamic finance if 
given a competitive alternative to conventional services indicating economies of scope 
and scale for the development of Islamic finance industry. 
 
According to Moody‟s (2011a), the Islamic finance market has been growing at over 30% 
annually since 2000 and is set for continued strong growth. At the end of 2010, Islamic 
finance totalled USD 1 trillion in assets and USD 53 billion in revenues, and is expected 
to double over the next five years. The opportunity is commanding attention beyond 
Islamic incumbents, as witnessed by the spurt in Islamic start-ups and conventional 
players opening Islamic windows. Due to such impressive developments, interest in 
Islamic finance has spread beyond Muslim countries, and leading financial centres like 
London have been pushing to position themselves as major Islamic finance hubs. 
 
In recent years, the growth of Islamic banking assets has outstripped that of conventional 
banking assets, even given the rapid system-wide asset growth. According to Standard & 
Poor‟s (2009), conventional banking assets nearly tripled between 2003 and 2008, while 
Islamic banking assets have been multiplied by seven, albeit starting from a much lower 
base. Demand for Islamic banking products has increased not only from retail customers, 
deemed the most interested in Shari’ah- compliant products, but also from private sector 
corporate and government-related entities. At the same time, financial innovation has 
contributed to facilitating the supply of financial products and services, from retail 
products, like housing or car financing programs, to more sophisticated products like 
sukuk or mutual funds. On the supply side, some banks have opted to be converted from 
conventional to Islamic banking, either through a full transformation or following a 
business diversification strategy. In fact, the most dynamic growth in Islamic banking 
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comes from conventional banks. It appears that they have enlarged or transformed their 
product suite to attract new customers or avoid losing existing ones. In addition, several 
governments of non-Muslim countries, in particular the UK, have announced plans to 
issue sukuk in the past, but issues have yet to materialize. 
 
That said, 2012 is expected to be a difficult year for the Islamic finance industry. The sort 
of asset growth witnessed prior to the financial crisis in 2007 and even in 2008, of around 
25%, will not be repeated during the coming few years. Experts expect that during 2012 
and 2013 the industry will grow by only 10%-15% (Moody‟s, 2011a). As part of this 
slow-down, liquidity ratios of Islamic banks are deteriorating, because banks are using 
their own excess liquidity accumulated in the past to fund their incremental business 
volumes. The developments demonstrate that funding is becoming increasingly costly; 
retail depositors are more cautious and savvy corporate depositors are asking for better 
returns to compensate for their perception of mounting credit risk. On the other side of 
the balance sheet, defaults of corporate and retail borrowers are expected to rise sharply, 
which will trigger more conservative credit policies, lower credit volumes, and more 
provisioning charges. Asset classes like real estate, sukuk, equity, and private equity are 
expected to under-perform relative to historical returns.  
 
As Figure 2.1 shows, the GCC and Iran are the largest markets for IBF. They account for 
80% of global Islamic finance assets but only comprise 6% of the global Muslim 
population. Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Nepal) are also major markets, while North Africa has a big potential to grow. In 
addition, as depicted by Table 2.2, IFSB (2007) estimates the total size of the Islamic 
finance industry based on various Islamic finance sub-sectors, each of which indicates 
rather large growth potential. 
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Figure 2.1: Muslim Population, Islamic Finance Assets, Revenues, and Profit Pool 
Breakdown by Region 
 
 
 
Source: Oliver Wyman (2009: 5) 
 
 
Table 2.2: Potential Size of the Islamic Finance Industry 
 
Source: IFSB (2007: 10) 
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2.4 PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE 
 
After providing a general introduction on the developments and trends in Islamic finance 
industry, it is essential to present the foundational principles of IBF. These principles can 
be summarized by five core rules, three being prohibition-related principles and two 
being positive measures (KPMG, 2006):  
 
(i) The prohibition of interest (riba)  
No financial transaction should be based on the payment or receipt of interest; hence, 
fixed return is prohibited in the Islamic tradition. Therefore, profit from indebtedness or 
the trading of debts is seen to be unethical. Instead, the investor and investee should share 
in the risks and profits generated from a venture, an asset or a project.  
(ii) The prohibition of uncertainty (gharar)  
Uncertainty in terms of a financial contract is considered unlawful, but not risk per se. 
Consequently, speculation (maysir) is forbidden. Therefore, financial derivatives are 
usually not permissible under Shari’ah-compliant finance despite the possible application 
for risk mitigation or risk transfer.  
(iii) The prohibition of unlawful (haram) assets  
No financial transaction should be directed towards economic and financial sectors 
considered unlawful according to the Shari’ah, such as the arms dealing, tobacco or 
gambling industries, as well as all enterprises for which financial leverage (indebtedness) 
would be deemed excessive (including conventional banks).  
(iv) The Profit-and-Loss Sharing (PLS) obligation  
The original concept of Islamic financing is in favour of equity participation. Parties to 
equity-based financial contracts should share in the risks and rewards derived from such 
financing or investment transactions. PLS converts the relationship from borrower and 
lender to partners. 
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(v) The asset-backing obligation  
Any financial transaction should be based on a tangible, identifiable underlying asset. 
Thus, Islamic teaching encourages financing economic activity through asset-based 
mechanisms as opposed to the financialisation of the economy.  
 
2.5 BASIC ISLAMIC FINANCING CONTRACTS 
 
Based on the identified principles in the previous section, over the many years a number 
of financial contracts have been developed and used within the Muslim societies as 
Shari’ah-compliant contracts. However, in recent years, with the financial developments 
in IBF, new products have also been engineered. Figure 2.2, hence, presents a brief 
overview of main Islamic financial instruments, while it is not the intention of this section 
to explain those contracts in details but rather to briefly explain the basic foundations.  
 
Figure 2.2: Overview of Islamic Financial Instruments 
Debt-Based Contracts   Fee-Based Contracts   Participatory Contracts 
Customer undertakes a debt 
obligation to the bank 
backed by an asset e.g. 
  Bank charges a fixed fee in 
exchange for a service 
provided to the customer 
e.g.  
  Bank and customer co-invest in 
a partnership agreement e.g. 
- Murabahah   - Wakala   - Mudarabah 
- Salam   - Ijara   - Musharakah  
- Istisna’a   -    - Diminishing Mushraka 
 
Source: Oliver Wyman (2009) 
 
 
Most contracts in Islamic banking are primarily based on (or are a combination of) the 
instruments identified in Figure 2.2.: 
 
2.5.1 Murabahah 
 
According to murabahah contracts, one party (the seller) purchases commodities from a 
supplier and sells the commodities to the other (the buyer) at an agreed mark-up price. 
The profit generated by the on-sale is derived as a profit resulting from a sale and is not 
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treated as interest. Accordingly, buyers requiring cash will immediately sell the 
commodities in the market to generate cash. Murabahah is also commonly known as 
„cost-plus financing‟ or „mark-up‟.  
 
The term Murabahah contracts refers to a cost-plus transaction in which a bank purchases 
a tangible asset required by a customer, and then re-sells it to the customer at a pre-
determined profit. It involves three parties: the purchaser/importer, the seller/exporter, 
and the financier. The Islamic financier provides finance by purchasing the desired 
commodity from a third party and reselling it to the purchaser at a predetermined higher 
price (mark-up), payable in installments (Sundararajan and Errico, 2002). The key is that 
the financier must have a title to the goods at some point in the transaction. 
 
To date, commodity murabahah has been the backbone of IBF; it is a vital product in 
Islamic finance, and it has been intensively used by Islamic financial institutions for 
money market transactions, investment, and retail activities. While no accurate figures 
exist about commodity murabahah volumes, industry experts estimate that at least USD 3 
billion worth of commodities are traded daily off exchange of the LME (OTC Contacts). 
This figure is likely to increase with the mounting interest in Islamic finance (Moore, 
2009). 
 
Commodity murabahah has been heavily used as a mechanism for cash generation; some 
refer to the transaction as „tawarruq’, which lexically means „generating cash‟ in Arabic. 
However, this is not the purpose murabahah was initially designed for. Shari’ah scholars 
are not pleased with this practice (pure tawarruq). They are pushing more towards 
genuine murabahah through which the bank buys the actual commodity (being a car, 
furniture, appliances, etc.) and resells it back to the customer at a cost plus margin 
(Consumer Finance).  
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2.5.2 Mudarabah (profit-sharing agreement) 
 
Mudarabah as an Islamic finance instrument is arranged between a bank (acting as a 
silent partner) and one or more entrepreneurs. The bank provides the entrepreneur with 
the funding for a specific commercial activity. However, the entrepreneur does not 
contribute any funding himself, but contributes management expertise. The entrepreneur 
earns an agreed portion of the profits („management fee‟ or „mudarib fee‟). In turn, the 
financial institution is guaranteed a percentage of the profits (agreed upon beforehand) 
and assumes all of the risk in terms of financial loss. This is accompanied by considerable 
risk, and therefore the financial institution involved performs careful risk and credit 
analysis. On the whole, mudarabah transactions account for less than 10% of world-wide 
Islamic banking operations; it  is similar to a Western-style limited partnership, with one 
party contributing capital while the other runs the business, and profit is distributed based 
on a negotiated percentage of ownership. Many banks use mudarabah to mobilize funds 
through savings and investment accounts (Usmani, 2002).  
 
2.5.3 Musharakah (equity participation)  
 
Musharakah as an essential IBF instrument involves a partnership between the bank and 
the entrepreneur: both contribute to the capital of the enterprise. An equity financing 
arrangement is widely regarded as the purest form of Islamic financing, where partners 
contribute capital to a project and share in both its risks and rewards. In a musharakah 
contract, a formal contract is normally in place, outlining the obligations and rights of 
both parties: profits can be allocated in any pre-agreed ratio, and losses are borne in 
proportion to the capital of each partner (Sundararajan and Errico, 2002). Musharakah 
conforms to the principle of profit and loss sharing and it is suitable for long-term project 
financing; hence it is considered to be the purest form of Islamic finance. 
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2.5.4 Ijarah and Ijarah wa-Iqtinah 
 
Ijarah and ijarah wa-iqtinah are Islamic leasing concepts similar to western operating 
and financial leases. Ijarah is similar to a conventional operating lease whereby an 
Islamic bank (lessor) leases the asset to a client (lessee) for agreed upon payments and 
period of time, but with no option of ownership for the lessee. The lessor takes the 
responsibility of maintaining and insuring the asset.  
 
Ijarha wa-Iqtinah, on the other hand, is comparable to financial/capital lease where the 
lessee has the option of owning the asset at the termination of the lease (Akkizidis and 
Khandelwal, 2007). The conditions governing both types of leasing are that assets must 
have a long secure productive life, and lease payments must be agreed on in advance to 
avoid any speculation. The price of the purchase of the asset at the end of the contract 
period cannot be predetermined, and can only be determined when the lease contract is 
terminated. 
 
Under Islamic leasing the lessee should start making lease payments only after the leased 
asset has actually been delivered. If that asset were destroyed, the lessee would cease 
making payments to the lessor, a contrary practice to most western lease financing. 
 
2.5.5 Istisna’a  
 
Istisna’a as a concept offers a number of future structuring possibilities used mostly to 
finance long-term large-scale facilities. It is basically a contractual agreement whereby a 
party undertakes to produce a specific thing according to certain agreed-upon 
specifications at a determined price and for a fixed date of delivery. This undertaking of 
production includes any process of manufacturing, construction, assembling, or 
packaging. In istisna’a, the work is not conditioned to be accomplished by the 
undertaking party and this work or part of it can be done by others under his control and 
responsibility. The price may be paid in advance or in installments, according to the 
preference of the parties (Iqbal and Llewellyn, 2002). Istisna’a is thus a certain form of a 
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futures market which enables an entrepreneur to sell his output to the bank at a pre-
determined price. It is a profit-mark-up contract similar to a murabahah; however, the 
istisna’a deal can be referred to something not in existence at the time of signing the 
contract, while murabahah is an order to buy commodities which are in existence in hand 
or possible to be found in the market.  
 
2.5.6 Wakala 
 
Wakala is a financial relationship between principal and agent. The contract of wakala 
means designating a person or legal entity to act on one‟s behalf or as one‟s 
representative. It has been a common practice to appoint an agent (wakil) to facilitate the 
trade operations.  
 
A wakala contract gives a power of attorney or an agency assignment to financial 
intermediary to perform a certain task. On the surface, there does not appear to be much 
difference between a mudarabah and a wakala contract, since both are principal-agent 
contracts. However, the main difference is that in case of mudarabah, the mudarib has 
full control and freedom to utilize funds according to his professional knowledge, as 
opposed to the case of wakala where the wakil does not have similar freedom (Siddiqi, 
1983). A wakil acts only as a representative to execute a particular task according to the 
instructions given. Recently, more banks have been using walaka for money market 
transactions to replace the commodity murabahah, which involve more complications 
and raise Shari’ah concerns when used for generating cash (tawarruq) as previously 
discussed. An Islamic bank can accept or place wakala, whereas a conventional bank can 
only use wakala placements to deposit with an Islamic counterparty.  
 
2.5.7 Bai’ Salam 
 
Salam is also known as „forward sale‟. It was originally allowed to meet the needs of 
small farmers who needed money during the harvesting period to meet expenses. In this 
transaction the bank pays the seller in advance the full-agreed price of a specified quality 
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and quantity of a commodity that the latter promises to deliver in the future. The price has 
to be paid all in advance.  
 
This form of finance is similar to forward purchase, and it has been applied in the case of 
agricultural products as their seasonality signifies the need for such finance. It should be 
noted that salam exposes banks to market risk, especially fluctuations in the commodity 
prices. To avoid this, modern bankers are using the „parallel salam’, where a bank enters 
into two simultaneous agreements for the same future date, one as a buyer and the other 
as a seller; this takes care of commodity price fluctuations to a certain extent, but still 
requires managing the risks from the non-delivery of the commodity on the due date 
(Usmani, 2002). 
 
2.5.8. Other Islamic Financial Products 
 
Other than the main Islamic finance contracts discussed above, there are several variants 
of different instruments available in the market. Some of the popular ones are briefly 
described below. However, sukuk as a financial instrument is discussed in detailed in the 
following section. 
 
(i) Hibah  
Hibah is a form of gift used to repay account holders in an Islamic bank. Current 
accounts and savings account holders in an Islamic bank do not get any interest, however, 
at the end of the year the bank, at its discretion, banks can give some hibah as a part of its 
compensation to the account holders (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007). 
 
(ii) Musawama 
Musawama is very similar to murabahah, except that the seller does not need to disclose 
his cost of goods (Moody‟s, 2009a).  
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(iii) Qard Hassan 
Qard hassan is a loan on a goodwill basis which is totally free of any extra cost. The 
debtor is required to return only the principal borrowed amount, although he may return 
anything extra, whatever he feels appropriate. This is a true riba-free loan (Usmani, 
2002). 
 
(iv) Wadiah 
In the case of wadiah, the bank works as the trustee for funds of customers. However, the 
bank does not guarantee any interest but can give some hibah, which can compensate the 
customers (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007). 
 
2.6 SUKUK: A STEP TOWARDS SECURITIZATION 
 
As an extensively used financial instrument in the recent years, sukuk is not a contract on 
its own, but rather it is a product based on one or more Islamic finance contracts that was 
introduced in order to address the asset/liability dichotomy in Islamic banking. Prior to 
2000, this particular market was virtually non-existent, but in the past few years it has 
experienced tremendous growth as highlighted in section 2.6.3. 
 
2.6.1. What is Sukuk? 
 
Sukuk is an Arabic term meaning „certificate‟. In financial sense, sukuk may be 
understood as a Shari’ah-compliant „bond‟. In its simplest form sukuk represents 
ownership of an asset or its usufruct. The claim embodied in sukuk is not simply a claim 
to cash flow but an ownership claim. This also differentiates sukuk from conventional 
bonds as the latter proceed over interest bearing securities, whereas sukuk are basically 
investment certificates consisting of ownership claims in a pool of assets (Dar Al 
Istithmar, 2006). 
 
Sukuk (plural of word sak) were extensively used by Muslims in the Middle Ages as 
papers representing financial obligations originating from trade and other commercial 
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activities. However, the present structures of sukuk are different from the sukuk originally 
used and are akin to the conventional concept of securitization, a process in which 
ownership of the underlying assets is transferred to a large number of investors through 
certificates representing proportionate value of the relevant assets (Askari et al., 2009). 
 
2.6.2.  Types of Sukuk  
 
Sukuk can be of many types (fourteen eligible sukuk types have been identified by the 
Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI)), 
depending upon the type of Islamic modes of financing and trades used in its structuring 
(Standard & Poor‟s, 2010a). However, the most common category in the market is ijara 
sukuk, which are backed by leases and often guaranteed by sovereign or regional 
governments. Because of the predominance of ijara sukuk, these transactions are 
commonly viewed as the de facto benchmarks in the Islamic marketplace. Ijara sukuk are 
structured around a specific asset, such as a building, property, or infrastructure facility. 
The asset itself is sold to a special-purpose entity that then issues the sukuk to fund the 
asset‟s purchase price. The special-purpose entity then leases the asset and receives 
periodic lease payments. At maturity, or in the event of dissolution, the special-purpose 
entity sells the asset back to the original seller at a predetermined price that includes any 
outstanding amounts still owed under the terms of the ijara sukuk (Standard & Poor‟s, 
2010a). 
 
2.6.3.  Developments in the Sukuk market 
 
Sukuk growth has been a factor in local debt capital market, which was also virtually non-
existent before 2000. Taking advantage of sukuk was a much-needed solution to the 
problem of increasing the Islamic banks‟ funding variety. Sukuk allow Islamic banks to 
allocate excessive funds to alternative classes of instruments; it has, thus, helped them to 
move away from conventional strategies related to equity and property alone. Similarly, 
sukuk varieties have been used by Islamic banks as tools in their investment portfolios to 
hedge against their more volatile credit exposures. 
 
34 
 
After two turbulent years, Standard & Poor‟s (2011) believes the sukuk market is back on 
track. Issuance reached a record high of USD 51.2 billion in 2010, including those issued 
and matured that same year. This represents about 26% of the cumulative amount of 
issuances since 1996 and bests the previous peak in 2007 by 34%. By mid-February 
2011, even those 2010 levels were being given a run for their money, with more than 
USD 16 billion of sukuk already issued since the beginning of the year. In 2011, it is 
expected that the depth and breadth of sukuk issuance will continue to hinge on the extent 
of the global economic recovery. This is notably crucial for the return of corporate sukuk 
issuers, including financial institutions, which fell from an average of about 65% over 
2001-2007 to a mere 12% of issuance in 2010. In geographic terms, the regional 
economic slowdown since mid-2008 has curtailed the financing needs of Gulf issuers. In 
doing so, it has re-centred the sukuk market growth on its historical engine and mainstay, 
Malaysia, which accounted for 78% of sukuk in 2010. Asian markets are expected to 
remain buoyant at least over the medium term (Standard & Poor‟s, 2011). Meanwhile, the 
GCC region is anticipated to catch up, and start to play a larger and more sustainable role 
in the market, particularly with the region‟s need to fund the huge pipeline of government 
projects and long-term events, such as the 2022 World Cup in Qatar. Figure 2.3 depicts 
the developments and trends in the sukuk issuance over the years. 
 
Standard & Poor‟s (2011) do not foresee that non-Muslim countries will change the shape 
of the market over the medium term. During the crisis, Western investors showed a 
marked interest in sukuk, partly because their average yield has been slightly higher than 
that available on a „plain vanilla‟ conventional comparable instrument, owing to their 
structured nature and lower liquidity. However, it is believed that this trend will slow 
down once rates begin to rise, which will increase the average yield of conventional 
bonds. 
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Figure 2.3: Global Sukuk Issuance 1996-2010 
 
 
Source: Standard & Poor‟s (2011) 
 
In addition, Moody‟s (2011a) expect that the complex web of socioeconomic, political, 
and religious issues in many of these non-Muslim countries is holding back any swift 
uptake of sukuk. Instead, it is argued that the market‟s future lies with countries whose 
economies have been less affected by the crisis, namely the GCC and South East Asia. 
The broader global demand for sukuk still depends on increasing their liquidity and 
standardizing Shari’ah interpretation. The developments, however, indicate that the 
market needs leaders to provide vision and direction, to take the domestic and 
compartmentalized initiatives of various countries toward clear international and 
standardized market principles (Standard & Poor‟s, 2011). 
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The market is yet to witness the first convincing and sizable sukuk issuance from a 
European or non-Muslim Asian country since the debut of the five-year €100 million 
German State of Saxony Anhalt sukuk in 2004. The UK, which has been the most likely, 
active, and vocal candidate since its announcement in 2007 of a planned sterling-
denominated sukuk, backtracked in January 2011, citing its lack of value for money. The 
South Korean government, meanwhile, failed in December 2010 to pass an amendment 
that would remove the tax disadvantage of sukuk compared with conventional bonds, but 
it will try again in the near future. The effect of these international setbacks to the sukuk 
may reverberate to other prospective issuers. Most of these non-Muslim countries have 
announced their intention to enter the sukuk market for opportunistic reasons, such as to 
tap the much-coveted liquidity available in the GCC countries or Asia, but it remains 
doubtful that they would do this at any cost (Standard & Poor‟s, 2011). 
 
Furthermore, one of the interviewees in this research, Qaedi (2010), explains that the 
market is now moving toward listed instruments, both in international markets and in 
local markets such as Dubai, Malaysia, or Saudi Arabia. The majority of sukuk to date 
have been issued in the form of over the counter instruments that investment bankers 
developed to fit the specific needs of issuers, and then privately placed to meet the needs 
of investors. Listing sukuk on organized markets is important for the liquidity of the 
instrument itself, and also makes it easier for investors to manage, both in terms of 
liquidity and price discovery. 
 
The main uncertainty within sukuk lies in current market conditions. The default of some 
sukuk has raised questions about this relatively young market. These sukuk were issued 
by East Cameron Partners (ECP), The Investment Dar (TID) and Saad Group. Sukuk 
issued by Nakheel PJSC avoided default thanks to a last-minute support package 
(Moody‟s, 2010b). Once investors have a clearer view of the possible outcome of the two 
recent defaults, the sukuk market is likely to grow more strongly, perhaps after making 
some adjustments reflecting lessons learned. Beyond 2010, a major impediment to the 
emergence of an integrated, global sukuk market remains, with lack of standardization, 
especially regarding Shari’ah compliance and the legal environment. 
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Abdul-Ghani (2009) explains that despite enormous success, the sukuk market is not as 
deep or liquid as a regular bond market. Regardless of growing demand fuelled by banks, 
corporations and governments in the GCC region, there is a shortage of supply. 
Additionally, the sukuk market is still stagnant: holders keep their bonds to maturity and 
there is relatively little secondary market trading. The ability to trade their bond 
portfolios gives banks the flexibility to adjust their asset/liability management process to 
their liking and to hedge themselves against sudden movements in asset prices by 
matching durations on both sides.   
 
So far, IBF institutions have preferred an originate-and-hold business model due to the 
lack of a secondary market for loans and sukuk; however, in the longer term, IBFs with 
limited capital resources might be more inclined to adopt an originate-and-distribute 
business approach, provided disintermediation picks up, market depth and liquidity 
improves, and growth in Islamic assets continues unabated.  
 
As depicted by Figure 2.4, the Malaysian ringgit (MYR) has been the currency of choice 
every year since the inception of the market, with ringgit-denominated sukuk representing 
about 59% of total issuance over the period from 1996 to 2010 or more than twice the 
U.S. dollar-denominated ones. Malaysia has notably funded infrastructure projects with 
ringgit-denominated sukuk, since Islamic investors tend to prefer asset-backed projects. 
But ringgit-denominated issuance is not limited to Malaysian issuers. The National Bank 
of Abu Dhabi issued the equivalent of a combined $325 million in the Malaysian 
currency in June and December 2010 to tap a deeper sukuk market (Standard & Poor‟s, 
2011). U.S. dollar-denominated sukuk made up only about 8% of sukuk issued in 2010. 
This is not expected to change significantly by the end of 2011. Any pickup in dollar-
denominated issuances would likely follow a pickup in the GCC region, which has most 
of its currencies fully or partially pegged to the U.S. dollar. 
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Figure 2.4: Global Sukuk Issuance by Currency 1996-2010 
 
AED - United Arab Emirates dirham, BHD – Bahraini dinar, BND – Bruneian dollar, EUR – euro, GDP – 
British pound, GMD – Gambian dalasi, IDR – Indonesian rupiah, MYR – Malaysian ringgit, PYR – 
Pakistan rupee, QAR – Qatari riyal, SAR – Saudi Arabian riyal, SGD – Singapore dollar, USD – U.S. 
dollar 
Source: Standard & Poor‟s (2011) 
 
While mudarabah, musharakah and ijara are widely applied, the actual legal structure 
behind the sukuk risk characteristics can vary significantly, even within a single „type‟. 
According to Zawya (2011), ijara and murabahah structures accounted for about three-
quarters of total sukuk issued in 2010, and this trend is expected to continue for the next 
few years. The remainder was in the form of istithmar, wakala, musharakah, and salam 
structures. Thus, until there is some broad consensual standardization in sukuk, investors 
will need to look at each structure individually to understand the cash flow, risk and 
return profile, irrespective of the type of sukuk structure used. 
 
Due to the availability of a large variety of sukuk structures in the market, detailed 
discussion of the sukuk is beyond the scope of this research and hence has not been dealt 
with. Chapter 3 looks at sukuk from a risk management perspective, while Chapter 5 
discusses a new phenomenon in sukuk: default.  
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2.7. ISLAMIC BANKING vs. CONVENTIONAL BANKING 
 
The previous sections aimed to provide information regarding the foundational principles 
and salient futures of IBF as well as the developments and trends in the IBF sector. As 
has been mentioned, the overarching principle of Islamic banking is that all forms of 
interest are prohibited. The Islamic financial model works on the basis of risk sharing 
(Mirakhor and Zaidi, 2007), as explained by Khandelwal (FRSGlobal, 2009): “because 
interest is prohibited under Shari’ah law, suppliers of funds become investors instead of 
creditors. The provider of financial capital and the entrepreneur share business risk in 
return for shares of the profits, and this has an impact on risk management”. However, 
using profit-sharing modes in Islamic banks changes the nature of risks these institutions‟ 
face as shown in Figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.5: Risks in Conventional Banks vs. Islamic Banks 
Risk in conventional banks compared to Islamic banks
 
Source: Modified version of FRSGlobal (2009) 
 
Islamic finance is based on the concept of profit- and risk-sharing and avoidance of the 
concept of interest. This means that the finance provider is not automatically entitled to 
payment in full of principal and periodic distributions, but that risk needs to be taken by 
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the finance provider, along with the borrower. This contrasts with the 
conventional/western concept of lending, which results in a number of considerations that 
need to be taken into account when assessing the risk profile of an Islamic bank. 
 
 
Table 2.3 - Differences between Islamic Finance and Conventional Finance 
 
Conventional finance Islamic finance 
Primarily based on interest rate Interest is prohibited 
Facilitate financial activities Facilitate social, economic, and financial 
activities 
Structured and formalized Unstructured and still informal in many ways 
Stress on financial efficiency Stress on social, ethical, and financial 
efficiency 
Restricted moral dimension Strong moral dimension 
Highly systematized in terms of risk 
management, accounting, and other standards 
Standards for risk management, accounting and 
other activities are still developing 
Existing set of legislations to deal with legal 
issues 
Legal support still in development with several 
legal areas under doubt 
Highly developed banking and financial 
product market 
Developing banking and financial product 
market 
Existence of conventional money market Non-existence of significant Islamic money 
market 
Availability of inter-bank funds Non-availability of inter-bank funds 
Strong and developed secondary market for 
securities 
Non-existing secondary market for securities 
Existence of short-term money market Non-existence of short-term money market 
 
Source: Akkizidis and Khandelwal (2007:3) 
 
It is also critical to develop an understanding of the spectrum of the risk and return 
profiles of different Islamic financial instruments. Often the Islamic financial system is 
equated with an all equity-based system, which ignores the fact that the system also has 
several other types of contracts, which are not based on profit-and-loss sharing. Contracts 
such as sales, trade financing, and leasing constitute a large portion of the system, but 
these contracts are not based on equity (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007). The existence of such 
non-equity based instruments has an important implication; these instruments have a 
risk/return profile that is very similar to a conventional fixed-income security. 
 
 
41 
In addition, Islamic banking, despite having been in existence in its modern form for over 
three decades, is still in many respects an infant industry, as depicted in Figure 2.6. 
Islamic banks are striving to build their reputation by exploiting „blind spots‟ in the 
market and by trying to develop competitive advantage. They are in serious rivalry for 
customers‟ loyalty and face high level of uncertainty. Conventional banking, on the other 
hand, is in its maturity stage. The market is dominated by powerful players, and 
entrepreneurial actions continue but are greatly deemphasized. 
 
Figure 2.6: Development Stages of Islamic Banking  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As discussed, the core principles of Islamic finance, especially the PLS characteristic 
have unique risk management implication. In conventional banking, if the payment of 
outstanding commitments is not timely and is not in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of the obligations then default has occurred. However, in Islamic banking, if 
PLS obligations were in fact to absorb losses, this would not in itself be viewed, at least 
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in theory, as a default event, as investors have contractually agreed to share in losses 
(Chowdhury, 2010).  
 
It should be noted that Chapter 3 explores these risk management implications in detail. 
 
2.8. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ISLAMIC BANKING AND 
FINANCE INDUSTRY 
 
The private sector has been much more active than the public sector in the growth of 
Islamic finance, as development in Islamic finance is mainly due to the economic 
liberalization and hence the private sector. However, a number of governments, such as 
those of Bahrain and Malaysia, have made serious efforts to establish financial centres for 
IFIs. An institutional infrastructure to support the development of the financial sector, 
hence, is slowly emerging with the collaboration between the private and public sector. 
Such developments include institutions to deal with accounting and regulatory standards, 
corporate governance, credit ratings, and capital markets. These efforts to develop 
institutions are also supported by several stakeholders such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), central banks of leading Muslim countries, international standard-setting 
bodies, and financial centres (Askari et al., 2009). These institutions are depicted in Table 
2.4 with their functional roles. 
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Table 2.4: Key Institutions in the Islamic Financial Industry  
Acronym Organization Function 
IDB Islamic Development Bank 
 
Member/ sister organizations: 
ICD – Islamic Corporation for the 
development of the Private Sector 
ICIEC – Islamic Corporation for the 
Insurance of Investment and Export 
Credit; Islamic insurance company, 
providing insurance products for 
investments and export credits. 
IRTI – Islamic Research and 
Training Institute; Research and 
training arm 
ITFC – International Islamic Trade 
Finance Corporation 
Solidarity Fund – To reduce poverty 
in OIC countries 
ARCIFI – Arbitration and 
Reconciliation Centre for Islamic 
financial Institutions 
Development institution formed in 1975 
to promote Islamic finance and 
economic development 
 
  
AAOIFI Accounting & Auditing Organisation 
for Islamic Financial Institutions 
Accounting and Shari’ah standard 
setting body 
IFSB Islamic Financial Services Board Standard-setting institution to ensure 
best practices and help member 
countries with regulating Islamic 
financial institutions 
IIFM International Islamic Financial 
Markets 
Trade association to promote capital 
markets 
IIRA Islamic International Rating Agency Rating agency 
LMC Liquidity Management Centre Institution to provide liquidity 
enhancement to the financial system 
CIBAFI General Council of Islamic Banks 
and Financial Institutions 
Trade association of Islamic banks to 
enhance member institutions‟ ability to 
better service customers around the 
world through transparent banking 
practices 
Source: Askari et al. (2009:39) 
 
 
Al-Ghamrawy (2010), one of the interviewees for this research, however stated that 
“there are several fine organizations dedicated to the promotion of Islamic finance across 
various jurisdictions. The problem is that they do not well-co-ordinate with each other.” 
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Figure 2.7 lays out the institutional developments in IBF. The degree of maturity of 
Islamic institutions is much lower compared to conventional system.  However, driven by 
industry research and inspired by international linkages, these institutions are 
continuously evolving. 
 
Figure 2.7: Institutional Developments in Islamic Finance 
 
 
Source: BLME (2009) 
Notes:  The dashed arrow depicts advisory roles, the solid arrow depicts supervisory 
roles. 
 
The main institutions in the institutionalization of IBF are explained in brief as follows: 
 
(i) Islamic Development Bank (IDB) 
The Islamic Development Bank was established in 1975 as a regional development 
institution to promote economic development in Muslim countries through Islamic 
finance. Since its creation, the IDB has established several sister institutions to develop 
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private sector insurance facilities and trade and export financing. Additionally, the IDB 
has played a key role in developing institutional infrastructure to promote Islamic 
financial systems. Some notable contributions of Islamic Development Bank are 
institutions to enhance the regulatory framework and standardization of the Islamic 
banking industry, such as: the AAOIFI; the IFSB, the General Council of Islamic Banks 
and Financial Institutions (GCIBFI); the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM); 
the Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA); the Liquidity Management Center 
(LMC); and the International Islamic Center for Reconciliation and Commercial 
Arbitration (IICRCA) (Askari et al., 2009). 
 
(ii) Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI) 
The IRTI, the research arm of IDB, was established in 1981 to undertake research, 
training, and knowledge generation activities in Islamic finance. The IRTI has become a 
centre of knowledge dissemination by developing a rich resource centre for research 
through collection of in-house research papers, seminar proceedings, lectures, 
translations, journals, and articles (Askari et al., 2009). 
 
(iii) Accounting & Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) 
In 1991 the AAOIFI was established in Bahrain as a self-regulation agency for the 
industry to tackle the problem of Shari’ah compliance and gaps in applying conventional 
financial reporting standards to Islamic banks. The AAOIFI‟s membership consists of 
about 97 institutions spanning over 24 countries, and it has issued around 50 standards on 
accounting, auditing, governance, ethical, and Shari’ah standards. The AAOIFI‟s 
Shari’ah board is paving the way towards Shari’ah harmonization of banking practices 
throughout the world. The banking supervisors in a number of countries, such as Bahrain, 
Jordan and Sudan, require Islamic banks to comply with the AAOIFI standards or, as in 
the case of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, are specifying these standards as guidelines 
(Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). 
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(iv) Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB)     
The AAOIFI was successful in defining the accounting and Shari’ah standards, while the 
IFSB was officially inaugurated in November 2002 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, with the 
help of the IMF to address systemic stability and various regulatory issues relating to 
Islamic financial services industry. As of June 2011, the 195 members of the IFSB 
included 49 regulatory and supervisory authorities as well as IMF, World Bank, BIS, 
IDB, Asian Development Bank, and the Islamic Corporation for the Development of 
Private Sector, Saudi Arabia, and 138 market players and professional firms operating in 
39 jurisdictions (IFSB, 2011). The government of Malaysia has enacted the IFSB Act 
2002, which gives the IFSB the immunities and privileges usually granted to international 
organizations and diplomatic missions (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). The primary objective 
of the IFSB is to develop uniform regulatory and transparency standards to address 
characteristics specific to IFIs, keeping in mind the national financial environment, 
international standards, core principles, and good practices. The IFSB made significant 
contributions in the areas of corporate governance, risk management, and regulation. The 
IFSB issued a number of guiding principles of risk management, capital adequacy, 
corporate governance, and transparency in Islamic banking and finance. Archer and 
Abdul Karim (2007) highlight that in spite of the high quality of these standards, they 
have been adopted in only a handful of countries, which are listed and depicted in Table 
2.5. 
 
(v) General Council of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (CIBAFI) 
Formed in 2001, CIBAFI is a non-profit organisation based in Manama, Bahrain, which 
provides information and services to the Islamic Financial Services Industry. The CIBFI 
focuses on media and awareness, information and research, and strategic planning in 
relation to IBF industry (IFSB, 2007).  
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Table 2.5: IFSB Standards 
Publication Year 
Published Standards:  
  
IFSB-1: Guiding Principles of Risk Management for Institutions 
(other than Insurance Institutions) offering only Islamic Financial 
Services (IIFS) 
December 2005 
IFSB-2: Capital Adequacy Standard for Institutions (other than 
Insurance Institutions) offering only Islamic Financial Services 
(IIFS) 
December 2005 
IFSB-3: Guiding Principles on Corporate Governance for Institutions 
Offering Only Islamic Financial Services (Excluding Islamic 
Insurance (Takaful) Institutions and Islamic Mutual Funds 
December 2006 
IFSB-4: Disclosures to Promote Transparency and Market Discipline 
for Institutions offering Islamic Financial Services (excluding 
Islamic Insurance (Takaful) Institutions and Islamic Mutual Funds) 
December 2007 
IFSB-5: Guidance on Key Elements in the Supervisory Review 
Process of Institutions offering Islamic Financial Services (excluding 
Islamic Insurance (Takaful) Institutions and Islamic Mutual Funds) 
December 2007 
GN-1: Guidance Note In Connection with the Capital Adequacy 
Standard: Recognition of Ratings by External Credit Assessment 
Institutions (ECAIs) on Shari’ah-Compliant Financial Instruments 
March 2008 
IFSB-6: Guiding Principles on Governance for Islamic Collective 
Investment Schemes 
January 2009 
IFSB-7: Capital Adequacy Requirements for Sukuk, Securitisations 
and Real Estate investment 
January 2009 
IFSB-8: Guiding Principles on Governance for Takaful (Islamic 
Insurance) Undertakings 
December 2009 
IFSB-9: Guiding Principles on Conduct of Business December 2009 
IFSB-10: Guiding Principles On Shari’ah Governance Systems For 
Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services 
December 2009 
IFSB-11: Standard on Solvency Requirements for Takaful (Islamic 
Insurance) Undertakings 
December 2010 
Other Documents:  
Issues in Regulation and Supervision of Takaful (Islamic Insurance) 
by IFSB and International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
August 2006 
Islamic Financial Services Industry Development: Ten-Year 
Framework and Strategies  
May 2007 
Compilation Guide on Prudential and Structural Islamic Finance 
Indicators: Guidance on the Compilation and Dissemination of 
Prudential and Structural Islamic Finance Indicators for Banking and 
Near-Banking institutions offering Islamic financial services  
November 2007 
TN-1: Technical Note on Issues in Strengthening Liquidity 
Management of Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services: The 
Development of Islamic Money Markets  
March 2008 
Source: IFSB website http://www.ifsb.org 
Access Date: 14 June 2011 
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(vi) Liquidity Management Centre (LMC)  
The LMC was founded in 2002 in Bahrain to facilitate the investment of surplus funds of 
Islamic financial institutions into financial instruments structured in accordance with 
Shari’ah principles. The key objective of the LMC is to facilitate the creation of an 
interbank money market that will allow Islamic financial institutions to more effectively 
manage their asset/liability mismatch through participation as both investors and 
borrowers (Mahlknecht, 2009). In addition, the centre attracts assets from governments, 
financial institutions, and corporates in both the private and public sectors in many 
countries. The assets are securitized into readily transferable securities or structured into 
other innovative investment instruments (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). The equal 
shareholders include Bahrain Islamic Bank, Dubai Islamic Bank, Islamic Development 
Bank, and Kuwait Finance House.    
 
(vii) International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) 
The Bahrain-based IIFM was created in 2002 as cooperation between various supervisory 
authorities of Islamic countries. The major objectives of the IIFM are (a) to address the 
liquidity problem by expanding the maturity structure of instruments, and (b) help in the 
creation of secondary market activity with designated market makers where such 
instruments can be actively traded. The IIFM focuses on standardization and 
harmonization within the industry. Its primary focus is on the advancement and 
unification of Islamic financial documents, structures, and contracts (Wilson, 2009). It 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the International Capital Market 
Association (ICMA) to develop master repurchase (repo) agreement to help central banks 
manage liquidity in the sukuk market, and with the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) to develop a Tahawwut (Hedging) Master Agreement (Mahlknecht, 
2009). In October 2008, IIFM marked a milestone with the launch of the first-ever 
universal Master Agreement in Islamic finance: the Master Agreements for Treasury 
Placement (MATP), which is to cater for global commodity murabahah trades, is a 
perfect example of how standardization can take place (IIFM, 2009). 
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(viii) Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA) 
The IIRA aims to assist in the development of regional financial markets by providing an 
assessment of the risk profiles of entities and instruments that can be used for investment 
decisions. The organization has a board of directors and Shari’ah boards as well as an 
independent rating committee. The IIRA also provides a unique service for rating the 
quality of the Shari’ah compliance of a financial institution (Askari et al., 2009).  
 
(ix) International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation (IILM) 
Finally, October 2010 saw the signing and launch of the IILM, the latest trans-national 
body to serve the global Islamic finance industry. The ultimate aim of the IILM is to 
enhance international integration of the Islamic money market and capital markets and 
to better equip them to face any liquidity crises. 
 
2.9. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter provided an overview of the Islamic financial principles. The development 
of Islamic banking and finance was introduced and the market size was explored. 
Additionally, major differences between conventional and Islamic banking were also 
presented. Islamic banks, similar to their conventional counterparts, act as financial 
intermediaries, transforming the characteristics of the financial inflows they capture, as 
part of their funding strategies, into Shari’ah-compliant placement, financing and 
investment instruments. However, asset classes managed by IFIs may sometimes differ 
from those of conventional banks, not so much in their economic substance, but more in 
their financial form (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007).  
 
Financial contracts in Islamic finance are not archetypal. They have special relationships 
between the contracting parties, which sometimes changes during the different stages of 
the contract. The origin, intensity, and the spread of risks are unique for IFIs, mainly 
because of the participatory risk relationship by the investor.  
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It should be noted that using PLS principle to reward depositors is a unique feature of 
Islamic banks. This feature, along with the different modes of financing and the Shari’ah- 
compliant set of business activities, change the nature of risks that Islamic banks face. 
Hence, risk management for Islamic banks is far more of a complex issue when compared 
to conventional banking.    
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CHAPTER 3 
RISK MANAGEMENT IN ISLAMIC BANKS: A THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
“The fact that people are full of greed, fear, or folly is 
predictable. The sequence is not predictable”.  
Warren Buffett 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been argued by proponents of Islamic finance that most Islamic banking products 
are less risky than conventional banking products because they are based on real assets. 
These advocates strongly argue that Islamic banks are recession-proof and are more 
resilient to economic shocks than their conventional peers. On the other hand, opponents 
of Islamic finance believe that most of the conventional risks are also present in Islamic 
banking in addition to further risks that are quite specific to the Islamic structure. They 
strongly argue that Islamic banking is more risky and less developed than the western 
Wall Street banking model. Who is right? Where does the truth reside?    
 
These are challenging questions, the answer to which requires careful examination of the 
associated risks within Islamic finance in general as well as other areas of Islamic 
operations and the macro environment that could have an impact on the risk culture, risk 
tolerance, and risk management of Islamic banks. A review of the existing literature does 
not provide a clear answer to these grey areas in Islamic banking, as the existing body of 
knowledge is still limited. 
 
Risk management is at the heart of banks‟ financial intermediation process, and has 
assumed utmost importance amid the current recession, which has witnessed the worst 
complexity and volatility in financial markets in living memory. Basel II and widespread 
write-downs have highlighted the importance of sufficient capital adequacy and, more 
importantly, set a framework for improving the overall risk management architecture in 
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banks. Appropriate risk management has become a differentiating factor in building 
competitive advantages for financial institutions. Today, regulators, creditors and rating 
agencies place great emphasis on risk management frameworks and corporate 
governance, particularly in fast-growing emerging markets where such factors tend to 
attract lower scores than in more mature economic and business environments. 
 
IFIs are no exception. Similarly to conventional banks, they face many challenges in 
adequately defining, identifying, measuring, selecting, pricing, and mitigating risks 
across business lines and asset classes. Unfortunately, risk management is an ignored area 
of research in Islamic finance. Therefore, a number of challenges are still being 
confronted in this field. These challenges stem from different sources. First, a number of 
risk management techniques are not available to Islamic financial institutions due to 
Shari’ah compliance requirements. Islamic alternatives to several hedging and risk 
mitigation techniques that are widely used in conventional banking have not yet been 
explored. Second, there are a number of Shari’ah positions which affect the risk 
management processes directly. Some of these are lack of effective means to deal with 
wilful default, prohibition of sale of debt, and prohibition of currency forwards and 
futures, and others. Third, lack of standardization of Islamic financial contracts is also an 
important source of the challenges in this regard. 
 
The majority of the risks faced by conventional financial institutions (such as credit risk, 
market risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, macroeconomic risk, etc.) are also faced by 
Islamic banks. However, the magnitudes of some of these risks are different for Islamic 
banks due to their unique business model. In addition, IFIs face further risks that stem 
from the different characteristics of the assets and the liabilities, balance sheet structure, 
and their compliance with Shari’ah principles. Furthermore, the profit-sharing feature of 
Islamic banking introduces some additional risks. For example, paying the investment 
deposits a share of the bank‟s profits introduces withdrawal risk, fiduciary risk, and 
displaced commercial risk. In addition, the various Islamic modes of finance have their 
own unique risk characteristics. Thus, the nature of some risks that IFIs face is different 
from their conventional counterparts.  
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In Islamic finance, the importance of risk management is clearly acknowledged. While 
conventional finance, with its roots in neo-classical economic theory, has developed 
instruments to identify and trade risks, in Islam risk cannot be sold in any matter. Risk 
management in Islamic finance, therefore, is built on the foundation that risk must be 
shared between parties as opposed to being assumed by one party or the other.  
 
Realizing the significance of risk management, the Islamic Finance Services Board 
(IFSB) issued a comprehensive standards document on risk management in December 
2005: IFSB-1: Guiding Principles of Risk Management for Institutions (other than 
Insurance Institutions) offering only Islamic Financial Services (IFS). This complements 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) standards to address the specificity 
of Islamic products. Islamic banks‟ balance-sheet structures indicate that there is a great 
diversity of classifications on both the asset and liability side. Such variety affects the 
ease of comparison both between differing Islamic institutions and between Islamic 
institutions and their conventional peers, making it difficult to apply just one appropriate 
risk management approach. Therefore, the IFSB has prudently adopted a principles-based 
approach. The IFSB standard lists 15 guiding principles for risk management in IFIs. 
There is a general requirement followed by those covering credit, equity investment, 
market, liquidity, rate-of-return and operational risks (IFSB, 2005a). Overall, the main 
differences between these principles and those appropriate for a conventional bank relate 
to five key areas: 
 
(i) The range of asset classes found in Islamic banks; 
(ii) The relatively weak position of investment account holders; 
(iii)  The importance of the Shari’ah supervisory board and the bank‟s ability to provide 
the board with adequate information as well as abide by its rulings; 
(iv)  Rate-of-return risk; and 
(v)  New operational risks 
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Notwithstanding the IFSB‟s endeavour to provide the Islamic banking industry with a set 
of guidelines towards best-practice risk management, a number of additional risk issues at 
IFIs deserve further examination as detailed in this chapter.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to define what differentiates IFIs in terms of their risk profiles, 
and to highlight the potential implications that such differences may have on the IFIs‟ 
financial strength, risk identification, management, and mitigation. Thus, this chapter 
maps the risk structure in IFIs but it also discusses the risk management strategies 
developed and utilised by IFIs. 
 
This chapter attempts to answer the long-debated question of whether Islamic banking is 
less or more risky than conventional banking. In doing so it reviews the existing literature 
about risks in Islamic banking with reference to the risks in conventional banking. The 
theoretical literature review is intermingled within the discussion about each risk type. It 
commences by researching risks that are common among Islamic and conventional 
banks, and asserts that Islamic banks face similar risk with different degrees. It then 
explores other risk areas which are unique to Islamic banks due to their unique business 
model and contracts. Furthermore, specific issues related to risk management and 
mitigation in Islamic banking are also discussed. The last section draws some 
conclusions. 
 
3.2 RISK MANAGEMENT – BASIC CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 
3.2.1 What is Risk Management?  
 
Risk is generally the possibility of an unplanned event that, if allowed to develop, could 
adversely affect all or part the institution‟s business, leading to loss of revenue, failure to 
meet key strategic goals or objectives, reduced company reputation, or missed 
opportunities to increase or improve any of these. Risk can be defined as the variability or 
volatility of unexpected outcomes. It is usually measured by the standard deviation of 
historic outcomes (Das, 2006). 
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Risk Management is the term applied to the process adopted by the business for 
identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring, and communicating risks 
associated with all the activities of the business in a way that will enable the institution to 
minimise its losses, maximise opportunities, and achieve its stated strategic objectives 
(Jorion and Khoury, 1996). The risk management process is a comprehensive system that 
includes creating an appropriate risk management environment, maintaining an efficient 
risk measurement, mitigating and monitoring process, and establishing an adequate 
internal control arrangement (Khan and Ahmed, 2001).   
 
Risk management is a continuous and vigilant process; it is an activity more than an 
action. The goal of an effective risk management system is not only to avoid losses, but 
also to ensure that the bank achieves its targeted financial results with a high degree of 
reliability and consistency. Taking risks is an integral part of any financial business. Risk 
arises when there is a possibility of more than one outcome and the ultimate outcome is 
unknown (Schroeck, 2002). Though all businesses face uncertainty, financial institutions 
face some special kinds of risks, given their nature of activities. 
 
Risk management, in a broad sense, is not only a discipline for specialised professionals, 
but permeates every activity of a financial institution. It starts with a clear definition of 
the chosen risk tolerance for the bank at all levels of the organisation, and includes 
management actions aimed at ensuring that its risk profile remains within the agreed risk 
tolerance. In addition, it is not limited to a narrow consideration of the risks undertaken 
by the institution, but evaluates these in the context of the external environment and how 
this can affect the bank The recent financial crisis, with the near collapse of the financial 
system in September-October 2008, provides a striking example of what can happen 
when risk is poorly managed, as is shown in Chapter 5. 
 
Since all financial entities are directly or indirectly inter-woven and interlinked, they 
create a complicated web of uncertainties which makes up the mass of the financial risk. 
Risk in a banking context arises from any transaction or business decision that contains 
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uncertainty related to the result. Because virtually every bank transaction is associated 
with some level of uncertainty, nearly every transaction contributes to the overall risk of a 
bank (Schroeck, 2002). Risks are part of financial intermediation; undertaking a business 
transaction or an investment decision involves some degree of risk taking regarding the 
future performance or outcome of the activity. The survival and success of a financial 
organisation depends on the efficiency with which it can manage its risks. According to 
Engel (2010) (Head of Risk Management at the European Islamic Investment Bank and 
one of the interviewees), “banks are in the risk business, they got to take risks. Once 
money has gone out of the door, the bank has taken a whole array of risks ... The most 
insidious and dangerous risk is zero risk. This arises when a risk manager always says 
„no‟ and comes up with many reasons not to do a deal.”   
 
3.2.2 History of Risk Management 
 
The appreciation of risk was the important building block in the development of modern 
financial systems. In the twentieth century, the economist Irving Fisher was the first to 
appreciate the importance of risk in the functioning of financial markets (Bessis, 1999). 
In the 1930s a number of renowned economists, most notably John Maynard Keynes, saw 
the importance of risk in the selection of portfolios. However, in their analysis the role of 
risk was largely limited to affecting expected gains and speculative and hedging 
activities. This strain of analysis led to results covering the relationship of futures prices 
and expected spot prices, the impact of risk on assessing the value of future streams of 
income, and eventually to the development of the portfolio theory (Askari et al., 2009). 
 
However, risk management as an independent topic is a fairly new field; although 
financial institutions have been always exposed to risks, the formal study of managing 
risk started in the second half of the last century. Markowitz‟s (1959) decisive paper 
initiated the risk-return trade-off discussion; it first indicated that portfolio selection was 
a problem of maximizing its expected return and minimizing the risks. A higher than 
expected return of a portfolio (measured by the mean) can result only from taking more 
risks. Thus, investors‟ problem was to find the optimal risk-return combination. His 
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analysis also points out the systematic and unsystematic components of risk. While the 
unsystematic component, known as the idiosyncratic risk, can be mitigated by 
diversification of assets, the systematic component has to be borne by the investor. 
Markowitz‟s approach, however, faced operational problems when a large number of 
assets are involved (Khan and Ahmed, 2001).  
 
Sharpe‟s Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) introduced the concepts of systematic and 
residual risks in 1964 (Stremme, 2005). Advances in this model include Single-Factor 
Models of Risk that estimates the beta of an asset. While residual (firm specific) risk can 
be diversified, beta measures the sensitivity of the portfolio to business cycles (an 
aggregate index). The dependence of CAPM on a single index to explain the risks 
inherent in assets is too simplistic. Arbitrage Pricing Theory proposed by Ross in 1976 
suggests that multiple factors affect the expected return of an asset. The implication of the 
Multiple Factor Model is that the total risk is the sum of the various factor-related risks 
and residual risk. According to Stremme (2005), the CAPM paved the way to more 
advanced capital structuring models like the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), 
Modigliani and Miller Theorem on optimal capital structure in 1959 and 1963, Myers‟ 
Trade-off Theory (1977), Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing, the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, and the renowned Pecking Order Theory which was granted the Nobel Prize 
in Economics in 2001.  
 
Modern risk management frameworks and processes started developing over the past 
three decades. Traditionally, risk management was engrained in the management 
practices. Like Islamic finance, risk management has come a long way during its short 
history. “If you mentioned the title Risk Manager twenty five years ago, people would 
laugh at you... Bankers only realised credit risk, all other risks including corporate 
governance, liquidity, money laundering, and even market risk were merely 
responsibilities of senior management and Board members” adds Lowe (2010), Head of 
Risk Management at Qatar Islamic Bank (UK) and one of the interviewees for this 
research. It was only when financial products started becoming complicated that risk 
management has evolved as an independent integrated framework. The development of 
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derivatives, pricing models, portfolios, and sophisticated international financial trading 
required independent risk management teams and advanced models to identify, measure, 
monitor and control different risks.  
 
It was in the mid-1990s, when JP Morgan started developing VAR models, that risk 
management started gaining prominence among banking executives. Gradually risk 
management started shifting to the hands of mathematicians and physics scientists who 
developed sophisticated models that tempted management to take decisions based on 
statistical modelling rather than credit fundamentals. During the past two decades, there 
has been an unprecedented development in the mathematical and quantitative treatment 
of financial variables with critical implications for banks. An important impact of this 
development has been on decomposing risk through financial engineering and product 
development, which have made risk management a serious scientific process. These 
innovations have led to significant cost reductions for most financial institutions. 
However, at the same time, additional uncertainties have been created, which could have 
serious consequences for risk management (IFSB, 2007). For example, executives at 
UBS and Merrill Lynch in some instances took decisions that relied on models that they 
did not fully understand. However, this wave is coming to an end and there will be a shift 
in power again to the basics, together with the help of mathematical models. It is a fact, 
however, that realising a fine balance remains a key challenge.  
   
3.2.3 Systemic Importance of Risk Management 
 
Over the last few decades, risk management has gained prominence in the global banking 
industry. The significant changes to the banking business have changed the nature of 
risks faced by financial institutions. Whereas two decades ago, a financial institution was 
primarily faced with credit and market risk only, today‟s financial institution is exposed 
to a whole array of new risks, and this list is expanding. Risk management is today at the 
heart of banks‟ financial intermediation process, and plays a major role in determining a 
bank‟s rating and financial strength.   
 
 
59 
It should be noted that the current risks can become tomorrow‟s potential losses unless 
they are managed efficiently. However, most risks cannot be eliminated, they can be 
managed. The element of risk also brings opportunities, and to gain from these 
opportunities, the risk should be managed properly. For a bank, some of the risks can turn 
into losses and may even cause liquidation. A risk is in many cases hidden before it is 
visible as a loss. Risk and return are usually correlated: the higher the risk, the higher the 
return. A bank with a conservative approach may not fully utilise its funds and thus have 
a higher cost of capital, whereas a bank with high risk appetite can over lend, thereby 
increasing the chances of a failure. Currently, pricing loans is largely based on risk. A 
risky loan which is under-priced may prove to be a drag on profitability, whereas a sound 
loan which is over-priced may shy away good customers. 
 
In the financial world, therefore, risk and return are two sides of the same coin. It is easy 
to lend and to obtain attractive returns from risky borrowers. The price to pay is a risk 
that is higher than the prudent bank‟s risk. The prudent bank limits risk and, therefore, 
both future losses and expected revenues, by restricting business volume and screening 
out risky borrowers. The prudent bank avoids losses but it might suffer from lower 
market share and lower revenues. However, after a while, the risk-taker might find out 
that higher losses materialise and obtain an end performance lower that the prudent 
lender. Who performs best? Unless assigning some measure of risk to income, it is 
impossible to compare policies driven by different risk appetites. Comparing 
performances without risk adjustment is akin to comparing apples and oranges. The 
rationale of risk adjustment is in making comparable different performances attached to 
different risk levels (PWC, 2008). 
 
Sundararajan (2007) provides four reasons for the importance of the application of 
modern approaches to risk measurement and management in Islamic banking: 
 
(i) To properly recognize the unique mix of risks in Islamic finance contracts; 
(ii) To ensure proper pricing of Islamic finance facilities, including returns to Investment 
Account Holders (IAHs); 
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(iii)  To manage and control various types of risks; and 
(iv)  To ensure adequacy of capital and its effective allocation, according to the risk 
profile of the Islamic bank. 
 
It is important to state that risk management is one of the critical factors in providing 
better returns to shareholders, as it is an important source of value creation in banks 
(Schroeck, 2002). Risk management is also a necessity for stability of the overall 
financial system. 
 
3.2.4 Risk Management vs Risk Measurement 
 
There is a difference between risk measurement and risk management. While risk 
measurement deals with quantification of risk exposures, risk management refers to “the 
overall process that a financial institution follows to define a business strategy, to identify 
the risks to which it is exposed, to quantify those risks, and to understand and control the 
nature of risks it faces” (Khan and Ahmed, 2001). As the definitions identifies, risk 
management is strictly linked to risk measurement; it is difficult to manage risk if the risk 
measurements are not robust (McKenzie, 2007).  
 
3.2.5 Risk Management Framework 
 
There are several risk management structures available worldwide, as has been explained 
in different studies; however, the most commonly used framework in today‟s modern 
world is based on 4 key domains: (i) risk culture and governance, (ii) risk management, 
(iii) risk measurement, and (iv) infrastructure and information systems (EIIB, 2010b). 
 
These four pillars of risk management should not each be considered in isolation. Rather, 
the dynamic interaction between them is at the core of risk management itself as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1, and they are discussed in detail in this section as follows: 
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Figure 3.1: Risk Management Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.5.1.  Risk Culture and Governance 
 
A strong risk culture and tone from the top management are vital for effective risk 
management. The board of directors and the executive committee are responsible for 
choosing the appropriate level of risk appetite for the bank and for ensuring that its risk 
profile remains within the bank‟s risk tolerance. The board of directors is key to 
providing effective checks and balances to a bank‟s management and ensuring that 
compensation policies are designed to avoid excessive risk-taking (McKenzie, 2007). At 
the same time, concrete support from senior management and the board is essential to 
ensuring that the risk function has the necessary authority, is appropriately staffed, and 
has the required infrastructure to measure and analyse risk in a timely manner.  
 
As discussed in the available body of knowledge, culture, strategy, and competitive 
position all influence risk appetite. Different banks will have different tolerances for 
different risks. A bank‟s risk appetite for credit risk in consumer lending might be quite 
different from its appetite for market risk in its investment banking operation. A major 
benefit of defining risk appetite is that it helps to ensure that the risk culture is made 
explicit (PWC, 2008).  
Risk Culture & Governance
Risk ManagementInfrastructure & Information 
Systems
Risk Measurement
Risk Management 
Framework
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The headwind that Chief Risk Officers and risk management staff typically faced, in 
particular in booming times, was effectively summarised by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) in its 79
th
 Annual Report. The BIS (2009) noted that: 
 
“Without support from top management, it did not matter much what the 
chief risk officer said or to whom he or she said it. The structural problem 
was compounded by the behavioural response to a risk officer whose job is 
to tell people to limit or stop what they are doing. If what they are doing is 
profitable, it is going to be difficult to get managers and directors to 
listen.”  
 
Engel (2010), one of the interviewees for this research, adds, “I keep reminding everyone 
at my bank to „Think Capital, Think Risk‟; everybody has got to engage in the risk 
culture if you want to implement a successful risk management framework.” 
 
3.2.5.2. Risk Management 
 
Once the risk tolerance for the financial institution has been agreed, this has to be 
translated into a coherent risk limit system for different types of risks as well as the 
different business activities of the bank. In addition, risk mitigation will be needed to 
ensure that the risk profile of specific portfolios or activities does not exceed the allocated 
limit – hence the link between Risk Governance and Risk Management. Figure 3.2 
illustrates that a sound risk management process requires appropriate linkage between 
approaches and actions that enable eliminating, transferring or managing risk, and 
instruments that facilitate the hedging and diversifying of those risks that the organisation 
can‟t manage. 
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Figure 3.2 – Ways to Conduct Risk Management 
 
 
 
Source: Schroeck (2002:79) 
 
3.2.5.3. Risk Measurement 
 
Risk cannot be managed without being measured. The crisis has made apparent that 
further work is required to enable banks to measure their risks with some degree of 
accuracy, particularly in relation to complex financial instruments, as well as to capture 
the interrelationship across different types of risk. In measuring and managing risk, the 
adoption of multiple risk measures is necessary to prevent important dimensions of risk 
being overlooked. For example, statistical measures, such as Value at Risk (VaR) need to 
be complemented by stress testing analysis. The results of models can be a valuable input 
into the decision-making process of a bank, but they cannot replace judgment. Lowe 
(2010) asserts that models and formulas should support a sound fundamental analysis, but 
never replace it. 
 
  
Ways to Conduct Risk Management
Approaches/Actions
Instruments
Eliminate/ Avoid
Absorb/ Manage
Set Policy
Insure
Diversify
Hedge/ Sell
Hold Capital
Transfer
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3.2.5.4. Infrastructure and Information Systems 
 
A robust risk infrastructure and good data quality are the essential elements for a bank to 
be able to measure in an accurate and timely manner the risks that it is taking. It is also a 
key element for effective risk reporting, which, as discussed above, is essential for the 
board of directors and the executives to make informed decisions (EIIB, 2010b). So, the 
risk Infrastructure and Information systems pillar links to Risk Culture and Governance. 
Consequently, with this process the circle is closed.  
 
3.3 RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE CREDIT CRUNCH 
 
Since 2008, the financial crisis has uncovered significant deficiencies in the way in which 
financial institutions manage risk. It has become clear that risk management has lacked 
the necessary authority to exert an appropriate influence over profit centres. The tools 
used to manage risk have also been found deficient, from stress testing and scenario 
analysis to the reliance on external rating agencies. 
 
While it is too early to count the ultimate survivors, or reach conclusions about whether 
(or to what extent) risk management may have contributed to some banks‟ ability to 
endure stress, it is noted that effective or ineffective risk management is often cited as the 
root of success or failure. However, as the dust starts to settle from the financial crisis, a 
consensus around what needs to be fixed is starting to form. Consequently, many western 
institutions are subjecting their risk management policies and processes to a significant 
overhaul, and are investigating a wide range of tools and techniques to give them a better 
overall picture of risk. 
 
While efforts to upgrade risk management techniques are commendable, there is a more 
fundamental point to address around the risk culture of the organisation. It has become 
apparent that, during the boom, the concerns of risk managers were all too often swept 
aside in the quest for profit and competitive advantage. As the banking industry seeks to 
rebuild itself, the balance of power needs to shift back towards risk management. Armed 
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with appropriate authority, clear visibility into lines of business, and the ear of senior 
executives, risk management will become an integral part of any future recovery 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009). 
 
3.4 CLASSIFIYING OF RISKS 
 
There are several ways in which risks are classified. One way is to distinguish between 
business risk and financial risks. Business risk arises from the nature of a firm‟s business; 
it relates to factors affecting the product market. Financial risk arises from possible losses 
in financial markets due to movements in financial variables (Jorion and Khoury, 1996).  
 
Khan and Ahmed (2001) present another way of decomposing risk between systematic 
and unsystematic components. While systematic risk is associated with the overall market 
or the economy, unsystematic risk is linked to a specific asset or firm. While the asset-
specific unsystematic risk can be mitigated in a large diversified portfolio, the systematic 
risk is non- diversifiable. Parts of systematic risk, however, can be reduced through risk 
mitigation and transferring techniques.  
 
While Santomero (1997) classifies risks faced by financial institutions into three types 
(risks that can be eliminated, those that can be transferred to others, and risks that can be 
managed by the institution), financial intermediaries would avoid certain risks by simple 
business practices and will not take up activities that impose risks upon them. Risk 
avoidance techniques would include the standardization of all business-related activities 
and processes, construction of diversified portfolio, and implementation of an incentive-
compatible scheme with accountability of actions. Some risk that banks face can be 
reduced or eliminated by transferring or selling these in well-defined markets. Risk 
transferring techniques include use of derivatives for hedging, selling or buying of 
financial claims, changing borrowing terms, etc. Iqbal and Llewellyn (2002) differentiate 
between two types of risks: „Uncontrollable risk‟ or chance, over which the bank, as the 
decision maker, has no control whatsoever, and „Controllable‟ or responsive risk, which 
can be controlled and affected by the bank.  
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Nonetheless, as previously discussed, most risks cannot be eliminated or transferred and 
must be absorbed by the financial institution, either due to the complexity of the risk and 
difficulty to separate it from asset, or because the risk is accepted by the financial 
institutions as being central to their business. These risks are accepted because the banks 
are specialized in dealing with them and get rewarded for it accordingly. 
 
Akkizidis and Khandelwal (2007) group risks into three major categories: financial, 
business, and operational risks. Financial risk will generally include credit, market, and 
liquidity risks. Business risk is a combination of management risk and strategic risk. 
Operational risk can arise due to people, process, systems, as well as several other 
factors. Some of the other relevant risks for the financial industry can be commodity risk, 
country and political risk, reputational risk, legal risk, concentration risk, regulatory risk, 
and systemic risk related to interconnected unfavourable events across the industry. 
 
Greuning and Iqbal (2008) classify risks into four major categories as depicted by Table 
3.1. Financial risks are subject to complex interdependencies that may significantly 
increase a bank‟s overall risk profile. For example, a bank engaged in foreign currency 
business is normally exposed to currency risk, but it is also exposed to credit, liquidity, 
and re-pricing risks if it carries open positions or mismatches in its forward book. 
Operational risks are related to a bank‟s organization and functioning, including 
technologies, compliance with bank policies and procedures, and measures against 
mismanagement and fraud. Business risks are associated with a bank‟s business 
environment, including macroeconomic and policy concerns, legal and regulatory factors, 
and the financial sector‟s infrastructure, such as payment systems and auditing 
professions. Event risks include all types of exogenous risks that, if they were to 
materialise, would jeopardise a bank‟s operations or undermine its financial condition.  
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Table 3.1: Banking Risk Exposures 
Financial risks Operational risks Business risks Event risks 
Balance sheet structure 
 
Internal fraud 
 
Macro policy Political 
Income statement 
structure and 
profitability 
 
External fraud 
 
Financial 
infrastructure 
Contagion 
Capital adequacy 
 
Employment practices 
and workplace safety 
Legal infrastructure Banking crisis 
Credit 
 
Clients, products and 
business services 
Legal liability Other exogenous 
risks 
Liquidity 
 
Damage to physical 
assets 
Regulatory compliance  
Market 
 
Business disruption 
and system failures 
(technology risk) 
Reputational and 
fiduciary 
 
Interest rate 
 
Execution, delivery, 
and process 
management 
Country risks  
Source: Greuning and Iqbal (2008: 65) 
 
 
Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007) divide the risk profile of a financial institution into four 
groups: financial, business, treasury, and governance risks. They define financial risk as 
the exposures that result in a direct financial loss to the assets or the liabilities of a bank, 
including credit, market and equity risks. Business risks are associated with a bank‟s 
business environment, including macroeconomic and policy concerns, legal and 
regulatory factors, and the overall banking sector infrastructure such as payment systems 
and the auditing profession. Treasury risks include risks arising from the management of 
the financial resources of the financial institution in terms of cash management, equity 
management, liquidity management and finally, assets and liabilities management 
(ALM). Finally, governance risk refers to the risk arising from a failure in governing the 
institution, negligence in conducting business and meeting contractual obligations, and 
from a weak internal and external institutional environment including legal risk, whereby 
a bank is unable to enforce its contracts. 
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It is important to note another dimension of risk which is the interaction and mutation of 
risks. Usually risks combine with each other, creating a new risk. For example, the risk 
on investments consists of credit risk, market risk, as well as an element of operational 
risk. A change on the value of the investment is a market risk, downgrading of the 
investment by rating agency will involve credit risk, whereas an error in documenting the 
guarantees will be classified as operational risk. Similarly, the inability to manage market 
risk can be considered as operational risk rather than a pure market risk. To what extent 
this needs to be allocated using market risk methodology and operational risk 
methodology is complicated to determine. While allocating capital to manage risks, this 
merging of risks can cause duplicate allocations and thus increase the capital allocation 
(Akkizidis and Khandelwal, 2007). This is a grey area of risk management requiring 
further probing.  
 
For the purpose of this research, risks will be classified into two main categories: risks 
which Islamic banks have in common with traditional banks and risks which are unique 
to Islamic banks due to their compliance with the Shari’ah. Although Islamic banks share 
many of the same types of risk as their conventional counterparts, they find these risks 
complex and difficult to mitigate for various reasons. First, unlike conventional banks, 
given the trading-based instruments and equity financing, there are significant market 
risks along with credit risk in the banking book of Islamic banks. Second, risks 
intermingle and change from one type to another at different stages of a transaction. For 
example, during the transaction period of a salam contract, the bank is exposed to credit 
risk, and at the conclusion of the contract it is exposed to commodity price risk. Third, 
Islamic banks are constrained in using some of the risk mitigation instruments that their 
conventional counterparts use, as these are not yet generally allowed under Shari’ah 
principles. Finally, the PLS modes in Islamic banks changes the nature of risks these 
institutions face. 
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3.5 COMMON RISKS AMONG ISLAMIC AND CONVENTIONAL BANKS 
 
The majority of the risks faced by conventional financial institutions such as credit risk, 
market risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, etc. are also faced by the IFIs. However, the 
magnitudes of some of these risks are different for Islamic banks due to their unique 
business model and its compliance with the Shari’ah principles. Thus, the nature of some 
risks that IFIs face is different from their conventional counterparts. Special attention 
must be paid to the contractual role of Islamic banks because the relationship between 
parties during the lifetime of the contract gives Islamic finance a different orientation 
towards risk. Even when risk management techniques in conventional finance are 
applicable to Islamic products, the implementation of risk management, especially in 
hedging market, price, FX, and commodity risks, is problematic.  
 
The following sections present an introduction to particular risk areas: 
 
3.5.1 Credit Risk 
 
Credit risk is generally defined as the risk of loss arising from default or failure to 
perform (EIIB, 2010b). It is also referred to as „default risk‟, which is one of the earliest 
recognized risks in the financial industry. Traditionally, a large part of a bank‟s profit 
came from the lending businesses, and the majority of bank losses were also related to 
this aspect of risk management; hence the focus was primarily on credit risk.  
 
Banks have always monitored and mitigated credit risk actively, through a number of 
mechanisms such as country limits, counterparty limits, large exposure limits, 
diversification, covenants, delegations, internal and external ratings, watch lists, etc. 
However, credit risk assessment remained judgmental because it cannot be precisely 
calculated ahead of time since the likelihood of default is highly uncertain and thus 
difficult to predict accurately. Credit applications, referred to as credit scoring models, 
play an important role in combining qualitative and quantitative risk aspects of clients 
including, but not limited to, operating experience, management expertise, asset quality, 
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Principle 2.1: IIFS shall have in place a strategy for financing, using various instruments in compliance 
with Sharī`ah, whereby it recognises the potential credit exposures that may arise at different stages of 
the various financing agreements.  
Principle 2.2: IIFS shall carry out a due diligence review in respect of counterparties prior to deciding on 
the choice of an appropriate Islamic financing instrument.  
Principle 2.3: IIFS shall have in place appropriate methodologies for measuring and reporting the credit  
Risk exposures arising under each Islamic financing instrument.  
Principle 2.4: IIFS shall have in place Sharī`ah-compliant credit risk mitigating techniques appropriate 
for each Islamic financing instrument. 
leverage and liquidity ratios, earnings, debt service, etc. (Akkizidis and Khandelwal, 
2007).   
 
3.5.1.1. Credit risk in Islamic banks 
 
The IFSB Principles of Credit Risk can help to develop an understanding on the nature of 
credit risks in Islamic banks, as in Box 3.1. 
 
Box 3.1: IFSB Principles of Credit Risk Management 
 
Source: IFSB (2005a) 
 
The unique characteristics of the financial instruments offered by Islamic banks result in 
the following special credit risks: 
 
(i) First access to collateral but foreclosure is difficult 
One of the five key pillars of modern Islamic finance is the obligation to back any 
transaction by a tangible, identifiable, underlying asset. This means that IFIs – at least in 
theory – back their transactions with collateral. Consequently, collateral coverage is 
usually higher for IFIs than for conventional banks. In short, IFIs naturally have a high 
level of collateralisation on their credit portfolios, and thus are in a position to somewhat 
reduce their economic, if not regulatory, exposures at default.  
 
Contrary to conventional banks, whose customers are not always obliged to disclose the 
purpose of their borrowings, Islamic banks finance the acquisition of identifiable assets of 
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which they have legal ownership, in most cases until maturity and final repayment. This 
is notably the case for ijarah and diminishing musharakah operations, in which the bank 
acquires the asset and leases it to the customer, with ownership transfer taking place only 
at maturity. The bank, as the legal owner of the asset, is therefore in a favourable position 
to foreclose on this asset (in the case of a default), and sell it on a secondary market 
Moody‟s (2008a).   
 
In practice, however, collateral foreclosure can be much more difficult, especially for 
residential real estate. Given the take-off in residential real estate lending in GCC 
countries, this question of foreclosure is set to become critical. Although an Islamic bank 
is in theory in a position to evict a customer from a property and resell it in the case of a 
default on the loan backed by the property, this would be unlikely to happen in practice, 
owing to its „social responsibility‟. According to Chowdhury (2010), one of the 
interviewees for this research, there are, however, instances when such a decision may be 
taken by a bank and authorized by its Shari’ah board – notably when specific conditions 
were set out and agreed upon before the conclusion of the transaction. In such cases, 
foreclosure may be easier than for conventional banks, as the property belongs to the 
Islamic bank. As a matter of fact, this type of structuring is sometimes used by 
conventional banks, as it is a strong way of reducing the problem of foreclosure. 
 
In addition, there are other problems with posting collaterals as securities, especially in 
developing countries, where most Islamic banks operate, or in declining times like the 
current recession. Typical problems include illiquidity of the collateral or inability of the 
bank to sell it, difficulties in determining the fair market value on a periodic basis, and 
legal obstacles in taking possession of the collateral. Diminishing musharakah contracts 
are increasingly used as a financing mechanism for Shari’ah-compliant home purchase, 
particularly in Dubai (Moody‟s, 2008b).  
 
However, when the financing is based on other Shari’ah -compliant schemes where the 
property is not registered in the bank‟s name, the IFI will find itself in the same position 
as its conventional peers. 
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(ii) Murabahah is the most predominantly used Islamic financial contract. Based on 
similarity in risk characteristics of the contract with the risk characteristics of interest-
based contracts, murabahah is approved to be an acceptable mode of finance in a number 
of regulatory jurisdictions. However, such a standardized contract may not be acceptable 
to all fiqh scholars. Moreover, as the contract stands at present, there is a lack of complete 
uniformity in fiqh viewpoints. The different viewpoints can be a source of counterparty 
risks as a result of the atmosphere of an ineffective litigation (Khan and Ahmed, 2001). 
The main point in this regard stems from the fact that financial murabahah is a 
contemporary contract which has been designed by combining a number of different 
contracts. There is a complete consensus among all fiqh scholars that this new contract 
has been approved as a form of deferred trading. The condition of its validity is based on 
the fact that the bank must buy (become owner) and afterwards transfer the ownership 
right to the client. The order placed by the client is not a sale contract but merely a 
promise to buy. According to the OIC Fiqh Academy Resolution, a promise can be 
binding on one party only. OIC Fiqh Academy, AAOIFI, and most Islamic banks treat 
the promise to buy as binding on the client. Some other scholars, however, are of the 
opinion that the promise is not binding on the client; the client, even after putting an order 
and paying the commitment fee, can rescind from the contract. The most important 
counterparty risk specific to murabahah arises due to this unsettled nature of the contract 
(Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007). 
 
(iii) In the case of mudarabah investments, where the Islamic bank enters into the 
mudarabah contract as rab al-mal (principal) with an external mudarib (agent), the 
Islamic bank is exposed to an enhanced credit risk on the amounts advanced to the 
mudarib in addition to the typical principal-agent problems. The nature of the mudarabah 
contract is such that it does not give the bank appropriate rights to monitor the mudarib or 
to participate in management of the project, which makes it difficult to assess and manage 
credit risk. The bank is not in a position to know or decide how the activities of the 
mudarib can be monitored accurately, especially if losses are claimed. This risk is 
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especially present in markets where information asymmetry is high and transparency in 
financial disclosure by the mudarib is low (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). 
 
(iv) In bay’ al-salam contracts, the bank is exposed to the risk of failure to supply goods 
on time, or supply the wrong quality of goods as contractually specified. Such failures 
could result in a delay or default in payment, and hence to financial losses to the Islamic 
bank. Salam is an agricultural-based contract and hence the counterparty risks may be 
due to factors beyond the normal credit quality of the client. The credit quality of the 
client may be very good but the supply may not come as contractually agreed due to 
natural calamities. Since agriculture is exposed to catastrophic risks, the counterparty 
risks are expected to be above-average in bay’ al-salam (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007). 
 
(v) The counterparty risks under istisna’a contracts are similar to the risks faced by 
Islamic banks under bay’ al-salam contracts. However, the object of istisna’a is more in 
the control of the counterparty and less exposed to natural calamities as compared to the 
object of salam. Therefore, it can be expected that the counterparty risk of the sub-
contractor of istisna’a although substantially high, is lesser severe as compared to that of 
the salam (Akkizidis and Khandelwal, 2007). In addition, under the istisna’a agreement 
IFIs are deemed to remain the beneficial owners of financed assets until the borrower 
pays back the final instalment. In the case where the borrower defaults before maturity, 
the IFI is entitled to dispose of the financed assets, which are generally illiquid because 
they are specific to the nature of the plant, the industry or the enterprise to which the IFI‟s 
funds were initially allocated. In the case of default, the IFI – more than any conventional 
bank – becomes a merchant, behaving in the field of commerce rather than in that of pure 
financial intermediation. This puts additional pressure on IFIs to equip themselves with 
the correct technical and professional expertise for both credit assessment and the 
management of underlying asset valuation, trading and liquidity, should loan foreclosure 
and collateral realisation occur (Mahlknecht, 2009). 
 
(vi) Credit risk management for Islamic banks is further complicated by additional 
externalities. For example, in the case of default by counterparty, Islamic banks are 
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prohibited from charging any accrued interest or imposing any penalty, except in the case 
of deliberate procrastination (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). Clients may take advantage by 
delaying payment, knowing that the Islamic bank will not charge a penalty or require 
extra payments. During the delay, the bank‟s capital is stuck in a non-productive activity. 
To mitigate this risk, Islamic banks tend to charge defaulted customers (who prove to be 
in negligence) a penalty for late payments, which the banks donate to charity and do not 
include in their income. This helps to prevent potential similar situations. 
 
(vii) Islamic banks have less sophisticated credit risk management practices, mostly 
because of the lack of databases and insufficient track record. Conventional banks use 
these tools to reduce their credit risk, a luxury not yet available to Islamic banks. For 
example, the calculation of Probability of Default (PD), Loss Given Default (LGD), 
Expected losses (EL), Exposure at Default (EAD), and Credit VaR do not generally exist 
in Islamic banking. There are endeavours by Moody‟s and Standard & Poor‟s to develop 
such models for Islamic banks, or to adjust some of the existing models like CreditEdge, 
RiskCalc, and Risk Tracker to accommodate Islamic banking. These models are still 
work in progress and are faced by huge difficulties stemming from the fact that there are 
limited systematic data available in the Islamic banking world so far.  
 
3.5.2 Concentration Risk 
 
Islamic banks tend to have a concentration base of assets and/or deposits; they face high 
concentration by name and sector, as well as high geographical concentration. The 
limited scope of eligible asset classes for IFIs increases concentration in investment 
portfolios, which tends to be mitigated by a lower appetite for speculative transactions. 
Since Islam forbids gharar and speculation, IFIs are naturally crowded out from the high-
risk/high-return leveraged and/or structured investment asset classes. As such instruments 
tend to be, in one form or another, based either on interest (riba) or derivatives (not 
commonly allowed by Shari’ah supervisory boards, although Islamic „equivalents‟ are 
appearing), their technical eligibility is in most cases difficult to justify. IFIs thus limit 
the scope of their investment strategies to „plain vanilla‟ asset classes such as stocks, 
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sukuk and real estate, notwithstanding their cash reserves in the form of short-term 
international murabahahs for liquidity purposes. A limited range of permissible asset 
allocations leads to concentration risks in IFIs‟ investment portfolios, by asset class, 
sector, and usually also by name. This led some IFIs to bear severe losses during the 
current recession. For example, IFIs that invested heavily in stock markets were exposed 
to swings in equity prices. Some opportunistic investments made by IFIs over the past 
four years in order to benefit from the boom in GCC stock markets, have been severely 
affected by the correction that took place in 2006 followed by the credit crisis which 
started in summer 2007 (Thun, 2010). Moreover, IFIs are usually significantly exposed to 
the real estate sector, as it is compliant with Shari’ah principles. Some Islamic banks in 
the GCC have significant exposure to this sector (directly or indirectly through collateral 
or sukuk), which magnifies the market risk especially during bearish market conditions.  
 
Because most Islamic financial transactions have an underlying asset at their centre, 
Islamic banks tend to own more physical assets than conventional banks, and “what is a 
better asset than real estate?”, wonders Marx (2010), one of the interviewees for this 
research.  
 
There has been a build-up of these assets during a benign period of credit risk and rising 
asset values,; a time when the market has seen ample liquidity (Moore, 2009). The recent 
straitened times that is impacting on markets around the globe have still to be felt in 
many of the countries where Islamic banks operate, Dubai was a clear example. The 
particular concentrations seen in Islamic banks and the similarity of many of their 
operations are causes for concern.  
 
In addition, the immaturity of securitisation in the industry means that this financial 
technology has not been widely used to remove such excess concentrations from the 
balance sheet, although 2007 did see the first few transactions of commercial property 
loans and residential ijarah mortgages. In particular, sukuk are scarce and constitute an 
illiquid market where investors tend to stick to a buy-and-hold approach rather than move 
towards more active bond trading (Moody‟s, 2011a). 
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Moreover, concentration risks arise from the banks‟ limited geographic reach, as most 
IFIs are domestic players and only few have material operations outside their home 
country. One interesting exception is Al Baraka Banking Group, which has a material 
presence in more than a dozen jurisdictions across the Muslim world that brings a good 
amount of de-correlation between the Group‟s sub-portfolios. 
 
Islamic banks also suffer from concentration on the liability side, leading to poor Asset 
Liability Management (ALM) as discussed in Section 3.5.5. At present, IFIs rely heavily 
on maintaining good relationships with depositors. However, these relationships can be 
tested during times of distress or changing market conditions, when depositors tend to 
change loyalties and shift to large financial institutions which they perceive to be safer. 
By diversifying their base of depositors, Islamic banks could reduce their exposure to 
displacement or withdrawal risks. According to Askari et al. (2009), with the changing 
face of banking and the introduction of internet-based banking, achieving a high degree 
of geographic diversity on the liabilities side is conceivable and should be encouraged.  
 
Concentration and potentially volatility in the credit quality of portfolios have made it 
necessary for IFIs to maintain strong capitalisation despite rapid growth. This has in turn 
put pressure on dividend payouts, and sometimes also on shareholders to inject fresh 
capital. 
 
3.5.3 Market Risk 
 
Market risk is generally defined as the risk of loss arising from changes in market prices 
and profit rates, which will result in a change in earnings or fair value of a financial 
obligation resulting in a capital gain or loss upon realisation of the asset (EIIB, 2010d). 
The losses can be in on- and off-balance sheet positions arising from adverse movements 
in market prices, i.e. fluctuations in yields and profit rates (rate of return risk), foreign 
exchange rates (FX risk), equity and commodity prices (price risk). The price volatility of 
most assets held in investment and trading portfolios is often significant. Volatility 
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prevails even in mature markets, although it is much higher in emerging or illiquid 
markets.  
 
Market risk was recognised in the late eighties, after the increasing importance of stock 
markets, when banks started investing heavily in securities (Davis, 2009a). Market risk is 
difficult to measure due to diversified portfolios, since it will consist of several markets, 
currencies, indexes, and instruments. The larger the diversification of the portfolio, the 
more difficult it is to accurately estimate market risks due to the correlation between 
risks.  
 
3.5.3.1.  Market risk management  
 
By its very nature, market risk requires constant management attention and adequate 
analysis. Although there are several ways to measure and manage market risks, which 
vary among banks, most banks have limits and triggers for portfolios, individual 
transactions, sectors, and even for traders. Banks also use marking to market, stop-loss 
provisions, gap analysis, back testing, and stress testing for their daily risk management 
of banking and trading books. Stress testing is gaining more popularity to help predict 
expected losses.  
 
Factor sensitivities and VaR can be used for marked-to-market trading. VaR is the most 
well-known methodology to quantify and valuate market risk in a systematic fashion. It is 
one of the newer risk management tools that indicates how much a firm can lose or make 
with a certain probability in a given time horizon. VaR summarizes financial risk inherent 
in portfolios into a simple number. It is the value of potential losses that will not be 
exceeded in more than a given fraction of possible events over the given time horizon. 
This fraction, expressed as a percentage, is called the „tolerance level‟. For example, 
stating that VaR is 100 at the tolerance level of 5% means that the chances that futures 
losses exceed 100 over a one day period are equal to 5% (Bessis, 1999). Though VaR is 
used to measure market risk in general, it incorporates many other risks like foreign 
currency, commodities, and equities. In fact, VaR applies to all levels of risk 
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Principle 4.1: IIFS shall have in place an appropriate framework for market risk management (including 
reporting) in respect of all assets held, including those that do not have a ready market and/or are exposed 
to high price volatility. 
management, including credit risk, although it is often associated with market risk only 
(Bessis, 1999). It has many variations and can be estimated in different ways like the 
Monte Carlo approach, the Parametric approach, and the Historical approach. However, 
VaR models possess some latent weaknesses arising from the fact that they are tailor-
made models. As a risk indicator, VaR works best for smaller positions in liquid markets. 
In the most recent crisis (like many in the past), the biggest losses occurred when several 
firms built up concentrations, sometimes unbeknownst to their managers and often 
unknown to each other. Then, when liquidity evaporated, firms were stuck with big 
positions or were forced to liquidate at the same time, exacerbating the trend in falling 
values. In either case, increases in observed market volatility caused the VaR attributed to 
remaining positions to rise. Thus, VaR has also been criticized for being a pro-cyclical 
risk measure. The use of other measures to supplement VaR, such as Expected Shortfall 
(the average of all the hypothetical losses beyond daily VaR), can help provide better 
market risk management (Moody‟s, 2009c). Therefore, data inputs should be carefully 
assessed before the appropriate model is applied. In addition, the conventional market is 
full of complex derivative products for hedging the positions to manage market risk.  
 
3.5.3.2.  Market risk in Islamic banks 
 
IFSB Principle, as in Box 3.2, introduces the risk management strategy in market 
risk. 
 
Box 3.2: IFSB Principle of Market Risk Management 
Source: IFSB (2005a) 
 
Market risk in the Islamic financial markets inherently exists within the lifetime of the 
Islamic contracts. The management of market risks is made more difficult for Islamic 
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Principle 6.1: IIFS shall establish a comprehensive risk management and reporting process to assess the 
potential impacts of market factors affecting rates of return on assets in comparison with the expected 
rates of return for investment account holders (IAH).  
Principle 6.2: IIFS shall have in place an appropriate framework for managing displaced commercial 
risk, where applicable. 
banks due to the limited number of risk management tools/instruments available to them. 
For example, it is difficult for an IFI to use hedging instruments, such as derivatives, as 
they are generally forbidden. On a positive note, the prohibition of gharar usually 
tempers the risk profile of Islamic banks simply by limiting the size of their trading 
operations. Market risk for IFIs can be divided into six categories as follows: 
 
3.5.3.2.1. Rate of return risk (profit rate risk) 
 
IFSB Principles, as in Box 3.3, introduce the risk management strategy for rate of 
return risk. 
 
Box 3.3: IFSB Principles of Rate of Return Risk Management  
Source: IFSB (2005a) 
 
Islamic banks are not exposed to an „interest-rate risks‟, as interest is not compliant with 
the Shari’ah. However, they face potentially even more complex rate of return risks and 
benchmark risks. Lee (2008) explains that Islamic banks do not operate in a closed 
economy; if interest rates rise sharply in relation to mark-up rates, deposits will flow from 
Islamic banks into conventional banks and vice versa. 
 
This results from a mismatch between the yield earned on the bank‟s assets and that 
served on its liabilities. Controlling margin rates is at the heart of IFIs‟ ALM. The 
management of interest-rate risk is one of the fundamental tasks of conventional banks‟ 
ALM committees. Similarly, IFIs face the same issue of identifying, measuring, and 
controlling the risk exposure stemming from the expected cash inflows and outflows of 
assets and liabilities according to their economic maturities. Like conventional banks, 
 
80 
IFIs have both a portfolio yielding fixed income over the duration of contracts and a 
portfolio generating floating rates of profit.  
 
However, unlike conventional banks, the charge attached to funding costs is supposed to 
be a function of asset yields, as per the core principle of profit sharing underlying Islamic 
banking and finance, which is at the heart of Profit-Sharing Investment Accounts 
(PSIAs). Should there be no smoothing of returns to PSIA holders, those IFIs that resort 
materially to PSIAs for funding would in theory be less profitable than conventional 
banks when the interest-or profit-rate cycle is at its peak, because when conventional 
banks would face a predetermined cost of funds, IFIs would on the contrary be in a 
position to share more returns with PSIA-holders (Thun, 2010).  
 
The opposite scenario would also be true: when the interest- or profit-rate cycle trends 
down towards its trough, IFIs would buffer the decline by distributing less profit to PSIA-
holders, whereas conventional banks would have to absorb the same cost of funds at a 
time when net asset yields had shrunk, therefore reducing more substantially their 
margins. If PSIA principles are applied, a lower income on outstanding loans and 
participations goes hand in hand with lower payments to depositors and the bank‟s 
solvency is not endangered (Visser, 2009). In practice, however, the losses of Islamic 
banks are not shared with PSIAs holders and often a minimum yield on deposits is 
„implicitly‟ guaranteed. As a result, the potential benefits of the PLS finance cannot be 
realised. There is often an implicit promise of some minimal return on deposits, or a de 
facto guarantee of non-negative returns (Turen, 1995). 
 
Another difference between Islamic and conventional banks is their respective capacity to 
use derivatives to hedge their loan books against adverse interest-/profit-rate scenarios. 
IFIs have a natural preference for short-term exposures or contractual credit terms that 
would allow for quick re-pricing schemes, such as ijarah or diminishing musharakah, 
which typically re-price every quarter, behaving like floating profit-rate loans. These 
mechanisms make it less necessary for Islamic banks to resort to (expensive) profit-rate 
swaps for hedging purposes. Only less than a handful of IFIs to date have had access to 
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such hedging instruments because of Shari’ah reasons and because so far these 
instruments are still very scarce, illiquid, based on over-the-counter arrangements, and 
thus still quite costly (Askari et al., 2009).  
 
In the longer term, IFIs are expected to be increasingly exposed to project finance and 
mortgage lending, two of the most likely and powerful engines for the future momentum 
of Gulf banking markets. In both lines of business, an IFI‟s capacity to supply long-term 
fixed-rate financing would be viewed as a key competitive advantage. From a balance-
sheet-management perspective, the IFI‟s corresponding capacity to manage the derived 
profit-rate risk would be critical, particularly under Basel II‟s Pillar 2.  
 
In some cases, IFIs can employ nascent Shari’ah -compliant hedging techniques. Dubai 
Islamic Bank and Deutsche Bank AG have stated that they have established the first ever 
Shari’ah-compliant profit rate collar (Ayub, 2007). For less sophisticated IFIs, the 
matching of floating and fixed yields can be used as a natural way to cover these risks. 
An ijara portfolio – with a floating margin or re-pricing characteristics – could be used to 
reduce an IFI's exposure to margin risk resulting from the use of PSIAs as a funding 
source. As IFIs usually benefit from a large portion of unremunerated deposits, as is the 
case for Saudi Arabia-based Al Rajhi Bank, this can also be a good mitigating factor for 
margin-related risks. 
 
The core opportunity comes from developing products to manage profit rate risks and FX 
risks using fixed-floating profit swaps and currency swaps. Profit rate swaps rely mostly 
on the double murabahah approach, referred to as the „Dual Murabahah‟ agreement 
(Marx, 2010). Although straight-forward FX contracts are not permissible, there are 
several alternative solutions, which all have their respective challenges, like: Back-to-
back qard al-hasan, Dual Commodity murabahah contracts, waad, arboun, and others as 
discussed under section 3.9. 
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Principle 3.1: IIFS shall have in place appropriate strategies, risk management and reporting processes 
in respect of the risk characteristics of equity investments, including Muḍārabah and Mushārakah 
investments.  
Principle 3.2: IIFS shall ensure that their valuation methodologies are appropriate and consistent, and  
shall assess the potential impacts of their methods on profit calculations and allocations. The methods 
shall be mutually agreed between the IIFS and the Muḍārib and/or Mushārakah partners.  
Principle 3.3: IIFS shall define and establish the exit strategies in respect of their equity investment 
activities, including extension and redemption conditions for Mudārabah and Mushārakah investments, 
subject to the approval of the institution‟s Sharī`ah Board. 
 3.5.3.2.2. Equity investment risk 
 
IFSB Principles, as in Box 3.4, introduce the risk management strategy for equity 
investment risk management. 
 
Box 3.4: IFSB Principles of Rate of Equity Investment Risk Management 
Source: IFSB (2005a) 
 
Most banks, whether conventional or Islamic, deal in quoted and non-quoted equities all 
over the world. Typical examples of equity investments are holdings of shares in the 
stock market, private equity investments, syndications, management buyouts, etc. 
However, due to the nature of Islamic finance contracts particularly, the musharakah and 
mudarabah contracts, may result in specific equity risks to IFIs. This is mainly because 
one of their main characteristics lies in the sharing, between the IFIs and the partner, of 
profit and loss that is driven by the share in the investment‟s equity (Grais and 
Kulathunga, 2007). Therefore, the degree of risk under those contracts is relatively higher 
than in other investments.  
 
Mudarabah can expose the IFI to moral hazards and to principal-agent problems when 
the bank enters as rab al-mal and the mudarib is the agent. While the bank bears all the 
losses in case of negative outcome, it cannot oblige the mudarib to take appropriate 
action or exert the required level of effort needed to generate the expected level returns. 
Such situations might be exploited by the mudarib (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008).  
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This moral hazard problem would be reduced in musharakah, where the capital of the 
partner is always at stake. Furthermore, the bank as an equity partner would minimize the 
problem of information asymmetry, as it would have the right to participate in 
management of the project in which it is investing. However, the musharakah asset class 
has an associated cost in the form of adverse selection and therefore requires extensive 
due diligence in terms of screening, information gathering, and enhanced monitoring 
afterwards. Each musharakah contract requires careful analysis and negotiation of profit-
and-loss sharing arrangements, leading to higher costs of intermediation.  
 
In addition, equity investments may not generate steady income, and capital gain might 
be the only source of return. The unscheduled nature of cash flows makes it difficult to 
forecast and manage them. 
 
As a result of the additional equity problems associated with both types of contracts, IFIs 
in practice tend to allocate limited funds to these asset classes. This implies an increased 
reliance on asset-backed securities, which limits the choice of investments and ultimately 
might hamper the bank‟s ability to manage risks and diversify its portfolio (Greuning and 
Iqbal, 2008). A few IFIs also tend to build portfolios of participations in the capital of a 
set of financial and industrial companies held for strategic purposes; usually, mudarabah 
contracts are used, as is the case for Shari’ah-compliant investment and/or private equity 
firms such as Arcapita Bank and Gulf Finance House in Bahrain. 
 
3.5.3.2.3. Mark-up risk 
 
Islamic banks are exposed to mark-up risk, as the mark-up rate used in murabahah or 
other trade-financing contracts are fixed for the duration of the contract, while the general 
„market mark-up rate‟ used in the financial market may rise or fall over that time period 
(FRSGlobal, 2009). This means that the prevailing market mark-up rate may rise beyond 
the rate the bank has locked into a contract, making the bank unable to benefit from 
higher rates. Very often the mark-up rate (or benchmark rate) will be an international 
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once such as London Inter-bank Offered Rate (LIBOR), which gives rise also to a so 
called „benchmark risk‟.   
 
 
3.5.3.2.4. Benchmark risk 
 
It is the risk of loss due to a change in the margin between domestic rates of return and 
the benchmark rates of return, which may not be linked closely to domestic returns. For 
instance, Islamic products issued in Malaysia can be linked to the Kuala Lumpur 
Interbank Offered Rate (KLibor), the national variant of LIBOR, but this is certainly not 
the case for all countries and contracts (Mahlknecht, 2009). In the absence of an Islamic 
benchmark or reference rate, a questionable, but common practice has been to use the 
LIBOR as a proxy which aligns their market risk closely with the movement in LIBOR 
rates.  
 
According to an interview with Yaccubi (2010), the practice of using LIBOR as the 
reference benchmark was originally considered an exception allowed by the Shari’ah 
scholars under the law of necessity. This exception has become a general rule and the 
practice is so prevailing that most practitioners do not even question it. Yet, using LIBOR 
as a benchmark has its proponents and opponents.      
 
The proponents of the practice argue that it is simply a reference point of the current 
capital market indicating the opportunity cost of capital, which should not be different in 
global markets where Islamic and conventional banking coexist (Askari et al., 2009). If 
the opportunity cost of capital is not the same, arbitrage opportunities will arise. They 
also argue that using a non-Shari’ah-compliant reference point does not invalidate a 
Shari’ah-compliant transaction, as the index is just used as a reference. Moreover, an 
Islamic benchmark is not expected in the near term. According to the Shari’ah scholar, 
Aznan Hasan, “A dual system which has both Islamic and conventional benchmark 
financing rates could throw markets into disarray … People will arbitrage. Once they see 
conventional financing is much better, they will go for conventional. Once they see 
 
85 
Islamic is much better, they will go for Islamic. In that situation, it will give a big 
turbulence to a country. The subject has to be treated very delicately” (Y-Sing, 2009). 
  
On the other hand, the opponents of this practice argue that in an Islamic economic 
system, the rate of return on a financial asset should be derived from the rate of return in 
the real sector and using LIBOR, as a benchmark does precisely the opposite and thus 
violates the foundation of an Islamic financial system (Askari et al., 2009). 
 
3.5.3.2.5. Currency risk 
 
Currency risk is of a „speculative‟ nature and could result in a gain or loss depending on 
the direction of exchange rate shifts and whether a bank is net long or net short in the 
foreign currency. For example, in the case of a net long position in the foreign currency, 
domestic currency depreciation will result in a net gain for a bank, and a currency 
appreciation will produce a loss, and vice versa, explains Fochler (2010), who was 
interviewed for this research.  
 
As for conventional banks, IFIs‟ exposure to foreign exchange risk can be harmful. While 
conventional banks can easily hedge themselves through swaps or other hedging 
instruments, these are generally forbidden in Islamic finance, making the situation more 
challenging for IFIs. However, most Islamic banks are active in the GCC, where local 
currencies are pegged either to the U.S. dollar or to a basket of international currencies, 
reducing tremendously their volatility. In the longer run, GCC economies might converge 
towards a single regional currency, the anchor of which might not be the U.S. dollar or 
the euro, but potentially a wider mix of internationally recognised currencies. This would 
in turn allow for some discrepancy between the reporting currency of GCC-based IFIs 
and the various cash flows they generate from multiples geographies. This will become 
even more obvious as IFIs such as Kuwait Finance House, Al Rajhi Bank, and Qatar 
Islamic Bank are expanding abroad in a more ordered and ambitious manner, sometimes 
in other emerging markets including the relatively volatile economies of Pakistan, 
Turkey, Sudan, and even Yemen. These jurisdictions are increasingly the key to the 
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future growth of IFIs as they have far larger Muslim populations and are comparatively 
underbanked (Standard & Poor‟s, 2010b).  
 
3.5.3.2.6. Commodity and price risks 
 
In the case of salam contracts, IFIs are exposed to commodity price volatility during the 
period between delivery of the commodity and its sale at the prevailing market price. This 
risk is similar to the market risk of a forward contract if it is not hedged properly. In order 
to hedge its position, an Islamic bank may enter into a parallel (off-setting) bay’ al-salam 
contract (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). Similarly, when the istisna’a contract is used, the 
delivery of the commodity is at a specific time in the future, where its price may differ 
from the set one. 
 
In addition, salam contracts are neither exchange traded nor these are traded over the 
counter. Thus, all the salam contracts end up in physical deliveries and ownership of 
commodities. These commodities require inventories exposing the IFI to storage costs 
and other related price risk. Such costs and risks are unique to Islamic banks (Greuning 
and Iqbal, 2008). 
 
In murabahah contracts, the bank is financing the contract on a certain profit added to the 
initial commodity price. The difference between the agreed and the future market price of 
the commodity is the actual exposure of the corresponding risk that banks take, at least in 
theory. In practice, the bank takes the commodity risk for a few seconds as it purchased 
and sells the commodities to commodity brokers – like Dawnay Day, Richmond, Aston 
commodities, and others, who involve into a purchase undertaking with the bank. This 
practice, referred to as tawarruq, has been under criticism from many Shari’ah scholars. 
It was approved initially as an interim solution until IFIs move to genuine commodity 
murabahah, but it seems that several banks took advantage from this interim approval 
and prefer to stick to tawarruq as it bears minimal commodity risks to the bank.   
 
 
87 
In addition, in the case of an operating ijarah, the IFI is exposed to market risk in case of 
a fall in the residual value of the leased asset at the maturity of the lease term (Ahmed 
and Khan, 2007). 
 
Finally, IFIs have been investing heavily in the sukuk market. However, given that the 
secondary market for sukuk is very limited, the prices of such instruments are highly 
distorted. Thus IFIs holding such securities are exposed to volatility in yield, unless they 
hold the sukuk until maturity. 
 
3.5.3.3.  Managing market risk for IFIs  
 
In order to manage market risk, first Islamic banks must be able to measure it accurately. 
To date, there is not a single Islamic banking system that is capable of measuring market 
risk properly (Marx, 2010). “I am confident Islamic banks will get there, it is a matter of 
time. One has to remember that conventional banking has mega banks that are capable of 
spending millions on developing sophisticated systems, something that Islamic banking is 
missing, given its relative nascent state” adds Bhat , one of the interviewees from 
InfrasoftTech, a specialized IT company for developing technology solutions and systems 
for Islamic banks. His interview was not included in the final sample, however. 
   
In the absence of Shari’ah-compliant hedging tools and liquid secondary markets, 
managing market risk is more expensive in Islamic banking than it is in conventional 
banking. Marx (2010), one of the interviewees for this research, adds “for example to 
carry a profit rate swap in the Islamic banking market, I have to pay around 30 bps higher 
than what this would usually cost in the conventional market. This is because very few 
banks have the capability, systems, and credit lines available to write Islamic profit rate 
swaps and they exploit this position”.  
 
Most advanced market risk management tools like VaR, and simulation models require 
huge trading volumes, long history of price changes, and volatility in order to be able to 
perform back-testing and stress-testing. This is simply unavailable for Islamic banking 
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given its relatively new state and the limited market liquidity. VaR does not work well for 
illiquid markets with high concentrations; unfortunately this is the current state of most 
Islamic banking operators. In addition, issuers in Islamic finance tend to have a relatively 
small number of issues with short term maturities. Furthermore, there tends to be a wide 
gap between the bid/offer spreads on Islamic instruments due to limited liquidity. All 
these factors indirectly distort the applicability of conventional market risk management 
tools in Islamic banking. “Islamic banking is not mature enough to apply existing 
conventional market risk mitigation and hedging techniques. It needs to develop it owns 
set of risk management tools” adds Qaedi (2010), one of the interviewees for this 
research. 
 
In the absence of sophisticated tools, Islamic banks tend to use traditional risk 
management techniques to manage their market risk. Simple stress testing, marking to 
market, stop-loss provisions, position limits, duration methodologies, scenario analysis, 
price sensitivity, and profit rate analysis are the most commonly used practices, mainly 
carried out using spreadsheets rather than sophisticated IT systems. “Very simple models, 
but currently adequate given the complexity of Islamic banking” comments Lowe (2010), 
one of the interviewees for this research. 
 
3.5.4 Liquidity Risk  
 
Liquidity is necessary for banks to compensate for expected and unexpected balance 
sheet fluctuations and to provide funds for growth. It represents a bank‟s ability to 
accommodate the redemption of deposits and other liabilities and to cover the demand for 
funding in the loan and investment portfolio (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007). Liquidity needs 
usually are determined by the construction of a maturity ladder that comprises expected 
cash inflows and outflows over a series of specific time bands; liquidity management is 
related to a net funding requirement.  
 
Liquidity risk results when the bank‟s ability to match the maturity of assets and 
liabilities is impaired. In other words, the risk arises due to insufficient liquidity for 
 
89 
normal operating requirements reducing the bank‟s ability to meet its liabilities when 
they fall due. This risk may result from either difficulties in obtaining cash at reasonable 
cost from borrowings (funding risk) or sale of assets (asset liquidity risk). While funding 
risk can be controlled by proper planning of cash-flow needs and seeking newer sources 
of funds to finance cash shortfalls, the asset liquidity risk can be mitigated by 
diversification of assets and setting limits of certain illiquid products (Khan and Ahmed, 
2001). 
 
The market turmoil that began in mid-2007 has highlighted the crucial importance of 
market liquidity to the banking sector. The contraction of liquidity in certain structured 
product and interbank markets, as well as an increased probability of off-balance sheet 
commitments coming onto banks‟ balance sheets, led to severe funding liquidity strains 
for some banks and central bank intervention in some cases. These events emphasised the 
interrelationship between funding, liquidity and credit risks, and the fact that liquidity is a 
key determinant of the soundness of the banking sector (BCBS, 2008). Financial 
innovation and global market developments have transformed the nature of liquidity risk 
in recent years. The funding of some banks has shifted towards a greater reliance on the 
capital markets, which are potentially a more volatile source of funding than traditional 
retail deposits. In addition, the growth and product range of the securitisation market has 
broadened as the originate-to-distribute business model has become more widespread. 
Northern Rock is a classical example of a bank that was brought down due to lack of 
liquidity rather than any credit or solvency risk. The bank simply borrowed for the short 
term from the capital markets and lent for long-term to residential mortgages. 
 
Inspired by international drive from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) and the Committee of European Banking Supervisors on liquidity management, 
regulators around the globe have been working on introducing a series of new rules 
outlining features of new liquidity regime which proposes much higher levels of stress 
testing and stricter liquidity management approaches. Basel III is the most obvious 
example. 
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Principle 5.1: IIFS shall have in place a liquidity management framework (including reporting) taking into 
account separately and on an overall basis their liquidity exposures in respect of each category of current 
accounts, unrestricted and restricted investment accounts.  
Principle 5.2: IIFS shall assume liquidity risk commensurate with their ability to have sufficient recourse 
to Sharī`ah-compliant funds to mitigate such risk. 
3.5.4.1.  Liquidity risk in Islamic banks 
 
IFSB Principles, as in Box 3.5, introduce the risk management strategy for liquidity 
risk management. 
 
Box 3.5: IFSB Principles of Liquidity Risk Management 
Source: IFSB (2005a) 
 
Islamic banks have traditionally held high levels of cash/liquid assets, ideally to 
safeguard the interests of their depositors, investors and shareholders against credit 
upheavals and liquidity crunch. This reduces liquidity risks in an economic downturn. In 
addition, from a leverage perspective, IFIs‟ operational models are built upon 
conservative fundamental values that discourage the use of disproportionate levels of debt 
to finance assets, as well as speculative and doubtful investments, which have inhibited 
the industry in terms of its use of leverage. As a result, IFIs‟ funding portfolios are highly 
concentrated in a few liquid assets and are deficient in terms of a securitised asset base 
(IFSB, 2008a). 
 
At the same time, underutilised surplus liquidity on most IFIs books has led to weak 
asset-liability management, which translates into liquidity risk. This risk arises from the 
scarcity of medium- and long-term funds to reduce the gap between assets and liabilities. 
The analysis in Figure 3.3 categorises the assets and liabilities of a sample of 20 leading 
Islamic banks into short term, medium term, and long term. IFIs use short and medium 
term liabilities to finance long term assets. Currently, IFIs are highly dependent on short-
term funds to manage their longer-tenure liabilities. This issue has become even more 
crucial in today‟s capital market environment because the frequency of asset write-downs 
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is on the rise. In the wake of global financial developments, liquidity has become one of 
the most critical risks for IFIs for the following reasons: 
 
(i) Limited availability of Shari’ah-compliant liquidity management instruments 
because most instruments used for liquidity management purposes are interest-based 
and Shari’ah does not allow the sale of debt, other than at its face value. Thus, to 
raise funds by selling debt-based assets is not an option for IFIs. 
 
(ii) Shallow secondary market exists to enable IFIs to manage their liquidity (Qaedi, 
2010); 
 
(iii) Absence of lender of last resort (central bank) which is vital for meeting the bank‟s 
need for short-term cash flow; 
 
(iv) Wide maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities as funding is still dominated 
by short-term customer deposits, whereas credit portfolios (namely in the retail, 
mortgage, and project finance segments) tend to witness longer tenors and duration 
(Moody‟s, 2009c); 
 
(v) Certain characteristics of some Islamic finance instruments give rise to liquidity 
risks. For instance, liquidity becomes a problem given the cancellation risks in 
murabahah or the inability to trade murabahah or salam contracts (Alvi, 2009a). 
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Figure 3.3: Breakdown Analysis of Leading Islamic Banks’ Balance Sheets 
 
Source: Zawya and Oliver Wyman Analysis (2009) 
 
Despite the efforts of the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) and others to provide a range of 
liquid instruments in which Islamic banks can place their surplus cash, there is still a 
great shortage of liquid instruments, which means IFIs tend to have more non-earning 
assets on their books. Typically, Islamic banks would place their excess cash reserves 
into short-term interbank murabahahs, at a cost compared to conventional banks. Indeed, 
short-term murabahahs resemble money market interbank placements, but as murabahah 
contracts make it necessary for commodity brokers to be involved, costs for managing 
liquidity might be high. As a consequence, IFIs are truly – and often more visibly – 
subject to the constant trade-off between profitability and liquidity in a binary way 
(Moody‟s, 2009c).  
 
Contrary to conventional banks, which benefit from a range of asset classes displaying 
different characteristics in terms of liquidity and profitability, IFIs at this stage of the 
development of the Islamic financial industry barely have an alternative – profitable but 
highly illiquid asset classes (such as credit exposures and sukuk); or highly liquid short-
term murabahahs with international investment-grade banks, but at a cost. Even before 
the present crisis, liquidity on the secondary sukuk markets was quite limited. The fact 
that most sukuk investors have always adopted a buy-and-hold strategy only exacerbates 
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the normal problems associated with a relatively new market. Critically in the current 
environment, such a situation could also continue to slow the efforts of central banks to 
boost sukuk liquidity. 
 
The assets side of the balance sheet will typically show investments in securities, leased 
assets and real estate. It will also show equity investments in joint ventures or capital 
ventures and sales receivables, and also inventories of assets held for sale. Most of these 
assets are illiquid and it is unlikely that any could be sold in a short space of time.  
 
Fortunately, yields on Islamic assets in many markets are still sufficient for the cost of 
managing liquidity, because „borrowers‟ are often willing to pay a premium for the 
Islamic nature of the banking relationship they build with the IFI. In the future, however, 
as the industry matures, margins might come under pressure and the trade-off between 
liquidity and profitability might lead to an increase in IFIs‟ risk appetite, provided that 
instruments for liquidity management purposes are not designed for the benefit of IFIs 
(Moody‟s, 2009c).  
 
Figure 3.4 extracted from a typical credit application for an anonymous counterparty at 
the European Islamic Investment Bank illustrates a typical liquidity structure of many 
Islamic banks with an imbalanced funding continuum heavily reliant on short-term 
customer deposits. IFIs normally have high volume of assets, which are generally of 
longer term than most deposits. Islamic banks have to manage this funding gap carefully: 
if there were a liquidity freeze like the one that struck Western banks, the damage among 
Islamic banks would be greater. 
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Figure 3.4: Example of Imbalanced Funding Continuum at an Islamic Bank 
 
 
 
Source: Extract from a credit application for an anonymous counterparty at the European Islamic 
Investment Bank (2010) 
 
Islamic banks use cash from deposits and short-term liquid assets to finance long-term 
liabilities. As a result, the liability makeup affects their funding structures differently and 
reflects an institution‟s specific asset-liability management policies. In comparison with 
conventional banks, asset-backed transactions (depending on the character of the asset) 
can expose an IFI both as an investor with high credit risk and also as an owner when 
dealing with long-term assets such as property and/or infrastructure. In order to mitigate 
this long-term liability-related risk, an IFI should have a vast pool of assets with a 
maturity range at its disposal to close the asset-liability gap (Lowe, 2010), who was 
interviewed for this research. 
 
As a result, the Islamic banking industry is faced with a conundrum: its institutions 
maintain high concentrations in current/short-term liabilities, but, at the same time, they 
are exposed to highly profitable, but illiquid, long-term assets (e.g. property and 
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infrastructure, and sukuk), and they have limited access to long-term funding solutions. 
The nature of the Islamic banking model and Shari’ah-compliant laws applicable to the 
available asset classes means that these banks are persistently faced with a swap between 
liquidity and profitability (Moody‟s, 2009c). 
 
According to McKinsey&Company (2009), on the liquidity front, as depicted in Figure 
3.5, Islamic banks have a more pronounced maturity mismatch than conventional banks. 
However, Islamic Banks source more funds from deposits. 
 
Figure 3.5: Breakdown Analysis of IFI’s Funding Base 
 
Source: McKinsey&Company (2009) 
 
3.5.4.2. Attempts to reduce liquidity risk for Islamic banks 
 
The above mentioned factors made liquidity risk management far from being an easy task 
for IFIs, which need to weather possible liquidity shortages in light of unforeseen events. 
For instance, during the financial crisis in Turkey during 2000-2001, IFIs faced severe 
liquidity problems and one, Ihlas Finance, collapsed (Standard & Poor‟s, 2010a). Market 
participants hope that the greater use of innovative asset classes will complement the 
Net liquidity gap by contractual maturity
Based on a sample of 7 each of the largest conventional 
and Islamic banks (by assets) in the GCC. 
1 Includes all pure Islamic banks in the UAE, KSA, Kuwait, and Qatar 
2 Includes all conventional banks in the UAE, KSA, Kuwait, and Qatar
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currently variety-starved asset section on the balance sheet and help IFIs deal with 
liquidity concerns more efficiently. Several developments have taken place with a view to 
meeting this challenge.  
 
In Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) has developed an ad-hoc 
instrument called mutajara, which behaves like a repurchase agreement, known as „repo‟ 
in the banking world. Contractually, it is a term deposit with SAMA or other financial 
institutions, but 75% of this deposit can be „repoed‟ at SAMA at any point in time for 
liquidity purposes. This is notably the case for Al Rajhi Bank, which has an investment 
portfolio that can be repoed with SAMA (Moody‟s, 2009c). 
 
In Bahrain, the CBB is also working on developing a Shari’ah -compliant repo scheme. 
In addition, the LMC was founded in 2002 in Bahrain to facilitate the investment of 
surplus funds of Islamic financial institutions into financial instruments structured in 
accordance with Shari’ah principles. It also aims to assist the IIFM in the creation of 
secondary market activity with designated market makers where such instruments can be 
actively traded. Early in 2009, the IIFM announced that it has plans to co-operate with the 
International Capital Market Association (ICMA) to develop a repo-type liquidity 
management tool in order to manage overnight liquidity more efficiently in the future 
(Mahlknecht, 2009). 
 
Similarly, the Central Bank of Sudan has introduced Shari’ah -compatible securities to 
provide liquidity in the market (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008).  
 
Malaysia had also taken steps to reduce liquidity risk among Islamic banks. The central 
bank, Bank Negara Malaysia, introduced the Islamic Interbank Money Market (IIMM) in 
early 1994. The activities of the IIMM include the purchase and sale of Islamic financial 
instruments among market participants, interbank investment activities through 
mudarabah interbank investment scheme, and a check clearing and settlement system. 
The Islamic financial instruments that are currently being traded in the market on the 
basis of bay’ al-dayn (sale of debt) are the bankers‟ acceptances, Islamic bills, Islamic 
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mortgage bonds, and Islamic private securities. In addition, IFIs can sell government 
investment issues to the central bank, as and when required, to meet their liquidity needs. 
In turn, IFIs can buy Shari’ah-compliant investment issues from the central bank 
(Greuning and Iqbal, 2008).  
 
Whereas the contract of bay’ al-dayn is commonly accepted and practiced in the 
Malaysian financial markets, it is not accepted by the majority of Shari’ah scholars 
outside of Malaysia, who maintain that debt can be traded only at par. According to one 
of the interviewees for this research, Kailani (2010), if trade is not at par, they feel that 
the practice opens the door to riba.  
 
Mahlknecht (2009) suggests creating a common pool to which all Islamic financial 
institutions contribute a specific percentage of their deposits in exchange for the right to 
receive interest-free loans overnight or for up to three days. He adds that an exceptionally 
promising route would be to integrate the IDB into such structures in order to encourage 
cross-border participation by Islamic banks.  
 
Finally, the introduction of sukuk is a good development that has can provide the 
foundation for the development of secondary markets. A sukuk structured on murabahah, 
salam, and istisn’a should be held to maturity, while sukuk structured on equity basis 
(musharakah and mudarabah) or ijarah sukuk can be traded on the secondary market 
(Dar Al Istithmar, 2006). Legislative steps, including the creation of Saudi sukuk and 
bond market under the Tadawul (the Saudi stock exchange), are improving the prospects 
of sukuk becoming an attractive liquid instrument. Recent similar reforms in South Korea 
and Indonesia should also support the longer-term viability of the primary sukuk market 
and the establishment of an active secondary market, which will benefit the longer-term 
prospects of sukuk as an investment instrument amongst issuers and investors alike. 
According to Standard & Poor‟s (2009), such developments as timely steps that should 
both diversify Islamic finance assets and address investor needs, as well as adding depth 
to the market and enhancing transparency and efficiency amongst market participants.  
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Sukuk offer a longer term and more stable source of funding. In addition, governments 
and government-related institutions have made it clear on several occasions that their role 
on the sukuk market would not be limited to that of a benchmark-setter; issuing sovereign 
and public-sector sukuk would also contribute to enhancing the overall liquidity of the 
market. However, sukuk still constitute a very small proportion of the balance sheet 
despite the recent rapid growth in this funding source. Still illiquid, dominated by local 
issuances and hardly traded globally, sukuk cannot be considered an effective fixed-
income instrument for active management of balance sheets and liquidity. According to 
one of the interviewees for this research, Marx (2010), most repurchase agreements 
(repos) with bank counterparts or central banks are riba-based, so sukuk can hardly be 
used as repo collateral and very seldom serves as the basis for raising emergency liquidity 
in the event of need.  
 
The gradual introduction of sukuk funds will help create a secondary market for sukuk, 
whereby investors, including banks, can price their sukuk fairly, enhancing both liquidity 
and secondary market tradability (Moody‟s, 2009d). 
 
Market observers have pointed out that the lack of sukuk liquidity is still a primary 
weakness compared with conventional bonds. Another interviewee in this research, Masri 
(2010), argues that central banks and major international institutions do not accept any of 
the currently issued sukuk for repos because of: (i) lack of secondary market for sukuk; 
(ii) non-convertibility to other currencies; and (iii) most sukuk issues are not rated by 
international rating agencies. The first sukuk that is expected to be internationally 
accepted for repos is the long anticipated sukuk to be issued by the UK government. 
Masri believes that, until a sophisticated repos market is developed for Islamic finance, 
the liquidity problem will persist. “There are initiatives to develop a Shari’ah-compliant 
repo market but for the time being Islamic banks have only limited scope for getting hold 
of money in a quick way. The lack of Shari’ah-compliant assets and a tendency for 
Islamic investors to buy and hold their investments have stunted the secondary market”, 
as identified by Qaedi (2010), one of the interviewees for this research.    
 
 
99 
So far, IFIs have preferred an originate-and-hold business model due to the lack of a 
secondary market for loans and sukuk; however, in the longer term, IFIs with limited 
capital resources might be more inclined to adopt an originate-and-distribute business 
approach, provided disintermediation picks up, market depth and liquidity improves, and 
growth in Islamic assets continues unabated.  
 
The effect of the credit crisis on the sukuk market and the emergence of defaults are 
thoroughly discussed in a subsequent chapter.  
 
Furthermore, Marx (2010), who was interviewed for this research, explains that 
traditionally Islamic banks have circumvented the lack of an Islamic money market by 
entering into bilateral commodity trades with western banks that produce a return very 
close to the equivalent money market instruments. Although this is a valuable source of 
liquidity, it is an inadequate and fragmented solution to a problem that is perceived to be 
one of the greatest hindrances to a fully integrated Islamic financial system. One of the 
aims of the LMC is to provide instruments that have greater Shari’ah credibility and are 
more competitively priced than the commodity murabahah transactions currently 
undertaken in the market. 
 
Because of the lack of adequate Shari’ah-compliant money market instruments for 
liquidity management and the underdevelopment of Islamic money markets, the studies 
by IFSB in March 2008 provide suggestions for the development of the Islamic money 
market. Among the suggestions are to design a low-risk Islamic money market and 
Islamic government financing instruments and to incorporate Islamic government 
financing instruments as an integral part of the overall public debt and financing 
programme and foster its development (IFSB 2008a).  
 
Finally, October 2010 saw the signing and launch of the IILM, the latest trans-national 
body to serve the global Islamic finance industry. The ultimate aim of the IILM is to 
enhance international integration of the Islamic money market and capital markets and to 
better equip them to face any liquidity crises. This breakthrough will surely help take 
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Islamic finance to a higher level of development. It was proposed by the IILM to include 
only AAA-rated Shari’ah-compliant sukuk issued by sovereigns, quasi-sovereigns, and a 
selected number of major corporates. However, critics have suggested that the pool of 
AAA-rated papers is not sufficient. Governor Zeti, Bank Negara Malaysia stated, “we 
inject or withdraw liquidity from the system. There are very strict criteria for the 
eligibility of assets, as it is not the shareholders themselves that would allocate assets. 
Central banks can nominate entities to donate assets, which can be monetized. They will 
issue Islamic commercial papers against these assets through special purpose vehicles. 
They will be the primary dealers and they will create the markets” (IFSB, 2011). 
 
3.5.5 Asset-Liability Management 
 
Asset liability management (ALM) is closely correlated with liquidity risk management. 
It is simply the practice of managing risks that arise due to mismatches between the assets 
and liabilities of a bank. ALM is a management tool that involves the raising and use of 
funds in terms of strategic planning, implementation, and control processes that affect the 
volume, mix, maturity, profit rate sensitivity, quality, and liquidity of a bank‟s assets and 
liabilities. The primary goal of ALM is to produce a high-quality, stable, large, and 
growing flow of net interest/profit rate income (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). This goal is 
accomplished by achieving the optimum combination and level of assets, liabilities, and 
financial risk. 
 
3.5.5.1.  Funding sources for IFIs 
 
Table 3.2 shows that the limited range of possible funding sources for IFIs leads to 
concentrated liabilities, imbalanced funding mixes, and stretched capital management 
strategies. IFIs‟ wholesale liabilities tend to be concentrated as they are generally well 
entrenched in retail banking, which gives them access to a large, and increasing, pool of 
relatively cheap deposits. When these are not in the form of Profit-Sharing Investment 
Accounts (PSIAs), Islamic banks benefit from the fact that a portion of Islamic deposits 
tend to be noninterest bearing. This lowers their cost of funding compared with 
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conventional banks, increases their margins and improves their profitability. In addition, 
Islamic depositors tend to display a strong sense of loyalty as they are less rate-sensitive. 
This results in a longer-term behavioural nature of deposits. However, as in most cases 
the contractual tenor of those deposits is short-term, the banks remain exposed to 
maturity / liquidity risk. In other words, in times of crisis the bank may witness 
substantial withdrawals. 
 
Table 3.2: Simplified Balance Sheet of an IFI 
 
Source: Moody‟s (2009c) 
 
There are two types of PSIAs: restricted and unrestricted. For unrestricted PSIAs there is 
no identified asset allocation, while for restricted accounts the bank acts in a fiduciary 
capacity, with the investor choosing the nature of the investment to be made. In some 
cases these are accounted for as off-balance-sheet. For these accounts, banks maintain 
two types of reserves: a profit equalization reserve to smooth returns and investment risk 
reserves to absorb capital losses. While contractually investors are expected to absorb 
losses (the bank being only liable if there is negligence or fraud), the reality may be very 
different. Banks are under pressure to offer competitive returns and repay in full on due 
date to ensure these assets continue to be funded. PSIAs in general have maturities of 12 
months, and the assets financed tend to be fungible (Moody‟s, 2008a). 
 
Apart from retail accounts, which are in most cases both granular and stable across 
business cycles, IFIs also resort to wholesale creditors for funding. So far, sukuk have not 
 
102 
served as the main term funding source: only a handful of IFIs have issued medium-term 
sukuk so far, or are expected to do so in the near future, such as Sharjah Islamic Bank, 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, and Al Baraka Banking Group. For asset-backed sukuk, an 
Islamic bank needs to originate enough income-generating contracts, the underlying 
assets of which are owned by the bank (like in ijarah and/or musharakah) for the sukuk to 
be possible. However, the majority of sukuk issued so far, particularly in the Gulf region, 
have been asset-based rather than asset-backed, with „par value repurchase undertaking‟ 
structures whereby the market value of the underlying assets bears little or no relation to 
the funding amounts raised, argues Qaedi (2010), one of the interviewees for this 
research. Also, as these are not true-sale structures, any non-liquid assets can be used. 
Therefore, IFIs typically raise short to long-term funds from bank and non-bank 
customers, who tend to be price sensitive, relatively unstable (except those from the 
public sector) and concentrated as depicted by Table 3.3. Deposit concentration is 
generally a significant risk factor for IFIs. 
 
Table 3.3: Sources of Funds: Islamic vs. Traditional Banks 
 
 
Source: Khan (2004) 
ISLAMIC BANKS TRADITIONAL BANKS
Tier – 1 Capital (equity) Tier – 1 Capital (equity)
Tier – 2 Capital Tier – 2 Capital (Subordinated 
loans)
Current accounts Current accounts
Saving accounts Interest-based Saving accounts
Unrestricted Profit Sharing 
Investment Accounts (PSIAs)
Time & certificates of deposits
Profit equalization reserves 
(PER)
Reserves 
Investment risk reserve (IRR)
ISLAMIC BANKS TRADITIONAL BANKS
Current accounts Current accounts
Banks in both cases use shareholders’ equity to protect these 
deposits
Profit sharing investment 
accounts (PSIA)
Time deposits, certificates of 
deposits, etc – fixed income 
liabilitiesShareholders’ equity protects 
these liabilities only in case of 
fiduciary risks (theory); Profit 
Equalization Reserve (PER) 
& Investment Risk Reserve 
(IRR)
Shareholders’ equity and 
subordinated loans protect 
these liabilities against all risks
Cost of funds: Variable Cost of funds: Fixed
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It should be noted that IFIs‟ funding bands remain imbalanced. Between deposits in their 
various forms (qard hasan, PSIAs, Murabahah, etc) and Tier 1 capital, IFIs have so far 
had access to a limited number of alternative funding sources with different features in 
terms of priority of claims and thus cost. Only very few subordinated sukuk have been 
issued so far. Malayan Banking Berhad in Malaysia, for example, issued a junior sukuk 
eligible as Tier 2 debt under Bank Negara Malaysia‟s regulation. According to Marx 
(2010), who was interviewed for this research, bank securitisation, other Tier 2 
instruments, Tier 3 short-term debt to cover the regulatory capital charge of market risk, 
as well as plain vanilla and innovative hybrid capital notes, are inexistent in the Islamic 
financial industry. One of the reasons behind such a vacuum in the wide – but often grey 
– area between deposit and core capital of IFIs lies in the fact that a number of Shari’ah 
supervisory boards have been uncomfortable so far with the concept of differentiating 
between priorities of claims of various classes of stakeholders in the case of liquidation, 
adds another interviewee, Chowdhury (2010). 
 
IFIs‟ capital management strategies, therefore, tend to be stretched. Allocation of 
economic capital to business units using risk-adjusted return-on-capital methodologies, 
for example, is barely applied, except in a handful of well-advanced institutions globally. 
However, even in the conventional universe, the allocation of economic capital to 
business units is still limited to a relatively small number of institutions that adopt more 
sophisticated risk management techniques. Therefore, it is not surprising that advanced 
approaches for economic capital computation have not so far been widely adopted by IFIs 
in emerging markets. Capital allocation tends to be inefficient at this stage, although this 
is not disadvantageous to a large extent as: (i) capitalisation ratios are high, and capital is 
not scarce in the geographies where IFIs are most active (typically in the Gulf region); (ii) 
asset yields are wide enough to serve record Return on Equity; and (iii) actual yields on 
equity far exceed shareholders‟ required rates of return (Moody‟s, 2008b).  
 
In the longer run, and after the current financial tsunami, competitive pressure and 
massive losses will drive margins down. In addition, customers will become more 
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educated about the concepts and principles underlying Islamic banking and finance and 
will tend to be less willing to accept lower returns on their deposits and switch more 
naturally to PSIAs, driving IFIs‟ funding costs up. Finally, capital has become scarcer 
given the recent losses and bailouts in the banking sector. All of these elements could 
easily change the nature of the IFIs‟ profitability equation, with lower net returns directed 
towards more demanding shareholders. A solution to the conundrum would be to let 
capitalisation ratios dwindle gradually to protect returns to shareholders while building 
assets more efficiently above targeted hurdle rates (Visser, 2009). Another option is to 
look for alternative financing vehicles like hybrid instruments, various classes of PSIAs, 
and securitization. Although debt obligations can only be traded at face value under 
Shari’ah law, this does not apply to the trading of assets, which opens the potential for 
the use of securitisation of assets such as leases (Visser, 2009). However, significant legal 
hurdles need to be overcome before securitisation can become a feasible source of 
funding for Islamic banks. 
 
As a fact, capital is a very expensive way of funding. Islamic banks, particularly in the 
GCC, therefore, engage in higher risk/high yield transactions to make up for the 
expensive funding via capital and consequently keep shareholders satisfied with high 
returns. Those IFIs forced themselves, unintentionally, up the risk curve instead of 
diversifying their risks. This makes the balance sheet of Islamic banks quite polarised, 
with high real estate assets. This led Islamic banks to a high Concentration Risk, on both 
sides of the balance sheet. A typical balance sheet structure of many Islamic banks 
displays high exposure to properties on the assets side; and limited funding sources with 
high reliance on short term liabilities and capital on the other side. A very unfavourable 
funding continuum that led Islamic banks to a viscous circle of risks: one risk creating the 
next.  
 
3.5.5.2.   ALM in Islamic banking: theory vs. practice 
 
In theory, IFIs should be less exposed to asset-liability mismatch than their conventional 
counterparts. This comparative advantage is rooted in the „pass through‟ nature of Islamic 
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banks, which act as agents for investors/depositors and pass all profits and losses through 
to them (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). In addition, the risk-sharing feature of Islamic 
finance plays a critical role. Following the theoretical model, any negative shock to an 
Islamic bank is absorbed by both shareholders and investors/depositors. On the other 
hand, depositors in the conventional system have a fixed claim on the returns of the 
bank‟s assets, irrespective of the bank‟s profitability on its assets side. In other words, 
holders of PSIAs in the Islamic system should share in the bank‟s profits and losses 
alongside shareholders, and are exposed to the risk of losing all or part of their initial 
investment. This contractual agreement between the IFI and the PSIA holders should be 
based on a „pass through‟ mechanism in which all profits and losses are passed to the 
investors. Thus, the problem of asset-liability mismatch should not exist. Some regulators 
have recognised this and require these assets (generally 50% risk-weighting) to be 
included in capital adequacy calculations and the reserves as Tier 2 capital (FRSGlobal, 
2009). Greuning and Iqbal (2008) argue that this type of financial intermediation 
contributes to the stability of the financial system. Because of the nature of contracts both 
on the assets and liabilities sides on the balance sheet, IFIs are often less vulnerable to 
external shocks and are less susceptible to insolvency. Chapter 5 covers in detail how the 
Islamic financial system could act as panacea for economic woes if its fundamentals are 
genuinely applied.  
 
The challenge to Islamic banks is to determine the rights and obligations of PSIA holders 
vis-à-vis shareholders, especially when various types of Shari’ah-compliant deposit 
accounts are offered, so as to ensure the required disclosures and transparency in the 
distribution of profits and the sharing of risks (IFSB, 2007). 
 
Lowe (2010), one of the interviewees in this study, explains that from an analytical 
perspective, PSIAs should not be classified as equity-like liabilities, despite their 
(theoretical) loss-absorbing characteristics. PSIAs are rather considered as more debt-like 
liabilities. The rationale behind this treatment of PSIAs as liabilities with no capital 
benefits is that, from an economic and practical perspective, PSIAs: 
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(i) are not permanent capital, as they tend to be very short-dated (with maturities 
typically below one year); 
(ii) can be withdrawn before maturity, provided that the PSIA holder gives up his or her 
contractual return to be earned at maturity; 
(iii)  have no voting rights; and 
(iv)  in practice, are very rarely allowed to absorb losses   
 
However, in practice the challenge is where there is a clear differentiation between PSIA 
holders and those of equity holders. Can IFIs avoid combining shareholders‟ and PSIA-
holders‟ funds, as the theory would suggest? The liabilities of Islamic banks may – in 
common with assets – have very different profiles and need careful management. The 
biggest issue remains the position of PSIA. Juristically, PSIA are a form of limited term 
equity rather than debt claims on the bank, and, therefore, losses relating to the assets 
they fund should not affect the bank‟s own capital. However, Islamic banks are not 
immune from runs or panic withdrawals, and PSIA-holders typically have the right to 
withdraw their funds at short notice, foregoing their share of the profit for the most recent 
period and also their share of any losses that might have arisen, explains Kailani (2010), 
who was interviewed for this research.  
 
Visser (2009) strongly opposes PSIA by arguing that they involve a moral hazard 
problem, as they might give the bank an incentive for risk taking and for operating with 
very little of their own funds. Depositors will have to take the brunt if investments go 
sour, just like equity investors in a conventional investment company, only they have no 
say in the appointment of management. They only thing depositors can do is to shift their 
funds to other banks, but they may not always have sufficient information to do so in 
time. He adds that this moral hazard problem was cited as one reason by the Rector of Al-
Azhar University in Cairo in his 2002 fatwa for declaring interest-bearing banking 
deposits halal. Visser (2009) obviously misses the point that regulators and Shari’ah 
boards will not allow IFIs to misuse PSIAs, and that IFIs put upmost importance on 
avoiding any jeopardy to their reputation.  
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Engel (2010), one of the interviewees for this research, adds that unrestricted PSIA funds 
will generally be combined with those of the bank‟s shareholders who may have quite 
different risk appetites, as PSIA-holders are generally looking for a safe investment, 
similar to deposit account holders in conventional banks. In practice, the treatment of the 
fund-combining issue is handled differently. Shamil Bank of Bahrain has so far applied a 
strict distinction, for management account and return computation purposes, between 
assets financed by shareholders‟ funds and what the bank calls „unrestricted investment 
accounts‟. Conversely, Kuwait Finance House – like most IFIs – does not explicitly 
segregate classes of liabilities and prefers a more flexible and convenient way of 
computing a total gross return on assets, and then applying both a musharakah and 
mudarabah fee to isolate returns to PSIA-holders (Moody‟s 2008a). 
 
The practice is, therefore, different from the theory, and the means of determining 
shareholder‟s share is not always transparent. Notwithstanding such practical differences 
among IFIs in both combining funding sources and computing returns, „displaced 
commercial risk‟ is always at stake, giving birth to various mechanisms of smoothing 
returns. Although displaced commercial risk is a unique risk to IFIs, it is discussed in this 
section because it forms an essential part of ALM for Islamic banks.  
 
3.5.5.3.  Displaced commercial risk 
 
 
Displaced commercial risk is indeed a term reflecting the risk of liquidity suddenly 
drying up as a consequence of massive withdrawals should the IFI‟s assets yield returns 
for PSIA holders lower than expected, or worse, negative rates of profits. It is the transfer 
of the risk associated with deposits to equity holders. This arises when under commercial 
pressure banks forgo a part of profit to pay the depositors to prevent withdrawals due to a 
lower return (AAOIFI, 1999). Displaced commercial risk implies that the bank though 
may operate in full compliance with the Shari’ah requirements, yet may not be able to 
pay competitive rates of return as compared to its peer group Islamic banks and other 
competitors. Depositors will again have the incentive to seek withdrawal. To prevent 
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withdrawal, the shareholders will need to apportion part of their own share in profits or 
even equity to the PSIA holders. 
 
As demonstrated below, the practice of smoothing investment returns through „profit 
equalisation reserves‟, „investment risk reserves‟, and active management of mudarib 
fees is a very common feature of IFIs to avoid random, business, and confidence-driven 
liquidity crises. As a matter of fact, a negative return on PSIAs would not constitute a 
breach of contractual obligations, as PSIAs are supposed to absorb losses other than those 
triggered by misconduct or negligence, and therefore would not be considered a default. 
Nevertheless, default might be subsequently triggered by the very tight liquidity 
conditions the IFI would face in the case of massive runs on deposits. While this is in 
keeping with the risk-sharing principles encouraged by Islam, it remains to be seen how 
such account holders would react to losses on their accounts.  
 
Some banking regulators have taken the view that this practice of smoothing returns 
results in a modification of the legal attributes of the PSIA such that Islamic banks have a 
„constructive obligation‟ to continue smoothing returns. This means that the practice of 
smoothing becomes obligatory, and unrestricted PSIA-holders effectively have the same 
rights as conventional depositors (Chowdhury, 2010), who was interviewed for this 
research. Kailani (2010) explained, during the interview for this research, that a typical 
problem in western countries with highly developed markets is the legal definition of a 
„bank‟ as a „deposit-taking institution‟; deposits having the legal status as debt contracts 
and being „capital certain‟, whereas Islamic banks accept deposits as PSIAs which cannot 
be capital certain as the Shari’ah does not permit this.  
 
Unfortunately, insofar as both Islamic banks and their supervisory authorities in some 
countries consider unrestricted investment accounts to be a product designed to compete 
with, and to be an acceptable substitute for, conventional deposits, profit smoothing in 
such an environment may be considered to be an inherent attribute of the product rather 
than a mean of deliberately avoiding transparency and market discipline, especially if it is 
combined with in-substance capital certainty (Archer and A. Karim, 2007). This 
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undermines an important inherent characteristic of risk mitigation within Islamic banking 
as discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
3.5.5.4. Managing displaced commercial risk efficiently is a dynamic exercise 
 
According to IFSB (2005a), traditionally, there are four lines of defence against displaced 
commercial risk: investment risk reserves (IRRs) and the bank‟s mudarib fee tend to 
absorb expected losses; profit equalisation reserves (PERs) are used to cover unexpected 
losses of manageable magnitude; and, ultimately, shareholders‟ funds stand against 
unexpected losses with a higher net impact. Figure 3.6 shows how Islamic banks use 
these lines of defend to ensure stability.  
 
IRRs are built from periodic provisions for expected, statistical losses, which come as a 
deduction from the asset portfolio, in the same way that loan-loss reserves are deducted 
from conventional banks‟ loan books. IRRs are gradually built from the periodic 
provision charge equivalent to the expected losses attached to IFIs‟ investment portfolios, 
transiting through the IFI‟s income statement. Should actual losses be in line with IRRs, 
there is limited likelihood that displaced commercial risk would materialise into a bank 
run and thus into a liquidity crisis. Indeed, returns to PSIA holders would not be 
negatively affected. IRRs are generally deducted from income distributable to PSIA 
holders after the PERs are accounted for, and after the mudarib fee is captured by the IFI 
(IFSB, 2005a).  
 
Reducing mudarib fees to protect returns to PSIA-holders remains a management 
decision. PSIAs are the combination of a musharakah contract (whereby PSIA-holders 
and shareholders bring funds to the banking venture) and a mudarabah contract (whereby 
the IFI‟s managers allocate PSIA-holders‟ funds to various asset classes on their behalf). 
Therefore, the IFI is eligible, under the mudarabah contract, for a mudarib (management) 
fee, which typically constitutes 20-40% of asset yields net of PERs. In case asset yields 
deteriorate beyond levels absorbable by IRRs, the IFI‟s management team, in line with 
the board‟s formal approval, could reduce management fees ex post, which it can do 
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contractually (although unilateral increases of mudarib fees are strictly forbidden). This is 
viewed as a gift of the bank to PSIA-holders to earn their loyalty across the cycle 
(Chowdhury, 2010), another interviewees for this research. Typically, mudarib fee 
reductions tend to apply when unexpected losses (beyond expected losses handled by 
IRRs) are manageable one-offs. When exceeding a certain threshold, losses would be 
covered by PERs (IFSB, 2005a).  
 
PERs, a grey area in the capital continuum, collectively belong to PSIA-holders for 
smoothing their returns. PERs are accounted for before any computation of the mudarib 
fee or IRRs. PERs are extracted from gross asset yields. Their purpose is to provide an 
excess return to PSIA-holders in periods where assets have performed worse than 
expected, and therefore when yields on PSIAs might be lower for a given IFI than for its 
Islamic and conventional peers. PERs collectively belong to present and future PSIA-
holders, although past PSIA-holders (who might not be current or future customers of the 
IFI) may have contributed to building them (Putz, 2010), one of the interviewees). This is 
in line with the principle according to which the various stakeholders of an IFI are subject 
to collective solidarity. PERs being a future claim of PSIA-holders on the bank, they are 
not part of capital in accounting terms, and thus are not subject to distribution to 
shareholders (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). From a regulatory perspective, however, the 
treatment suggested by the IFSB is very subtle, particularly in western jurisdictions, just 
like the treatment of PSIAs for the computation of capital adequacy ratios of IFIs under 
Basel II, which is explained in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
Smith (2010), Senior Analyst-Financial Institutions at Fitch Ratings and one of the 
interviewees for this research, explains that shareholders‟ funds constitute the ultimate 
line of defence against displaced commercial risk. Ultimately, should IRRs, mudarib fee 
cuts and PERs be insufficient to protect depositors from excessive volatility regarding 
PSIA returns, shareholders can lawfully use their own capital to compensate for possible 
losses or PSIA-holders‟ opportunity costs. Shareholders‟ funds have in the past been used 
to compensate holders of investment accounts, such as in 1998 for Dubai Islamic Bank 
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PJSC and in 1990 for Kuwait Finance House. In both cases, PSIA-holders suffered no 
losses.  
 
Figure 3.6: Managing Displaced Commercial Risk in IFIs 
 
Source: Khan (2004) 
 
Mahlknecht (2009) argues that an extreme example of displaced commercial risk is the 
International Islamic Bank for Investment and Development in Egypt, which distributed 
all of its profits to investment account holders and nothing to shareholders from the 
middle to late 1980s. In 1988 the bank distributed to its depositors an amount exceeding 
its profits, and the difference appeared in the bank‟s accounts a „loss carried forward‟. 
The practice of forgoing part or all of the shareholder‟s profits may adversely affect the 
bank‟s own capital, which can lead to insolvency in extreme cases.  
 
In short, although in theory there should be no mismatch between assets and liabilities of 
an Islamic bank, current practices have introduced distortions that expose banks to asset-
liability mismatch risk, especially when they have no liquid assets with which they can 
hedge such risks. Greuning and Iqbal (2008) believe that IFIs should standardize how to 
deal with displaced commercial risk, and the rights of PSIAs should be clearly stated and 
explained to all depositors. They suggest that the profits should be deducted only from 
long-term depositors, who are more likely to be exposed to such risk, and not from short-
term depositors, who are not exposed to it.  
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3.5.6 Operational Risk  
 
Historically, operational risk has been defined as all risks other than market, credit, and 
liquidity risk. However, the BCBS (2006) has narrowed this definition within Basel II by 
stating that operational risk is “The risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
internal processes, people or systems or from external events.” This definition includes 
legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk. 
 
Operational risk has been recently recognized and has been gaining prominence among 
risk-related research. It is now part of the integrated risk management framework of all 
financial institutions, which typically increases with the scope and size of activities of a 
bank but can be mitigated by a sophisticated risk management function and systems. The 
major components of operational risk are people, processes, technology, and external 
events (usually catastrophic). People‟s risk includes human errors, lack of expertise and 
compliance, and fraud. Process risks include risks related to different aspects of running a 
business, which may include regular business processes, risk related to new products and 
services, inadequate controls, etc. (Akkizidis and Khandelwal, 2007).  
 
Lowe (2010) argues that operational risks are rather difficult to measure and manage 
because these risks only become apparent once a problem arises. He stated that risks 
associated with operational risk could include:  
 
(i) Internal fraud. For example, intentional misreporting of positions, employee theft, 
and insider trading on an employee‟s own account; 
(ii) External fraud. For example, robbery, forgery, cheque kiting, and damage from 
computer hacking; 
(iii) Employment practices and workplace safety. For example, workers compensation 
claims, violation of employee health and safety rules, organised labour activities, 
discrimination claims, and general liability; 
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Principle 7.1: IIFS shall have in place adequate systems and controls, including Sharī`ah 
Board/ Advisor, to ensure compliance with Sharī`ah rules and principles.  
Principle 7.2: IIFS shall have in place appropriate mechanisms to safeguard the interests of 
all fund providers. Where IAH funds are commingled with the IIFS‟s own funds, the IIFS 
shall ensure that the bases for asset, revenue, expense and profit allocations are established, 
applied and reported in a manner consistent with the IIFS‟s fiduciary responsibilities. 
(iv) Clients, products and business practices. For example, fiduciary breaches, misuse 
of confidential customer information, improper trading activities on the bank‟s 
account, money laundering, and sale of unauthorised products;  
(v) Damage to physical assets. For example, terrorism, vandalism, earthquakes, fires 
and floods; 
(vi) Business disruption and system failures. For example, hardware and software 
failures, telecommunication problems, and utility outages; and 
(vii) Execution, delivery and process management. For example, data entry errors, 
collateral management failures, incomplete legal documentation, unapproved 
access given to client accounts, non-client counterparty mis-performance, and 
vendor disputes. 
 
The wide range of activities included in operational risks make it difficult to apply a 
standard model to all organizations and hence there is a lack of universally accepted 
standard models. Banks often use internal audit ratings, quality self-assessments, 
operation risk indicators or key Risk Indicators (KRIs) such as volume, turnover, or rate 
of errors, income and loss volatilities, etc.  
  
3.5.6.1.  Operational risk in Islamic banks  
 
IFSB Principles, as in Box 3.6, introduce the risk management strategy for 
operational risk management. 
 
Box 3.6: IFSB Principles of Operational Risk Management 
 
Source: IFSB (2005a) 
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Operational risk is considered high on the list of risk exposures for Islamic banks. A 
survey by Khan and Ahmed (2001) shows that the managers of Islamic banks perceive 
operational risk as the most critical risk after mark-up risk. The survey found that 
operational risk is lower in the fixed income contracts of murabahah and ijarah, and 
higher in the deferred sales contracts of salam and istisna’a. The relatively higher 
rankings of these instruments indicate that banks find them complex and difficult to 
implement.  
 
An internal control problem cost Dubai Islamic Bank $50 million in 1998 when a bank 
official did not conform to the bank‟s credit terms. This resulted in a one-day run on the 
bank‟s deposits to the tune of USD 138 million, representing around 7 percent of the 
bank‟s total deposits at that time (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). 
 
It is argued that operational risks are likely to be significant for IFIs due to their specific 
contractual features. Moreover, Islamic products are less commoditized and require more 
tailoring and oversight, and this leads to substantial overheads and higher operational 
risk. One of the interviewees in this research, Lowe (2010), asserts that a number of small 
Islamic financial institutions have allowed their businesses to grow rapidly without a 
proper organisational infrastructure in place. He listed some specific aspects of Islamic 
banking that could raise the operational risk of Islamic banks: 
 
(i) Cancellation risks in the nonbinding murabahah and istisna’a contracts; 
(ii) Failure of the internal control system to detect and manage potential problems in the 
operational process and back-office; 
(iii) Potential difficulties in enforcing Islamic contracts in a broader legal environment; 
(iv) Need to maintain and manage commodity inventories often in illiquid markets; 
(v) The monitoring of PLS arrangements cannot easily be standardised; and 
(vi) Potential costs and risk of monitoring equity-type contracts and the associated legal 
risk.  
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People’s risk and the scarcity of qualified human resources is the most striking weakness 
of the whole industry (Brown et al., 2007). In fact, scarcity of talent might impede, for a 
while, the growth dynamics of Islamic banks. There is a clear, identifiable and sometimes 
quantifiable shortage of skilled managers, officers and clerks in the Shari’ah -compliant 
financial universe. Not only is the industry growing fast, triggering pressure on existing 
staff to absorb growing volumes, but a number of new entrants are also entering the 
arena: markets like Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Malaysia and Singapore, 
among others, have witnessed the incorporation of a large number of new IFIs 
announcing authorised capital of unprecedented size. Newcomers must be staffed and 
newly trained employees are scarce because education, training and experience take time 
to build exploitable competences (Mahlknecht, 2009). The easiest and most effective way 
to quickly staff freshly instituted organisations is to acquire them from existing banks, 
creating visible pressure on the labour market in the entire industry. Risks including 
management discontinuity, excessive growth of personnel expenses, innovation 
disincentives and lack of experienced staff might all damage an IFI‟s capacity to build 
competitive advantages, and ultimately its market position, reputation, and business 
model.  
 
On a positive note, several professional qualifications in Islamic finance have been 
created in different regions over the last few years. This should ease the pressure on the 
industry in the medium term. It is necessary to create a pool of highly qualified 
professionals with in-depth knowledge of not only the Shari’ah and its objectives, but 
also Islamic and conventional finance and financial engineering. Directors and senior 
management of Islamic banks too should be required to attend such courses. 
 
Technology risk is another type of operational risk that is specifically high for Islamic 
banks. It is associated with the use of software and telecommunications systems that are 
not tailored specifically to the needs of Islamic banks. Like any other business, Islamic 
banks require bespoke software; given the nature of business the computer software 
available in the market for conventional banks may not be appropriate for IFIs. 
Compliance with Shari’ah rules requires management information systems that are scarce 
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and expensive to develop. The currently available systems are less robust than those in 
conventional banks; they are either bespoke systems or ones that have been modified to 
handle Islamic products. There are few systems that have been specifically designed for 
the use of Islamic banks and are in widespread use (Brown et al., 2007). Santhosh Bhat, 
one of the interviewees for this research but whose interview was not included in the final 
sample, stated that “the most critical features of any Islamic banking software is the 
automation of profit pooling, which is the calculation of weighting and distribution of 
profit to the depositors according to the Shari’ah-compliant distribution method”. The 
latest systems and technologies, as used in conventional banks, are often not used by 
Islamic banks.  
 
Documentation risk is higher for Islamic banks than for conventional banks partly as a 
result of the lack of standardisation in the contracts and also because any deficiencies in 
the documentation could make the contract unenforceable (Moore, 2009). 
 
In short, given the newness of Islamic banks and their unique business model, operational 
risk can be acute in these institutions. Therefore, the three methods of measuring 
operational risk proposed by the Basel II Accord have to be adapted considerably if they 
were to be applied to Islamic banks. This is explored in details in Chapter 4. 
 
3.6 FURTHER RISK AREAS SPECIFIC TO ISLAMIC BANKS 
 
In addition to the traditional risk that Islamic banks share with their conventional 
counterparts as financial intermediaries, Islamic banks are also exposed to several risks 
that are very specific to their business model. Such specific risks are equally important 
and stem from the nature of their contracts, business environment, competition, and 
certain prevailing practices. 
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3.6.1 Displaced Commercial Risk 
 
As discussed in section 3.5.5, Displaced Commercial Risk is a unique risk to Islamic 
banks that stems from their ALM practices. 
 
3.6.2 Shari’ah Non-Compliance Risk 
 
Shari’ah non-compliance risk is related to the structure and functioning of Shari’ah 
boards at the institutional and systemic level. This risk could be of four types which are 
strongly correlated and linked: 
 
3.6.2.1. Lack of standardization risk 
 
The Shari’ah is subject to interpretation, particularly in the field of economic and 
financial transactions known as the fiqh al-muaamalat. Therefore, from one market to 
another, from one school of thought (madhab) to another, and even from one Shari’ah 
scholar to another, the fine line between what is considered lawful at any point in time 
and what is not considered lawful can be so thin that fatawa may differ substantially. This 
difference in the interpretation of Shari’ah rules result in differences in financial 
reporting, auditing, and accounting treatment. For instance, while some Shari’ah scholars 
consider the terms of a murabahah or istisna’a contract to be binding on the buyer, others 
argue that the buyer has the option to decline even after placing an order and paying the 
commitment fee, explains Al-Ghamrawy (2010), Managing Director at Al Baraka Bank-
Egypt and one of the interviewees for this research. Differing attitudes towards hedging 
techniques such as forwards, futures, and options provide another example of a large 
divergence of opinions that does not benefit the industry (IFSB, 2007). 
 
These differences can be partly attributed to the presence of the Shari’ah board, which 
governs and guides the banks regarding the conduct of Islamic banking. The Shari’ah 
board interprets various products and situations based on the Qur’an, Sunnah, and fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence). There are four classical schools of Islamic thoughts; namely: 
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Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali, which have specific presence in different parts of 
the world and hence the Shari’ah ruling differs which can also be found based on them. 
China and Turkey are more influenced by the Hanafi; in a large part of Africa Maliki is 
followed; Indonesia and Malaysia have large followers of the Shafi’i school; and Hanbali 
appears to be followed in Saudi Arabia (Akkizidis and Khandelwal, 2007). These four 
schools represent most commonly accepted rulings of Islamic jurisprudence. The 
interpretations of Shari’ah scholars can be based on one or more schools of though and 
hence can have impact on the conduct of the Islamic banking.  
 
Multiple factors are considered before the Shari’ah board provides a ruling on a 
particular case. This multiplicity of methods of financing has been a prime reason for the 
lack of standardisation of products, processes, and policies. This did not hamper the 
growth and development of Islamic banking, but has resulted in some confusion among 
the followers of Islamic banking. This has direct effect on risk management for Islamic 
banking. Also, due to the multiplicity of interpretations of situations, the progress on the 
front of developing specific legislations for Islamic banking has been slow. Malaysia, 
Pakistan, and Bahrain have developed specific legislations dealing with Islamic banking, 
whereas most of the other countries offering Islamic banking are using conventional 
banking legislations with some modifications for Islamic banking along with Shari’ah 
rulings (Akkizidis and Khandelwal, 2007).    
 
This variation is not only time-consuming and costly, but it also leads to confusion about 
what Islamic banking really encompasses and, therefore, hinders its widespread 
acceptance. It also makes it difficult for regulators – especially in non-Muslim countries – 
to understand the idea of Islamic banking. Consequently, regulators tend to be restrictive 
in granting licenses for Islamic banks. The same applies to investors and customers who 
sometimes find themselves reluctant to invest in Islamic banks because of their confusion 
about the concept and its specific products.  
 
The curious case of Investment Dar Company („TID‟) vs. Blom Development Bank may 
have some significant implications for the Islamic finance industry. Blom Development 
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Bank of Lebanon had placed various „funds‟ with TID of Kuwait, pursuant to a wakala 
arrangement. TID became distressed during the course of 2008/09 with the onset of the 
credit crunch and announced a restructuring. In May 2009, it defaulted on the 
profit/coupon of its USD100 million sukuk issue, and since then there has been much 
confusion regarding the status and progress of the restructuring. TID then argued that the 
previously executed wakala arrangements with Blom Development Bank did not actually 
comply with Shari’ah principles; hence, all related agreements should therefore be 
considered ultra vires (or void). The court issued a summary judgment ordering payment 
of the capital amount but not the anticipated profit required, which necessitated 
consideration at a full trial (Moody‟s, 2010b). Chowdhury (2010), one of the interviewees 
for this research, hence, states that “It is widely felt that the application of Shari’ah 
compliance as a commercial and defensive legal tool undermines the credibility and 
ethical ethos that underpins Islamic finance”. 
 
3.6.2.2. Shari’ah arbitrage risk 
 
The competitive dynamics of IFIs, together with lack of standardization, could enhance 
Shari’ah arbitrage, itself a component of Shari’ah-compliance risk. IFIs compete head on 
with conventional banks, but they also position themselves as contenders within the 
Islamic financial industry, sometimes internationally, if not globally. The difference 
Shari’ah interpretations give rise to Shari’ah arbitrage, which is the risk of resorting to 
the most liberal interpretation of financial Islam for business purposes (Visser, 2009). 
Therefore, Muslim investors and originators might be tempted by Shari’ah arbitrage, 
which is the risk of resorting to the most liberal interpretation of financial Islam for 
business purposes. Shari’ah arbitrage might also lead an IFI to crowd itself out of the 
market because it would not be considered sufficiently Shari’ah compliant by its 
constituency, the final decision-making body as to Shari’ah compliance that is beyond 
the reach of any fatwa. This could be damaging from a macro-industrial perspective, 
should the whole Islamic financial industry be overly heterogeneous to the point where 
fragmentation becomes unavoidable and durable (Yaccubi, 2010).  
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3.6.2.3. Non-compliance risk 
 
Chowdhury (2010)¸ one of the interviewees for this research, argues that the relationship 
between an Islamic bank and its customers is not only that of an agent and principal; it is 
also based on implicit trust that the bank will respect the desires of its customers to 
comply fully with Shari’ah. This relationship is what really distinguishes Islamic banks 
from their conventional counterparts and it is the sole justification of their existence. If 
the bank is unable to maintain this trust, by being non-Shari’ah-compliant, it risks 
breaking the confidence of its customers. This could severely damage the 
creditworthiness of an IFI. For instance, Muslim depositors might withdraw their funds 
from a bank, triggering a liquidity crisis. Retail customers that are mainly attracted by the 
Islamic nature of a bank might also stop requesting loans from this institution, triggering 
a downturn in profitability. 
 
Wilson (2002) argues that what distinguishes IFIs from their conventional counterparts is 
not only the unique products they have on offer but also the commonality of their client 
base who all have been attracted to IFIs because they provide products compatible with 
Shari’ah, which the clients themselves respect and believe in. The high level of trust 
between IFIs and their clients reduces the risks of moral hazard. Therefore, IFIs should 
ensure transparency in compliance Shari’ah and place this issue on the top of its 
priorities. 
 
3.6.2.4. Shortfall of scholars 
 
This is an industry-related rather than an organization-specific risk. There are few 
Shari’ah experts on the commercial law and finance law. Most scholars who go on to 
specialize as academics do so in fields such as theology or history, while those who 
specialise in practical subjects become experts on the laws of zakah, marriage, and 
divorce, or inheritance (Selvam, 2008). The industry is no longer able to produce 
qualified scholars at the required rate, particularly due to the long an arduous process 
involved, which includes learning the fine points of modern capital markets. It could take 
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up anywhere between 10 to 15 years for a person to be qualifies as a Shari’ah scholar and 
sign off on a fatwa due to the training and guidance required to be an established scholar, 
according to Chowdhury (2010) who was interviewed for this research. He also stated 
that “There are only a few scholars who combine knowledge of the Shari’ah with an 
understanding of the working of modern finance … I personally know several scholars 
who have written advanced academic dissertations on subjects dealing with the classical 
jurisprudence of commerce and transacting.” However, as Sheikh Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo 
(cited by Selvam, 2008) states “their knowledge is theoretical, these scholars are of no 
practical use to modern Islamic finance.”   
 
Another obstacle is mastering the language of communication needed in the financial 
realm. Shari’ah scholars need to be conversant in both Arabic, the language of the 
Shari’ah, and English, the main language of modern finance. “Most scholars are not 
fluent in English and the Islamic finance industry in dominated in the English language at 
the moment,” adds Kailani (2010), another interviewee.   
 
Funds@Work (2009), a strategy consultant firm, carried out a research on the landscape 
of Shari’ah scholars. The results, as depicted in Figure 3.7., show that among 271 
organisations researched (including banks, mutual funds, insurance companies and 
private equity funds), there were 180 scholars with 956 positions, which remains an 
important challenge with various risk implications. If this shortage of Shari’ah scholars is 
not reversed, Islamic finance may not grow as quickly as it could. 
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Figure 3.7: Shari’ah Scholars’ Involvement in Boards and Beyond.  
 
 
Source: Funds@Work (2009: 4). 
 
It should also be noted that the shortage of skills applies not only at the scholarly level, 
but also in the wider industry as discussed earlier. 
 
3.6.3. Reputational Risk  
 
“It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five 
minutes to destroy it”. 
 
 Warren Buffet as quoted in Askari et al. (2009) 
 
Historically, reputational risk used to be considered a subset of operational risk; however, 
convincing arguments have been put forth over time to distinguish reputational risk from 
operational risk and to highlight the sole significance of the former. According to Askari 
et al (2009), a survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCooper (PwC) in early 2004, showed 
that of 1,400 CEOs taking part of the study, 35 percent identified reputational risk as 
either „one of the biggest threats‟ (10 percent) or „a significant threat‟ (25 percent) to their 
business growth prospects. Reputational Risk is the most critical risk for IFIs, because the 
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total loss caused by reputational damage can well extend beyond the bank‟s liquidation 
value and affect the whole industry for generations regionally, internationally, and even 
globally. Once a bank‟s reputations has been damaged or tainted, restoring market 
confidence is extremely challenging. Nevertheless, all Islamic banks in a given market 
are exposed to such risk. Close collaboration among financial institutions, standardization 
of contracts and practices, self-examination, investing customer awareness, and 
establishment of industry associations are some of the steps needed to mitigate 
reputational risk. “Reputational risk is certainly a major issue for a growing industry like 
Islamic banking and finance” added Richard Thomas, Managing Director of Global 
Securities House (Thomas, 2009). 
 
Reputational risk for IFIs and can occur at different levels. First, as a matter of image, 
loan foreclosure and security realisation, described as a relative strength of Islamic banks, 
are double-edged swords. Taking into account the expected take-off in mortgage lending 
especially in the GCC countries, the question of loan foreclosure and collateral seizing 
may be critical going forward. An IFI can hardly feel comfortable in the case of a Muslim 
family defaulting on the financial obligation pertaining to its primary residential property. 
In a number of jurisdictions, such a scenario would immediately trigger legal action 
leading the (conventional) bank to take full ownership of the collateralized property, at 
the expense of the borrower, who would be forced to relocate to an alternative, often 
smaller, home. According to Smith (2010), one of the interviewees for this research, in 
the context of the Muslim societies where IFIs are most active, it would be quite 
damaging for the IFI‟s „ethical‟ reputation to leave a Muslim family homeless for the 
sake of profit, and then sell the seized property post foreclosure on the secondary market, 
for real estate Islamic finance presents itself as an ethical alternative to conventional 
banking. Therefore, should mortgage financing pick up in a number of Islamic 
jurisdiction, reputation risk management would call for a number of mitigating 
mechanisms like mutual takaful attached to housing loans. 
 
Reputational risk can also arise from the fact that Islamic finance is a relatively young 
industry, and a single failed institution could trigger negative publicity to other banks in 
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the industry affecting their market share, profitability, and liquidity. For example, Islamic 
Bank of Britain (IBB) has been suffering since its inception in 2004 from the negative 
publicity about Islamic banking among British customers caused by the collapse of the 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in 1991 and the withdrawal of Al-
Baraka Bank from the UK market in 1993
1
. It took IBB‟s management tremendous effort 
to overcome the damage caused in the trust in Islamic banking in the western world.  
 
More broadly, reputation risk might stem from the misconception that IFIs, through zakat 
and other charitable givings, might be close to violent militant groups. In order to avoid 
even the perception of such involvement, IFIs, particularly in the aftermath of 11 Sept. 
2001, have materially invested in know-your-customers (KYC) and anti-money 
laundering (AML) systems in order to enhance their processes and procedures for the 
early detection and reporting of doubtful and fraudulent transactions, sometimes at a 
heavy cost. For example, in 2006, there was US state enforcement action against Doha 
Bank‟s Islamic banking arm in its New York branch relating to insufficient anti-money 
laundering controls and systems. In April 2009, Doha Bank paid a fine of USD 5 million, 
which was imposed by two US government agencies: the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The post 9/11 environment 
necessitates the attention of IFIs to reputational risk due to the increased scrutiny and 
regulations dealing with them. 
 
Finally, if an Islamic bank is viewed as non-Shari’ah-compliant this could break the trust 
of its retail, corporate, and even money market customers. This could trigger a liquidity 
crisis as devout Muslim depositors might withdraw their funds.  
 
Askari et al. (2009) highlight that, although there has not been a major failure of an 
Islamic bank in more than 30 years, there have been instances of failures of financial 
institutions claiming to offer Islamic financial products. For example Ihlas Finans of 
                                                          
1
 Although BCCI – which was incorporated in Luxembourg – was a conventional bank, the fact that it had 
lots of Muslims on board created the illusion that it was an Islamic bank. 
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Turkey in early 2001, The Islamic Bank of South Africa in 1997, and Islamic investment 
companies in Egypt in the 1980s.  
 
3.6.4. Accounting Standards 
 
In a relatively immature and fragmented Islamic banking industry, there is a need to 
establish an adequate infrastructure, including the setting up of uniform accounting 
standards. Until recently, IFIs had developed their own standards in cooperation with 
their domestic regulators. However, this resulted in a lack of comparability between 
financial statements of different institutions in different countries. The need is now 
widely recognized to provide users of financial statements with more meaningful, 
transparent, and comparable information on the financial performance of the reporting 
entity.  
 
AAOIFI has made some progress in developing a level playing field amongst Islamic 
banks, preparing a common set of accounting standards and developing consistent 
auditing standards and banking practices for those institutions, as well as starting to 
create a benchmark for Shari’ah compliance. Accounting standards issued to date reflect 
the adoption of conventional accounting practice, amended to reflect the nature of Islamic 
banking and incorporating compliance with Shari’ah doctrines (Mahlknecht, 2009). 
 
AAOIFI and IFSB have played pioneering roles in designing key accounting, risk 
management, auditing, and reporting standards for IFIs; they have complemented these 
with Shari’ah standards for contracts and governance, and have built awareness of major 
risk and prudential issues in Islamic finance. However, the pace of adoption of standards 
is slow. Also, considerable challenges remain to upgrade the standards and develop new 
ones in order to support the rapid innovations in the industry, and to align the accounting 
and auditing standards more closely with the evolving regulatory standards. AAOIFI and 
IFSB standards are still under refinement and are not mandatory, and hence are still not 
used by several IFIs.  
 
 
126 
Eglinton (2010), Director - Banking and Capital Markets at Ernest & Young and one of 
the interviewees for this research, adds that consistency is of great importance and 
significantly different treatments of the same item can and do occur; this makes it 
difficult and potential confusion arises relating to the treatment of investment accounts. 
Should these be on- or off-balance-sheet? Are they with or without recourse? Differing 
treatment of investment accounts can have significant implications for capital adequacy 
calculations and liquidity requirements. Income recognition (cash or accrual) at inception, 
receipt or ultimate repayment and expense recognition (deducted from profit 
apportionment) are also important issues as different treatments can have a significant 
impact on reported profitability. 
 
Despite AAOIFI‟s efforts, its standards are not mandatory because of the overriding need 
to comply with domestic regulatory requirements, with the exception of a handful of 
countries, such as Bahrain and Sudan, where banking supervisors require Islamic banks 
to comply with the AAOIFI standards.  
 
Most countries use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or US GAAP 
standards for their accounting, or some close local adaptation. These have limitations for 
good transparency of the operations of Islamic institutions and may lead to very poor 
disclosure of important aspects of their operations. However, many regulators believe that 
they need one set of accounting rules to be applied by all banks in their jurisdiction and 
so they are reluctant to depart from this practice.  
 
AAOIFI has, however, continued working closely with regulators and the International 
Accounting Standards Committee in order to encourage adoption of its standards. There 
has been an increasing number of institutions that produce financial statements that 
conform to both IFRS and AAOIFI standards (Moore, 2009). Eglinton (2010), one of the 
interviewees for this research adds that “This may be the way to go, especially as 
AAOIFI has never wanted to reinvent the wheel but has stated that its standards should be 
used to give more appropriate presentation only when IFRS is not suitable”. 
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3.6.5. Fiduciary Risk 
 
Fiduciary risk is derived directly from the profit-and-loss sharing feature of Islamic 
finance, and is closely interlinked with Corporate Governance risk. AAOIFI defines 
fiduciary risk as “being legally liable for a breach of the investment contract either for 
non-compliance with Shari’ah rules or for mismanagement of investors‟ funds” (Moore, 
2009). As fiduciary agents, IFIs are expected to act in the best interests of investors, 
depositors, and shareholders. If and when these objectives diverge from the actions of the 
bank, the bank is exposed to fiduciary risk. 
 
Fiduciary risk can lead to dire consequences. First, it can cause reputational risk, creating 
panic among depositors, who may rush to withdraw their funds. Second, it may require 
the IFI to pay a penalty or compensation which may result in a financial loss. Third, it can 
have a negative impact on the market price of shareholders‟ equity. Fourth, it can affect 
the bank‟s cost and access to liquidity. Finally, it may lead to insolvency if the IFI is 
unable to meet the demands of current investment account holders (Greuning and Iqbal, 
2008). 
 
In this context, information disclosure facilitates market discipline and enables different 
stakeholders to protect their own interests by allowing depositors to withdraw their funds, 
shareholders to sell their shares, and regulators to take necessary actions in case of 
mismanagement or misconduct (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). 
 
In its Exposure Draft on Risk Management, the IFSB gave some examples of how 
fiduciary risks may arise, which do not appear in the final standard but give a useful 
indication of the sort of risks that can arise (Moore, 2009): 
 
(i) A critical aspect of IFIs‟ activities relates to the potentially large availability of funds 
available by current account holders, whereby, as a result of the inappropriate 
management decision, IFIs may increase disproportionately their investment 
portfolios‟ returns by excessively leveraging these funds without due regard to risks 
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arising from sudden and unexpectedly high levels of withdrawals from current 
accounts. 
(ii) Where IFIs manage and invest various funds in longer-term investment projects, 
investment funds received over a more prolonged period may be commingled 
inappropriately. For example, if funds provided by more long standing investors are 
invested in a troubled project, there is a risk that the IFI could use other IAH funds 
received later on to invest in the same project in the hope that the project may be 
salvaged. Distortions may arise when the IFI reports an attractive return to longer 
standing fund providers when they are in fact being paid out of funds paid in by more 
recent investors.  
(iii) The reinvestment of profits (rather than their distribution to investors) may give rise 
to unfair advantages to the IFI, which may thereby extend the period of a poorly 
performing investment. This may unfairly increase the exposure of incoming IAH to 
losses, which may have already existed prior to their investment. 
(iv) The risk of conflicts of interest exists where poorly performing assets and/or 
restructured assets of the IFI may be transferred by the IFIs‟ management from on-
balance sheet to off-balance sheet accounts where the restricted IAH would bear the 
risk of loss. Such misapplications of funds could result in the investment risk being 
removed from the IFIs‟ balance sheet but, based on an agency contract, the IFI may 
earn fees inappropriately on the investment management and would not share in any 
eventual losses recorded after the transfer. 
(v) When purchasing assets at a very low price, IFIs may „park‟ them in a subsidiary or 
related company and, when the opportunity arises, sell them to the IAH at a higher 
price. 
(vi)  Other internal and operational issues may not be directly related to IAHs‟ 
investments but may give rise to exposures to losses for IAH. For example, the risks, 
derived from such elements as an excessive allocation of expenses and the hiring of 
less experienced staff, affect the quality of investment performance and oversight. 
 
Moore (2009) argues that these indicate some of the ways in which a less than scrupulous 
management could manipulate returns to suit their purposes. There appear to be many 
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ways management might conceal their errors, and lack of transparency means that their 
actions would be hard to discover. 
 
3.6.6. Corporate Governance Risk 
 
Corporate governance has a particular importance for Islamic banks because of the 
unique nature of their stakeholders. All banks, as a result of their role in national and 
local economies and financial systems, have a broader group of stakeholders than other 
institutions. But in the case of IFIs, the group is even wider as PSIA holders and Shari’ah 
boards must be added (Moore, 2009). 
 
Deposits in conventional banks are, by definition, capital protected. Depositors also often 
have the comfort of deposit insurance schemes and the comfort that banks can turn to the 
lender of last resort to fend off any temporary problems. Regulators and supervisors do 
not want to see depositors lose money as it could have dire consequences for the whole 
financial system. However, the same protection is not offered to PSIA holders, 
particularly unrestricted PSIAs. Here, not only do the account holders have no say in how 
their money is invested, it is often also co-mingled with the bank‟s own funds. It is easy 
to see that situations could arise where there is a conflict of interest between shareholders 
and PSIAs holders, while the management could have a third agenda. This could be in the 
area of risk appetite or in the share of profits that would be allocated to the different 
parties. While shareholders can make their wishes heard through the board of directors, 
PSIA holders have no such voice. Assets can be transferred between unrestricted PSIAs, 
shareholders‟ equity, and other funds; and as disclosure requirements have stood, only 
management needed to know what had happened or why it had happened (Moore, 2009). 
 
The IFSB produced its standard on corporate governance in December 2006. One of its 
proposals is that each IFI should establish a governance committee of its board, one of 
whose responsibilities should be to ensure that the interests of its PSIA holders are looked 
after (IFSB, 2006). In addition, AAOIFI has set governance standards for Islamic 
institutions that cover the appointment, composition, and responsibilities the Shari’ah 
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board, one of which is to protect the interests of depositors and PSIA holders (Kailani, 
2010, one of the interviewees for this research). As such, this board is a critical 
governance body within the bank.  
 
It has been suggested by many that the governance process would be significantly 
enhanced by allowing PSIA holders some representation on the board of directors and by 
an improvement in the transparency of financial reporting. Another proposal that has 
been put into practice by the Al Baraka Group is to have a separate investors‟ committee 
(Moore, 2009). However, the practicality of both proposals is questionable. 
 
Corporate governance practices can have a material impact on the bank‟s risk profile, 
particularly in countries where such practices are weak. Islamic banks do not generally 
have robust corporate governance frameworks in place. However, in this they are no 
different from some of their local conventional peers. For instance, family 
ownership/majority ownership by a core shareholder group is seen in both segments of an 
Islamic country‟s banking system. Their prevalence weakens the rights of minority 
shareholders, could lead to unmerited appointments or promotion of family members and 
could give rise to conflicts of interest between different stakeholders. The lack of 
genuinely independent directors is a shortcoming of emerging markets in general and 
impairs a board‟s ability to maintain accountability and provide strategic guidance.  
 
The exposure of big family businesses is among the most important risks among Islamic 
banks and the GCC business environment in general. Saudi Arabia is a clear example: 
Ahmad Hamad Algosaibi & Brothers owes money to more than hundred banks. This 
family-owned company owned a Bahraini bank, the International Banking Corporation 
(TIBC), which defaulted on USD 2.2 billion of debt in early May 2009. In addition, 
Algosaibi, had defaulted on some USD 1 billion of foreign exchange, trade finance, and 
swap agreements and was seeking restructuring of all its group obligations, which are 
reported to include about USD 2.5 billion owed to Saudi banks and hundreds of millions 
of dollars owed elsewhere. Closely connected with family ties, Saad Group and its 
subsidiary Awal Bank, owned by Maan Al Sanea were also restructuring debt: the group 
 
131 
owes banks at least USD 5.5 billion. The ripples from the Saad and Algosaibi‟s defaults 
also extend into international waters, weakly in concrete financial terms but perhaps more 
lastingly in terms of sentiment. Both groups borrowed from foreign banks: Algosaibi took 
out a USD 700 million syndicated loan in May 2007 arranged by BNP Paribas and 
WestLB, while a USD 150 million borrowing in 2006 by Awal was arranged by Arab 
Bank, Gulf International Bank and Hypovereinsbank. The Financial Times reported on 
June 11, 2009 that several of the international banks with a relationship with Saad and Mr 
Al-Sanea had closed down credit lines. It is hardly to find an Islamic bank in the GCC or 
Europe without significant exposure to these entities. According to Damak (2010), who 
was interviewed for this research, gross loan exposure within the GCC to Saad and 
Algosaibi groups amounts to USD 9.6 billion for 30 banks in six-nation GCC countries. 
Such developments and incidents have resulted in questioning the nature of corporate 
governance, if any, in the Middle East, as the two conglomerates were controlled by 
family members. This Saudi banking scandal is, on one level, a family affair. 
 
The GCC Board Directors Institute, a Dubai-based non-profit that seeks to improve 
corporate governance standards, issued a report earlier in 2009, highlighting the need for 
corporate governance reform in the six GCC member states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The report, „Building Better Boards,‟ 
notes that only 55 percent of GCC companies disclose the main executive positions of 
board members, compared with 100 percent in Europe, and only 32 percent of companies 
disclose other positions held by board members, compared with 97 percent in Europe. It 
urges a reduction in the number of boards on which directors serve; the appointment of 
strong audit, nomination and remuneration committees; efforts to attract more 
international directors to the boards of Gulf companies; and the promotion of greater 
corporate transparency (Townsend, 2009).  
 
Thus, corporate governance risk in the GCC, where most Islamic banks reside, has 
become publicly exposed. Poor corporate governance imposes heavy costs. The need for 
additional efforts toward improved corporate transparency is paramount. As long as Gulf 
companies and banks restricted their activities largely within the region, there was little 
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pressure to change those opaque practices. However, growing links with international 
markets and financial institutions are generating greater demands for reform. Changing 
corporate practices, however, would not be easy. Governance reform needs to be 
addressed against the cultural backdrop in the Gulf, which places great emphasis on 
reputation and discretion. Nevertheless, in recent years Bahrain, Dubai, and Qatar have 
created financial centres that promote high standards of regulation and corporate 
disclosure, including the requirement to publish regular results under International 
Financial Reporting Standards.  
 
3.6.7. Regulatory and Tax Issues 
 
As the nature of their operations is different, IFIs have to face different problems in 
respect of legal, regulatory, and taxation rules. In order to foster stability in Islamic 
banking, there is a need to develop uniform regulatory and transparency standards that 
are tailored to the specific characteristics of Islamic financial products and institutions. 
This task, whilst taking into consideration the financial environment in each country, 
would also need adaptation of the international standards, core principles, and good 
practices to the specific needs of IFIs. For example, IFIs have to purchase assets for 
onward sale or lease to their clients. As such, the levy of taxation and fees on their 
purchases leads to an uneven playing field for them compared with their conventional 
counterparts. To avoid such costs, IFIs is some jurisdictions resort to practices creating 
doubts with respect to Shari’ah compliance (Ayub, 2007). 
 
Some regulations need to be amended before an Islamic bank can operate within a 
particular economy; an example is the stamp duties in mortgaging in Western markets. 
Since the Islamic bank purchases a product on behalf of a client and then resells it, double 
stamp duties should not be charged in such circumstances. Regulators in countries where 
both systems operate side by side should recognize the need to set up flexible regulatory 
and tax frameworks that could facilitate banking operations in line with the Shari’ah 
principles. Flexibilities granted by the FSA in Britain to accommodate the specific needs 
of Islamic banking are a welcome move; it is hoped that the process of adaption of laws 
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will continue in order to make London an international hub for the Islamic finance 
industry in coming years.    
 
3.6.8. Legal Risk 
 
Given the different nature of financial contracts, Islamic banks face risks related to their 
documentation and enforcement. As there are no standard forms of contracts for various 
financial instruments, Islamic banks prepare documentation according to their 
understanding of the Shari’ah, the local laws, and their needs and concerns. Lack of 
standardized contracts along with the fact that there are no litigation systems to resolve 
problems associated with enforceability of contracts by the counterparty increases the 
legal risks associated with the Islamic contractual agreements (Khan and Ahmed, 2001). 
 
There are special concerns for Islamic banks over the enforceability of contracts. 
Conventional banks use well-established products for which standard documentation has 
been developed over the years that is accepted globally. This gives comfort, despite any 
limitations that may exist in the legal systems of the countries where the banks operate. 
This is not the case for Islamic products as yet. If problems arise and cases go to court, 
there is considerable uncertainty as to the court‟s decision (Moore, 2009).  
 
Furthermore, the legal environment in some Islamic countries tends to be ambiguous and 
has never been tested, which constrains the ability to enforce a contract, recover bad 
debts, or realize collateral. For example, Chowdhury (2010), one of the interviewees for 
this research, adds that “in the GCC, the rule of precedent does not apply to court cases, 
and insolvency rules have not been tested before”. Dey and Holder (2008) explain that 
courts in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia will generally not honour any 
provisions of a foreign legal system which are contrary to Shari’ah, public order, morals, 
or any mandatory provisions of the local law. 
 
A number of recent court decisions have proven that when it comes to resolving disputes 
arising from Islamic finance contracts, Shari’ah rules and principles do not necessarily 
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apply. This is simply because, most often, the issues in dispute are not of Shari’ah in 
nature, but rather specific to the civil and commercial rights and obligations as contracted 
by the parties. The precedent here is the case of Shamil Bank of Bahrain and Beximco 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd in 2004, when the Court of Appeal ruled that it was not possible for 
the case to be considered based on principles of Shari’ah law (HMCS, 2009). There were 
two main reasons: first, there is no provision for the choice or application of non-national 
system of law, such as Shari’ah. Second, because the application of Shari’ah principles 
was a matter of debate, even in a Muslim country.  
 
To mitigate this risk, contracts have to be written very carefully to minimise potential 
disputes and state the governing law. At present, most Islamic finance contracts are 
governed by English law, and a few under New York law. There are also advantages in 
standardization of documentation.  However, local courts may not enforce an English law 
judgement without re-examining the merits of the claim and may not recognise English 
law as the law of the contracts, or only to the extent that it is not incompatible with local 
law and public policy. This would mean that the local courts could seek to reinterpret 
English law governed documents as if they were governed by local law. They could 
therefore give effect to the documents in a manner not intended by the parties (Miller, 
2008). For instance, around 110 banks from all over the world are currently struggling in 
courts trying to retrieve their money from the defaulted Ahmed Hamad Algosaibi & 
Brothers group and the Golden Belt sukuk issued by Saad group in Saudi Arabia. The 
ongoing litigations have proved that the ability to enforce English judgement in Saudi 
Arabia is almost impossible, and that liquidation rules in the GCC are lagging behind. 
 
3.6.9. Short Track Record 
 
Modern Islamic banking has been in existence for only three decades and many products 
are less than a decade old. This is in addition to the fact that most Islamic banks are active 
in the developing world where transparency, corporate governance, and risk management 
at large are still works in progress, if non-existent. 
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3.7 RISK CATEGORIES ARE ENTANGLED 
 
In a large number of Islamic finance contracts it is often challenging to distinguish 
between risks because risk categories of a different nature are entangled, along with the 
changing relationship of parties during the lifetime of the contract. Also, the nature of 
risks contained in Islamic instruments is likely to change significantly over time. 
 
This is referred to as „conglomeration of risks‟ where each mode of finance carries 
various risks bundled together (Khan, 2004). For example, in an ijarah contract, which 
resembles a financial lease, the IFI buys an asset that is subsequently leased or rented to a 
customer against periodic rental payments. The IFI remains the owner of the leased asset 
throughout the duration of the lease contract, leaving the bank exposed to the residual 
value of the asset at maturity or should the lessee be willing to terminate the ijarah 
relationship prior to maturity. The management of leased assets‟ residual value is a 
feature that differs materially from credit risk management and assumes access to robust 
and reliable market data as to asset-price volatility and behaviour across economic cycles 
and business conditions, all the more so as IFIs tend to run a portfolio of asset inventories 
that they buy and then sell or lease (FRSGlobal, 2009). 
 
Inventory management is another aspect that separates IFIs, from a risk management 
perspective, from their conventional peers. Similar issues arise when it comes to 
diminishing musharakah contracts (co-ownership contracts whereby the customer‟s 
ownership share in a financed asset increases as principal is incrementally repaid to the 
bank). Should the customer default, the IFI‟s share in the financed asset is used as 
collateral, the value of which might be volatile and naturally subject to scrutiny and 
management independently from the customer‟s perceived creditworthiness (Moody‟s, 
2009a).  
 
In addition, given the trading-based instruments and equity financing, there are 
significant market risks along with credit risk in the banking book of Islamic banks. For 
example, trade-based contracts (murabahah, salam, and istisna’a) and ijarah are exposed 
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to both credit and market risks. During the transaction period of a salam contract the bank 
is exposed to credit risk, and at the conclusion of the contract it is exposed to commodity 
price risk, the liquidity risk of its conversion into cash, the operational risk of its storing 
and movement and so on (Ahmed and Khan, 2007).   
 
3.8 RISK MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN SUKUK 
 
Sukuk present specific market and credit risks, particularly with regard to pricing, delays 
in scheduled payments, events of default, asset protection, structural issues, and reporting 
standards. The risk and return in sukuk are linked to the underlying assets. The key 
distinction when looking at sukuk from a risk management perspective is whether they 
are asset-backed, or asset-based via a repurchase undertaking. In other words, do sukuk 
holders rely on the assets themselves, or on the ultimate originator for repayment? Due to 
the nature of sukuk, all transactions are likely to involve a set of underlying assets. Both 
parties – the issuer and the investors – share their risks in the transaction. Where investors 
enjoy asset-backing, they benefit from some form of security or lien over the assets, and 
are therefore in a preferential position over other, unsecured creditors. In other words, in 
the event that the issuer were to default or become insolvent, the sukuk holders would be 
able to recover their exposure by taking control of and ultimately realising the value from 
the underlying asset(s) (Moody‟s, 2008a). There have seen a couple of notable issues 
where the assets were „truly‟ sold like Tamweel and Sorouh PJSC, both UAE 
transactions. They still account for the minority of overall global sukuk issuance. 
 
Where the transaction is asset-based (which has been the case for the vast majority of 
sukuk so far), the originator undertakes to repurchase the assets from the issuer at 
maturity of the sukuk, or upon a pre-defined early termination event, for an amount equal 
to the principal repayment. In such a repurchase undertaking, the true market value of the 
underlying asset (or asset portfolio) is irrelevant to the sukuk holders, as the amount is 
defined to be equivalent to the notes. In this case, investors in sukuk rely wholly on the 
originator‟s creditworthiness for repayment. Box 3.7 depicts the practical case of default 
of East Cameron sukuk and the legal complication associated with recovering the assets 
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by investors. This class of sukuk is identical to unsecured lending from a risk perspective. 
The vast majority of sukuk structures to-date fall into this category; they do not aim to 
complete an off-balance sheet transfer of the assets from the originator. In this sense, 
from a risk profile, the investors bear similar risk to unsecured lending (Dey and Holder, 
2008), and their credit risk will be identical to a conventional unsecured bond.  
“There is no scope in the courts for such vagaries – either the investors have a legal 
enforceable claim on assets or they do not. So when crunch time comes, those investors 
in asset-based structures are left with nothing: no assets, no security, just an unsecured 
claim in substance like a debt of the company”, explains Engel (2010), one of the 
interviewees for this research. Most of the sukuk are currently asset-based rather than 
asset-backed, with a few exceptions. Many investors – Islamic and non-Islamic alike – 
simply want a fixed-income bond, and it is this powerful investor demand that primarily 
drives the shape of market. Therefore, securitization has not really taken off in Islamic 
finance. Thomas (2009), hence, states that “The way forward is to revert to the asset-
backed sukuk”.  
 
It should also be mentioned that there‟s no track record of sukuk enforcements to date, 
and the issue of effective legal ownership of assets between a company and its related 
sovereign have yet to be tested.  
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Box 3.7: Practical Default Case of Asset-Based Sukuk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Denton Wilde Sapte (2009) 
 
Transparency is another issue with sukuk. Some of the sukuk had a huge lack of 
transparency and the complexities were beyond the comprehension of some scholars and 
market participants alike. The absence of disclosure and the very weak transparency 
standards make a clear assessment almost impossible. Going forward with transparency 
guidelines will be an important part of sukuk issues; it will affect not only the risk 
management but also the pricing of the sukuk (Abdul-Ghani, 2009).  
 
Moreover, sukuk tend to be document intensive and relatively complex compared to 
conventional bonds because of the underlying asset structure. They also involve a 
complex relationship between Shari’ah and local (very often secular) legal systems, and 
the scope for conflict is great (Miller, 2008).  
 
East Cameron Asset-Backed Sukuk: Who owns the assets? 
 
The East Cameron Partners L.P. (ECP) sukuk was relatively small one at USD 165.67 
million and was issued in July 2006. It was the first issued by a US company and was a 
genuine effort at an asset-backed musharakah. It was secured by an interest in the oil and 
gas royalty rights on two gas fields in the Gulf of Mexico. On 16 October 2008, East 
Cameron Partners (the originating company), filed for Chapter 11 / bankruptcy in the US 
courts. 
A sukuk enforcement event was then triggered on 3 September 2008 the due to a shortfall 
in the stressed oil and gas reserves. As an asset-backed structure sukuk investors already 
have legal rights over the oil and gas assets but ECP has requested a ruling that the 
transaction was not a „true sale‟ but a „secured loan‟. In the former, sukuk investors have 
sole rights to the assets in the latter they would lose their rights and share the assets with 
the other creditors should ECP enter Chapter 7 (liquidation). 
 
Ultimately providing asset security for investors is a legal issue that impacts conventional 
and sukuk structures equally. The concept is well tested in the US so investors‟ rights 
should be preserved if structured correctly. In the Middle East, legal systems are less tested 
and secured sukuk are the minority. Investors in asset-based sukuk have no senior claim or 
lien over the sukuk assets – but this is deliberate and clear to most parties. 
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3.9 RISK MITIGATION IN ISLAMIC BANKING 
 
Hedging can be one of the most contentious issues in Islamic banking. Conventional 
futures and short positions, which are often vital ingredients in risk mitigation, can be 
difficult to achieve under Shari’ah principles (KPMG, 2006). By the late 1990s and early 
2000s, there began discussion on the scope of financial engineering and derivatives in 
Islamic finance. This did not receive much attention in the literature, primarily because 
most of transactions were designed by lawyers and Shari’ah experts and were executed in 
private by financial institutions who did not discuss the structure in a transparent manner 
(Askari et al., 2009).   
 
The unique nature of risks faced by Islamic banks, combined with the restrictions added 
by Shari’ah, makes risk mitigation for Islamic banks a difficult and complex process. 
There are risks that Islamic banks, like their conventional counterparts, can manage and 
control through appropriate risk policies, controls, and traditional risk management tools 
like risk diversification, credit ratings, on-balance sheet netting, GAP analysis, stress 
testing, etc. Such traditional tools do not conflict with the Shari’ah principles. However, 
there are other risks that banks cannot eliminate and can only be reduced by transferring 
to or selling those risk in well-defined markets. These risks can generate unexpected 
losses that need capital insulation, and hedging can help to restrict the impact of 
unexpected loss. Traditionally in the conventional world risk transferring techniques 
include the use of derivatives for hedging, selling or buying of financial claims, and 
changing borrowing terms. The challenge is, however, that most of the conventional 
hedging tools do so far not comply with the Shari’ah requirements.  
 
Until recently, it had been the opinion of most Shari’ah scholars that hedging would fall 
into the category of speculation and uncertainty. In the last few years, however, the 
increasing sophistication in Islamic banking products has led some scholars to take the 
view that Islamic banks could be able to enter into hedging arrangements provided that 
the hedging tool is in itself structured in a Shari’ah compliant manner, and that the trade 
is being entered into to a protect against a genuine exposure or liability, rather than solely 
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for speculative purposes (Obaidullah, 2007). According to Khan (2010), one of the 
interviewees for this research, “there is growing demand for hedging and Shari’ah-
compliant derivatives, which would be used merely for hedging and not speculation”. 
 
In fact, hedging techniques and derivatives have drawn a lot of debate as regards to their 
permissibility. There are two schools of thought when it comes to hedging in Islamic 
finance: a very conservative view that prohibits hedging in all its forms, and a more 
liberal view that is looking to develop Shari’ah-compliant hedging tools. This 
conservative school of thought accuses derivatives of causing volatility in the market 
through speculation without being involved in real economic transactions. Nonetheless, 
another viewpoint is that some derivatives are permissible because they involve the full 
transaction price and do not cause injustice to anyone.  
 
There are two approaches that can be adopted in the product development of hedging 
tools for Islamic banks: first, through replicating a conventional product. For example, a 
swap, repo or future could be used as a starting point, before turning into a Shari’ah 
compliant instrument. However, this is not the most efficient way of product 
development because there will be additional costs involved to fulfil Shari’ah 
requirements and it‟s also less creative. The second approach would be to focus on the 
function of the instrument and the design tools suitable for that purpose. That is what is 
known as financial engineering. Much research is needed before those techniques can be 
adapted to Islamic banking. But things are certainly moving in the world of Islamic 
hedging. In September 2006, the IIFM signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
ISDA, with an eye to developing a master agreement for documenting privately 
negotiated Shari’ah-compliant derivatives transactions (Visser, 2009). The ISDA may 
prove to be crucial in helping to lift Islamic risk management to a point at which basic- to 
medium-level hedging instruments can be introduced as it has the expertise in developing 
derivatives. In addition, the IIFM is currently working on developing a „tahawwut’ 
(Hedging) Master Agreement which will lead the way in risk minimization of Islamic 
economic activity.  
 
 
141 
Afaq Khan, CEO Standard Chartered Saadiq & Director of IIFM, said:  
 
“Risk management solutions are the need of the Islamic industry with 
particular focus on treasury risk management. Islamic FI‟s continue to grow 
within their home markets and are increasingly adopting regional and 
International expansion strategies. It is imperative that they have adequate risk 
management tools to allow them to play a responsible role in their local 
economy and also in their expansion plans. Tahawwut Master Agreement is 
another important initiative from IIFM to help the industry in developing a 
mutually agreed standardized document. This will make it easy for banks to 
trade with each other” (IIFM, 2009). 
 
This will play a critical role in the development of risk mitigation tools in Islamic 
banking.  
 
Another challenge for Islamic hedging tools is the lack of liquidity in the secondary 
market. Derivatives and hedging tools in conventional banking thrive on trading in the 
liquid secondary market. This is an obstacle for IFIs as liquidity is simply not there yet. 
Most Islamic banks, as previously discussed, have large balance sheet mismatches, which 
are difficult to bridge given the lack of long duration liabilities.  
 
There has been substantial development in finding ways to apply derivatives to reduce 
certain risks such as currency and commodity risks; in Malaysia, for example, some 
Shari’ah-compliant hedging instruments, such as profit rate swaps, have been introduced. 
However, much of this progress remains localised with limited scope for cross-border 
application and further work is still needed. 
 
3.9.1 Credit Derivatives 
 
In recent years derivatives have been increasingly taking an important role not only as 
instruments to mitigate risks but also as sources of income generation. They are one of 
the newest tools for managing credit risks. A derivative is an instrument whose value 
depends on the value of something else. In these instruments the underlying risk of a 
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credit is separated from the credit itself and sold to possible investors whose individual 
risk profile may be such that the default risk attracts their investment decision (Ahmed 
and Khan, 2007). This can be done by packaging, securitization, and marketing credit risk 
exposures with a variety of credit risk features. Derivatives come in many guises for 
examples futures, options, and swap contracts (Davis, 2009b).  
 
Futures are forward contracts of standardized amounts that are traded in organized 
markets. Like futures, options are financial contracts of standardized amounts that give 
buyers/sellers the right to buy/sell without any obligation to do so. A swap involves 
agreement between two or more parties to exchange set of cash flows in the future 
according to predetermined specifications (Stremme, 2005). 
 
3.9.2 Shari’ah and Islamic Derivatives 
 
Discussion on Islamic derivative products is rare, and even what available in the literature 
is not very favourable. In general, it is argued by many Shari’ah scholars that 
conventional derivatives are not compliant with the precepts of Shari’ah for various 
reasons (Obaidullah, 2007).  
 
First, they entail gharar and maysir and are therefore viewed in a similar way to 
gambling. For example, the argument is often put forward that the huge trading volume 
of derivative markets is indicative of extensive speculation, that the market attracts and 
accentuates speculative behaviour (Chapra, 2007).  
 
A second issue that causes uneasiness among fiqh scholars is the fact that a large portion 
of those trading in derivative markets have no intention of either making or taking 
delivery of the underlying asset; they are based on a system of margin calls without real 
movement of goods. Third, standard options, swaps, and futures contracts stem from debt 
and are connected to the sale and purchase of debts and liabilities (Yaccubi, 2010). 
Shari’ah only permits taking on risk proportionate to the real value of the asset and not 
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beyond the value of the real asset (Usmani, 2009). As a result, the scope for risk transfer 
techniques in Islamic finance is limited at the present. 
 
Derivatives also introduce a serious moral hazard to the financial matrix due to the nature 
of their structures. In some situations, a bank could benefit from the customer‟s default, 
as the bank makes profit from the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) it bought on this 
customer. In a creditor‟s meeting to help the customer, for example, this particular bank 
will have a hidden agenda of trying to make the customer default. This is against the core 
principles of Islamic finance that promotes the wellbeing of society. 
   
While the OIC Fiqh Council has endorsed arbun under the condition that a time limit is 
specified for the option, the concept of arbun is merely acceptable to the extent of part 
payment after finalisation of the deal. Its legality as a separate sale (i.e. bai’al-arbun), 
detached from real transactions, is in general not approved by the Shari’ah scholars. 
From the main schools of Islamic fiqh, only the Hanbali considers bai’ al-arbun to be a 
valid legal contract (Ayub, 2007).    
 
Kamali (2005) attempts to make a case for commodity derivatives on the grounds that 
derivatives are clear if the wrongful devouring of the properties of others and such 
contracts are concluded through the mutual consent of trading parties. He also argues that 
commodity derivatives should be viewed under the broad scope of public interest or 
maslahah. In addition, Chapra (2007) argues that hedging has become an important 
instrument for the management of risks in the present international economic and 
financial environment where there is a great deal of instability in exchange rates as well 
as other market prices. He makes a suggestion to the fiqh jurists to review their position 
on currency hedging contracts. To explain his view, he assumes that a Saudi businessman 
places an order for Japanese goods worth a million dollars (Rls 3.75 million) to be 
delivered three months from now. If the exchange rate s 117 Yen per dollar, and if the 
exchange rate remains stable, Yen 117 million will become due at the time of delivery of 
goods. Since exchange rates are not stable, and consequently if the Yen appreciates over 
these three months by say 5 per cent, the Saudi importer will have to pay Rls 3.94 million 
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for the goods instead of Rls 3.75 million. The Saudi businessman will therefore incur an 
unforeseen loss of Rls 190,000. 
 
Although recognizing that the verdict so far is that “hedging is not permissible,” Chapra 
(2007) argues that this opinion is based on three objections: hedging involves gharar, 
interest payment and receipt, and forward sale of currencies. All three of these are 
prohibited by the Shari’ah. However, as far as gharar is concerned, the objection is not 
valid because hedging in fact helps eliminate gharar by enabling the importer to buy the 
needed foreign exchange at the current exchange rate. The bank, which sells forward 
Yen, also does not get involved in gharar because it purchases the Yen spot and invests 
them until the time of delivery. The bank therefore earns a return on the Yen that it 
invests for three months but also loses the return it would have earned on the Riyals or 
the dollars that were used to purchase the Yen. The differential in the two rates of return 
determines the premium or the discount on the forward contract. The second objection 
with regard to interest can be handled by requiring the Islamic banks to invest the Yen or 
other foreign currencies purchased in an Islamically permissible manner. There would not 
have been any interest, but rather profit earned on the investments. The third objection is, 
of course, very serious. Chapra (2007) argues that although Islam prohibits forward 
transactions in currencies, we live in a world where instability in the foreign exchange 
markets has become an unavoidable reality. It is very risky for businessmen as well 
Islamic banks to carry unhedged foreign exchange positions on their balance sheets, 
particularly in crisis situation when exchange rates are very volatile. “If they do not resort 
to hedging, they actually get involved in gharar more intensively. In addition, one of the 
important objectives of the Shari’ah, which is the protection of wealth, is compromised 
unnecessarily” (Chapra, 2007).  
 
Engel (2010), who was interviewed for this research, explains that derivatives will come 
for Islamic banks; it is just a matter of time. Today the closest structure is sukuk, with 
lease agreements and the transfer of ownership rights, but still a lot of work is needed. 
The Malaysian market is more liberal than the GCC market and the Islamic financiers in 
Malaysia are working hard on developing Islamic derivatives that would have a wide 
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acceptance among Shari’ah scholars. Lowe (2010), another interviewee for this research, 
adds that “if the scholars rule all derivatives haram, this would make hedging very 
difficult for Islamic banks”.  
 
It is said that a wise man learns from others‟ mistakes; Islamic banking should learn from 
the painful experience of conventional banking in the over use of derivatives. Derivatives 
should be used for hedging to reduce risks rather than profit generating purposes. The use 
should also be carefully controlled and audited by the individual banks and regulators. 
Judging derivatives should be made within context.  
 
3.9.3 Islamic Hedging Tools 
 
Islamic banking needs to move quickly towards viable hedging alternatives if it is to 
sustain the growth that it has enjoyed so far. However, Islamic banks are not using any 
equivalent of credit derivatives, as sale of debt is prohibited, almost by all scholars, 
except in Malaysia. With the dramatic improvement in financial innovation in Islamic 
finance, some endeavours have been successful in providing a number of contracts exist 
in Islamic banking that could be considered a basis for derivative instruments within an 
Islamic framework. These are bai’salam, arbun, khiyar al-shart, wa’ad, and dual 
murabahah.  
 
3.9.3.1 Bai’ salam 
 
Bai’ salam is similar to the conventional forward contract. However, the major difference 
is that in a bai’ salam contract, the buyer pays the entire amount in full at the time the 
contract is initiated. The contract also stipulates that this payment must be in the form of 
cash. The buyer in a contract therefore is an Islamic bank. Because there is full 
prepayment, this potential contract is beneficial to the seller. As such, the predetermined 
price is normally lower than the potential price. The price behaviour is certainly different 
from that of conventional forward contracts, where the forward price is typically higher 
than the spot price by the amount of the carrying cost. Credit or counterparty risks of 
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forward and bai’ salam contracts are therefore different. In a bai’ salam contract, the risk 
would be one-sided because the buyer has fully paid, and therefore only the buyer faces 
the seller‟s default risk as opposed to both parties facing risk, as in a forward contract. In 
order to overcome the potential for default on the part of the seller, the Shari’ah allows 
the buyer to require security, which may be in the form of a guarantee or pledge (Noraini 
et al., 2009). 
 
Visser (2009) adds that, instead of using forward contacts for swaps, as they have been 
traditionally utilised, one could also hedge price risks with the help of futures. Since the 
buyer of a future really wants to take delivery of a good and thus no speculation, futures 
contracts should be met with less disapproval. It should be noted that the Maliki school 
allows futures contracts to be traded, like they have always done for bai’ salam contracts, 
but the Hanafi, Shafii, and Hanbali schools do not (Visser, 2009). 
 
Ahmed and Khan (2007) assert that by virtue of a number of fiqh resolutions, conventions 
and new research, the scope for commodity futures in Islamic finance is widening; the 
potential of futures contracts is tremendous in risk management and control. Kamali 
(2005) argues that if new technology can eliminate gharar in the contract, then it may be 
reconsidered by Shari’ah scholars. Futures contracts should not be branded as maysir as 
they serve an economic purpose – to reduce price risk. The implementation of a 
contemporary futures contract removes gharar that is the base of forbidding these 
contracts, and in the futures they may prove to be instrumental in managing the risks in 
Islamic banking, particularly commodity risks. He adds that Shari’ah scholars require the 
possession of assets prior to sale is in principle in order to avoid gharar, but this 
argument against futures does not hold water as delivery is guaranteed by the futures 
clearing house. Kamali concludes that futures contracts are Islamically permissible 
provided that they steer clear of haram commodities and of interest elements. 
 
It should be mentioned that there are a few Muslim countries with futures markets: 
Indonesia (coffee and crude palm oil), Kazakhstan (wheat), Malaysia (crude palm oil, 
stick index, and government debt), and Turkey (currency). In addition, there is some 
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over-the- counter trading based on bai’salam in a number of Islamic countries, including 
Iran (Visser, 2009).   
 
3.9.3.2.  Arbun 
 
Arbun is a contract whereby a buyer of goods makes an immediate down payment of part 
of the price against future delivery. The buyer has the option to pay the balance, being the 
purchase price less the down payment, at any time until a specified final purchase date. 
However, should the buyer choose not to buy the goods by the final purchasing date, the 
down payment will be forfeited. It is very similar to the call option in conventional 
finance. The main difference is that a call option is purchased by paying a premium 
which is not offset against the purchase price should the option be exercised, whereas the 
down payment on an arbun purchase is part payment for the good or asset if the sale is 
effectuated (Visser, 2009). Islamic funds have successfully utilized arbuns to minimize 
portfolio risks in what are now popularly known in the Islamic financial markets as the 
Principal Protected Funds (PPFs) (Ahmed and Khan, 2007). Further development should 
move towards credit risk mitigation by way of Islamic credit default swaps and the 
development of options under the arbun structure. 
 
It should be noted that the Hanbali school is the most liberal in allowing arbun; other 
schools, in particular the Hanafi school, tend to be opposed to it (Yaccubi, 2010). They 
argue that the retention of a down payment by the seller is akin to misappropriation of the 
property of others and hence is not permissible (Visser, 2009).  
 
3.9.3.3. Khiyar al-shart 
 
Khiyar al-Shart (option of condition) is a contract in which one or both parties to a 
contract (or even a third party) holds an option (embedded within the contract) to confirm 
or rescind the contract within a specified time contingent on the fulfilment of a stipulated 
condition. The contract has embedded options that could be triggered if the underlying 
asset‟s price exceeds certain bounds. The exercise features of this contract are similar to a 
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conventional put option. What differentiates the khiyar al-shart option from conventional 
options is that there can be no separate fee paid at the start of the contract in respect of 
granting the option right. Therefore, it is the delivery price of the underlying asset, which 
includes an element that recognises the economic value awarded to the option holder in 
the contract. Ahmed and Khan (2007) argue that there are no fiqh objections to using 
non-detachable embedded options and that in Sudan such a contractual agreement has 
become a regular feature of the salam contract. 
 
3.9.3.4. Wa’ad 
 
Bai’ salam, arbun, and khiyar al-shart all involve bi-lateral binding contracts, whereas 
the rules are less stringent with a wa’ad contract. It is a promise whereby the party 
looking to hedge provides a unilateral binding undertaking to buy currency from a third 
party at a given price in the future. The third party is not under any obligation to act on 
the transaction when the offer to purchase is submitted, resulting in significant 
counterparty risk (Wyman, 2009). 
 
3.9.3.5. Dual murabahah 
 
In conventional terms a Dual Currency Deposit is a fixed deposit with variable terms for 
the currency of payment. Deposits are made in one currency, but repayment at maturity 
occurs either in the currency of the initial deposit or in another agreed upon currency, 
depending on the occurrence of a trigger event. The „optionality‟ is typically created by 
buying an option from the client. Rather than return the option premium to the client as a 
flat payment, it is embedded in the deposit and returned to the client as an enhancement 
to the deposit yield. This deposit creates foreign exchange rate risk for the investor and is 
therefore only suitable to clients with a specific view or risk appetite.  
To replicate the above payoff and risk profile in an Islamic environment, Islamic banks 
combine commodity murabahah and wa’ad technology, enabling the bank to pay the 
customer an increased profit on the murabahah and settle the principal amount of the 
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deferred price in a pre-specified different currency. Figure 3.8 provides detailed 
explanation of how the dual currency murabahah can be used as a risk mitigation tool.  
 
Figure 3.8: Dual Currency Murabahah Structure 
 
Source: EIIB (2010a) 
 
(1) Client (as seller) undertakes a commodity murabahah with the Islamic bank (as 
purchaser) in a specified original currency (e.g. USD); 
(2) Contemporaneously, but separately, the Client issues an undertaking to the Islamic 
bank to buy a specified amount of alternative currency (e.g. EUR) in exchange for a 
specified amount of the original currency (e.g. USD); 
(3) The Islamic bank will give an undertaking to a Counterparty Bank to enter into a FX 
trade which mirrors the undertaking given by the Client to the Islamic bank; 
(4) Islamic bank completes a contemporaneously but separate murabahah transaction 
(CM2) with the Counterparty Bank and receives the murabahah price. This 
transaction will be concluded for spot settlement with no deferred payment; 
(5) At maturity, subject to the prevailing FX rates, the Islamic bank may enter into a FX 
trade with the Counterparty Bank pursuant to the Islamic bank‟s undertaking; 
(6) At maturity, subject to the prevailing FX rates, the Islamic bank may enter into an FX 
trade with the Client pursuant to the Client‟s undertaking. The Islamic bank pays the 
Murabahah principal to the client in the original currency and (if appropriate) 
completes the FX trade with the client to exchange the original currency with the 
alternative currency. The profit is paid in the original currency. 
 
Islamic Bank
Cash deposited 
with the Islamic 
Bank
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3.9.4 Further Risk Mitigation Provisions Inherent in Islamic Banking 
 
IFIs have to absorb the risks that they cannot transfer or mitigate. This is done through 
the use of collateral, guarantees, loss reserves and provisions, allocation of capital 
through the Risk-adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC) exercise, risk weightings, etc. 
Sundararajan and Errico (2002) argue that in addition the traditional risk mitigants, the 
management of the risk-return mix, particularly of the unrestricted PSIAs, could be used 
as a key tool of risk management. Appropriate policies toward profit equalization 
reserves (and possibly investment risk reserves), coupled with appropriate pricing of 
investment accounts to match the underlying risks, would improve the extent of overall 
risk sharing by these accounts.  
 
Also, under a PLS system the Islamic bank is subject to higher screening and monitoring, 
making the danger of insolvency lower, provided that PLS principles are rigorously 
applied. Managing the risk-sharing of IAHs through proper pricing, reserving, and 
disclosure policies would greatly enhance risk management in Islamic banks.  
 
Chapra (2007) argues that PLS might go a long way to prevent financial crises, as it 
would substantially reduce the moral hazard problems associated with prudential 
supervision of banking, in particular the incentive given by deposit guarantees for high-
risk lending and investment. In addition, it is argued that under PLS, there would be more 
discipline in the system. Depositors would be more interested in the soundness of the 
banks and in the quality of the banks‟ assets, in order to prevent having to accept negative 
returns. Banks would also have a better incentive to be careful in selecting borrowers and 
projects.  
 
The PLS feature of Islamic banking, therefore, provides an inherent risk management tool 
that could be of great help to banks and the whole system if properly implemented. Under 
capital allocation, the IFSB supervisory discretion formula is a step in the right direction 
as it acknowledges the risks assumed by the PSIA holders and incentivise banks – 
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through lower capital requirements – to adopt more PLS financing modes as explained in 
Chapter 4. 
   
In practice, however, the losses of Islamic banks are not shared with PSIAs holders, and 
often a minimum yield on deposits is „implicitly‟ guaranteed. As a result the potential 
benefits of the PLS finance cannot be realised. According to Sundararajan (2007), 
available empirical evidence shows that in practice, because Islamic banks try to provide 
Shari’ah-compliant alternative to conventional products, there is considerable smoothing 
of the profits paid out to the unrestricted IAHs, and correspondingly reduce sharing of 
risk between the bank and the holders of such investment accounts, with banks bearing 
the majority of the risk. The extend of this de facto departure from risk-sharing principle 
for unrestricted IAHs varies between countries; in some countries banks are expected – 
though not legally bound – to bear virtually all of the asset risk, while in others it is 
simply a matter of competitive pressure. Under current practices, reserves are passively 
adjusted to provide a stable return to unrestricted IAHs, effectively not allowing any risk 
mitigation through investment account management. For example, many banks with 
sharply divergent risk profiles and returns on assets seem to be offering almost identical 
returns on unrestricted IAHs, and these are broadly in line with the general rate of return 
on deposits in conventional banks.  
 
Moreover, most Islamic banks realise the risk management gaps in their current business 
models especially in areas of liquidity and hedging. Therefore, Islamic banks traditionally 
have been holding a comparatively larger proportion of their assets in reserve accounts, 
resulting in higher buffers than conventional banks. 
 
Finally, some constraints attached to the status of IFIs, as sellers and buyers of tangible 
goods – as opposed to conventional banks intermediating between cash inflows and 
outflows with different maturities – also have risk-mitigating benefits. One rule of the 
key principles of modern Islamic finance states that any financial transaction should be 
backed by a tangible, identifiable underlying asset. This is a powerful way for the IFI to 
secure, at least in principle, strong access to the collateral backing the transaction. In 
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short, IFIs naturally have a high level of collateralisation on their credit portfolios, and 
thus are in a position to somewhat reduce their economic, if not regulatory, exposures at 
default. In addition, IFIs have in principle greater visibility in terms of the economic 
allocation of the funds they supply to borrowers. Indeed, contrary to a conventional 
financial institution where a customer is not obliged to disclose the purpose of its loan, 
the IFI finances the acquisition of an identifiable asset for which legal ownership belongs, 
in most cases, to the bank until full repayment is made. 
 
3.10 SURVEYING RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN ISLAMIC BANKS: 
A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
Given the importance of risk management for the survival of financial institutions, it is no 
surprise that there are numerous conceptual studies about risk management frameworks 
and techniques for conventional banks. Also, there are many empirical findings that 
examine different aspects of risk management practices by various financial institutions. 
 
In the context of Islamic banking, however, risk management is an under-researched area. 
A few studies have been carried out on the theoretical side of risk management in Islamic 
banking, including the work of Haron and Hin Hock (2007) on market and credit risk, 
who explain the inherent risk, i.e. credit and market risk exposures in IFIs. They also 
illustrate the importance of displaced commercial risk in Islamic banking. They conclude 
that certain risks may be considered as being inherent in the operations of both Islamic 
and conventional banks. Although the risk exposures of IFIs differ and may be more 
complex than those of conventional financial institutions, the principles of credit and 
market risk management are applicable to both.  
 
Apart from those two risks, Archer and Haron (2007) show that IFIs are exposed to a 
number of operational risks that are different from those face by conventional banks. 
They argue that the complexities of a number of their products, as well as their relative 
novelty in the contemporary financial services market, combined with the fiduciary 
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obligations of Islamic bank when it acts as a mudarib, imply that for IFIs operational risk 
is very important consideration.  
 
Other conceptual research about risk management in Islamic finance include Iqbal and 
Mirarkor (2007), Akkizidis and Khandelwal (2008), Grais and Kulathunga (2007), 
Greuning and Iqbal (2007), and Sundararajan (2007).   
 
On the empirical side, research about risk management in Islamic finance is limited. An 
earlier study by Khan and Ahmed (2001) is still the most profound empirical research 
that examined different aspects of risk management issues in IFIs. They sent out 
questionnaires to 68 Islamic financial institutions in 28 countries and also visited Bahrain, 
Egypt, Malaysia, and the UAE to discuss issues related to risk management with the 
officials of the Islamic financial institutions. A total of 17 questionnaires were received 
from 10 countries in their study, which touched on different aspects of risk management 
in IFs. Their study first identified the severity of different risks and then examined the 
risk management process in Islamic banks. Among the traditional risks facing Islamic 
banks, mark-up risk was ranked the highest, followed by operational risk. The results 
show that Islamic financial institutions face some risks that are different from that faced 
by conventional financial institutions. These banks reveal that some of these risks are 
considered more serious than the conventional risks faced by financial institutions. Profit-
sharing modes of financing (diminishing musharakah, musharakah, and mudarabah) and 
product-deferred sale (salam and istisna’a) are considered more risky than murababah 
and ijarah. Other risks arise in Islamic banks, as they pay depositors a share of the profit 
that is not fixed ex ante. The results of survey of risk perception in different modes of 
financing by Khan and Ahmed (2001), thus, show that the risk level is considered 
elevated as depicted by Table 3.4.  
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Table 3.4: Risk Perception in Different Modes of Financing 
 
Note: The rank has a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 indicating „Not Serious‟ and 5 denoting „Critically 
Serious‟ 
Source: Khan and Ahmed (2001: 64) 
 
Their research also indicates that Islamic banks have been able to establish better risk 
management policies and procedures than measuring, mitigating, and monitoring risks, 
with internal controls somewhere in the middle. The results also point out that the lack of 
some instruments (like short-term financial assets and derivatives) and of a money market 
hampers risk management in IFIs. There is a need for research in these areas to develop 
instruments and their markets that are compatible with the Shari’ah. At the government 
level, the legal system and regulatory framework of the Islamic financial system need to 
be understood and appropriate policies should be undertaken to cater to the needs of IFIs.  
 
Furthermore, Khan and Prodhan (1992) carried a survey that focused on the integration of 
Islamic banks with conventional banking and the problems arising from the potential 
conflict, such as the need for convertible instruments, proper accounting procedures, etc. 
they concluded that with an Islamic banking system it becomes more important for the 
government to take an active position in terms of enforcing regulations and overseeing 
economic activity. “If policy measures are piecemeal and fiscal intervention 
uncoordinated, then an inefficient conventional banking and fiscal sector is replaced by 
an equally inefficient Islamic system” (Khan and Prodhan, 1992: 20) 
  
Moreover, Samad (2004) empirically studied the performance differences between 
conventional and Bahraini Islamic banks by t-testing nine accounting ratios by studying 
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twenty one banks, out of which six were Islamic, over the period 1991-2001. He 
concluded that both types of banks performed equally well in terms of profitability and 
liquidity. However, Islamic banks seem to be less exposed to credit risk. 
 
In a recent IMF research, Heiko and Cihak (2008) used data from 77 Islamic banks and 
397 commercial banks across 18 jurisdictions with a substantial presence of Shari’ah-
compliant banks to provide a cross-country empirical analysis of the role of these banks 
in financial stability using their so-called z-scores. The z-score combines a bank‟s 
capitalisation, profitability, and a measure of risk faced by the bank into a single index. 
The interpretation of the z-score is straightforward: the lower the score, the more likely it 
is that a bank will run out of capital. Defining large banks as those with total assets of 
more than USD 1 billion and small banks as all others, the study found that:  
(i) small Islamic banks tend to be financially stronger (that is, have higher z-scores) than 
small and large conventional banks;  
(ii) large conventional banks tend to be financially stronger than large Islamic banks; and 
(iii)  small Islamic banks tend to be financially stronger than large Islamic banks. 
A plausible explanation of the contrast between the high stability in small Islamic banks 
and the relatively lower stability in larger ones is that it is significantly more complex for 
Islamic banks to adjust their credit risk monitoring system as they become bigger. For 
example, the PLS modes used by Islamic banks are more diverse and more difficult to 
standardise than loans used by conventional banks. As a result, as the scale of the banking 
operation grows, monitoring of credit risk rapidly becomes much more complex, which 
results in a greater prominence of problems relating to adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Another explanation is that small banks concentrate on low risk investments and 
fee income, while large banks do more PLS business. They also found that as the 
presence of Islamic banks grows in a country‟s financial system, there is no significant 
impact on the soundness of other banks. This suggests that Islamic and conventional 
banks can co-exist in the same system without substantial „crowding out‟ effects through 
competition and deteriorating soundness. 
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More recently, Shaikh and Jalbani (2009) also provided a differential analysis of risk 
management procedures in Islamic banking. Studying a sample of four banks, this 
research used ROE as the benchmark for the comparative performance of Islamic banks 
and conventional banks. The study concluded that there is a strong relationship between 
the ROE of both Islamic and conventional banks, and that the risk management 
procedures in Islamic banks are adequate to mitigate their largely equity-based 
investments and give their customers adequate returns which are comparable with 
conventional banks. The paper optimistically concluded that equity-based business of 
Islamic banks posing a slightly more risk than conventional banks is well mitigated by 
Islamic banks through their effective and adequate distinct risk management procedures. 
However, this research does not agree with the research methodology and the findings of 
his study. 
 
More relevant to this study is Rosman and Abdul Rahman‟s (2010) study, which found 
that the lack of effective risk management practices for both liquidity risks and rate of 
return risk/displaced commercial risk will be the prime concern for Islamic banks and 
regulatory agencies. They argue that the inadequacy of risk management practices by 
Islamic banks that may threaten their sustainability especially during financial crises. 
They assert that they are still lacking on the use of technically advanced risk 
measurement approaches among Islamic banks. Hence, IFIs need to further enhance the 
risk measurement approaches to measure the complex risks such as the liquidity risk and 
rate of return risk/displaced commercial risk. Islamic banks are also found to be mostly 
complacent in their risk mitigation approaches as they continued to utilise the risk 
mitigation techniques that are widely used by the conventional banks. These findings lead 
to the need to develop the unique Shari’ah-compliant risk mitigation techniques 
 
Finally, Noraini et al. (2009) attempted to ascertain the perceptions of Islamic bankers 
about the nature of risks, risk measurement, and risk management techniques in their 
banks. The study covered 28 Islamic banks in 14 countries, using a questionnaire survey. 
The results indicated that Islamic banks are mostly exposed to similar types of risks to 
those in conventional banks, but that there are differences in the level of the risks. 
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However, the study found no evidence that Islamic bankers in different countries 
perceived risks differently. The study recommends that each risk should be assessed 
separately for each financial instrument in order to facilitate appropriate risk 
management. The findings also suggest that Islamic banks are perceived to use less 
technically advanced risk measurement techniques, of which the most commonly used 
are maturity matching, gap analysis and credit ratings. In addition, Noraini et al.‟s (2009) 
research shows that Islamic banks are not fully using the Shari’ah-compliant risk 
mitigation methods, which are different from the ones used by conventional banks. The 
findings of their study have both theoretical and policy implications for the issue of 
transparency, with particular reference to risk reporting in Islamic banks.  
 
3.11 CONCLUSION 
 
Islamic banks are, for the most part, still small and in the start-up phase of development 
in an industry which is itself relatively young. Whereas risk management is practiced 
widely in conventional financial markets, it is underdeveloped in Islamic finance. This 
gives rise to an array of risks which are not well comprehended yet. Moreover, risks 
unique to Islamic banks arise from the specific features of Islamic contracts; and the 
overall legal, governance, and liquidity infrastructure of Islamic finance. Literature 
review reveals that the infrastructural environment of most Islamic banks is characterized 
by weak transparency, high concentration risks, lack of commonly accepted Shari’ah-
compliance and accounting standards, and the shortage of liquidity and hedging products. 
To solve these problems Islamic finance institutions like the AAOIFI, IFSB, LMC, IILM, 
IIFM, and others have developed a core set of accounting, liquidity, governance, risk 
management, auditing, and Shari’ah standards. Nevertheless, IFIs still face risks 
connected to the enforceability of promises, an efficient management of funding and asset 
liquidity, and many other limitations. Several areas such as asset pricing, hedging, and 
risk mitigation require, therefore, further research. For example, in the absence of a risk-
free asset, how will the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) behave? Or using Black‟s 
zero-beta model, how will the model behave with restrictions on short selling? Several 
such issues have not been researched yet (Askari et al., 2009). Adopting accepted risk 
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models from the conventional banking practice or making suitable adjustments to best 
practices pose major challenges.  
 
The future of Islamic banking will highly depend on innovation. The immediate need is 
to develop instruments that enhance liquidity; to develop secondary money and interbank 
markets; to perform asset-liability and risk management; and to develop Islamically 
acceptable risk hedging tools.  
 
In some ways, Islamic banking could be less risky than the conventional banking industry 
because there are several features that could make IFIs less vulnerable to risk. For 
instance, Islamic banks are able, in theory, to pass through a negative shock on the asset 
side to the PSIA depositors. The risk-sharing arrangements on the deposit side provide 
another layer of protection to the bank. In addition, it could be argued that the need to 
provide stable and competitive returns to investors, the shareholders‟ responsibility for 
negligence or misconduct, and the more difficult access to liquidity put pressures on 
Islamic banks to be more conservative (Heiko and Cihak, 2008), and to keep liquidity 
buffers. Furthermore, because depositors share in the risks (and typically do not have 
deposit guarantee), they have more incentives to exercise tight oversight over bank 
management. Finally, Islamic banks have traditionally been holding a comparatively 
larger proportion of their assets than commercial banks in reserve accounts. So, even 
though Islamic investments are more risky than conventional instruments, these higher 
risks have traditionally been compensated for by higher buffers. 
 
In 2007, Michael Ainley, Head of Wholesale Banking at the FSA stated at the Islamic 
Finance Summit in London that “Risk knows no religion” (Ainley, 2007). He obviously 
did not get it fully right when he thought that risks are similar for Islamic and 
conventional banks. Although conventional and Islamic markets share similar risks, the 
level of risk is different and certainly higher in the case of today‟s Islamic banking. A 
common perception about Islamic banking is that it is expected to be safer and more 
resilient than the debunked Wall Street model, a perception which is not entirely correct. 
Advocates of Islamic banking have been recently, especially after the start of the credit 
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crisis, claiming that Islamic finance is a safe haven. The truth is that Islamic banking in 
its current state can be riskier than conventional banking because of the additional risk 
management challenges and constraints the industry faces.  
 
In theory, Islamic banking is safer than conventional banking. The theory is, 
unfortunately, a long way from fact in its current financial practice. Since the risk 
management needs of Islamic banking are not being met yet, the system is not 
functioning at its full potential. There is a growing realisation that the long-term 
sustainable growth of Islamic banking will depend largely on the development of risk-
sharing products. Chapter 5 thoroughly explains that Islamic banking could be a safe 
haven provided that its broader principles on a macro-level are entirely followed by all 
participants. In other words, when the short-terms risks and the longer-term stability are 
put together, the outlook for the Islamic banking industry looks less risky than its critics 
claim. 
 
After mapping out the risk and risk management techniques and also the practices, the 
following chapter continues with capital adequacy in Islamic banks, which is further 
explored, like the issues in this chapter, empirically in the later chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CAPITAL ADEQUACY FOR ISLAMIC BANKS: A SURVEY  
 
“Capital isn‟t scarce; vision is” 
Sam Walton 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Financial liberalisation, as part of globalisation, has keenly been followed by developing 
countries since the 1990s. Several restrictions were eased, and self-regulation was 
considered to be the motivating factor. However, the developments show that everything 
did not work well. There were several instances of malpractice, financial frauds, and 
some failures. In responding to this, regulators started looking at the existing set of 
standards and ways to overcome the issue of balancing control and freedom. From simple 
capital provisions to comprehensive frameworks for risk management, the practice of risk 
management, as a result, has undergone wholesale transformation over the past two 
decades (Akkizidis and Khandelwal, 2007). More systematic transformation has taken 
place during the current straitened times. It is a fact that each country has its own set of 
regulations based on several parameters. The most common among them is the 
requirement to hold minimum capital indexed to the activities of the bank.  
 
Capital adequacy is at the core of the supervisory activities all over the world. It is an 
important benchmark for the soundness of the financial institutions. It is gaining more 
prominence after the recent credit crunch which saw numerous financial institutions 
collapsing because their capital was not big enough to absorb the risks they were taking. 
The developments have shown that the market turmoil turned out to be deeper and more 
enduring than previously anticipated and that financial markets are failing to sustain the 
normal flow of capital. Regulators, banks, and industry participants realized that capital is 
a critical factor for the intrinsic strength of banks. Therefore, this chapter is designated to 
discuss capital adequacy in Islamic banking, which is explored empirically in the 
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following chapters with the opinions of sample bankers, financiers, Shari’ah scholars, 
and academics.  
 
The fundamental principle that capital is the currency of risk and adequate capital 
protects against distress applies equally to all banks. Therefore, the implementation of 
Basel II is as critical to Islamic banks as it is to their conventional counterparts. With 
necessary adjustments, the three pillars of Basel II could be applicable to Islamic banks. 
The need for supervisory oversight in Pillar 2 can hardly be overemphasized, as market 
discipline through disclosure will provide greater transparency and benefit to Islamic 
banks. The capital treatment of PSIAs adds complexity to capital requirements for 
Islamic banks. Notwithstanding the loss-absorbing features of the PSIAs, in practice they 
behave like normal deposits and most regulators do not treat them as having capital 
features. Hence, the risk-sharing characteristic of PSIAs requires special capital 
treatment.   
 
The previous two chapters have dealt with the evolution of Islamic banking and the major 
types of risks in conventional and Islamic banks. The present chapter provides a brief 
review of the Basel II Accord and is hence largely based on documents issued by the 
BCBS. A brief summary of the original Basel I Accord is presented, highlighting the 
major limitations of the first Accord. A summary of the three Pillars of Basel II and the 
forthcoming Basel III standards and their applicability for IFIs is also presented. The 
IFSB has issued capital adequacy standards for the Islamic financial industry, which are 
discussed in detail. This chapter, however, does not thoroughly discuss Basel II, nor does 
it examine every single detail of the IFSB papers as plenty of literature exists about Basel 
Accords and other Bank for International Settlements (BIS) guidelines, and the IFSB 
papers are brief and simple enough to be self-explanatory. This chapter highlights the 
specifics of capital adequacy requirements for IFIs, explains the differences between 
conventional Basel Accords and the Islamic version provided by the IFSB, and illustrates 
how capital adequacy requirement can be used as a tool for risk mitigation for Islamic 
banks. 
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4.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF CAPITAL IN BANKING 
 
Nearly all jurisdictions with active banking markets require banks to maintain a minimum 
level of capital. Capital plays an important role in any business but it is critically 
important in case of banks, as it serves as a foundation for a bank‟s future growth and as a 
cushion against its unexpected losses. Adequately capitalised banks as well managed 
banks are better able to withstand losses and to provide credit to consumers and 
businesses alike throughout the business cycle, particularly during downturns. Hence, 
capital is one of the key determinants and indicators of the soundness of a bank, not only 
because adequate capital serves as a safety net but also it is the ultimate determinant of a 
bank‟s lending and investment capacity. Adequate levels of capital thereby help to 
promote public confidence in the banking system.  
 
Banks by the nature of their business have a lower capital-to-liabilities ratio than other 
types of business. This low ratio is a reflection of the nature of the intermediation 
business and acceptance of large amounts of liabilities in the form of deposits. To 
encourage prudent management of the risks associated with the unique balance sheet 
structure, regulators require banks to maintain a certain level of capital. The idea behind 
such a requirement is that a bank‟s balance sheet should not be expanded beyond the 
level of risks its capital can absorb. The technical challenge, however, for both banks and 
supervisors, has been to determine how much capital is necessary to serve as a sufficient 
buffer against unexpected losses. If capital levels are too low, banks may be unable to 
absorb high levels of losses. On the other hand, excessively low levels of capital increase 
the risk of bank failures which, in turn, may put depositors‟ funds at risk. Under-
capitalised banks are highly prone to the risk of insolvency and can also suffer from 
retarded growth. If capital levels are too high, banks may not be able to make the most 
efficient use of their resources. A bank which is over-capitalised will have low return on 
its capital and will not be able to pay decent dividends to its shareholders (Jorion and 
Khoury, 1996). Thus, arriving at an optimal level of capital is in the best interest of banks 
and shareholders. Both financial intermediaries and regulators are, therefore, sensitive to 
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the dual role of capital. Financial intermediaries tend to focus more on the earnings-
generating role, while regulators tend to be focused on the stability-cushion role. 
 
4.3 CLASSIFICATION OF CAPITAL 
 
Defining what constitutes capital is a long-debated issue. However, there is a wide 
acceptance of the capital structure that has been stipulated by the BCBS, which 
segregates capital into three categories as set out in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Classification of Capital in the Basel Accords 
Classification Contents 
Tier 1 (core capital) Ordinary paid-up share of capital or common stock, 
disclosed reserves from post-tax retained earnings, non-
cumulative perpetual preferred stock (goodwill to be 
deducted) 
Tier 2 (supplementary capital) Undisclosed reserves, asset revaluation reserves, general 
provisions or general loan-loss provisions, hybrid (debt-
equity) capital instruments, and subordinated term debts 
Tier 3 Unsecured debt: subordinated and fully paid up, to have 
an original maturity of at least two years and not be 
repayable before the agreed repayment date unless the 
supervisory authority agrees 
Source: Greuning and Iqbal (2008: 223) 
 
 
In general, according to BCBS (2006), the capital of a bank should have three important 
characteristics: 
(i) It must be permanent; 
(ii) It must not impose mandatory fixed charges against earnings; and 
(iii) It must allow for legal subordination to the rights of depositors and other 
creditors. 
 
4.4 STEPS IN THE BASEL ACCORD 
One cannot discuss capital adequacy without mentioning the renowned Basel Accord. 
The BIS was established on 17 May, 1930; it is the oldest international financial 
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institution. It provides a platform for consultative cooperation among the central banks. 
The role of BIS has undergone change as per the needs of the international financial 
sector. BIS now also acts as an institution for collection, compilation, and dissemination 
of economic and financial statistics. It actively promotes global financial stability, and 
also performs the traditional banking function for the central banks community (gold and 
foreign exchange transactions). It has several committees working on different aspects of 
international financial stability. The BCBS, as part of the BIS structure, was formed at the 
end of 1974 by the Governors of G-10 nations. The BCBS issued a series of documents 
beginning from 1975 on banking supervision (Akkizidis and Khandelwal, 2007).   
 
4.4.1 The Basel I Accord 
 
The 1988 Basel Capital Accord set out the first internationally accepted definition of, and 
a minimum measure for, bank capital. The Basel Committee designed the 1988 Accord as 
a simple standard so that it could be applied to banks in several jurisdictions. It requires 
banks to divide their exposures up into broad „classes‟ reflecting similar types of 
borrowers. A minimum capital of 8 percent of risk-weighted assets was given. For 
example, 0 percent for cash, 20 percent for claims on multilateral development banks, 50 
percent for residential mortgages, and 100 for loans to private sector. This risk-based 
capital charges roughly attempted to create a greater penalty for riskier assets (Jorion and 
Khoury, 1996). 
 
While the 1988 Accord was initially applied only to internationally active banks in the 
G10 countries, it quickly became acknowledged as a benchmark measure of a bank‟s 
solvency and is believed to have been adopted in some form by more than 100 countries 
(KPMG, 2007). 
 
4.4.2 The 1996 Amendment 
 
The 1988 Basel Accord was soon proved insufficient and rendered obsolete by rapid 
changes in the financial sector. The amendment covered the four major risk categories of 
market risk (Akkizidis and Khandelwal, 2007: 82-83):  
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a. Interest rate-related instruments 
b. Equities 
c. Foreign exchange risk 
d. Commodities 
 
4.4.3 Issues with the Basel I Accord 
 
The world financial system has seen considerable changes since introduction of the Basel 
I Accord. Financial markets have become more volatile, and a significant degree of 
financial innovation has taken place. There have also been incidents of economic 
turbulence leading to widespread financial crises – for example, in Asia in 1997 and in 
Eastern Europe in 1998. In addition, advances in risk management practices, technology, 
and banking markets have made the 1988 Accord‟s simple approach to measuring capital 
less meaningful for many banking organisations. For example, the 1988 Accord sets 
capital requirements based on broad classes of exposures and does not distinguish 
between the relative degrees of creditworthiness among individual borrowers. 
 
In a similar manner, improvements in internal processes, the adoption of more advanced 
risk measurement techniques, and the increasing use of sophisticated risk management 
practices, such as securitisation, have changed leading organisations‟ monitoring and 
management of exposures and activities has been the result of Basel I. However, 
supervisors and sophisticated banking organisations have found that the static rules set 
out in the 1988 Accord have not kept pace with advances in sound risk management 
practices. This suggests that the existing capital regulations did not reflect banks‟ actual 
business practices. In other words, it was not sufficiently risk sensitive (KPMG, 2007). 
 
4.4.4 The Basel II Accord 
 
In June 2004, the Basel Committee finalised a comprehensive revision to the Basel 
Accord. In the European Union, the new Capital Adequacy Directive began to apply to 
all banks from 2007 onwards, with the most advanced methods being viable from 2008. 
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US regulators decided to apply Basel II to a small number of large banks, with other 
banks subject to a revised version of Basel I. 
 
4.4.4.1. How does Basel II differ from the 1988 Basel Capital Accord? 
 
The Basel II Framework is more reflective of the underlying risks in banking and 
provides stronger incentives for improved risk management. It builds on the 1988 
Accord‟s basic structure for setting capital requirements and improves the capital 
framework‟s sensitivity to the risks that banks actually face. This will be achieved in part 
by aligning capital requirements more closely to the risk of credit loss and by introducing 
a new capital charge for exposures to the risk of loss caused by operational failures (EIIB, 
2010c). 
 
The Basel Committee, however, broadly maintained the aggregate level of minimum 
capital requirements, while providing incentives to adopt the more advanced risk-
sensitive approaches of the revised Framework. Basel II combines these minimum capital 
requirements with supervisory review and market discipline to encourage improvements 
in risk management. 
 
Basel II also covers a wide range of risks which were not previously included in the 
original accord, such as operational risk, country risk, legal risk, concentration risk, 
liquidity risk, and reputational risk. Basel II marks a shift from transaction-based 
supervision to risk-based supervision (KPMG, 2007).  
 
4.4.5 The Three Pillars of Basel II 
 
The overarching goal for the Basel II Framework is to promote the adequate 
capitalisation of banks and to encourage improvements in risk management, thereby 
strengthening the stability of the financial system. This goal was accomplished through 
the introduction of „three pillars‟ that mutually reinforce each other and that create 
incentives for banks to enhance the quality of their control processes. The first pillar 
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represents a significant strengthening of the minimum requirements set out in the 1988 
Accord, while the second and third pillars represent innovative additions to capital 
supervision. Figure 4.1 provides an overall structure of the Basel II framework and the 
sub components of each of its main three pillars. 
 
When estimating the minimum capital requirements, there are two types of capital that 
can be calculated by financial institutions: economic capital and regulatory capital. As 
opposed to regulatory capital, which is set by the regulators, economic capital is the 
amount of capital estimated by the bank‟s management to be maintained. Setting a higher 
limit for economic capital provides some room for leverage for banks. Economic capital 
is covered by Pillar 2, while regulatory capital is covered by Pillar 1 of the Basel II 
Accord. 
 
Pillar 1 of the new capital framework revises the 1988 Accord‟s guidelines by aligning 
the minimum capital requirements more closely to each bank‟s actual risk of economic 
loss. 
 
Basel II improves the capital framework‟s sensitivity to the risk of credit losses generally 
by requiring higher levels of capital for those borrowers thought to present higher levels 
of credit risk, and vice versa. The calculation of the minimum capital is presented with 
the help of the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), which is defined by the following 
equation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The equation defines the CAR as the ratio of the bank‟s capital (Tier I and Tier II) to its 
risk-weighted assets, and it should not be lower than 8 percent. However, the regulators 
in each jurisdiction are given the discretion to impose higher percentage if required).   
CAR computation according to Basel II 
Accord
Capital (Tier 1,2, 3 and deductions)
RWA (Credit risk + Market risk + Operational risk charge) 
Bank’s capital ratio ≥ 8%=
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Three options are available to allow banks and supervisors to choose an approach that 
seems most appropriate for the sophistication of a bank‟s activities and internal controls.  
 
4.4.5.1. Credit risk capital charge 
 
Credit risks are of such great importance to banks from the regulators‟ perspective that 
the original 1988 Capital Accord required capital only against credit risks for on-balance 
sheet and off-balance sheet assets. The primary concern of regulators is that banks should 
be aware of their credit risk and maintain a minimum level of capital to overcome any 
instability caused by default by a client. Basel II classifies assets into five risk categories 
(0%, 10%, 20%, 50%, and 100%), depending on their rating. 
 
Under the „Standardised Approach‟ to credit risk, banks that engage in less complex 
forms of lending and credit underwriting and that have simpler control structures may use 
external measures of credit risk to assess the credit quality of their borrowers for 
regulatory capital purposes.  
 
Banks that engage in more sophisticated risk-taking and that have developed advanced 
risk measurement systems may, with the approval of their supervisors, select from one of 
two „Internal Rating Based‟ (IRB) approaches to credit risk. Under an IRB approach, 
banks rely partly on their own measures of a borrowers‟ credit risk to determine their 
capital requirements, subject to strict data, validation, and operational requirements 
(BCBS, 2006). 
 
4.4.5.2. Market risk capital charge 
 
The BCBS described detailed methods for the calculation of capital charges for (i) 
foreign exchange risk, (ii) interest rate risk, (iii) equity position risk, (iv) commodities 
risk, and (v) derivative trading. The capital charge for foreign exchange risk may exclude 
structured foreign exchange positions. The capital charge for interest rate risk is applied 
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to the current trading book items. The Committee has prescribed two alternative models 
to measure market risk: the Standardized Approach (SA) and the Internal Model 
Approach (IRA). 
 
4.4.5.3. Operational risk capital charge 
 
Unlike Basel I, which focused on credit risk, Basel II includes an explicit measure for 
operational risk. This new capital accord requires all banks to hold adequate capital 
against potential operational losses. The new framework establishes an explicit capital 
charge for a bank‟s exposures to the risk of losses caused by failures in systems, 
processes, or staff, or to losses that are caused by external events such as natural 
disasters. Similar to the range of options provided for assessing exposures to credit risk, 
banks will choose one of three approaches for measuring their exposures to operational 
risk that they and their supervisors agree reflects the quality and sophistication of their 
internal controls over this particular risk area. Banks have the option to choose from 
Basic Indicator Approach, Standardised Approach, or Advanced Measurement Approach. 
 
By aligning capital charges more closely to a bank‟s own measures of its exposures to 
credit, market, and operational risks, the Basel II Framework encourages banks to refine 
those measures. It also provides explicit incentives in the form of lower capital 
requirements for banks to adopt more comprehensive and accurate measures of risk, as 
well as more effective processes for controlling their exposures to risk. 
 
While understanding the risks and the allocation of capital under Pillar I is a critical step, 
the core elements of supervision (Pillar 2) and market discipline (Pillar 3) are equally 
important. The Basel committee believes that a well-designed capital requirement 
standard cannot be made effective in the absence of strong and prudent supervision. 
 
Pillar 2 of the new capital framework recognises the necessity of exercising an effective 
supervisory review of banks‟ internal assessments of their overall risks to ensure that 
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bank management is exercising sound judgement and has set aside adequate capital for 
these risks. 
 
Supervisors will evaluate the activities and risk profiles of individual banks to determine 
whether those organisations should hold higher levels of capital than the minimum 
requirements in Pillar 1 would specify, and to see whether there is any need for remedial 
actions. 
 
The Committee expects that, when supervisors engage banks in a dialogue about their 
internal processes for measuring and managing their risks, they will help to create 
implicit incentives for organisations to develop sound control structures and to improve 
those processes. 
 
The Committee cautions that increased capital should not be taken as the only option for 
addressing risks. It advised the use of other means such as: strengthening risk 
management, applying internal limits, strengthening the level of provisions and reserves, 
and improving internal controls. Capital should not be treated as a substitute for 
inadequate control or risk management processes.  
 
Pillar 3 leverages the ability of market discipline to motivate prudent management by 
enhancing the degree of transparency in banks‟ public reporting. It sets out the public 
disclosures that banks must make that lend greater insight into the adequacy of their 
capitalisation. The disclosure requirements are based on the concept of materiality, i.e. 
banks must include all information where omission or misstatement could change or 
influence the decisions of information users. The only exception is proprietary or 
confidential information, the sharing of which could undermine a bank‟s competitive 
position.   
 
The Committee believes that, when marketplace participants have a sufficient 
understanding of a bank‟s activities and the controls it has in place to manage its 
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exposures, they are better able to distinguish between banking organisations so that they 
can reward those that manage their risks prudently and penalise those that do not.  
 
Figure 4.1: Structure of the Basel II Accord 
 
 
The shaded Approaches are the ones most commonly used by Islamic banks.  
 
4.4.6 Criticism and Amendments to the Basel II Accord  
 
As previously mentioned, after the Asian and the Eastern European financial crises in the 
1990s, there was an increasing concern that the Basel I Accord did not provide an 
effective means to ensure that capital requirements match a bank‟s true risk profile. The 
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risk measurement and control aspects of the Basel I accord needed to be improved, which 
lead to introduction of the Basel II Accord. Similar concerns are being raised about Basel 
II after the current financial tsunami engulfed the world since 2008. As a result, voices 
have been raised criticising Basel II and requesting a new Accord for measuring and 
controlling capital requirements (British Bankers‟ Association, 2009). 
 
“Shortcomings in the Basel II will be definitely addressed” as stated by Engel (2010). 
This is essential, as the crisis has revealed that, on its own, without a strong liquidity 
pillar, Basel II is impotent. The Basel regime, which was always meant to be an 
evolutionary process, will change. The trend – apparent already before the crisis – 
towards loosening the definition of regulatory capital will be reversed. Definitions of 
capital will tighten and regulatory capital requirements will increase. Capital must no 
longer be looked at in isolation. The regulations must recognise the interplay between 
liquidity and capital and the ability of liquidity problems to become capital problems. In 
addition to developing a more prescriptive regime for liquidity risk, future capital rules 
should make excessive leveraging incrementally more expensive and address 
procyclicality, potentially by requiring banks to maintain larger capital buffers over the 
cycle (British Bankers‟ Association, 2009). It is worth mentioning that even before the 
crisis, Basel II has been widely criticised for encouraging pro-cyclicality, which dynamic 
provisioning is designed to offset. 
 
The Basel Committee met in March 2009 to discuss embracing provisioning and higher 
capital. A statement on the BIS website stated that “This will be achieved by a 
combination of measures such as introducing standards to promote the build-up of capital 
buffers that can be drawn down in periods of stress, strengthening the quality of bank 
capital, improving the risk coverage of the capital framework, and introducing a non-risk 
supplementary measure”. On 13 July 2009, the BCBS announced that proposals for 
enhancing the Basel II framework have been finalised. The Committee is strengthening 
the treatment for certain securitisations in Pillar 1 (minimum capital requirements). It is 
introducing higher risk weights for resecuritisation exposures to better reflect the risk 
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inherent in these products and is also requiring that banks conduct more rigorous credit 
analyses of externally rated securitisation exposures.  
The supplemental Pillar 2 guidance addresses several notable weaknesses that have been 
revealed in banks‟ risk management processes during the current financial turmoil. The 
areas addressed include:  
 
(i) firm-wide governance and risk management;  
(ii) capturing the risk of off-balance sheet exposures and securitisation activities;  
(iii) managing risk concentrations;  
(iv) providing incentives for banks to better manage risk and returns over the long 
term; and  
(v) sound stress testing practices; and sound compensation practices.  
 
The Pillar 3 (market discipline) requirements have been strengthened in several key areas, 
including:  
 
(i) securitisation exposures in the trading book;  
(ii) sponsorship of off-balance sheet vehicles;  
(iii) resecuritisation exposures; and  
(iv) pipeline and warehousing risks with regard to securitisation exposures  
 
On 17 December 2009, the BCBS issued two consultative documents, one entitled 
„Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector‟ and the other „International 
Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring‟. These 
documents contain proposals to strengthen global capital and liquidity regulations with 
the goal of promoting a more resilient banking sector (BCBS, 2009b). Together with the 
measures already approved in July 2009, they form the core of the new Basel III Accord. 
In fact, Basel II is correct in principle but was wrong in implementation. Regulators 
should focus more on the implementation side.  
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4.5 BASEL II AND ISLAMIC BANKS 
 
Islamic finance has become part of the global financial industry since the early 1990s; it 
is, therefore, subjected to international standards and regulations. The capital adequacy, 
hence, will remain as a core issue for risk management, whether it is for conventional 
banks or Islamic banks, as the concept of having sufficient capital cannot be refuted in 
Islamic finance. Although the risks in Islamic banks are more contract-centric rather than 
conventional product-centric, Basel II standards can still be applied with some 
adjustments. Thus, application of Basel II is a matter of adoption of the standards to the 
needs of Islamic banks.  
 
4.5.1. Pillar 1 
 
Unlike depositors of conventional banks, the contractual agreement between Islamic 
banks and IAHs is based on the concept of profit and loss sharing, which makes IAHs a 
unique class of quasi-liability holders: they are neither depositors nor equity holders. 
Although they are not part of the bank‟s capital, they are expected to absorb all losses on 
the investments made through their funds, unless there is evidence of negligence or 
misconduct on the part of the bank. This has serious implications for the determination of 
adequate capital for Islamic banks as highlighted by Grais and Kulathunga (2007: 79) in 
the following points:  
 
(i) PSIAs should not be subject to any capital requirements other than to cover 
liability for negligence and misconduct by the bank, and to winding-down 
expenses; 
(ii) Investments funded by current accounts carry commercial banking risks and 
should be subject to adequate risk weights and capital allocation; 
(iii) Restricted PSIAs on the liabilities side form a collection of heterogeneous 
investments funds resembling a fund of funds. Therefore, banks holding such 
funds should be subject to the same capital requirements as are applicable to fund 
managers; 
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(iv) The presence of displaced commercial risk and the practice of income smoothing 
have indirect implications for Islamic banks‟ capital adequacy, which a regulator 
may take into account when determining the CAR; 
(v) Islamic banks acting as intermediaries may face a moral hazard issue. Since, as 
agent, the bank is not liable for losses but shares the profits with the IAHs, it may 
have an incentive to maximize the investments funded by the account holder and 
to attract more accounts than it has the capacity to handle. This can lead to 
investment decisions that are riskier than the investment account holder is willing 
to accept. Such „incentive misalignment‟ may lead to higher displaced 
commercial risk, which necessitates higher capital requirements.   
 
Grais and Kulathunga (2007) add that capital as it is classified in conventional banking 
cannot be used in Islamic banking. To be considered adequately capitalised, banks are 
required to hold a minimum capital (Tier I and Tier II) equal to 8 percent of risk-
weighted assets (in most cases). Tier 1 capital is the same for Islamic and conventional 
banks. However, in Islamic banks the reserves include the shareholders‟ portion of the 
PER, which is included in disclosed reserves. In tier 2 capital, there are no hybrid capital 
instruments or subordinated debts, as these would bear interest and contravene Shari’ah 
principles. Furthermore, an issue is the treatment of unrestricted PSIAs, which may be 
viewed as equity investments on a limited term. 
 
In addition, operational risk exposures appear to be higher in Islamic banks. Akkizidis 
and Khandelwal (2007) argue that the „Basic Indicator Approach‟ as indicated by Basel II 
does not appear to be a case of perfect fit for Islamic banks. The 15% provision for 
operational risk of the average of three years gross income needs to be examined 
thoroughly. The use of gross income as the basic indicator approach could be misleading 
in Islamic banks, insofar as the large volume of transactions in commodities and the use 
of structured finance raise operational exposures that are not captured by gross income. In 
contrast, the standardised approach that allows for different business lines would be more 
suited, but it would have to be adapted to the needs of Islamic banks as the different risk 
weights as proposed by the „Standardised Approach‟ are not entirely applicable to their 
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needs. In particular, agency services under mudarabah and commodity inventory 
management need to be considered explicitly. The allocation of 18% risk weight for 
business lines such as corporate finance, trading and sales, and settlements may not 
represent the true picture of risk exposures of Islamic banks as trading and sales in 
Islamic finance may include some murabahah transactions and some exposure from 
financing large accounts through istisna’a. Also, the „Standardised approach‟ allocates 
12% to retail banking, asset management, and retail brokerage, which does not fully 
apply to Islamic banks. As previously discussed, the risk exposures differ greatly during 
different stages of the Islamic finance contract and a blanket of 12% does not appear to 
map the risk exposure completely.  
 
Furthermore, the „Internal Rating Based Approach‟ (IRB) under credit risk, the „Internal 
Model Approach‟ (IMA) under market risk, and the „Advanced Measurement Approach‟ 
(AMA) under operational risk are not largely applicable to Islamic banks due to several 
reasons: first, due to the absence of wide spread rating for Islamic finance; second, due to 
the changing nature of the relationships during the lifetime of the contract; and third, due 
to difficulties in estimating PDs, LGDs, and EADs for Islamic finance.  
 
4.5.2. Determination of Risk Weights 
 
Assigning risk weights to different asset classes depends on the contractual relationship 
between the bank and the borrower. For conventional banks, the majority of assets is 
debt-based, whereas for IFIs, the assets range from trade financing to equity partnership; 
this fact changes the nature of risks. In some instruments there are additional risks which 
are not present in conventional instruments. Therefore, the calculation of risk weights for 
the assets of IFIs differs from the conventional banks because (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 
2007:126): 
 
(i) Assets based on trade are not truly financial assets and carry risk other than 
credit and market risks; 
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(ii) There are non-financial assets such as real estate, commodities, istisna’a, and 
ijara contracts that have special risk characteristics; 
(iii) IFIs carry partnership and profit-and-loss sharing assets, which have a higher risk 
profile; 
(iv) IFIs do not have well-defined risk mitigation and hedging instruments, which 
raises the overall risk level of assets.  
 
Another complication in risk weightings is explained by Alsayed (2008); as finance 
provided by Islamic banks is asset-backed, it is connected to the value of tangible assets. 
These assets are subject to volatility in their values (as distinct from depreciation). Banks 
are therefore exposed to not only the risk of default by a customer, but also to volatility in 
the amount of credit mitigation available from the asset in the event of the need to realise 
their value. This means that there are not just risk-weighted assets for the book value of 
the outstanding credit facility, but also so-called „market risk charges‟ in respect of the 
value of the assets collateralising the finance facility, at the start of the life of a facility, 
sometimes during the life of a facility, and at termination of the facility if the customer 
returns the assets to the bank and does not take title. The regulatory risk-weighting 
framework for Islamic banks is therefore more complex than for conventional banks, and 
Islamic banks need additional risk management policies and procedures to manage these 
risks.     
 
4.5.3. Pillar 2 
 
The role of supervisors is more critical due to the evolving nature of Islamic financial 
industry. Strong regulatory support in the form of monitoring and assistance is needed for 
Islamic banks. Some of the recommendations of Pillar 2 can be applied to Islamic banks, 
such as strengthening risk management systems, applying internal limits, strengthening 
the level of provisions and reserves, improving internal controls, focus on concentration 
risk and business cycle risks, etc. A few of Pillar 2 recommendations, although very 
relevant for conventional banks, do not hold ground for Islamic banks (Grais and 
Kulathunga, 2007). For example, liquidity risk, which is classified as residual risk under 
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Pillar 2, is one of the most important risks in Islamic banks. Liquidity risk management is 
at the core of risk management in Islamic banking.  
 
Ironically, after the recent financial crisis and the failure of some banks due to liquidity 
issues, the BCBS declared the need for a special directive to address liquidity. Regulators 
around the world began to introduce stricter liquidity standards and independent measures 
to monitor liquidity.  
 
4.5.4. Pillar 3 
 
The absence of comparable information is one of the main issues in Islamic financial 
reporting. Since AAOIFI standards are not mandatory, there have been limited 
implementations, and the problem of non-comparability remains. Basel II 
recommendations regarding consistent and comparable information are highly applicable 
to the Islamic financial industry. Due to social commitment attached to Islamic finance, 
there is special need for market disclosure, and therefore, transparency is considered to be 
at the core of Islamic financial contracts and thus should also be reflected in reporting.  
 
The role of information in the risk management in Islamic banking is more critical 
compared to conventional banking; as the PLS contracts are heavily biased towards 
availability of information for managing the risks. It is, therefore, mandatory to report the 
investment of funds, lines of business, activities, and sources of revenue. Due to the 
nature and ethical foundations, the social responsibility is of utmost importance in Islamic 
finance. Moreover, direct market discipline is embedded in the risk-sharing principle of 
Islamic finance because IAHs share in the risk of the IFI and are not offered guarantees; 
incentives are created for a wider range of stakeholders in the bank to monitor its 
activities and risk-taking, which reduces the moral hazard problem. Along with this, there 
is greater emphasis on transparency, and thus Pillar 3 of Basel II has more relevance for 
the Islamic financial industry (Grais and Kulathunga, 2007).  
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Several recent studies by the World Bank and the IMF such as Greuning and Iqbal 
(2008), Hasan and Dridi (2010), and others have highlighted the significance of the 
appropriate balance of prudential supervision and market discipline in Islamic finance, 
and the related implications for the industry in specific and the wider financial stability in 
general are also discussed.  
 
4.6 BASEL III  
 
The new tougher framework for international banking came into being in September 
2010, when the new guidelines for risk management were announced by the BIS. This 
new set of rules was denominated as Basel III requirements and was accepted two months 
later in November 2010 during the G20 meeting in Seoul, South Korea. G20 leaders 
endorsed the Basel III capital and liquidity framework, and committed to fully adopt and 
implement these standards within the agreed timeframe that is consistent with economic 
recovery and financial stability – a finely judged balance. The new framework will be 
translated into national laws and regulations, and will be implemented commencing on 
January 1, 2013 and fully phased in by January 1, 2019. 
   
As a result of Basel III, the capital ratio requirement has increased; the eligibility of 
capital has been tightened, thus reducing the amount of capital banks have to meet the 
required ratio; and the calculation of risk weighted assets has changed leading to an 
increase for many institutions. Although implementing Basel III has its challenges and 
may ultimately not be sufficient to help banks globally withstand another financial blow, 
it is hoped that the new Accord will improve banking confidence and increase 
competition between banks. To achieve these objectives, the BCBS Basel III proposals 
are broken down into three main areas, as shown in Figure 4.2, that address:  
 
(i) Capital reform (including quality and quantity of capital, complete risk coverage, 
leverage ratio and the introduction of capital conservation buffers and a counter-
cyclical capital buffer); 
(ii) Liquidity reform (short term and long term ratios); and 
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(iii) Other elements relating to general improvements to the stability of the financial 
system. 
 
Figure 4.2: Main Components of the Basel III Accord 
 
 
Source: KPMG 2010 
 
 
The implications of Basel III for capital can be summarized as follows: 
 
 
It should be noted that in general Basel III aims at reducing procyclicality and promoting 
countercyclical buffers through a combination of forward-looking provisioning and 
capital buffers. While directionally positive, Moody‟s (2011b) does not expect Basel III 
to cure the structural challenges banks face from a credit perspective, including illiquidity 
and high leverage levels, as well as the tension between equity holders and bank 
managers whose focus is on maximizing profits, in contrast to risk-averse bondholders.  
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4.7 IFSB PRINCIPLES ON CAPITAL ADEQUACY  
 
Since Basel II did not answer all the risk management issues for Islamic financial 
institutions, there has been a need for alternative and supportive standards, as “Basel II 
was drafted with conventional banking very much in mind”, as observed by Lowe (2010), 
one of the interviewees for this research. 
 
With the growing size of IFI all over the world, there have been efforts to develop 
prudent supervisory norms. Thinking along the lines of Basel II and recognizing the 
differences in the nature of Islamic banks, AAOIFI drafted a basic standard on capital 
adequacy of Islamic financial institutions in 1999. This standard was further enhanced by 
the IFSB, which in December 2005 released the Guiding Principles of Risk Management 
and for Institutions (other than Insurance Institutions) offering Only Islamic Financial 
services (IFSB-1). Also in December 2005, the IFSB issued the first Capital Adequacy 
Standards for Institutions (other than Insurance Institutions) offering Only Islamic 
Financial services (IFSB-2). This was complemented in March 2008 with the IFSB‟s 
Guidance Note In Connection with The Capital Adequacy Standard: Recognition of 
Ratings by External Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAIs) on Shari’ah-Complaint 
Financial Institutions (GN-1). Finally, in January 2009, the IFSB issued Capital 
Adequacy Requirements for Sukuk Securitisations and Real Estate Investment (IFSB-7), 
which deals with aspects relating to regulatory capital requirements for sukuk that are not 
covered in the previous issued standards.  
 
Such intensive documentations are well prepared and address the relevant issues that are 
fundamental for the successful application of Basel II to IFI. Archer and Karim (2007) 
highlight that, in spite of their high quality, these standards have been adopted in only a 
handful of countries. As with most standards, the respective banking regulators need to 
customize some of their own requirements.  
 
The IFSB Standard on Capital Adequacy (IFSB-2) highlights that Islamic banks carry 
partnership and profit-and-loss sharing assets that have a higher risk profile, and that 
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Islamic banks do not have well-defined instruments for mitigating and hedging risks. In 
the case of partnership-based contracts such as mudarabah and musharakah, the bank is 
exposed to both credit and market risk that need to be analysed in a similar manner to the 
methodology of the Basel Accords. When such partnership-based assets are acquired in 
the form of tangible assets, such as commodities, and are held for trading, the only 
exposure is to market risk because credit risk is minimised by direct ownership of the 
assets. However, there is significant risk of capital impairment when direct investment 
takes place in such contracts and the investments will be held till maturity. Treatment of 
this risk within the Basel framework is not straightforward and therefore requires special 
attention.  
 
The key principle underlying the IFSB‟s approach is that PERs (and PSIAs overall) have 
a loss-absorbing feature, the intensity of which would not merit inclusion in eligible 
capital (the numerator of Basel II‟s capital adequacy ratio), but would rather allow for 
some deductions from computed risk-weighted assets (the denominator of Basel II‟s 
capital adequacy ratio), depending on the conservativeness of the regulator in terms of the 
degree to which PSIAs and PERs would be deemed capital-like instruments. PERs being 
a future claim of PSIA-holders on the bank, they are not part of capital in accounting 
terms, and thus are not subject to distribution to shareholders. From a regulatory 
perspective, however, the treatment suggested by the IFSB is very subtle particularly in 
western jurisdictions. 
 
The IFSB-2 Standard covers minimum capital adequacy requirements based 
predominantly on the standardised approach for credit risk with respect to Pillar 1 of 
Basel II, and the various applicable measurement methods for market risk set out in the 
1996 Market Risk Amendment. The IFSB is aware of the fact that some Islamic banks 
are progressively improving their risk management practices to the extent that they will 
be in a position to meet the requirement for applying the internal models approach for 
measuring their risk exposures.  
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The IFSB (2005b) states that: 
“While this Standard stops short of explaining approaches other than the 
standardised approach, supervisory authorities are welcome to use other 
approaches for regulatory capital purposes if they have the ability to address 
the infrastructure issues adequately. The IFSB will monitor these 
developments and plans to consult the industry in the future and eventually 
to make any necessary revisions.” 
 
In respect of capital charge for operational risk, the IFSB Standard recommends using 
either the basic indicator approach or the standardised approach given the structure of 
business lines of Islamic banks at the present stage. The Standard also recommends 
excluding the share of PSIA holders from gross income in determining capital charge for 
operational risk. This adjustment is necessary because Islamic banks share these profits 
with their depositors/investors. 
 
Moreover, the Standard does not address the requirements covered by Pillar 2 
(Supervisory Review Process) and Pillar 3 (Market Discipline) of Basel II, as the IFSB 
intends to cover these two issues by separate standards.  
 
This Standard comprehensively discusses the nature of risks and the appropriate risk 
weights to be used for different assets. It deals with the minimum capital adequacy 
requirement for both credit and market risks of seven Shari’ah-compliant instruments: (a) 
murabahah, (b) salam, (c) istisna’a, (d) ijarah, (e) musharakah and diminishing 
musharakah, (f) mudarabah, and (g) sukuk. Discussion of each contract includes risk 
weights to be assigned to each for market and credit risks. 
 
In calculating the CAR, the regulatory capital as the numerator shall be calculated in 
relation to the total risk-weighted assets as the denominator. The total of RWAs is 
determined by multiplying the capital requirements for market risk and operational risk 
by 12.5 (which is the reciprocal of the minimum CAR of 8%) and adding the resulting 
figures to the sum of RWAs computed for credit risk. The minimum capital adequacy 
requirements for Islamic banks shall be a CAR of not lower than 8% of its total capital. In 
this, Tier 2 capital is limited to 100% of Tier 1 capital.  
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The Shari’ah rules and principles, whereby IAH provide funds to the Islamic bank on the 
basis of profit-sharing and loss-bearing mudarabah contracts instead of debt-based 
deposits, mean that the investment account holders would share in the profits of a 
successful operation, but could lose all or part of their investments. The liability of the 
IAHs is limited to the capital provided, and the potential loss of the Islamic bank is 
restricted to the value or opportunity cost of its work. 
 
In other words, the assets financed by IAH are excluded from the calculation of the 
capital ratio, considering that the IAH directly share in profits and losses of those assets, 
and the loss to the bank (as mudarib) is limited to the time and resources spent on the 
investments, except in the case of negligence or misconduct. 
 
However, if negligence, mismanagement, fraud, or breach of contract conditions can be 
proven, the Islamic bank will be financially liable for the capital of the investment 
account holders. Therefore, IAHs normally bear the credit and market risks of the 
investment, while the Islamic bank bears the operational risk.  
 
The IFSB standard is defined in two formulae: standard and discretionary. In the standard 
formula, depicted by Figure 4.3, capital is divided by risk-weighted assets excluding the 
assets financed by IAHs, based on the rationale explained earlier. The size of the RWAs 
is determined for credit risk first then adjusted to accommodate for the market and 
operational risks. To determine the adjustment, the capital requirements for market risk 
and operational risk are multiplied by 12.5 (which is the reciprocal of the minimum CAR 
of 8%).  
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Figure 4.3: IFSB Standard Formula for Calculating CAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second formula, depicted by Figure 4.4, is referred to as the supervisory discretion 
formula, is modified to accommodate the existence of reserves maintained by Islamic 
banks to minimise displaced commercial, withdrawal, and systematic risks. In 
jurisdictions where an Islamic bank has practiced the type of income smoothing for IAH, 
the supervisory authority has discretion to require the Islamic bank to include a specified 
percentage of assets financed by PSIA in the denominator of the CAR (represented by α 
in the Supervisory Discretion Formula). α is simply the percentage of depositors‟ risk 
absorbed by the Islamic Bank as percentage of capital required for assets funded by 
PSIA. This would apply to RWAs financed by both unrestricted and restricted PSIA. 
Further adjustment is made for PER and IRR in such a manner that a certain fraction of 
the RWAs funded by the reserves is deducted from the denominator. The rationale given 
for this adjustment is to allow central banks and supervisors to decide on the profit–
sharing / loss-bearing risk (displaced commercial risk) that IFIs are exposed to. For 
instance, the Bahrain Central Bank has ruled it to α be 30% for the kingdom (Farook, 
2008: 19-20). This implies that PSIAs will bear up to 70% of their losses, while the 
remaining 30% will be borne by the shareholders of the bank.  
 
However, what if an individual IFI is more resistant to shocks in the local economy 
because it already undertakes pure performance-based PLS with PSIAs, i.e. the IFI has a 
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lower displaced commercial risk? Farook (2008: 19) argues that the supervisory 
discretion formula is applied on jurisdictional basis, and assumes that all IFIs in that 
particular jurisdiction fit into the „one-size fits all‟ category. He adds that most central 
banks that have applied this regulation did in such a manner, and there is nothing 
particularly wrong with this in the absence of a better indicator of individual displaced 
commercial risk exposure. For example, the Central Bank of Kuwait approved the 
implementation of the amended capital adequacy ratio on local Islamic banks starting 
from 30 June 2009, aiming to give Islamic banks incentives to improve their ways of 
managing risks. 
 
Figure 4.4: IFSB Supervisory Discretion Formula for Calculating CAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 summarises the main differences in Capital Adequacy Standards between Basel 
II & IFSB. 
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Table 4.2: Capital Adequacy Standards: Basel II vs. IFSB 
 
Capital Adequacy Standards for Credit Risk 
Criteria Basel II IFSB 
Risk weight Calibrated on the basis of 
external ratings by the Basel 
committee 
Calibrated on the basis of external 
ratings by the Basel committee; 
varies according to contract stage 
and financing mode 
Treatment of equity in the 
banking book 
>= 150 percent for venture 
capital and private equity 
investments 
Simple risk weight method (risk 
weight 300 or 400 percent) or 
supervisory slotting method (risk 
weight 90-270 percent) 
Credit risk mitigation 
techniques 
Includes financial collateral, 
credit derivatives, 
guarantees, netting (on and 
off balance sheet) 
Includes profit-sharing investment 
accounts (PSIA), or cash on deposits 
with Islamic banks, guarantees, 
financial collateral, and pledged 
assets 
Capital Adequacy Standards for Market Risk 
 
Criteria Basel II IFSB 
Category Equity, foreign exchange, 
interest rate risk in the 
trading book, commodities 
Equity, foreign exchange, interest 
rate risk in the trading book, 
commodities, inventories 
Measurement 1996 market risk 
amendments (standardized 
and internal models) 
1996 market risk amendments 
(standardized measurement method) 
Capital Adequacy Standards for Operational Risk 
 
Criteria Basel II IFSB 
Gross income Annual average gross 
income (previous three 
years) 
Annual average gross income 
(previous three years), excluding 
PSIA holders‟ share of income 
 
Source: Greuning and Iqbal (2008: 228) 
 
 
The following example, depicted by Figure 4.5, demonstrates the difference in 
calculating CAR between Basel II and IFSB. Let us assume that bank A is an Islamic 
bank with the following balance sheet structure and that its regulator requires supervisory 
authority discretion (α) of 25%. The example proves that the risk-sharing characteristic of 
PSIAs requires special capital treatment. Calculating the bank‟s capital adequacy 
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requirements according to the IFSB standard formula lead to a higher CAR than the Basel 
II, meaning that Islamic banks that invest in partnership and profit-and-loss-sharing assets 
will have a better CAR due to the loss-absorbing feature of these asset classes. Figure 4.5 
also demonstrates that calculating an Islamic bank‟s CAR according to the IFSB 
supervisory discretion formula is more practical, as the supervisory discretion formula is 
modified to accommodate the existence of reserves maintained by IFIs to minimise 
displaced commercial and withdrawal. When an Islamic bank has practiced income 
smoothing for IAH, the supervisory authority has discretion to require the Islamic bank to 
include a specified percentage of assets financed by PSIA in the denominator of the CAR 
(represented by α). The IFSB supervisory discretion formula, therefore, gives a natural 
incentive to IFIs to engage in providing true economic returns to PSIAs and to stop the 
smoothing practice. 
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Figure 4.5: Computation of CAR for an Islamic Bank 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Wan Yusuf (2011) states the capital adequacy framework for Islamic Banks in 
Malaysia was implemented on 1 January 2008 and was developed based on the Capital 
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Adequacy Standard for Institutions (other than Insurance Institutions) Offering Only 
Islamic Financial Services issued by the IFSB in December 2005. The Malaysia 
framework is applicable to all Islamic banks licensed under Section 3 (4) of the Islamic 
Banking Act 1983. The analysis conducted on 12 Islamic banks shows that all banks 
follow capital adequacy framework for Islamic banking in Malaysia. The exception was 
in 2006, when Bank Islam fell below the requirements due to net loss of RM1.30 billion. 
It was attributed to non-performing loans that severely affects the bank. However, the 
figure was improved to exceed the minimum regulatory requirement after additional 
capital injection. The analysis showed that banks in the study were overcapitalized. The 
excess capital could be used to reallocate assets where they could shift to more risky 
assets such as loans rather than less risky assets such as government bonds. This in turn 
would increase bank‟s profitability and thus enhance bank‟s efficiency by optimal 
utilisation of available resources. The study also revealed that domestic Islamic banks in 
Malaysia hold lower Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio compared to foreign Islamic banks that 
can be attributed to familiarity with local financial environment. It means that foreign 
Islamic banks are overcapitalized especially in the early years of establishment. The 
assets that the banks hold tend to be under safer risk category and it moves towards 
riskier assets as it managed to have a foothold in the industry. Not much difference exists 
between full-fledged Islamic banks such as Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad and Bank 
Muamalat Malaysia Berhad, which were established before 2003, and Islamic banks 
originated from Islamic banking windows, which were established after 2003, with regard 
to Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio. This can be due to parent banks‟ familiarity with local 
financial environment and understanding of Malaysian financial system. Experience and 
familiarity leads the banks to have a wider portfolio of riskier assets in order to fully 
utilized capital and enhance efficiency. 
 
4.8 CAPITAL ADEQUACY AS A TOOL FOR RISK MITIGATION 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, risk mitigation is a key challenge for Islamic banks. 
Mimicking conventional risk mitigation techniques is not the best way forward because 
of the constraints imposed on Islamic banking by Shari’ah principles and mainly because 
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the Wall Street conventional banking model has proved to be unstable and unsustainable. 
Some Islamic hedging tools have been developed; others are still work-in progress, 
opening the door for huge opportunities in financial engineering. However, the risk-
sharing characteristic of PSIAs in Islamic banking could greatly enhance risk 
management and mitigation in IFIs provided that proper pricing, reserving, and disclosure 
are maintained. A measure of the extent to which the risks to shareholders are reduced on 
account of risk-sharing with IAHs should be the basis of any capital relief or lower risk 
weights on assets funded by PSIAs. The IFSB supervisory discretion formula is, 
therefore, a step in the right direction, with α representing the extent of total risk assumed 
by the PSIA, with the remainder absorbed by the shareholders on account of displaced 
commercial risk. To take the IFSB standards forward, disclosure for IFIs needs to become 
more comprehensive and transparent, with a focus on disclosure of risk profile, risk-
return mix, and internal governance. This requires coordination of supervisory disclosure 
rules and accounting standards. In addition, the regulators should monitor and recognize 
the actual extent of risk sharing by IAHs in assessing capital adequacy, and thereby 
encourage more effective and transparent risk sharing with IAHs. Adequate disclosure by 
the IFI of the risks borne by PSIA and shareholders should be a supervisory requirement 
for giving a low value to the parameter in the supervisory discretion. Thus, inadequate 
disclosure would result in a high value being set for α in addition to higher risk weights 
for profit-sharing assets, and hence granting little or no capital relief to the Islamic bank. 
In addition, Islamic banks that treat PSIAs as substitute for conventional deposits should 
be enforced by the regulator by treating these IAHs in the same way as liabilities for the 
purpose of calculating capital adequacy ratio. On the other hand, banks that practically 
implement the risk-sharing technique will be keen on proper disclosure to enjoy a higher 
capital relief. This would provide the greatest risk mitigation tool for Islamic banks. 
 
4.9 CONCLUSION 
 
It should be noted that risks in Islamic banking are more contract-centric than in 
conventional banking, where risks tend to be more product-centric. Islamic financial 
contracts are characterized by the changing relationship between the contracting parties 
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during the lifetime of the contract. This has a direct bearing on the risk exposures and 
relevant capital charges. Soundness and safety for banks depend to a great extent on the 
capital they hold. Since there is a constant dilemma to find the optimal mix of capital for 
business and regulatory purposes, the Basel I Accord was the first-ever systematic 
attempt at a global level to provide a framework for capital adequacy. Due to the rapid 
changes in the financial world, the original Accord proved to be insufficient to cover 
increasing complexities in financial markets. Basel II (and potentially Basel III) had 
revolutionised the concept of risk management with the detailed analysis of credit, market 
and operational risks. The three mutually enforcing pillars of Basel II have improved the 
framework‟s sensitivity to the risks that banks actually face.   
 
This chapter examined the three pillars of Basel II and their relevance to Islamic banks. It 
has become obvious that, although some of the principles of risk management as 
proposed in Basel II are applicable to the Islamic financial industry, the Accord was 
developed with conventional banks perspective and, hence, does not apply to the Islamic 
banks without suitable modifications.  
 
The IFSB has played a key role in the development of risk management and capital 
adequacy standards in the Islamic financial industry. The IFSB‟s efforts should be 
considered as the first attempt at consolidating the Islamic financial risk management 
principles under one umbrella. More effort and research is needed in this under-
researched area. Moreover, the IFSB standards should be made mandatory for Islamic 
banks to allow for wider implementation, consistency, and standardisation of risk 
management principles across the IFI. This requires collaboration between regulators, 
IFSB, AAOIFI, Islamic banks, and industry experts. 
 
It should be mentioned that Sam Walton was indeed right, as finding capital is not the 
biggest challenge. It is the management and control of capital in an optimum way that 
worries financial institutions and regulators around the world. International standards like 
those issued by BCBS, AAOIFI, and the IFSB act as capital guides that provide industry 
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practitioners with vision for the right direction. It is up to individual banks to make 
proper use of the compass or lose their way along the hard financial journey.   
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CHAPTER 5 
ISLAMIC BANKING AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS  
“Clearly, the crisis is dire. The situation is 
deteriorating, and it demands urgent and immediate 
action” 
 
Barack Obama, on the economic crisis (2009) 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been great optimism about the resilience of Islamic finance over the past two 
years due to the failures witnessed in the conventional financial world; this is, however, 
based on prejudice rather than proper analysis. Although this optimism has faded out 
recently, it still exists to a lesser degree. Immediately following the outbreak of the credit 
crisis in the West, advocates of Islamic finance filled stages and conferences with long 
emotional speeches on topics like: „the resilience of the Islamic financial industry‟, 
„Islamic banking is recession-proof‟, „Islamic finance could have saved the world‟, etc. In 
such emotional discourses it is forgotten that modern Islamic financial institutions have 
been deviating from the foundational principles and aspirations of Islamic moral 
economy for some time now – principles which could, to a certain degree, provide some 
resilience against crisis. In theory, the Islamic finance world is definitely more resilient to 
economic shocks than the flawed Wall Street model, but unfortunately the theory is a 
long way from fact in its current financial practice, as practitioners of Islamic finance to-
date have been mimicking conventional products. This mimicking has resulted in a close 
correlation between the two systems. 
 
However, it is evident that Islamic banking has avoided some of the major causes of the 
problems in the conventional system, especially in relation to speculation and trading in 
derivative instruments that are far removed from the underlying asset. It is not because 
IFIs‟ risk management architecture and culture were more robust that they avoided 
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carrying toxic products on their books; structurally, they have simply been banned – so 
far – from investing in such asset classes, as per the core principles they abide by. It is 
true that most Islamic deals are backed by real assets. There is no doubt that Islamic 
banks are more resilient to economic shocks than their conventional peers. This was 
proven in Malaysia during the 1997 currency crisis and it has been confirmed by the 
delayed effect of the current financial crisis on Islamic banking and finance. This has 
changed the world‟s perception of this young industry and given it the chance to grow 
substantially.  
 
It has been argued that if the world had followed the true principles of Islamic finance, 
the subprime loan crisis and the collapse of some of the world‟s largest banks could have 
been avoided. This raises the interesting question of whether Islamic finance can offer 
solutions to avoid another global financial crisis. Are the risk management characteristics 
inherent in Islamic finance more resistant to global woes and economic shocks? Since 
risk and its management is essential to prevent crisis, raising such questions are essential 
in gauging the resilience of a particular financial method. This is the essential research 
question of this research, which aims to empirically explore whether Islamic banking 
provides a more resilient model.   
 
The relevant Western literature suggests that, theoretically, Islamic banks are more risky 
than their conventional counterparts in some respects. Western researchers have been 
urging Islamic banks to follow the steps of conventional banks in adopting sophisticated 
risk management and mitigation techniques, which have been the pride of Western 
financial markets until recently. On the other hand, in most literature by Islamic scholars 
or economists, Islamic banking is presented as a safe haven and a less risky mode of 
finance. In such studies, one tends to read about the relative benefits of the Islamic 
economic system, albeit completely normative statements based on theoretical principles 
without any substantial empirical evidence. Islamic researchers argue that the lack of 
evidence is due to the absence of real economy that follows full Islamic principles and 
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where economies do, such as in the case of Iran and Sudan, there have been lapses in 
governance or modifications in the Shari’ah compliance rules that have substantially 
altered the actual premise of Islamic economics. Hence, researchers were largely unable 
to empirically detect the impact of following pure Islamic finance principles or to 
ascertain whether Islamic finance is inherently better than its conventional counterpart. 
The answer came – paradoxically from the West – in the form of the credit crunch, which 
has at least shown the shortcomings of the conventional system and has given Islamic 
finance an opportunity to be marketed as an alternative.  
 
Over the last few years the World economy went into severe recession, starting with the 
subprime mortgage debt write-downs in the US and the spiralling food and commodity 
price inflation, followed by quick deflation, all of which have had a crippling effect on 
the world economies. Figure 5.1 shows the bleak economic picture worldwide in 
September 2009, amid the peak of the crisis. Most world economies were in recession. 
The cost of debt has increased and, therefore, access to finance had dried up. So what are 
the causes of this crisis and where is the connection to Islamic banking? These are the 
questions for which this chapters aims to find answers; and building on what have been 
discussed in the previous chapters, evidence will emerge that Islamic finance has 
conservative risk management techniques - implicitly bent to it - that could provide a 
safer alternative.   
   
5.2 UNDERSTANDING THE CREDIT CRISIS   
5.2.1 The Debt Bubble 
 
The financial crisis started in one corner of the US mortgage market, but the fallout from 
the collapse of the sub-prime lending bubble has spread across the globe via the 
disintermediation of the originate-to-distribute banking model. What began as a crisis for 
individual markets and institutions has now undermined the foundations of the entire 
global financial system. Credit markets were the first to be engulfed, but the contagion 
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has subsequently reached all asset classes that were reliant on a combination of cheap 
money and high leverage, bringing the demise of the independent Wall Street investment 
banking model and sending countries from Iceland to Hungary „cap-in-hand‟ to the IMF. 
 
In the period of the run up to the crisis, the US and the global economy displayed robust 
growth which was expected to continue. Interest rates were low, liquidity was high and 
growing, financial innovations were proceeding at a rapid pace (especially in 
securitization and structure finance), complacency in the face of growing risk was 
deepening and regulation as well as supervision receding and weakening. All of this 
created an incentive structure that encouraged excessive risk-taking in search of higher 
yields. By March of 2007, the excesses “came home to roost” (Mirakhor and Krichene, 
2009). Easy credit had already created an incentive for home purchases and refinancing 
of existing mortgages, while prices in the housing market were already increasing, 
indicating a boom. This provided the primary motivation for the emergence of the 
subprime market, for, as long as price of houses were increasing, the underlying debt 
obligation would be continuously validated by an increase in value regardless of the size 
of the down payment, the credit record of the buyer, or the adequacy of documentation. 
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Figure 5.1: World Recession in 2009  
 
Source: Moody‟s (2010a) 
 
The liquidity crunch was fundamentally the result of the credit bubble bursting. Too 
much liquidity and overcapacity in the industry resulted in much lower underwriting 
standards. Consequently, consumers became overleveraged. With new entrants in both 
the mortgage lending and bank loan markets, competition led to loan terms that did not 
compensate for the risks. In this process, the risk management model followed by 
financial institutions is to be blamed for the crisis, as rising risk and falling returns 
became a dangerous mix.  
 
It should be mentioned that the economy is always passing through cycles in the long-
term or what economists call „Kondratief cycles‟ within which there are other small 
cycles. The current cycle is not new, nor did it occur overnight (Economist Intelligence 
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Unit, 2009). Many commentators recognized the potential consequences long before they 
became real. Yet the feeling seemed to be that „as long as the music was playing, lenders 
had to dance.‟ Indeed, a financial institution cannot afford to sit out the dance unless it 
can stomach a significant loss of market share. In a hypercompetitive market, however, 
banks sometimes have to take the long-term view and refrain from dancing. Some did, as 
they shunned option adjustable-rate mortgages and high loan-to-value products, and their 
better performance in the current environment is already beginning to differentiate itself. 
 
Banks around the world have been put under significant pressure; most affected are those 
that were originally highly leveraged and heavily dependent on wholesale funding. A few 
years ago, it would have been unthinkable that iconic financial services groups would 
become so widely distrusted. Regaining this trust is, however, key to worldwide 
economic recovery. Figure 5.2 depicts how the market value of the world‟s largest banks 
had significantly shrunk between mid 2007 and January 2009. Banking giants saw their 
market value diminishing at an unprecedented pace. For example, Royal Bank of 
Scotland had its market value shrunk from USD 120 billion in mid 2007 to USD 4.6 
billion by January 2009, UBS from USD 116 billion to USD 35 billion, HSBC form USD 
215 billion to USD 97 billion, and Citigroup from USD 255 billion to USD 19 billion.   
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Figure 5.2: Decline in Market Value of Leading Banks in 2009  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg, 20 January 2009 
 
Securitisation channels have shut down in the crisis process from 2008 onward, and 
banks that rely on the originate-to-distribute model have substantially reduced their 
volumes of new lending, thus leading to a sharp reduction in revenues. Some banks, in 
recent times, are attempting to shift back to a more traditional on-balance sheet banking 
model. The growth of derivatives during the boom years decoupled from the growth of 
the real economy. There will now be a reduction in that decoupling effect. As a response, 
indeed, derivatives will not disappear, but their volumes may shrink and become more 
aligned with the size of real economies. However, as a result of the crisis, access to short-
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term funding channels has been severely compromised, and a number of banks became 
relying on government support. This opened criticism in the financial industry to the 
substantial malpractice of highly geared investments and questionable risk management 
practices. More importantly, it has raised questions on the integrity of the sophisticated 
conventional modern financial system in which regulators are trying desperately to catch 
up with the market innovations, particularly in the space of derivatives, debt markets, and 
speculation.  
 
The current period in the markets provoked thoughts on failures in conventional risk 
management techniques and the need for a better alternative. Therefore, “this crisis has 
been a wake-up call for reassessing the effectiveness of international financial 
architecture and in particular for mechanisms to head off systemic risk,” as stated by 
Reza Moghadam, director of the IMF‟s strategy, policy and review department 
(Wroughton, 2009).  
 
It should be noted that the conventional systems have pretty much forgotten about ethics; 
this is an important cause of the financial crisis. The fragility of the conventional system 
operating on the basis of speculation, manipulation, and interest rates was underlined by 
the infamous 2001 Nobel economist Joseph Stiglitz (2008) who argued that:  
 
“The present financial crisis springs from a catastrophic collapse in 
confidence. The banks were laying huge bets with each other over loans and 
assets. Complex transactions were designed to move risk and disguise the 
sliding value of assets …Financial markets hinge on trust, and that trust has 
eroded. It was all done in the name of innovation, and any regulatory 
initiative was fought away with claims that it would suppress that 
innovation.” 
 
In addition, the crisis has highlighted shortcomings in banks‟ pricing, monitoring and 
managing of risk. Too much reliance has been placed on quantitative models, based on 
historical data, to make assessments of current and future risks. The inappropriate use of 
financially innovative structured products has led to tremendous wealth destruction.  
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The crisis cannot be explained by the argument that it was because of liquidity which was 
being there one day and gone the next. As, when trust and confidence disappeared and 
investors asked for their money back, it became apparent that real liquidity had not been 
created in the first place; a situation that should not occur under an aspirational Islamic 
financial system where there is a partner, rather than a debtor, relationship with 
depositors. 
 
5.2.2 Derivatives and the Crisis: A Source of the Financial Crisis 
 
“Derivatives are financial weapons of mass 
destruction... I view derivatives as time bombs, both 
for the parties that deal in them and the economic 
system.” 
 
Warren Buffet, Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report, 2002 
 
Following the outbreak of the crisis, it became fashionable to malign derivatives for 
doing much damage to the global economy. Politicians and the media held derivatives 
responsible for massive corporate losses and the downfall of companies like insurer AIG 
and Lehman Brothers. Some have gone so far as to suggest that derivatives were the main 
contributing factors to the credit crisis and to the wider global recession. 
 
Bartram (2009) disagrees with this approach, as he argues that blaming derivatives is like 
blaming a car for causing a crash, rather than the reckless driver who was behind the 
wheel. The cause of the global recession in reality is manifold and the reason for many 
corporate failures is varied too, adds Bartram. However, derivatives are complex 
securities that transfer one kind of risk but create newer risks, which are difficult to 
assess. They break down the relationships between lender and borrower and encourage 
risk-taking at the originator level (Ahmed, 2009). One of the interviewees for this 
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research, Engel (2010), argues that derivatives should not be blamed for the mess that 
happened in the financial sector.  
 
As financial products, derivatives are great risk transfer tools: they help stop systemic 
collapse in the financial sector. For example, when Enron collapsed, many feared that 
several top banks would go under because of their huge exposure to Enron. It was 
derivatives that spread the risk among several banks and saved the system from a total 
meltdown. While it is true that bankers make derivatives look very complicated, but once 
they are broken down to little boxes and pieces, their structure could be understood with 
greater ease.  
 
5.2.3 Searching for the Causes of the Crisis 
 
A number of economists have tried to determine the causes of the crisis: Some consider 
financial liberalization and deregulation to be the cause in an environment where the 
financial systems of many countries are not sound as a result of improper regulation and 
supervision. Others feel that the ultimate cause is the bursting of the speculative bubble in 
asset prices driven initially by excessive risk-taking and the use of innovative complex 
structures. It has also been argued that the root cause of the crisis was the maturity 
mismatch and liquidity mismanagement where long-term assets were far greater than 
short-term liabilities.  
 
The available literature on the financial crisis, thus, indicates as many opinions as there 
are researchers. However, even though all these factors may have had some role to play 
in the crisis, no consensus seems to have developed so far in pinpointing the ultimate 
cause or the cause of all causes. In the absence of a proper understanding on the ultimate 
cause, conflicting remedies have been proposed. Consequently, the proposals for 
government bailouts, stricter regulations and supervision have been unable to step beyond 
the basic principles of the conventional banking mechanism. 
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In the pre-crisis times, most conventional banks employed intense financial leveraging 
techniques to magnify their gains in expansionary economic times. The use of leverage 
amplifies returns during a boom cycle, but it can also have a reverse effect during a 
recessionary phase when managements not only have to write down losses on their 
declining asset portfolios, but also have to pay interest on their outstanding loans – the 
exact situation that most conventional banks are presently faced with. 
 
Banks created complex opaque financial instruments that created new risks which were 
not well understood (Ahmed, 2009). This decomposing of risk through financial 
engineering and product development made risk management a serious scientific process, 
as risk management became often dependent on sophisticated mathematical models. 
 
It had become apparent that, during the process of financial crisis, at many banks, 
multiple lines of defence failed  – business managers, risk managers, audit and control. 
Coupled with these failures was weakness in board risk oversight. The crisis revealed that 
very few firms have a true „culture‟ of risk management that will not be compromised 
when competition heats up, regulatory pressure abates, or management changes. 
 
The weaknesses of the system have to be studied in a comprehensive manner, and as a 
result of such an approach, the key factors causing the crisis can be identified at three 
levels: instrumental (the use of innovative complex products), organizational (financial 
institutions engaged in excessive risk taking), and regulatory (a deregulated environment 
and lax regulations) (Ahmed, 2009). However, the industry debate has focused on pure 
risk management failures, particularly the shortcomings of risk models in measuring risks 
accurately, without addressing the broader issue of how risk is managed at the highest 
macro-economic levels and how the whole financial system is based on greed and lack of 
morality. 
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When the financial crisis erupted, most people refer to „greed‟ as the source behind the 
crisis – the ultimate cause; the worship of markets in general and financial markets in 
particular is considered as the source of „greed‟. However, the main causes stem from the 
creation of (excessive) debt, de-linkage of wealth creation from debt creation and the 
making of money (debt) by banks, which may be linked to the „greed‟ of those involved 
in such processes. These have led to debts growing faster than wealth, which must 
eventually be equalized by a crash resulting in business failures, unemployment, and 
ultimately gross inequalities of income and wealth. An economy with a heavy reliance on 
debt could lead to nothing but high risk and volatility. 
 
After the crisis, the global economy is not expected to rebound quickly, but rather return 
to trend growth rates, with persistent unemployment and budget deficits. Figure 5.3 offers 
a stylized illustration of global macro-economic and credit conditions over recent years. 
The financial crisis may be behind but the sovereign risk challenges, with huge public 
debts, definitely represent a rocky road ahead. World economies went from low risk 
aversion during the boom in 2006 to high risk aversion during the peak of the panic in 
2009. Worldwide economic recovery, which started during the second half of 2009, 
remains fragile and uncertain. 2010 was expected to be the year of recovery; however, the 
global recession turned out to be more persistent than initially thought and during the 
second half of 2011 the budget deficit in the USA and sovereign debt issues in the 
Eurozone caused worldwide fear of a double dip recession.   
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Figure 5.3: Global Economic Conditions 
 
Source: Moody‟s (2010a) 
 
5.3 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE 
SYSTEM  
 
The current crisis has highlighted shortcomings in the existing conventional banking 
system. Unlike in the wake of earlier crises, the world economy and its financial markets 
will not resume their former pattern. The consequences of this current crisis indicate that 
there will be a fundamental systemic change to the banking industry. In supporting this, a 
recent report by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC, 2009) claims that the nature of the 
banking system will change. Unsustainable, overleveraged structures will be replaced 
with simpler and more transparent forms of banking, and some activities may be subject 
to limitations in a new model that represents a renaissance of classic banking. Thus, it is 
expected that there should be a new financial culture with a greater focus on „what you 
have‟ in terms of resources, rather than „what you can‟ create through financial 
innovation (PWC, 2009). The developments, thus, show that regulators and financial 
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institutions must look beyond mere survival mode, accept that the facts have changed, 
and focus on achieving a sustainable banking model – a model that enjoys trust, is 
reliable, stable, ethical, and transparent. In other words, the rule of the game has to and 
will change under the new circumstances. This is echoed by Keynes “When the facts 
change, I change my mind” (PWC, 2009). 
 
In an attempt to overcome the failures of the conventional financial system, the world has 
started to look for an alternative method of banking and finance. Calls have been 
provoking traditional old style banking without the destructive power of derivatives and 
toxic assets, regulators have been reducing interest rates across the world, hoping to 
stimulate the stagnant economy, and experts are starting to look for a more ethical mode 
of finance. Amid all these searches, it so happens that Islamic banking is one of the very 
few alternatives that are available today, and within the gloom of the global crisis, 
investors are turning to Islamic finance as the less risky and more ethical option. Islamic 
finance is gaining credibility as an alternative; the fact that the Wall Street banking model 
that is based on open-ended innovation and leverage had failed to make people to search 
for ethical alternatives.  
 
5.4 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ISLAMIC FINANCE AND BANKING AS 
AN ALTERNATIVE OPTION  
 
5.4.1 Islamic Finance: No Sub-Prime Exposures but not Fully Immune 
 
The foundational principles and operational mechanisms of IBF were discussed in 
Chapter 2, which made reference to the ethical sources of IBF. Despite such foundational 
ethical claims, on the surface, the story of Islamic banking as more resilient than 
conventional banking, which has been repeated in a world torn by a financial tsunami, is 
attractive. Unfortunately, at least in the current form it is practiced, such expectations 
from IBF are not entirely true.  
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Since the main liquidity for Islamic banks comes from the GCC region, it should be 
mentioned that many Islamic banks, especially in the GCC, have not been immune to the 
financial crisis. The liquidity squeeze in the region has put pressure on these banks just as 
much as their conventional peers.  
 
In examining the propensity of IBF for crisis, it can be seen that Islamic banks mainly 
carry four main asset classes within their investment portfolios: property, equity, sukuk 
and managed funds (which include underlying assets mainly comprising infrastructure, 
private equity, real estate and stocks). In the financial crisis process, it is observed that 
such assets have all lost value (Moody‟s, 2009a). In addition, the volume of sukuk 
issuance has dramatically declined between September 2008 and summer 2009; though it 
started to take off later in 2009 (Standard and Poor‟s, 2010a). However, Islamic banks, 
due to the immaturity of the industry coupled with constraints imposed by the Shari’ah, 
have been relatively protected because they had no exposure to sub-prime assets and their 
derivatives, such as dubiously rated collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and special 
investment vehicles (SIVs) securitised debt-based assets.  
 
Table 5.1: The Impact of the Crisis on Islamic Banking  
The 2008-2009 economic crisis has impacted banks globally, with large markets for Islamic finance no 
exception 
- Global banks suffered USD 700 billion losses in 2008 
- GCC economies have also felt the crunch, with little or no growth in 2009 
- Equity markets have also seen steep declines in spite of a partial recovery in 2009 
- Banks in the GCC have faced challenging times, with scarce liquidity, a rising perception of risk, and 
the ever-present reality of credit defaults 
 
Since 2008, Islamic banks have not been immune from the crisis 
- Islamic banking penetration is up in key markets with Islamic banks outperforming in asset growth 
- However both market values and profitability of Islamic banks have come under pressure, narrowing 
the gap with conventional peers 
o Revenues have declined significantly from 2008, particularly driven by a drop in income 
from investing activity 
o A number of Islamic banks have been harder hit by NPLs than conventional peers and 
continue to face the risk from real estate concentrations even as their operational efficiency 
continues to lag conventional peers 
- Liquidity continues to be a significant constraint for Islamic banks. While Islamic banks maintain their 
market share of deposits, it will be subject to increased competition in the “war for deposits”  
Source: McKinsey & Company (2009) 
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It can be argued that IFIs around the world have generally displayed strong resilience 
amid the current global financial debacle. One obvious reason for their proven ability to 
weather the storm is embedded within the core principles of Islamic banking: both 
speculation and interest are prohibited. In addition, the sub-prime crisis has been driven 
by a number of factors that in combination led to the accumulation of risks, which were 
again magnified through the use of complex, often highly structured financial products – 
all of which were explicitly riba-based. However, it may be that the Islamic finance 
industry was not as badly affected as its conventional counterpart because of its 
comparative lack of sophistication and Shari’ah restrictions rather than anything different 
in its current activities. It is a fact that re-packaging of debt obligations into several layers 
without a substantial trace to the underlying asset is difficult to achieve by Shari’ah 
engineering. Islamic securities should be asset-based. Furthermore, a direct link to the 
asset is the substantial basis of the asset generating returns. Moreover, Shari’ah disallows 
the trading of future obligations until the asset is actually delivered.  
 
By based on the observed progress, it can be argued that IFIs are not risk-immune, but 
their current capacity to resist this crisis has been bolstered by the naturally inherent 
conservatism in the principles of Islamic finance, which is based on ethical norms of 
Islamic moral economy. 
 
5.4.2 Islamic Banks Affected by the Financial Crisis: No Man is an Island 
 
Similar to any other institutions, Islamic banks do not operate in isolation. They are part 
of the local, regional and increasingly global interdependent financial markets. In this 
respect, although they are less sensitive to the monetary fluctuations of the West, they 
remain dependent on the real economic cycle. The Islamic financial market will always 
need to interact and engage with the conventional one – it does not exist in some isolated 
bubble; therefore some level of „contamination‟ may be difficult to avoid.  
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The credit crisis has highlighted the globalised nature of the world we live in: imagining 
that a sub-prime crisis could never happen in Islamic finance would be to encourage 
complacency. As the financial crisis gradually turned into a real economic downturn, 
asset quality ultimately deteriorated and Islamic banks‟ high exposures to the real estate 
sector turned out to be a curse rather than a blessing. For example, the Gulf countries now 
contemplate the effects of property and stock market declines coupled with lower 
economic growth prospects in the short term, and Islamic and conventional institutions 
alike are feeling the pain of reduced liquidity and credit losses. This is due to the fact that 
the global financial and economic crisis did not spare the once-booming economies of the 
Middle East, and the Gulf Arab states in particular. However, in general, the 
macroeconomic repercussions were milder in the region, where recovering oil prices and 
large amounts of liquidity in numerous Sovereign Wealth Funds allowed governments to 
take interventionist counter-cyclical measures to stimulate their domestic economies and 
support flagship government-owned banks and companies. 
 
As such, Islamic banks have been facing three series of cyclical challenges, which again 
reflect their current structural strengths and weaknesses (Moody‟s, 2009c): 
 
(i) Managing short-term liquidity has been made more difficult;  
(ii) Investment portfolios, concentrated on illiquid and cyclical asset classes, have 
been impaired; 
(iii) Access to long-term funding has been postponed, forcing banks to reduce the 
maturity profile of their assets.  
 
With the financial crisis, market disruptions made it difficult for Islamic banks to 
continue fuelling their aggressive pre-crisis growth as key funding sources dried up. 
Customer deposits shrank as money that had entered in 2008 left the market leaving 
governments to prop up deposits single-handedly, and IFIs, particularly in the GCC, 
started to raise deposit rates to ensure retention. Governments stepped in to ease short-
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term liquidity positions; however, this did not alleviate the overall long-term position 
gap. To help manage their liquidity, Islamic banks will have to develop creative funding 
strategies and improve their internal capabilities to understand and forecast their liquidity 
needs. 
 
However, despite such constraints, which are expected to be temporary, Islamic banks 
have had the capacity to resist due to a number of buffers in the following format: 
 
(i) Their credit portfolios have been essentially domestic, with limited pressure on 
asset quality so far; 
(ii) Their entrenchment in the retail banking arena, with high customer loyalty and 
deposit stability, limits the probability of massive bank runs; 
(iii) High capitalisation and ample core liquidity often provide a relatively higher 
amount of confidence to counterparts. 
 
In the ongoing economic downturn, falling asset prices, credit seizures, and liquidity 
crunches have created a difficult situation where retail-funded, commercial Islamic banks 
are better placed than their rivals. They enjoy low leverage and abundant liquidity. 
Islamic investment banks, meanwhile, are wholesale-funded with a concentrated deposit 
base and are also highly exposed to cyclical and illiquid asset classes such as real estate, 
private equity and venture capital. Consequently, they have suffered far more, with two 
of them defaulting: Global Investment House and The Investment Dar, both being in the 
GCC. Another Islamic finance company whose survival has come under pressure for the 
same reasons is Tamweel, which is merging with its rival Amlak in the UAE. 
  
In general, Islamic banking has shown stronger performance than conventional banking. 
In 2009, amid the peak of the global crisis, more Shari’ah banks have been launched and 
more markets open up to Islamic products, while most conventional banks suffered 
substantial losses and severe asset reductions, assets in Islamic finance have grown to 
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USD 822 billion in 2009, an increase of 29 percent compared with 2008, with the 
opening of 20 Islamic banks, according to Maris Strategies and the Banker (Oakley, 
2009). No comparative data are available for 2010. 
 
Traditionally, IFIs have not been heavily leveraged. The primary reasons for conservative 
financial leverage maintenance are:  
 
(i) IFIs have limited incentives to grow debt-like liabilities because their assets tend 
to be highly profitable;  
(ii) They needed to set aside extra capital buffers to prepare for expansion;  
(iii) Funding is usually cheap, thanks to easy access to non-remunerated qardh hasan 
current-account deposits; and (iv) the necessity to set aside capital charges for 
specific risks like DCR, reputation risks and concentration risks as per Basel II‟s 
Pillar 2 (Moody‟, 2009d). 
 
These capital and liquidity buffers, previously criticized by opponents of Islamic finance 
as a burden on profitability, have perhaps been one of the most important strengths of the 
IFIs amid this crisis because they provide a financial institution with surplus cash to use 
as a shock absorber. As a result, under the current difficult economic conditions, most 
IFIs have been able to seek out opportunities by using their surplus liquidity to 
aggressively boost deposit volumes and thus to increase their market shares by growing 
lending volumes, while maintaining their focus on the retail and corporate sectors. For 
example, this is a strategy employed by GCC banks to de-couple their retail lending 
business from global markets by focusing on extending credit locally. According to one 
of the interviewees for this research, Thun (2010), stated that with few exceptions 
(especially in Dubai), funding has been less of a constraint for IFIs because of the 
market‟s perception that these players will be more resilient than their conventional peers 
to the global credit turmoil. Thus, the market has acknowledged that Islamic banks cannot 
carry assets such as highly leveraged structured instruments or global investment banks‟ 
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shares on their balance sheets because these are considered haram and therefore are not 
eligible for investment according to the Shari’ah boards‟ fatawa. 
 
In practice, customers are switching their savings from conventional banks (perceived as 
riskier), to Islamic banks (perceived as less directly exposed to sub-prime). This activity 
has been recorded in a number of countries, especially the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain. 
The latest figures on these banks show an increase of 34.4% in their Q3 2008 deposit 
base over the previous year (Moody‟s, 2009a). This retail entrenchment is a good 
strategic shift – one suitable for the current environment with wholesale funding 
restricted and liquidity ratios lower (albeit not severely so). 
 
Moreover, wholesale-funded IFIs were affected by their inability to access the retail 
deposit segment for funding, as retail deposits are more granular, more stable, and 
cheaper, while wholesale depositors are savvy and constantly arbitrage institutions in 
need of funding. It is no coincidence that Islamic intermediaries like Global Investment 
House (GIH) in the field of merchant banking and Amlak and Tamweel in specialised 
mortgage finance found it extremely difficult to fund their businesses (Alvi, 2009a).  
 
Islamic investment banks that operate largely as private equity firms have been feeling 
the impact of global market conditions because they have invested in the real estate 
markets and companies outside the Gulf region, through private equity transactions. 
Falling real estate prices, the credit crunch, and the economic recession in Europe and the 
US lessened the value of these investments and pushed these Islamic investment banks to 
either enlist their generally sophisticated clients‟ support to share any losses or to write 
down losses to preserve their reputations. Effectively illustrating this is Arcapita Bank, 
which has reported significantly deteriorated liquidity, its 2008 financial performance 
declined versus historical levels, and between January and June 2009 its credit rating has 
been downgraded by S&P‟s from BBB to BB-; this is 4 notches downgrade in less than 
six months. In June 2009, Arcapita requested to withdraw its rating.  
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Although GCC countries, home to most IFIs, announced that that they stand ready to 
support their financial systems if needed, providing support to IFIs is more complicated 
than for conventional banks, because governments are limited to use the same 
mechanisms as those for conventional institutions. For instance, interest-based repo 
facilities or traditional deposits are not Shari’ah-compliant, which by definition implies 
the limited instruments for governments to intervene with the liquidity of Islamic banks. 
The UAE has based its support to IFIs on wakala, which has required some time to 
implement (Standard & Poor‟s, 2010a). 
 
5.4.3 Failures in Islamic Finance: Sukuk Defaults 
 
“Defaults in the sukuk market are a sign of market maturity; however, it comes   
at severe costs, the most expensive of which is reputational risk.” 
 
Badlisyah Abdul-Ghani, CEO of CMB Islamic Bank (2009) 
 
Sukuk issuers such as Kuwait-based The Investment Dar Company defaulted on its sukuk 
as part of a general debt restructuring program. Another noticeable example is Saudi 
Arabia-based Saad Group, which has defaulted on its debt in the recent past, including 
the Golden Belt sukuk that it issued in 2007. This was followed by the Dubai debt 
bombshell, which put sukuk in the spotlight for all the wrong reasons. As, Nakheel, the 
property arm of Dubai World, is responsible for key developments in the region such as 
the Jumeira Palm and The World and has issued three sukuk to finance its investments. 
Three years after issuing the world‟s biggest sukuk, Dubai‟s Nakheel has grabbed the 
headlines once again, this time through default. On 25 November 2009, the Government 
of Dubai announced that it intends to restructure part of the debt (approximately USD 26 
billion) of Dubai World, the Emirate‟s largest state owned conglomerate. Nakheel asked 
for trading to be suspended on all three of its listed sukuk until it is in a position to 
provide a clarification to investors and the market. On 14 December 2009, Abu Dhabi 
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provided USD 10 billion to help Dubai to meet its obligations, including USD 4.1 billion 
needed to repay Nakheel, with the rest of the money to be used to pay trade creditors and 
contractors as well as meeting interest expenses and company‟s working capital (Oakley, 
2009). Indeed, Dubai‟s woe did hit the reputation of Islamic banking and finance. As a 
response, Dubai first had announced that it would restructure the debt, then two weeks 
later it announced that it would repay, possibly on the back of market reaction. Dubai 
realised that it could not afford to damage of not repaying. But the damage may have 
already been done.    
 
The market conditions of the past two years have resulted in others defaults in Islamic 
finance sector, such as the Saad Group, Investment Dar and the East Cameron Gas 
Company. These failures have brought several key risk management issues like 
enforcement of judgments in the GCC, transparency, corporate governance, and asset-
based sukuk into the limelight. 
 
These episodes reminded investors that default can and does happen in the sukuk market, 
as in any other part of the financial sector. However, sukuk default is a new phenomenon, 
as the market is still in its infancy. This represents an interesting development, and it 
should help investors to understand what could happen in the case of default and what the 
legal and financial repercussions could be. According to Professor Habib Ahmed of 
Durham University (cited in Newby, 2009), “Islamic economists have been saying that 
Islamic finance was not affected directly by the subprime problems. The Nakheel 
problem shows that Islamic finance can have similar problems if wrong investments are 
made ... This case is a wake-up call for Islamic finance to focus more on ethical and 
moral issues that it has been ignoring for so long”.  
 
Recent sukuk defaults highlight the issues Sheikh Taqi Usmani battled with, as he 
rejected the „opaque‟ musharakah/mudarabah type where investors did not really know 
what „assets‟ as sukuk holders they were getting but did not care as they relied on 
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creditworthiness of obligor. Ijara, thought not perfect, at least gives sukuk holders the 
ability to assess the value of what they are getting for their money (inflated or otherwise). 
In addition, the rating agencies were only concerned with the credit rating of the obligor 
(because of the purchase undertaking), whereas a proper musharakah/mudarabah sukuk 
would have forced them to look at the merits of the underlying business – and perhaps to 
reject them on that basis. 
 
During the financial crisis, thus, the default of a couple of sukuk was possibly partly 
responsible for the recent slowdown in issuance. The silver lining was that these defaults 
should provide the market with useful information on how sukuk will behave following 
default. 
 
According to Standard and Poor‟s (2010a), despite its relative recovery in 2009, major 
hurdles remain on the path to sukuk market development, including: 
 
(i) Difficult market conditions, which are slowing the planned issuance of numerous 
sukuk; 
(ii) Uncertainty about the legal recourse to the underlying asset as demonstrated by 
the recent defaults; 
(iii) The lack of standardization, notably when it comes to Shari’ah interpretation; 
and 
(iv) The low liquidity of the sukuk market, which constrains investors trying to exit 
the market in times of turbulence or access the market looking for distressed 
sellers. 
 
The need to address those issues in a well-regulated Islamic finance market is even more 
crucial due to its nascent stage of development. Any failure in the Islamic financial sector 
now will hurt its reputation and could threaten its survival. “If there is a failure of the 
bond market in California, nobody will question whether there is a systemic risk to the 
 217 
global bond market. But if a sukuk fails, it will raise questions on the entire Islamic 
finance” said economist Mirakhor, who is formerly an International Monetary Fund 
executive director (Oana, 2009). 
 
5.4.4 Islamic Banking Emerging Stronger from the Crisis 
 
It should be considered that lower volumes, shrinking margins and deteriorating asset 
quality will all weigh on IFIs‟ profitability and ultimately their capitalisation. However, 
once again, the impact will be more manageable than for conventional peers. Fortunately, 
Islamic banks have been very profitable in the past and have therefore accumulated large 
amounts of capital, making them capable of absorbing these sorts of shocks. 
Conventional banks have had greater appetite for exotic asset classes, like bank bonds, 
hedge funds and direct exposures to global financial institutions and insurers, than 
Islamic banks. In that sense, asset quality deterioration at conventional banks may be 
more pronounced. In addition, conventional peer banks used to be less well capitalised 
and less liquid, and hence will find it more difficult to book new business in the current 
market conditions. To grow today, a bank must have accumulated excess liquidity and 
capital in the past: most commercial Islamic banks have, some conventional banks have 
not. 
 
Wilson (2009) points out that Islamic banks have been less adversely affected by the 
crisis than major international banks. He argues that, as the latter have been weakened by 
the recent financial crisis, this undoubtedly presents an opportunity for Islamic banks, 
especially in the GCC, which have been less adversely affected. GCC-based investors in 
conventional banks, such as Prince Waleed‟s Kingdom Holdings, which holds 5 percent 
of Citibank, and the Abu Dhabi and Qatar Investment Authorities, which hold significant 
stakes in Barclays, have seen the value of their investments plummet. In contrast, the 
value of Al Rajhi Bank and KFH investments in retail Islamic banking affiliates in Asia 
has been much more resilient. 
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The Islamic financial industry is, therefore, expected to emerge stronger from the crisis, 
provided some conditions are met: more innovation bound with ethical norms of Islamic 
moral economy, enhanced transparency, more robust risk-management architecture and 
culture, and, most importantly, less deviation from the core Shari’ah principles. These are 
the lessons to be learnt from the financial crisis, as the crisis has forced the Islamic banks 
to have a complete re-assessment of their policies and attitudes to not only whether they 
are merely Islamizing conventional products but also whether the financing is beneficial 
to the real economy. In an interview with Arab News (2009), Sheikh Esam M. Ishaq 
stated that “I think in a way the financial crisis is a blessing in disguise for Islamic 
banking because Islamic banks unfortunately were far down the road in trying to mimic 
and replicate anything and everything that was there in the conventional banking sector.” 
Hence, the call exists for a return to the foundational basics of Islamic finance to 
overcome or at least moderate the consequences of potential financial crises. 
  
Paradoxically, the reputation of Islamic banks has benefited from the recent crisis (albeit 
with some exceptions), reflecting their conservative approach to business, a close 
proximity to their domestic and regional deposit franchises, their balanced and ordered 
appetite for growth, and their focus on basics of banking as opposed to over innovation, 
with an emphasis on their domestic market first. All these factors, which used to be 
perceived as weaknesses before the credit crisis began, are now being used as shields 
against the potential damages of imported stress. Investors may therefore view IFIs as 
safer havens less prone to excessive financial shocks. Several Islamic banks therefore are 
in a position to gain market shares at the expense of conventional peers, which have been 
weakened by toxic sub-prime assets. Furthermore, a global economic recovery is likely to 
benefit the GCC as oil and gas prices rebound, resulting in fresh liquidity being pumped 
into Islamic banks to fuel further expansion (Wilson, 2009). 
 
It is quite clear that the policies implemented and practiced by Islamic banks have luckily 
worked to their advantage so far. From a risk management perspective, however, (and in 
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light of the financial crisis) IFIs are using unstable policies without growing their liquid 
asset supply and monitoring their risk levels. As the market matures and the crisis 
deepens, the negative impact of these policies could lead to bankruptcies due to 
inaccurate liquidity management and defective asset qualities. That said, the chances of 
an IFI becoming insolvent are low due to the availability of government support – 
especially in the GCC – and support from other financial institutions. 
 
From a conceptual perspective, Islamic banks will probably be the big winners when the 
crisis ends, provided that the above-mentioned conditions are fulfilled. As a sub-set of 
ethical finance, Islamic banking is now considered not so much a niche business standing 
at the margins, but rather as representative of a credible, viable and sustainable alternative 
business model for sound, ethical, and socially responsible banking (Oakley, 2009). 
Many now believe that mainstream finance has moved too far into excess leverage, 
meaningless innovation, and value-destroying investments. As a rule, Islamic bankers 
tend to view a monetary, banking, and financial system as existing to serve the real 
economy and not be served by it. In a sense, the Islamic banking model inherently calls 
for social and economic responsibility from those who create money with credit, 
encouraging balance, care, honesty and transparency in doing business. What Islamic 
banking also promotes is that debt is a responsibility and should not be overly traded; that 
money is a measure of value, not a commodity; and finally that human factors, rather than 
simply profits, are the cornerstone of any economic and financial system. In that sense, 
by endogenising such features into its operations, IFIs will undoubtedly find their 
reputations strengthened, and Islamic finance as a whole will come out stronger from this 
crisis. At this stage, supervisory authorities and IFIs have a golden opportunity to achieve 
the true goals of Islamic moral economy and to create a stable Islamic financial system 
that can resist economic shocks and that truly operate on the basis of profit and loss 
sharing (Awan, 2008). The credit crunch has shaken confidence in the existing western 
regulations and created the need for a better more transparent system; this has opened the 
door for Islamic bankers to take up the opportunity. Indeed at the 5th World Islamic 
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Economic Forum (WIFE) in Jakarta on 2 March 2009, Muslim leaders, including 
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Malaysian Prime Minister 
Abdullah Badawi, called on the Muslim world to leverage the global financial crisis by 
turning “adversity into opportunity” (Parker, 2009).  
 
In short, Islamic banking has suffered from the liquidity drought, to the point where a few 
of the sector‟s investment banks have defaulted, but as an industry it now has a track 
record of resilience, which had not been tested before. It is true that Islamic finance has 
been more conservative because of Shari’ah rules, which has resulted in Islamic 
financiers steering clear of toxic repackaged credit instruments. By partially following the 
core principles of Shari’ah IFIs were more financially stable than their conventional 
peers. Therefore, a true Shari’ah-compliant financial model can be a panacea if it is 
followed purely without deviations. 
 
5.5 DEVIATIONS FROM THE FOUNDATIONAL SHARI’AH PRINCIPLES: 
EVALUATING THE OPERATIONS OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
 
The social failure and the deviation of Islamic finance from its foundational aims have 
been articulated by a number of studies (Asutay, 2007; and Asutay and Zaman, 2009). An 
important part of this criticism is related to the notion of Shari’ah compliancy, as the real 
issue in Islamic banking is the excessive reliance on form in the sense of technical norms 
at the expense of substance or the foundational norms. A critical examination of the 
developments and trends in Islamic finance indicates that the convergence has been from 
Islamic finance to conventional finance in terms of operations and functioning; and that 
Islamic banking, in its current state, does not necessarily uphold the full spirit of an 
Islamic moral economy (Asutay, 2007). The financial crisis, being an extremely difficult 
lesson, should encourage the IBF institutions to overcome this apparent divergence and 
the growing dichotomy between the ideals of an Islamic moral economy and the realities 
of today‟s Islamic banking (Asutay, 2009b). Indeed, a number of scholars are of the view 
that some IFIs have deviated to a great extent from the fundamental basis of Islamic 
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finance. Currently, most of the Islamic finance is work in progress. Some Islamic banks 
have succumbed to the influence of conventional banking. Notably controversial 
examples include the contemporary mechanisms of tawarruq or fixed income 
instruments, IFIs‟ reluctance to hold PLS assets, and the issuance of „asset-based‟ sukuk 
with no real recourse to the underlying assets.  
 
5.5.1 Tawarruq: A Contentious Islamic Finance Instrument 
 
One major example of the apparent divergence between theory and practice is the 
excessive use of murabahah, which gives a fixed return. This has been dubbed as 
„murabahah syndrome‟ with an ironic feeling about operations of IFIs. This practice, 
referred to as tawarruq (meaning „cash generation‟ in Arabic), which has been under 
criticism from many Shari’ah scholars, such as Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani, Dr 
Abdul Latif Al Mahmood, and others. It was initially approved as an interim solution 
until IFIs move to genuine commodity murabahah, but it seems that several banks took 
advantage from this interim approval and prefer to stick to tawarruq as it bears minimal 
commodity risks to the bank and replicates a conventional loan. Figure 5.4 shows that 
IFIs have a long-standing bias toward simple products that use mostly murabahah and 
ijarah structures, both of which offer more predictable returns, and have similar profiles 
to conventional products. Furthermore, they do not bear the challenges in terms of 
governance, profit calculation and allocation of more complex structures, like 
musharakah and mudarabah, which allow for more advanced financing offerings such as 
private equity. 
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Figure 5.4: Asset Breakdown for a Sample of Leading Islamic Banks (Excluding 
Fixed Assets and Cash) 
 
Source: Oliver Wyman (2009) 
 
Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani, as cited by Ayub (2007: 446), states that tawarruq and 
fixed income instruments: 
 
“Shari’ah scholars have allowed their use for financing purposes only in those 
spheres where musharakah cannot work and that, too, with certain conditions. This 
allowance should not be taken as a permanent rule for all sorts of transactions and the 
entire operations of Islamic banks should not revolve around it.” 
 
The problem is that for many banks, tawarruq has become an essential tool for 
conducting day-to-day business (Davies, 2009). 
 
Practically, however, fixed income murabahah is being used to a very large extent and 
the use of PLS mode is negligible, even in institutions in which the honourable Sheikh 
Usmani used to serve as Shari’ah supervisor or member of the Shari’ah board.  
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5.5.2 Lack of Appetite for Risk-Sharing Assets 
 
One of the major criticisms of Islamic banks is their reluctance to hold risk-sharing 
assets. By design, because of the prohibition of interest and pure debt, and sharing of 
risks, Islamic banks should engage on partnerships and equity-sharing financial assets, 
but in practice the portion of such assets on the balance sheets of Islamic banks is 
minimal. For example, Table 5.2 shows the asset composition of selected banks from 
1999 to 2002. It is evident that Islamic banks‟ first preference is for financial instruments 
that are generated through debt creating, sale contracts and leasing instruments. Informal 
observation of more recent balance sheets shows a similar picture.  
 
 
Table 5.2: Asset Composition of Selected Islamic Banks 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Murabahah and deferred sales 80.1% 83.0% 86.7% 84.3% 
Istisna’a 10.8% 8.7% 7.5% 7.0% 
Ijara  2.5% 2.4% 1.9% 2.9% 
Mudarabah 1.6% 1.6% 1.2% 3.1% 
Musharakah 0.9% 0.8% 1.3% 1.2% 
Qard ul-hassan 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 
Other 0.2% 0.2% 0.5% 3.0% 
Source: Askari et al. (2009: 95) 
 
 
Islamic bank‟ reluctance in regards to risk-sharing instruments such as musharakah and 
mudarabah is problematic for achieving the true potential and promise of the system. The 
reason for shying away from such instruments is a lack of appetite for risky assets, which 
in turn is due to Islamic banks‟ attempts to emulate conventional commercial banks 
where preservation of depositors‟ principal is their foremost objective. By investing in 
financing and trade-related instruments, Islamic banks are able to provide low-risk and 
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good fee investment opportunities; they want the best of both worlds. There are also 
pressures on Islamic banks to make their investment accounts behave like conventional 
deposits in terms of return profile. These pressures are two-fold – namely, from the 
marketplace and from the banking supervisor in some countries (IFSB, 2007).  
 
The real issue in Islamic banking, as mentioned above, is the excessive reliance on form 
at the expense of substance. By promoting risk-sharing through asset-based equity-type 
facilities on the assets side and profit-sharing investment accounts on the funding side, 
Islamic finance could in principle contribute to a better balance between debt and equity, 
thereby fostering stability. However, in practice, the use of equity-type financing 
facilities is limited due to risks linked to considerations of asymmetric information and 
adverse selection (IFSB, 2007). 
 
IFIs should change this business model and expand their portfolio to include risk-sharing 
instruments. Islamic banks often claim that their reluctance is a direct reflection of the 
depositors‟ low appetite for risk-sharing products. However, it is possible that the 
depositors‟ low appetite for such instruments is due to a lack of transparency and 
confidence in the ability of the financial intermediary. Therefore, Islamic banks should 
consider doing a better job of selecting and monitoring risk-sharing assets and enhance 
the transparency of the investment process by informing the depositors with good 
estimates of exposures to risks taken by the bank on investing in risk-sharing instruments 
(Askari et al., 2009). The long-term sustainable growth of Islamic banking will depend 
largely on the development of risk-sharing products. 
 
5.5.3 Sukuk 
 
While there are many sukuk structures (14 described by AAOIFI), the majority of those 
applied (be they ijarah, musharakah, or mudarabah) effectively „reduce‟ to a form that is 
an Islamic equivalent of a conventional unsecured bond. Much complexity is generated 
by asset-based aspects of the structure, but the ultimate objective is to replicate the risk 
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and return characteristics of a fixed income bond. Moreover, most originators in these 
structures do not intend to sell the contributed assets, and the transfer of assets is often 
not legally perfected or registered (Dey and Holder, 2008). Most sukuk transactions are 
therefore „asset-based‟ rather than „asset-backed‟. 
 
This disparity between the „ideal‟ and the „reality‟ of sukuk was highlighted by AAOIFI 
in February 2008 following a well-publicised criticism of the mudarabah sukuk structure 
made by the prominent Shari’ah scholar and Chairman of the AAOIFI Shari’ah Board, 
Sheikh Taqi Usmani. AAOIFI then published a statement containing six principles 
regarding sukuk structures. Subsequently, many sources attributed the market decline to 
this statement. In reality, that the decline in sukuk market volume in 2008 was probably 
due more to prevailing global credit market conditions (it was a very difficult time to 
raise funds, whether conventional or Islamic) rather than to any direct reaction to the 
AAOIFI statement. In the midst of this global turmoil and the market pause, the AAOIFI 
comment has provided for some self-reflection in the industry. 
 
While there was some debate regarding the method of its release, the AAOIFI‟s 
comments constituted a positive effort towards improving transparency and bringing the 
„substance‟ of sukuk products closer to the basic tangible and risk-sharing principles on 
which there is an almost universal consensus; it is in the implementation of these 
principles that matters become complex for investors. 
 
To-date, many of the current sukuk types adhere to AAOIFI in form, but not in substance. 
The highly successful Indonesian sovereign sukuk (USD 650 million) issued in April 
2009 shows there is still heavy demand for these unsecured, asset „based‟ structures 
(Moody‟s, 2009d).  
 
The term „based‟ is often used to reference a „looser‟ asset security structure that has little 
or no legal relevance in the event of a corporate default or distress. There is no scope in 
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the courts for such vagaries – either the investors have a legal enforceable claim on assets 
or they do not. So when crunch time comes, those investors in asset-based structures are 
left with nothing: no assets, no security, just an unsecured claim in substance like a debt 
of the company. The majority of investors happily accept these structures. Many 
investors – Islamic and non-Islamic alike – simply want a fixed-income bond: rough 
estimates put the market size at USD 45-50 trillion and it is this powerful investor 
demand that primarily drives the shape of market (Moody‟s, 2010b). 
 
5.6 HOW TO ACHIEVE THE FULL POTENTIAL OF ISLAMIC FINANCE? 
 
Although Islamic banking offers a combination of both equity and non-equity based 
instruments, the system‟s preference for equity contracts often makes it more efficient 
and stable than debt-based conventional systems. Sadr and Iqbal (2002) presented 
empirical evidence based on the data gathered over 15 years from the Agricultural Bank 
of Iran demonstrating that equity based financing increase transparency, monitoring, and 
supervision, and thus improve efficiency and stability of the financial system.  
 
The operations of IFIs demonstrate that they tend to shy away from equity and 
partnership based instruments for several reasons, such as the inherit riskiness and 
additional costs of monitoring such investments, low appetite for risk, and lack of 
transparency in the markets. Consequently, bank portfolios are often not diversified either 
geographically or by product. This unwillingness to take on risk reflects the lack of 
transparency in the Islamic banking system, which dampens confidence and trust among 
investors and market participants. The result is that depositors and investors become more 
risk averse, and so banks become even more risk averse, thus creating a vicious circle 
which results in a severe financial and economic crisis. In theory, Islamic financial 
principles contribute to the stability of the financial system. Islamic modes of finance, 
particularly the profit-sharing principle, provide a loss absorption feature to financial 
institutions.  
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The original concept of Islamic financing is undoubtedly in favour of equity participation 
rather than creation of debt, because it is only equity that brings an equitable and 
balanced distribution of wealth in the society. Debt-ridden economy, on the other hand, 
tends to concentrate wealth in the hands of the rich and creates a bubble economy which 
fuels inflation and brings many other social and economic evils (Usmani, 2008). 
However, the practice is very different from the theory. All of these deviations between 
theory and practice of Islamic finance mean that the system is not functioning at its full 
potential and has adapted itself to a limited functionality. In fact, due to these deviations, 
the Islamic banking system is exposed to risks that it is not supposed to be exposed to. 
These deviations and other greedy banking practices, hence, have created additional risks 
both at the institutional and systematic levels. In a „pure‟ Shari’ah system, finance would 
be based around equity rather than debt and, although cycles would occur, they would not 
be on the same scale and crashes could be avoided. Therefore, Islamic banking needs to 
develop more ideal equity based Islamic products and shift away from those based on 
debt. The Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him) declared that “Allah Almighty remains with 
trade-partners (to help and support them) unless one of them becomes dishonest to the 
other
1
.” Also, in the Hadith, debt presents a troubling face once the possibility of 
deferment arises, as it might with a debtor in difficulty. Such Islamic sentiments, under 
the conditions of the current financial crisis have been raised by contemporary 
researchers and financiers as well; for examples Davis (2009a) states that “Debt is the 
weapon used to conquer and enslave societies, and interest is its ammunition”. 
 
In addition, IFIs – in theory – should be less exposed to asset-liability mismatch than 
their conventional counterparts. This comparative advantage is rooted in the „pass 
through‟ nature of Islamic banks, which act as agents for investors/depositors and pass all 
profits and losses through to them. Following the theoretical model, any negative shock 
to an Islamic bank is absorbed by both shareholders and investors/depositors. Thus the 
chronic problem of asset-liability mismatch in Islamic banks should not exist; this type of 
                                                          
1
 Abu Dawood, Chapter 27, Hadith no. 3383. 
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financial intermediation contributes to the stability of the financial system. This is theory; 
the practice is, however, different as discussed thoroughly in Chapter 3. IFIs tend to 
sacrifice a share of their profits for the year to subsidise PSIAs‟ appetite for returns. In 
order to mitigate the displaced commercial risk, these IFIs resort to the practice of 
smoothing distributions to PSIAs, utilizing IRRs and PERs. This implies that an Islamic 
bank that practices distributions smoothing may be subject to higher earnings volatility 
when it does not have a significant build-up of reserves. This renders the Islamic bank 
riskier than a conventional bank, given that a conventional bank has hedging 
mechanisms. If IFIs truly provide real economic distributions to their PSIAs, as the 
Shari’ah requires, these banks will be able to avoid systemic risks and be more resistant 
to economic shocks.   
 
Regrettably, both Islamic banks and their supervisory authorities in some countries 
consider unrestricted investment accounts to be a product designed to compete with, and 
to be an acceptable substitute for, conventional deposits; in such an environment profit 
smoothing may be considered to be an inherent attribute of the product rather than a 
means of deliberately avoiding transparency and market discipline, especially if it is 
combined with in-substance capital certainty (Archer and A. Karim, 2007). In some such 
countries unrestricted IAHs may benefit from deposit guarantee schemes; the compliance 
of such practices with Shari’ah principles seems open to doubt. Therefore, if unrestricted 
IAHs are considered to be virtual depositors, the implications of this in terms of capital 
adequacy need to be enforced by the regulator by treating these IAHs in the same way as 
liabilities for the purpose of calculating capital adequacy ratio.  
 
Dar and Presley (2000) argue that Islamic banking is all about taking risk. Depositors 
keep their money in profit-sharing accounts and so, in theory, at least, they participate in 
both the profits and losses of the banks. In practice, however, banks have consistently 
given depositors returns that are on par with the interest rates that conventional banks 
deliver. Now, as their profits decline, IFIs are dipping into PERs to keep depositors 
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satisfied. But they will face a dilemma if the economic downturn continues. “Devout 
Muslims have increasingly migrated to Islamic banks in recent years, but will the trend 
survive if some of them start losing their money?”, wonders Dar (Khalaf, 2009). It is 
arguable that illiquidity cases like Northern Rock in the UK would have never happened 
under a pure Islamic system because instead of borrowers funding investments, they 
would be sharing the risks with other investors and they would not be able to „withdraw‟ 
funding as they did with Northern Rock. 
 
However, many argue that PSIAs would not agree to receive volatile distributions, since 
they mistakenly believe that IFIs should provide distributions similar to conventional 
banks. Archer and Karim (2007) suggest that this might be because of the inherent nature 
of bank depositors (whether Islamic or conventional) whose relatively low net worth 
means that they are naturally risk averse and prefer to earn stable low returns compared 
with high net worth individuals who invest in shares, funds, and all sorts of diversified 
risky investments. But perhaps it may also have to do with market education about 
Islamic banking as an alternative system. Many people, particularly after the current 
crisis, have started to believe in the Islamic finance system and the benefits it offers. 
AAOIFI and IFSB are working towards educating the market about the best practices of 
Islamic finance, but it might be difficult to change the mindset of bank depositors, which 
has been grounded in stone over decades.  
 
It should also be noted that some IFIs might mistakenly see no incentives in moving in 
this direction of fully applying Shari’ah principles. It is, therefore, essential that 
supervisory authorities, at least in Islamic countries, provide regulatory incentives to IFIs 
that comply with Shari’ah rules and punishments to those that do not comply. Making 
AAOIFI and IFSB standards mandatory for Islamic banks should be a step in the right 
direction. 
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As has been discussed in the previous chapter, the IFSB supervisory discretion formula 
for calculating CAR gives a natural incentive to IFIs to engage in providing true 
economic returns to PSIAs and to stop the smoothing practice. However, this formula is 
not obligatory in most countries and is applied on a jurisdictional basis, i.e. if an 
individual IFI has little or no displaced commercial risk, it still has to abide by the 
regulatory imposed α factor. One way for regulators and supervisors to resolve this „one-
size fits all‟ issue and indirectly incentivise IFIs to engage in the „passing through‟ 
mechanism to PSIAs is imposing a variable α factor on banks (Farook, 2008). The IFSB 
already provides this flexibility to each regulator. This would, however, require 
accounting technology that would calculate an individual bank‟s exposure to displaced 
commercial risk, as this is quite achievable. Central banks, for instance, can design a 
formula to calculate individual displaced commercial risk exposure for each Islamic 
bank. Based on this exposure, the central bank can impose a variable α factor that will 
determine the capital that each bank must hold against its RWAs funded by PSIAs. In 
addition, banks can be given further α factor relief based on the extent of disclosure 
provided, with more disclosures allowing more haircuts on the extent of RWAs funded 
by PSIAs to be included in the denominator of the CAR equation (Farook, 2008). If the 
measure is variable and banks have the opportunity to reduce their CAR by reducing the 
PSIAs‟ displaced commercial risk charge, they will do whatever in their capacity to 
diminish it. This may include ensuring a more efficient asset allocation strategy, reducing 
dependence on fixed rate instruments, better disclosure directed towards IAHs, educating 
them about the nature of their relationship with the bank and the rationale behind the 
profit share distributed to them, even if it happens to be lower than conventional-based 
market deposit rates.   
 
This will of course have a positive effect on the broader Islamic financial system, as IFIs 
will be more resistant to systemic risks as they will actually share the effects of shocks 
with PSIAs, who will also get to bear the fruit from expansionary cycles. 
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Even liquidity, which both academics and practitioners identify as one of the highest risks 
facing Islamic banks, acted is some way as a financial crutch for Islamic banks in the 
recent years. IFIs have traditionally held high levels of cash/liquid assets, ideally to buffer 
for their high liquidity risk. This excessive liquidity syndrome of IFIs in fact reduced 
their liquidity risk during the economic downturn when money market dried up and 
several banks went under because of liquidity issues.  
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
 
 “The Chinese use two brush strokes to write the word 
crisis. One brush stroke stands for danger; the other 
for opportunity. In a crisis, be aware of the danger, but 
recognise the opportunity.” 
John F. Kennedy 
 
The current bleak economic environment represents a golden opportunity for Islamic 
banking and finance, as the fundamental weaknesses in the Wall Street banking model 
have been exposed, requiring substantive change to the whole banking system. If it was 
not for this crisis, the inherent stability and risk management techniques within Islamic 
finance would not have gained so much attention. 
 
Although IFIs have been more resilient to the financial turbulence than their conventional 
peers, the shift in the environment did negatively affect some of them. IFIs are not risk-
immune; they face their own liquidity and asset decline challenges but to a limited 
degree. So far, Islamic banks have been following a close mimicry of western products 
and hence they are being exposed to similar risks. No major collapse has occurred in 
Islamic finance as a result of the crisis, but Islamic banking has been hit by defaults, for 
example the slump in Dubai real estate and debt restructuring. Even if Islamic finance 
had been prevailing, at its current state, the crisis could have happened but at a less severe 
level. Islamic finance has not yet provided a more principled mode of finance than the 
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debunked Wall Street model because the embedded ethical foundations have not been 
explored yet (Asutay, 2009b). 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY  
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The literature review and the examination of other studies about risk management in 
Islamic banking have shaped the research methodologies used in this study. The previous 
chapters thoroughly reviewed and synthesised the literature relating to, first, the 
theoretical overview of Islamic banking with specific reference to risk management; 
second, the difference between conventional and Islamic banking from a risk 
management perspective; third, the empirical studies regarding risk management in 
Islamic banking; and, finally, the impact of the recent financial crisis on the future of 
Islamic banking. This chapter discusses the research methods employed in this research, 
and also presents the appropriate analytical tools utilised. 
 
The chapter defines the research objectives and questions introduced earlier in Chapter 1; 
this is followed by the research hypotheses presented in Section 6.3. The chapter later 
discusses research design and methodologies, and explores the advantages and 
disadvantages of each by identifying the research methodology and design for this 
research. The subsequent sections explain the research design, strategy, methods for 
primary data collection, and the chosen data analysis methods or tools. An explanation of 
the questionnaire and interview design and the pilot study are also included.  
 
6.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, the aim of this study is to explore and evaluate the risk profile of 
Islamic banks. At the heart of this paper is the question of whether Islamic banks are 
more or less risky than their conventional peers as perceived by the participants. A 
review of the existing literature does not provide a clear-cut answer to this question, 
which is expected to be explored by primary data. In other words, this is clearly an 
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empirical question, the answer to which requires feedback from the market place. This 
study, however, is not merely another addition to the available literature. It distinguishes 
itself by extracting empirical evidence from the perceptions of banking professionals and 
from the recent crisis. 
 
Given the complexity of the topic, there are several questions that this research sets out to 
answer: 
(i) What is the difference between risk management for conventional and Islamic 
financial institutions? 
(ii) What are the additional risks faced by Islamic banks?  
(iii) How do the Islamic banks perceive their own risks?  
(iv) How advanced are the current risk management practices used by IFIs?  
(v) How do regulators expect to respond to the new risks inherent in Islamic banks? 
(vi) Was Basel II drafted with conventional banking model in mind?  
(vii) What does Basel III carry for Islamic banking?  
(viii) What are the appropriate capital requirement levels for Islamic banks?  
(ix) What possible Shari’ah-compatible risk management instruments are available at 
the present and for the future?  
(x) Can conventional risk mitigation techniques be adopted by Islamic banks or 
Islamic banking need to engineer its own mitigation techniques?  
(xi) Is Islamic banking actually more resilient than conventional banking?  
(xii) What effects did the recent crisis have on Islamic banking?  
(xiii) Are Islamic banks recession proof?  
(xiv) Will the Islamic banking principles offer a role model for the future?  
(xv) Could the crisis have occurred under an Islamic banking system?  
(xvi) Can Islamic banking survive without proper hedging tools?  
(xvii) Is hedging Shari’ah-compliant?  
(xviii) What are the main divergences between the current practice and the moral 
principles of Islamic banking?  
(xix) What is the next chapter for risk management in Islamic banking?  
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Following a structured approach, answers for each of these questions are explored 
through collecting primary data.   
 
After the research questions were identified, an attempt was made to operationalize the 
research questions within the context of the broader objectives. Thus, the operationalized 
objectives are: 
 
(i) to ascertain the fundamental principles underlying risk management in Islamic 
banking and the unique risks facing the IFIs; 
(ii) to investigate the effect of different control variables like region, country, 
respondent‟s position, nature of FI, nature of operations, and accounting 
standards on the participants‟ perception on nature of risks, risk measurement 
and risk management and mitigation approaches of IFIs in comparison to those 
of conventional banks and with reference to the market conditions in which IFIs 
operate; 
(iii) to evaluate the applicability of IFSB Standards and Guidelines with respect to 
risk management and capital adequacy, and how could they operate in a Basel II 
(and potentially Basel III) era; 
(iv)  to investigate the real roots of the recent crisis with a view to draw some lessons 
for IFIs. 
(v) to examine the dichotomy between the theory and practice of Islamic banking; 
and 
(vi)  to explore the next chapter for risk management in Islamic banking. 
 
In answering the research questions, the impact of various categories of respondents and 
their profile indicators on risk perception are also investigated. 
 
6.3 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
Having reviewed the related literature, identified research issues and formulated research 
objectives and questions, what follows is the formulation of the research hypotheses.  
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A research hypothesis is the statement created by a researcher when they speculate upon 
the outcome of a research or experiment. It is a tentative generalization, the validity of 
which remains to be tested. It is often a statement of the expected relationship between 
two or more variables. The hypothesis requires more work by the researcher in order to 
either confirm or disprove it (Creswell and Clark, 2007). Research hypotheses determine 
the parameters of the research questions; therefore, the methods used in testing the 
hypotheses should be relevant to the research questions and objectives (Robson, 2011).  
 
For this study, research hypotheses were developed based on the main findings of prior 
research literature as well as by referring to the researcher‟s wide practical experience in 
Islamic banking and also the unique characteristics of IFIs as compared to conventional 
banks. The hypotheses are related to the opinions of several groups of respondents about 
risk management in Islamic banking. 
 
As discussed in the following section, Research Design, in order to follow a structured 
approach that facilitates data collection and analysis, the questionnaire and interview 
format was utilized which is divided into ten main parts. Research questions and 
hypotheses are categorized in relation to the topical aspect of each part in the 
questionnaire and interview. The findings from questionnaire and interview data analysis 
are tested against those hypotheses and, as a result, conclusions will be drawn 
accordingly. In addition, the researcher further formulated sub-hypotheses in order to 
further investigate the impact of various categories of respondents on the risk perception 
 
The research hypotheses and sub-hypotheses are listed and categorized as follows: 
 
Section A - Risk perception and risks in Islamic banking 
Hypothesis 1: 
The main risks facing Islamic banks are reputational risk, Shari’ah- non-compliance risk, 
asset-liability management risk, liquidity risk, and concentration risk. 
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H1-1:  There is no statistically significant difference among the respondents in relation to 
their perception of the various risks facing IFIs according to region. 
 
H1-2:  There is no statistically significant difference among the respondents in relation to 
their perception of the various risks facing IFIs according to the country in which they 
operate. 
 
H1-3:  There is no statistically significant difference among the respondents in relation to 
their perception of the various risks facing IFIs according to the respondent’s position. 
 
H1-4:  There is no statistically significant difference among the respondents in relation to 
their perception of the various risks facing IFIs according to accounting standards. 
 
H1-5:  There is no statistically significant difference among the respondents in relation to 
their perception of the various risks facing IFIs according to the nature of the FI. 
 
Section B - Islamic Finance Contracts 
Hypothesis 2: 
Islamic bankers prefer mark-up based contracts (murabahah, wakalah, salam, istisna’a, 
and ijarah) and shy away from profit sharing contracts (musharakah and mudarabah ). 
 
H2-1: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ use of 
Islamic finance contracts according to region. 
 
H2-2: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ use of 
Islamic finance contracts according to the respondents’ position. 
 
H2-3: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ use of 
Islamic finance contracts according to the nature of the FI. 
 
H2-4: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ use of 
Islamic finance contracts according to the nature of activities. 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
Profit sharing contracts are perceived as more risky than mark-up based contracts in the 
Islamic finance industry. 
 
H3-1: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ risk 
perceptions about Islamic finance contracts according to region. 
 
H3-2: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ risk 
perceptions about Islamic finance contracts according to the respondent’s position. 
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H3-3: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ risk 
perceptions about Islamic finance contracts according to the nature of the FI. 
 
H3-4: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ risk 
perceptions about Islamic finance contracts according to accounting standards. 
 
H3-5: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ risk 
perceptions about Islamic finance contracts according to the nature of activities. 
 
Section C - Additional Risk Issues Facing IFIs 
Hypothesis 4: 
There is no substantial difference between risk management in Islamic banking and 
conventional banking. 
 
H4-1: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ perceptions 
about additional risk management issues in Islamic banking according to the nature of 
the FI. 
 
H4-2: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ perceptions 
about additional risk management issues in Islamic banking according to region. 
 
H4-3: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ perceptions 
about additional risk management issues in Islamic banking according to the 
respondent’s position. 
 
H4-4: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ perceptions 
about additional risk management issues in Islamic banking according to the nature of 
activities. 
 
H4-5: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ perceptions 
about additional risk management issues in Islamic banking according to accounting 
standards. 
 
Section D - Capital adequacy for Islamic banks 
Hypothesis 5: 
It is generally known that capital requirements levels should be lower in IFIs than in 
conventional banks. 
 
Hypothesis 6: 
Basel II was drafted with conventional banking very much in mind. IFIs should follow 
their own standards, e.g. IFSB Principles on capital adequacy. 
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H6-1: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ views 
about capital adequacy for Islamic banks according to region. 
 
H6-2: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ views 
about capital adequacy for Islamic banks according to the nature of the FI. 
 
H6-3: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ views 
about capital adequacy for Islamic banks according to the nature of activities. 
 
Section E- Islamic banking and the global credit crisis 
Hypothesis 7: 
Islamic banking is more resilient to economic shocks than conventional banking but not 
recession-proof. 
 
H7-1: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ 
perceptions about credit crisis and Islamic banking according to region. 
 
H7-2: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ 
perceptions about credit crisis and Islamic banking according to the nature of the FI. 
 
H7-3: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ 
perceptions about credit crisis and Islamic banking according to the nature of activities. 
 
H7-4: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ 
perceptions about credit crisis and Islamic banking according to accounting standards. 
 
H7-5: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ 
perceptions about credit crisis and Islamic banking according to the respondent’s 
position. 
 
Section F - Risk Management and Reporting 
Hypothesis 8: 
Not many Islamic banks use the more technically advanced risk measurement and 
reporting techniques. 
 
H8-1: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the 
frequency of producing risk management reports according to region. 
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Section G - Risk Measurement 
Hypothesis 9: 
The use of risk measurement techniques is less advanced among Islamic banks than 
their conventional peers. 
 
H9-1: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk measurement techniques according to region. 
 
H9-2: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk measurement techniques according to the respondent’s position. 
 
H9-3: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk measurement techniques according to the nature of the FI. 
 
H9-4: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk measurement techniques according to the nature of activities. 
 
H9-5: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk measurement techniques according to accounting standards. 
 
Section H - Risk Mitigation 
Hypothesis 10: 
Islamic banks use a number of risk mitigation tools that are intended to be Shari’ah-
compliant and that are less advanced than those utilised by conventional banks. 
 
H10-1: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk mitigation techniques according to region. 
 
H10-2: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk mitigation techniques according to the respondent’s position. 
 
H10-3: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk mitigation techniques according to the nature of the FI. 
 
H10-4: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk mitigation techniques according to the nature of activities. 
 
H10-5: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk mitigation techniques according to accounting standards. 
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Section I - Islamic Banking in Practice 
Hypothesis 11: 
Most IFIs abandoned conservative risk management Shari’ah principles in favour of 
copying conventional structures. 
 
H11-1: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ perceptions 
about the current practices in Islamic banking according to the nature of the FI. 
 
H11-2: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ perceptions 
about the current practices in Islamic banking according to region. 
 
H11-3: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ perceptions 
about the current practices in Islamic banking according to the respondent’s position. 
 
Section J- The next chapter in Islamic banking 
Hypothesis 12: 
Islamic banking has a great potential to become a strong alternative financing system 
provided that it goes back to its roots.  
 
H12-1: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ recommended 
growth strategies for Islamic banks according to region. 
 
H12-2: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ recommended 
growth strategies for Islamic banks according to the respondent’s position. 
 
H12-3: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ recommended 
growth strategies for Islamic banks according to the nature of the FI. 
 
H12-4: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ recommended 
growth strategies for Islamic banks according to the nature of activities. 
 
H12-5: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ recommended 
growth strategies for Islamic banks according to accounting standards. 
 
General hypothesis 
Hypothesis 13 is a general hypothesis that is not linked to a specific part of the 
questionnaire, which aims to develop a conclusion from the main narrative and analysis 
of the entire research. This hypothesis expects significant differences between the 
perceptions of Islamic and conventional bankers, with the former being biased in favour 
of the Islamic banking model and the latter being biased towards their banking model. 
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Hypothesis 13:  
Perceptions of Islamic and conventional bankers differ significantly in relations to risk 
and risk management issues in Islamic banking and finance, as Islamic bankers are more 
biased towards their business model, and vice versa. 
 
6.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Research methodology is the approach a researcher follows in carrying out a research 
project. Bryman (2008) defines methodology as “the practices and techniques used to 
gather, processes, manipulate and interpret information that can then be used to test ideas 
and theories about social life.” Thus, research methodology provides a framework of the 
methods used in collecting, analysing, and reporting data.  
 
According to the literature, there are two types of research methodologies: qualitative and 
quantitative. Quantitative methodology is designed to reach conclusions based on 
numerical data, for example by means of testing the strengths of the relationship between 
dependent and independent variables (Creswell, 1994). It involves the collection of data 
so the information can be quantified and subjected to statistical treatment in order to 
support or refute alternative knowledge claims. The main motive in quantitative 
methodology is to explain and examine a subject matter by correlating various variables. 
 
Qualitative research methodology, on the other hand, places an emphasis on words 
instead of quantification when a researcher collects and analyses data (Bryman, 2008). 
Therefore, qualitative methodology is a set of research techniques used to interpret a 
phenomenon. It should be noted that when the motivation for a research is exploratory 
and evaluatory, it is constructed as a qualitative research methodology (Cresswell and 
Clark, 2007). 
 
This research is designed as a qualitative research study, as it aims to explore the 
opinions and also aim to evaluate the risk perceptions of respondents to develop a better 
understanding of risk practices in Islamic finance industry. 
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6.5 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Research design is a framework for a certain set of criteria that would generate suitable 
evidence for the researcher in the desired area of investigation. It, therefore, provides 
structure for the collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2008). The objective of 
research design is to guide the research process from beginning to end by providing the 
framework within which all the necessary work will be completed. Social research should 
be constructed with a particular design in mind before a researcher starts collecting and 
analysing data.  
 
Creswell and Clark (2007) and Bryman (2008) regard a successful research design to 
comprise of the following tasks: 
(i)  Define the research problem; 
(ii) Determine the problem-solving information that is needed and when it is needed; 
(iii) Design the exploratory, descriptive or casual phases of the research; 
(iv) Specify the measurement and scaling procedures; 
(v) Construct and pre-test a questionnaire or an appropriate form for data collection; 
(vi) Specify the sampling process and sample size; 
(vii) Develop a plan of data analysis and tabulation; 
(viii) Specify the time and financial constraints; and 
(ix) Follow-up on the completed research study. 
 
Research design, by considering the above-mentioned tasks, can be classified in 
numerous ways depending on the objective of the categorization criteria. The most 
common classification is according to the particular approach taken: exploratory 
research, descriptive research, and explanatory research, which are explored as follows: 
 
Exploratory research is conducted to provide insights into and comprehension of the 
problem situation confronting the researcher. It helps the researcher solve an issue that 
has not been studied extensively previously. As the general nature of a research problem 
and the relevant variables are investigated, exploratory research is typically inevitable 
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when the data that are sought for is loosely defined, resulting in an unstructured working 
format. This does not mean that the research is non-systemic but rather of a qualitative 
nature providing room for interpretative explanations (Creswell and Clark, 2007).  
 
Descriptive research‟s main intention is to describe something pertaining to 
characteristics, functions, or any phenomena. It is conducted to describe what exists. 
Thus, it is a type of research where the researchers use the past events to explain existing 
observable facts. Descriptive research is characterised by the preceding formulations of 
explicit hypotheses, therefore, stressing the importance of clearly defined research 
problems. This leads to a research design that is more structured, consisting of numerous 
planning and statistical methodologies (Bryman, 2008).  
 
Explanatory research, on the other hand, exceeds to recognise cause-and-effect 
relationships between variables in the problem model, which is characterised by a 
structured design and a considerable amount of planning. This design sees how various 
independent variables are manipulated in order to check how a dependent variable is 
affected within a relatively controlled environment. There are, however, disadvantages of 
explanatory research. Some of the most common issues include it being expensive, and 
having administrative problems (Creswell and Clark, 2007).   
 
When one considers the relationship between the three previously discussed types of 
research design, choosing a research approach is not an easy decision. The best way is to 
rationalise the chosen design(s) by examining the situation at hand. The selected design 
should be relevant to the problem being studied and the procedure of conducting the 
research should be economically feasible and realistically attainable. Thus, the nature of 
the study and the resources available to the researcher will greatly influence the research 
design. 
 
The framework of the present study contains characteristics of both exploratory and 
descriptive research designs. This study benefits from the use of both the survey 
technique and the semi-structured interviews to search the particularities of risk 
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management in Islamic banking. This enables the researcher to explore the subject matter 
through the perceptions of banking professionals (explorative). The descriptive nature of 
the research stems from the fact that it benefits from the available body of knowledge and 
literature as discussed in the literature review section. Therefore, the chosen research 
design in this research is mixed research design. This study does not warrant the use of 
explanatory research, as it does not examine any direct cause-effect relationships.  
 
6.6 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
Another important aspect of a research is the research strategy. Research strategy is the 
approach to the study, and it is related how the connection between theory and empirical 
data can be made. It is a fact that “social research attempts to connect theory with 
empirical data – the evidence we observe from the social world. In other words, the 
relationship between research and theory”, and how it is done is explained by research 
strategy (Asutay, 2011). In social research, there are two main research strategies: 
deductive and inductive reasoning methods. 
 
Deductive theory represents the most common view of the nature of the relationship 
between theory and social research. The researcher, on the basis of what is known about 
in particular domain and of theoretical considerations in relation to that domain, deduces 
a hypothesis that must then be subject to empirical scrutiny (Bryman, 2008). The 
researcher begins with a theory about the topic to be researched; which is then narrowed 
down to a more specific hypothesis that needs to be tested. This ultimately leads the 
researcher to be able to test the hypotheses with specific data to reach a conclusion 
confirming or rejecting the hypotheses (Creswell, 1994). 
 
The inductive approach on the other hand moves from specific observations or findings 
to a broader generalisation and theory. In other words, the researcher begins with specific 
observations or arguments, formulates tentative hypotheses to be explored, and finally 
develops a general theory (Blaikie, 2007). 
 
 
246 
Since this research is oriented towards an explorative approach, it commences with 
exploring the field, and with the data collected from the field; it generates particular 
hypotheses to be tested with the data collected from the field. In other words, since this 
study begins with the specific and then moves to the general, it therefore, follows a 
deductive strategy. 
 
6.7 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Research method includes the techniques, tools, and procedures, by which the data is 
collected, analysed, and interpreted for the research project (Bryman, 2008). Creswell 
(1994:64) defines research method as “the practices and techniques used to gather, 
processes, manipulate and interpret information that can then be used to test ideas and 
theories about social life.”  
 
According to the literature there are two types of research methods: qualitative and 
quantitative. The quantitative method is designed to reach conclusions based on 
numerical data, while qualitative research method places an emphasis on words instead of 
quantification. Therefore, the qualitative method is a set of research techniques used to 
interpret a phenomenon. Quantitative analysis depends heavily on statistical significance, 
while qualitative analysis mainly uses simple human judgment in interpreting and 
organizing the collected data (Oppenheim, 2001).  
 
Quantitative measurement is perceived as more accurate, valid, reliable and objective 
than qualitative measurement, due to the former‟s scientific nature. However, this does 
not mean that qualitative research is less valuable. Instead of focusing on numbers, 
qualitative research focuses on observations and words, stories, visual depictions, 
interpretations, and other expressive descriptions. Qualitative approaches have the 
advantage of allowing for more diversity in responses as well as the capacity to adapt to 
new developments or issues during the research process itself. While qualitative research 
can be expensive and time-consuming to conduct, many fields of research employ 
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qualitative techniques that have been specifically developed to provide more succinct, 
cost-efficient and timely results.   
 
Generally speaking, a research method that combines two or more research methods 
provides better interpretation as the information missed by one method might be captured 
by the other and thus an enhanced and integrated result may emerge from the analysis. 
According to Creswell and Clark (2007:13), mix methods research 
 
“provides more comprehensive evidence for studying a research problem than 
either qualitative or quantitative research alone. Researchers are given 
permission to use all of the tools of data collection available rather than being 
restricted to the types of data collection typically associated with qualitative 
research or quantitative research. Mixed methods research helps answer 
questions that cannot be answered by qualitative or quantitative approaches 
alone.” 
 
This research, hence, is triangulation- or mixed method-based, as it benefits from 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. While quantitative research method is in 
the form of self-administered questionnaire, qualitative research method in this study is 
based on semi-structured interviews. Both the survey questionnaire and the semi-
structured interviews are developed from the same perspective and are expected to 
achieve the same objective of finding relevant responses to the research questions. It 
should be noted that research related to the literature review being descriptive research 
further contributes to the triangulation nature of the research. 
 
6.7.1 Research Method: Data Collection 
As mentioned above, two main data collection method utilised in this study, namely 
questionnaire and interviews. The following sections explore the details of the both 
methods of data collection. 
 
6.7.1.1 The survey questionnaire 
A questionnaire is a research instrument which consists of a series of questions and other 
prompts for the purpose of gathering information from respondents. It is very popular, 
since many different types primary data can be collected including attitudinal, 
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motivational, behavioural, and perceptive aspects of the subject being studied (De Vaus, 
2002).   
 
In designing the questionnaire, it is important that the questions address the aims of the 
study. The questionnaire is considered to be effective if it suits the research objectives 
and questions. A good questionnaire has to be clear, unambiguous, and encourage the 
respondents‟ participation (Creswell, 1994). 
  
If properly designed and implemented, surveys can be an efficient and accurate means of 
determining information about a given population. Results can be provided relatively 
quickly and, depending on the sample size and methodology chosen, they are relatively 
inexpensive. Survey questionnaires have many advantages over other methods of data 
collection (De Vaus, 2002).  
 
Some advantages of questionnaires can be listed as follows:  
(i) The responses are gathered in a standardised way, so questionnaires are more 
objective, certainly more so than interviews; 
(ii) It can be completed at the convenience of the respondents; 
(iii)  Generally it is relatively quick to collect information using a questionnaire; 
(iv)  Low cost of data collection & processing; 
(v) As the questionnaire can be anonymous, it gives the respondents freedom and 
encouragement to answer questions honestly, especially sensitive questions; and 
(vi)  It can cover a large sample of respondents at the same time. 
 
On the other hand, the questionnaire method has some disadvantages which have to be 
taken into consideration. Oppenheim (2001) highlights the following problems: 
(i) Some respondents may not be willing to answer the questions; 
(ii) Respondents may answer superficially especially if the questionnaire takes a 
long time to complete. The common mistake of asking too many questions 
should be avoided. 
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(iii)  The validity of the responses may be compromised by a biased view of the 
respondent;  
(iv)  No opportunity to correct misunderstandings or to probe, or to offer 
explanations or help; 
(v) Questionnaires are standardised so it is not possible to explain any points in the 
questions that participants might misinterpret; and 
(vi)  Respondent‟s inability to answer the question might affect the response rate and 
reliability. 
 
Despite the disadvantages of the questionnaires, they are rather useful and efficient in 
aiming to collect data related to the perceptions and opinions of individuals on particular 
subject are; as this study utilized a questionnaire survey in collecting primary data from 
the bankers and financiers in the form of their opinions and perceptions in mapping out 
the risks aspects of and their management in Islamic banking and finance. Thus, a 
questionnaire survey is considered as one of the main methods of primary data collection 
for this study. 
 
6.7.1.1.1. Open-ended vs. closed questions 
 
In terms of questionnaire design, the questions included may be divided into those which 
are „open-ended‟ and those which are „closed‟. In open-ended or free-response questions, 
respondents are free to reply to the questions in any way they wish and the answers have 
to be recorded in full. In „closed‟ questions, respondents are offered a choice of alterative 
replies and they must reply in one of a predetermined number of ways, such as „yes‟, 
„no‟, or „don‟t know‟ (De Vaus, 2002). The advantages of using closed ended 
questionnaires are that this technique is easier and quicker for the respondents to answer; 
they require no writing. In addition, closed ended questionnaires are easier to code and 
statistically analyse as and quantification is straightforward. Disadvantages of closed 
questions are the loss of spontaneity and expressiveness, and perhaps the introduction of 
bias by „forcing‟ respondents to choose between given alternatives or by making them 
focus on alternatives that might have not occurred to them (Oppenheim, 2001). On the 
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other hand, open-ended questions have many advantages, stemming from the fact that 
respondents are encouraged to structure the answer as they wish. This provides a means 
for obtaining information which cannot be obtained adequately by the use of a closed 
question (Creswell, 1994). Another advantage of the open-ended question is the 
information which the respondents indicate with respect to their level of knowledge or 
degree of expertise. The disadvantage of open-ended questions is that they produce a 
mass of different words meaning the same thing, or a number of similar words meaning 
different things.). It can therefore be stated that open-ended questions are easy to ask, 
difficult to answer, and more difficult to analyse. Oppenheim (2001) explains that these 
free-response questions require drawing up some system of categories known as coding. 
The design of such coding framework and the actual coding operation require trained 
staff and are extremely time consuming; for this reason researchers have to curb their 
desire to have too many open-ended questions (Oppenheim, 2001). 
 
6.7.1.1.2. Level and characteristics of measurements 
 
The level of scales measurement of a variable in statistics is a classification that is used to 
describe the nature of data contained within numbers assigned to objects and, therefore, 
within the variable. According to De Vaus (2002), there are three main levels of 
measurement scales. These are: 
 
a) Nominal scale, in which a distinction between categories of a variable can be made, 
but one cannot rank the categories in any order. The nominal scale is used to measure 
qualitative variables and yields frequency data that may be subjected to non-parametric 
statistical tests, such as gender. 
 
b) Ordinal scale, in which it is meaningful to rank the answers by categories, but it is not 
possible to quantify precisely how much difference there is between categories, such as 
more than, less than, equal to). 
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c) Interval/ratio scale, in which ranking of categories can be made and it is also possible 
to quantify the differences between the categories precisely. Likert scales are very 
commonly used with interval procedures. 
 
6.7.1.1.3. Sampling in the questionnaire 
 
A sample is a small selected portion of the whole population. According to Bryman 
(2008:85), “a sample is the segment of population that is selected to be investigated.” The 
size of the sample must be sufficient in order represent the population, which the study is 
intended to investigate. The sample size depends on the homogeneity of the population. If 
the pilot study indicates that there is a considerable heterogeneity of the population, then 
it is important to choose a larger sample. As Robson (2011:164) contends, if the 
population is heterogeneous and the main interest of the study is to generalise the 
findings to the population from which the sample was drawn, then a larger sample is 
needed. In addition, a larger sample size will decrease the probability of having sampling 
error.  
 
According to Bryman (2008), sample sizes smaller than 500 cases and larger than 30 
cases tend to be suitable for most studies. As far as the survey sample in this study is 
concerned, there were obviously some real cost and time constraints which limited the 
sample size. The target population is the wider group of banking professionals 
worldwide, both Islamic and conventional banking practitioners, whose perceptions about 
risk management in Islamic banking could shape the outcome of this study. The 
significant diversity and dispersion of the population meant the time and cost constraints 
would be unusually high due to the inherent extra complications associated with such a 
target population. Caught between these challenges and the strong desire to make the 
sample size as large as possible, the researcher completed 77 questionnaires out of which 
5 were not fit for purpose. The sample size for this study, upon which both descriptive 
and inferential statistical analysis will be performed, is therefore 77 questionnaires.  
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There are different sampling strategies such as simple random sampling, systematic 
sampling, stratified sampling, cluster sampling, panel sampling, and others; each with 
their own advantages and disadvantages.  
 
According to Robson (2011), a variety of sampling methods can be employed, 
individually or in combination. Factors commonly influencing the choice between these 
designs include: 
(i) Nature and quality of the research; 
(ii) Availability of auxiliary information about units on the research; 
(iii) Accuracy requirements, and the need to measure accuracy; 
(iv) Whether detailed analysis of the sample is expected; and 
(v)  Cost/operational concerns 
 
It should be noted that snowball sampling method is used for this research, which is a 
sampling method used to obtain research and knowledge from extended associations 
through previous acquaintances; it uses recommendations to find people with the specific 
range of skills that has been determined as being useful. It is referred to metaphorically as 
snowball sampling because as more relationships are built through mutual association, 
more connections can be made through those new relationships and a plethora of 
information can be shared and collected, much like a snowball that rolls and increases in 
size as it collects more snow. Snowball sampling is a useful tool for building networks 
and increasing the number of participants. However, the success of this technique 
depends greatly on the initial contacts and connections made (Babbie, 2010). 
 
Snowball sampling has a number of advantages as opposed to other sampling methods. It 
is possible for the surveyors to include people in the survey that they would not have 
known. It is also useful for locating respondents of a specific population if they are 
difficult to locate. The advantage of this is that the researcher can quickly find 
respondents who are experts in their fields. This leads to only having the most well-
known experts for the sampling group, and also can help the researcher find lead users 
more simply (Babbie, 2010). The method is, however, heavily reliant on the skill of the 
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researcher in conducting the actual sampling, and that individual‟s ability to vertically 
network and find an appropriate sample. To be successful requires previous contacts 
within the target areas, and the ability to keep the information flow going throughout the 
target group. Identifying the appropriate person to conduct the sampling, as well as 
locating the correct targets is a time consuming process which renders the benefits only 
slightly outweighing the costs. Another disadvantage of snowball sampling is the lack of 
definite knowledge as to whether or not the sample is an accurate reading of the target 
population. By targeting only a few select people, it is not always indicative of the actual 
trends within the result group (Babbie, 2010). 
 
The experience in conducting this research indicates that due to the nature of the research 
as well as the subject matter, snowballing strategy of sampling proved to be a very 
successful strategy. 
 
6.7.1.1.4. Operationalising the questionnaire  
 
(i) Questionnaire Design and Structure 
 
The questionnaire was primarily developed by the researcher drawing on conclusions 
from the literature review which included articles, books, PhD theses, and exploratory 
surveys on the topic of risk management in Islamic banking. In particular, the survey by 
Khan and Ahmed (2001) was quite useful in developing the questions. In addition, the 
researcher‟s extensive practical experience in Islamic banking played a role in designing 
the questionnaire.  
 
The nine-page questionnaire (reproduced in Appendix 1) was drawn up with twenty-two 
main questions, most of which having a number of sub-statements.  
 
The survey was mainly dominated by closed questions in a manner that ensures that 
respondents could answer all the questions as easily as possible, with a box ticking 
response required of respondents. However, at the end of the questionnaire, an open 
ended question option was provided for the respondents to raise any issue which they 
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might have in mind in relation to the subject of the questionnaire. The type of questions 
used in the questionnaire varies according to the type of information required to test the 
research hypotheses. The questions are mostly multiple choices in order to cover all the 
relevant data. 
 
The questionnaire was split into five main parts: 
 
Part One, General and Background Information, covers the control variables of the 
survey by acquiring background data of the respondents and their organisations. The aim 
of obtaining data for this section is to use them as control variable to investigate whether 
these variables had any effect on the respondents' answers in the other sections.  
 
The second part, Risk Perception, is used to elicit opinions of respondents on different 
risk management issues in Islamic banking. This part is subdivided into three main 
sections: Section One covers the inherent risks, risk measurement, severity of risks facing 
Islamic banks, in addition to seeking the respondents „perception abut different Islamic 
banking contracts; Section Two deals with capital adequacy for Islamic banks; while 
Section Three is intended to gather the respondents‟ views on the impact of the recent 
credit crisis on Islamic banking. Part Two consists of ten questions. The five-point 
Likert-scale is used in providing options for each question to the respondents to express 
his/her preference in terms of how strongly they agree or disagree with statements. In Q7 
the five-point Likert-scale is used to express the degree of importance (ranking from 
Very Unimportant = 1 to Very Important 5). However, the respondents are given space at 
the end of the question to provide additional comments. 
 
In the third part, Risk Management and Mitigation, respondents requested to provide 
feedback on the use of risk management and mitigation techniques at their organizations, 
if applicable. This part consists of four closed-ended questions through which 
respondents have to express their views on risk management and mitigation techniques 
employed by the banks. Replies from the respondents were obtained by asking each one 
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to answer questions using a 5-point Likert scale for Q17, while respondents had to choose 
from listed options for Q 18, 19, and 20. 
 
Part Four, Islamic Banking in Practice, investigates whether there is a dichotomy 
between the practice and ideals of Islamic banking. It consists of one closed-ended 
question, Q21, which is subdivided into four statements. Replies from the respondents 
were obtained by asking one to answer questions using a 5-point Likert scale (ranking 
from Strongly Disagree = 1 to Strongly Agree = 5) 
 
Finally, Part Five, the Next Chapter in Islamic Banking, explores different growth 
strategies for IFIs. Respondents were asked to rank the importance of each strategy 
according to their perception. While Q22 is a closed-ended question, respondents are 
given space at the end of the question to provide additional comments.  
 
(ii) Administration and Sampling  
 
The list of institutions and respondents to approach was taken from the contact list at the 
European Islamic Investment Bank Plc (EIIB). Between February 2010 and November 
2010, questionnaires were sent to 110 Islamic banker professionals in 19 countries.  
In the process of conducting the questionnaire, a cover letter for each questionnaire was 
provided to explain the purpose of the research, as well as to highlight the importance of 
the individual‟s response. The letter aimed at assuring respondents that the information 
provided is confidential, anonymous and would be used only for the purpose of the 
research.  
 
The sample included Islamic and conventional bankers, auditors, lawyers, rating analysts, 
Shari’ah scholars, consultants, and brokers from various countries and regions. 
 
The final return date for the questionnaire was 30 November 2010. Questionnaires were 
distributed via email, fax, post, and in person. 58 questionnaires were initially returned – 
an initial response rate of 52.7%. Follow-up reminders increased the total to 77 returned 
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questionnaires from 18 countries. However, out of the 77 surveys returned, 5 were not 
useable because the researcher felt that their answers were inconsistent or that that the 
respondents were biased in their replies, which could influence the validity and reliability 
of the findings.  
 
The final sample comprised 72 surveys from 18 countries – a final response rate of 
65.5%. The sample represented a diverse geographic spread of institutions, and 
respondents were spread across different departments and held different positions within 
their organisations. The sample size and distribution is within acceptable limits.  
 
Table 6.1 provides a breakdown of the response rate, however, detailed analysis of the 
sample according to respondents‟ roles, countries and regions, and nature of institution is 
provided in Chapter 7. 
 
Table 6.1: Questionnaire Response Rate 
 
 
6.7.1.1.5. Pilot study 
 
A pilot study is a small-scale preliminary study conducted before the main research in 
order to check the feasibility or to improve the design of the research. The questionnaire 
must be evaluated rigorously before final administration of the questionnaire (De Vaus, 
2002). A pilot test is important as it highlights any shortcomings before the document is 
fully launched. The objective is to check the overall presentation, clarity and reasonableness 
in terms of the length of the questions and the depth of the information sought (Bryman, 
2008) Also piloting is important to check the uniformity of interpretation of each of 
respondent, and whether respondents are answering the questions correctly (Dillman, 
2000).  
 
The drafted questionnaires for this study were first pilot tested on a group of ten bankers 
working in London. The respondents were asked about the following questions: 
Distributed Received Not valid Valid Response rate
110 77 5 72 65.5%
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(i) Is the questionnaire too long? 
(ii) Were the instructions clear? 
(iii)Were any of the statements ambiguous? 
(iv) Did they find any of the questions sensitive? 
(v) If they have any comments and suggestions. 
 
The feedback of this piloting showed some observations, as follows: 
(i) Q7: Some respondents did not understand what is meant by Displaced 
Commercial Risk. 
(ii) Q7: There was some ambiguity concerning which risks fall under market risk. 
(iii) Q11: Some sub-statements are unclear 
 
These feedbacks were then incorporated into the questionnaire and a further random 
sample of seven bankers was then selected for second piloting. This time the results from 
the pilot test resulted in no noticeable difference to the original questionnaire. This 
produced the final version used for this research.  
 
6.7.1.2 Interviews 
 
An interview is a qualitative research technique that allows face-to-face interaction. It 
involves asking questions and receiving answers from respondents in an identified 
research area. As compared to questionnaires, it can lead to increased insight into 
respondents‟ thoughts, feelings, and behaviour rather than having simple answers.  
 
Robson (2011) classifies interviews into structured, semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews. The different types can, to some extent, be linked to the depth of response 
sought. Oppenheim (2001) classifies interviews to essentially two kinds: 
 
a) Exploratory interviews, depth interviews, or free-style interviews; 
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b) Standardised interviews such as used, for example, in public opinion polls, market 
research and government surveys. 
 
Oppenheim (2001) provides some advantages of interviews compared to questionnaires:  
 
(i) Improved response rate; 
(ii) Interviews can give a prepared explanation of the purpose of the study more 
convincingly than a covering letter; 
(iii) Flexibility as questions that are inappropriate to a particular interviewee can be 
omitted or additional ones included; 
(iv)  Gives the interviewer the opportunity to probe further into a subject to extract more 
details from the interviewee; 
(v) In interviews it is easier to keep the attention of the respondent; and 
(vi) Enhancing data validity: due to human interaction, interview results have less 
chance of being biased and unreliable.   
 
However, interviews have some common disadvantages. Creswell and Clark (2007) 
argue that the disadvantages of using interviews are to some extent a reflection of their 
advantages. Obviously, interviews are much more expensive than questionnaires. The 
larger or the more dispersed the sample, the greater the cost. Travel costs and call-backs 
add to this. The cost factor also enters the data processing stage: since interviews are used 
particularly where many open-ended questions have to be asked, there will be a major 
and costly coding operation allied to the use of interviews. Analysis of interview data 
may be challenging as the data collected usually contains non-standard responses. 
Moreover, interviews tend to be time consuming, as they require lots of preparation and 
coordination with the interviewees.   
 
6.7.1.2.1. Operationalising interviews  
 
This study collected qualitative data by conducting exploratory semi-structured 
interviews because exploratory interview is essentially heuristic, which helps to develop 
ideas and research hypotheses rather than to gather facts and statistics (Oppenheim, 
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2001). In addition, Bryman (2008) describes in-depth interview as an engaged 
conversation between two people. In the interview, the researcher puts him or herself in 
the participant‟s situation to try and understand that person‟s point of view (De Vaus, 
2002). The researcher needs to listen and pay constant attention to the participants as they 
are responding, repeatedly attempting to understand the meaning of what is being said 
and how the person has shaped his or her perspective. In this way, interviewing is more 
than „collecting data‟. Furthermore, interviewing allows the researcher and the participant 
to connect in a profound way, reducing the distance between them (Creswell and Clark, 
2007). This type of interview is often unstructured and, therefore, permits the interviewer 
to encourage a respondent to talk at length about the topic of interest in a flexible 
approach (Robson, 2011).  
 
(i) Interview Structure 
 
The interview script was developed within the context of the original research questions 
and hypotheses. The script helps to guide the interview sessions. The interview is divided 
into six main parts corresponding to the six research parts introduced under the structured 
approach in Section 9.2. This facilitated data collection and analysis. The interview script 
covers the same topics as the questionnaire, as the main purpose of the semi-structured 
interviews is to prove or disprove the conclusions driven from the questionnaire data 
analysis. 
 
(ii) Administration of the Interview and Sampling 
 
The snowball sampling method, as discussed before, was used for the interview sampling 
to obtain perceptions and knowledge from an extended network of respondents, through 
previous acquaintances. The researcher utilised his network of initial contacts and 
connections to find participants with valuable experience and knowledge in Islamic 
banking and risk management. From June 2010 to January 2011, in-depth semi-structured 
interviews were completed with 37 Islamic banking professionals. The interviewees 
included a mix of senior banking executives and heads of business units who work at 
either Islamic banks or conventional banks with Islamic activities/windows, researchers, 
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academics, Shari’ah scholars, consultants, and specialized analysts at rating agencies. 
Five of the respondents in the interview were also included in the sample for 
questionnaires.  
 
Out of the 37 interviews conducted, 4 interviews were discarded because the researcher 
felt that the interviewees were biased in their replies or they were not well informed 
about the issues discussed. Therefore, the final sample included only 33 respondents (five 
of which were included in the questionnaire sample) who were knowledgeable about the 
topic and the contemporary developments, and whose replies could be taken, with a high 
level of confidence, as bias-free. 
 
Out of the 33 interviews that comprise the final sample, 21 interviews were conducted 
face to face, either in London or in the participants‟ cities. The researcher utilised his 
numerous business travels to arrange for these face to face interviews. 7 interviews were 
conducted via teleconference, and 5 interviews were conducted via video conference 
facilities. Both the teleconferences and the video conferences were dialled from the 
researcher‟s primary location in London. The final sample was diverse both 
geographically and by participants‟ roles.  
 
Interviews were conducted to gather primary data for this research to support the primary 
data generated through quantitative method, namely the questionnaire. It should be noted 
that the preparation for the interview was carefully planned and professionally conducted. 
When possible, these interviews were audio recorded with the permission of the 
interviewee. When recording was not possible because of the spontaneity to engage in the 
interview, notes were taken in shorthand by the interviewer. Even when an interview was 
being recorded, shorthand notes were also kept.  
 
However, the interview sample was not as big as the questionnaire sample for a number 
of reasons: 
 
(i) In depth-interviews take much more time than structured questionnaires; 
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(ii) Interviews require one-on-one interactions; 
(iii) Travelling to meet interviewees was difficult due to time and cost constraints; 
(iv) Despite exploiting video conference and teleconference facilities to conduct 
some interviews, several potential interviewees did not have the time or the wish 
to participate; 
(v) Some potential interviewees were located in remote time zones (like America 
and Southeast Asia), which added to the difficultly of arranging suitable 
interview times. 
  
Despite these difficulties, the sample size and distribution are within acceptable limits 
and, therefore, allows for reliable data.  
 
Table 6.2 combines the geographic distribution with the position of interviewees. It is 
obvious that interviewees represent a wide range of expertise and roles. 
 
Table 6.2: Breakdown of Interview Sample  
  
A detailed list of interview participants, their positions, organizations, and location is 
reproduced in Appendix 2.  
 
6.7.1.3 Validity and reliability of the data 
 
Validity refers to whether the questionnaire or interviews measure what they intend to 
measure, which is crucial, regardless of the method used to collect such data, as invalidity 
makes the results worthless. Validity depends largely on how honest and accurate the 
responses given by the respondents are, which is a difficult factor to measure.  
Position Bahrain Egypt France Kuwait Malaysia Qatar Syria UAE UK Total
Consultant 3% 3% 3% 6% 15%
Conventional Banker 3% 3% 6% 12%
Islamic Banker 6% 6% 3% 9% 24%
Lawyer 3% 3% 3% 9%
Rating Agency Analyst 3% 3% 15% 21%
Researcher 3% 3% 3% 9%
Shari’ah  Scholar 3% 3% 3% 9%
Total 12% 18% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 12% 42% 100%
Country
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Reliability refers to the consistency of the questions. This means that if the research was 
to be carried out by other independent researchers employing the same methodology and 
strategy, they would arrive at a similar conclusion, all other things being equal (Creswell, 
1994). If a method of collecting evidence is reliable it means that anybody using this 
method, or the same person using it at another time, would come up with the same results. 
According to Oppenheim (2001), the key components of data reliability include 
consistency, precision and explicability of results, which suggests that the researcher should 
be consistent when collecting the data and should aim for a high degree of precision and 
accuracy, which of course will be subject to many factors outside the control of the 
researcher. However, the researcher should try and minimize bias in the data collection 
process. 
  
In this study, the validity and reliability of the Data were proved acceptable thanks to a 
number of reasons: 
 
(i) The use of multiple methods of data collection; 
(ii) Having a cover letter explaining the purpose of the research and assuring 
confidentiality of responses; 
(iii) The questionnaire was subjected to a sequence of pilot test, which involved every 
question being scrutinised and edited when necessary;  
(iv) Collected raw data was screened and filtered for errors; 
(v) Personal close follow-up with the questionnaire respondents via telephone calls and 
emails to ensure eliminating any confusion or lack of clarity that might arise; 
(vi)  Checking consistency of answers in questionnaires through multiple questions 
asking about the same point; 
(vii) Five questionnaires were excluded from inclusion in the final sample as the 
researcher felt the inconsistency in the answers might spoil the data; 
(viii) Four interviews were discarded because of the same reasons; 
(ix) Personally assuring the interviewees of the semi-structured interviews of the 
anonymity of both their identity and personal responses; 
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(x) Sending the draft questionnaire and interview script to a number of PhD students and 
academics in order to seek their opinions on the proposed drafts and their potential effect 
of the data validity and reliability. 
 
Cronbach’s alpha test 
Cronbach‟s alpha is the most common form of internal consistency reliability 
coefficients, which ranges in value from 0 (when the true score is not measured at all and 
there is only an error component) to 1 (when all items measure only the true score and 
there is no error component). The higher the value of alpha, the more reliable the scale is. 
As a rule of thumb, alpha should be at least 0.7 (De Vaus, 2002). 
 
Table 6.3 – Reliability Statistics (Cronbach’s alpha coefficient) 
Cronbach’s Alpha N of Items 
0.912 105 
 
Table 6.3 reveals that the Cronbach‟s alpha coefficient for respondent groups for the 105 
items, which used the scale, was 0.912 (>0.70), which should be taken as confirming the 
reliability of the contents of the questionnaire used in this study. 
 
6.7.2 Research Method: Data Analysis 
 
Data analysis is one of the most difficult parts of the research process. Having chosen the 
appropriate method of analysis, the choice of statistics is affected by both the method of 
analysis itself, the level of measurement of variables and the complexity of research 
questions (De Vaus, 2002). This section provides a detailed description of the methods 
used to analyse the assembled qualitative and quantitative data. 
 
6.7.2.1 Quantitative data analysis 
 
An initial screening of the questionnaire was carried out regarding the completeness and 
the eligibility of the responses. As a result of this initial screening, only 72 out of the 77 
returned questionnaires were included in the final sample. 
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The questionnaires were numbered and data was checked for errors. Cross tabulations 
were carried out to check the inconsistency of the data (skip errors, missed answers, 
values outside the range). In addition, the frequency distribution for all question items has 
been checked and corrected if required. Once all the errors had been corrected, raw data 
was coded and saved as new master file for statistical analysis. The final complete sample 
was then entered directly into the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) 
programme. Initially, all the variables were created, and then the actual questionnaires 
were entered. This enables the data to be created in statistical tables in order to facilitate 
the inferential statistical analysis. 
 
Most questions in this questionnaire are designed along a 5-point Likert scale in order to 
measure the respondents‟ opinions about sets of statements, which make the codification 
and the analysis of the data easier and efficiently.   
 
The following statistical techniques are utilised:  
 
(i) Descriptive Analysis Methods 
Descriptive statistics are summaries of data, which can be tabular, numerical, or 
graphical. Different types of descriptive statistics such as the mean, the mode, the 
median, frequency distribution, the minimum, the maximum and percentages are 
calculated; and presented in the following chapters. 
 
(ii) Non-parametric Tests 
The main objective of statistical analysis applied in this research is to test whether there 
are significant differences in perceptions of respondents through various control variables 
at the overall sample level and among various groups of respondents. Significance testing 
is usually concerned with accepting or rejecting hypotheses or propositions, which can be 
conducted by parametric and non- parametric tests. Non-parametric tests were considered 
to be appropriate for this study because the data collected were mainly nominal and 
ordinal; the responses were not normally distributed; and the sample size is relatively 
small. Parametric tests usually suit samples which are drawn from a normally distributed 
population and data collected on an interval or ratio scale (Hebel, 2002).  
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The following non-parametric techniques were used: 
 
(a) Chi-Square test 
The Chi-square test is used to measure the association between dependent variables and 
independent variables (Saunders et al., 2007). The test is appropriate for testing the 
goodness of fit variables because the test can be applied to determine whether or not an 
observed set of frequencies matches some expected set of frequencies. The Chi-Square 
test was used to verify the existence of any significant differences in the responses 
regarding the degree of response for each statement. A significance level of 5% is used 
for this study as justification for rejecting the null hypothesis. 
 
(b) Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U Test  
Kruskal-Wallis test is a non-parametric method for testing equality of population medians 
among groups. It is identical to a one-way analysis of variance with the data replaced by 
their ranks. It is an extension of the Mann-Whitney U test to 3 or more groups. 
 
K-W test allows researchers to measure the possible differences between two or more 
groups in relations to particular control variables. In this study, the K-W test of 
significance was intensively used for the inferential statistical analysis to test the impact 
of control variables like region, country, respondent‟s position, nature of FI, nature of 
activities, and accounting standards on the perception of survey participants. The 
significance level used for this Kruskal-Wallis test is 5%. 
 
(c) Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient 
Spearman‟s Rank Correlation Coefficient is a measure of correlation, which shows how 
closely two sets of data are linked. It only can be done on data that can be put in order, 
highest to lowest (Bryman, 2008). In this study, the Spearman‟s rank correlation 
coefficient is used to test whether there is correlation between different groups of 
respondents. 
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(iii) Factor analysis 
Factor analysis as an inferential statistical analysis tool is used as data reduction method 
in order to reduce a large number of variables to a small number of factors to facilitate 
the process of summarising the data which has been collected. Pallant (2007) states that 
in order to conduct factor analysis the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett‟s test 
need to be conducted. For the factor analysis to be considered as appropriate, the 
Bartlett‟s test of Sphericity value should be significant (P<.05), while for the KMO test, 
the suggested minimum outcome must be at least 0.6 (KMO score ranging from 0 to 1). 
The KMO test‟s benchmarks are as follows: if the KMO measure is in the 0.90s, the 
sampling is considered as marvellous. If the outcome is in the 0.80s, then the sampling is 
considered as meritorious; if it is in 0.70, then the sample is middling; if it is in the 0.60s, 
then the sample is mediocre; if it is in 0.50s, then the sample deemed as miserable, and 
lastly if it is below than 0.50, then the sample is unacceptable (Pallant, 2007).  
 
In this study, factor analysis was used for questions 11 and 16 to test whether the 
observed variables can be explained largely or entirely in terms of a much smaller 
number of components. This also helps to organise large numbers of factors into 
components generated by the study. 
 
(iv) MANOVA 
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) is a generalized form of univariate 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). It is used when there are two or more dependent 
variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2006). MANOVA tests aim at whether mean 
differences among groups on a combination of dependent variables is likely to occur by 
chance (Pallant, 2007). In this study, after conducting factor analysis, MANOVA test was 
computed for questions 11 and 16 in order to investigate if there is any significant 
difference between the component groups identified by factor analysis in relation to some 
control variables. This helps to locate the impact or significance of each control variable 
on the generated distribution and components.  
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(v) Friedman test 
The Friedman test is used to find a tendency for some variables to receive higher ranks 
than others, for example assigning the ranks of 1 to 10 to the most preferred and least 
preferred variables, respectively (Creswell, 1994). The Friedman test ranks the scores for 
each of the cases and then calculates the mean score for each sample. If there is no 
significant differences between the samples, their mean score ranks should be similar 
(Bryman, 2008). The Friedman test determines whether the rank totals for each condition 
or variable differ significantly from the values which would be expected by chance 
(Bryman, 2008).  
 
In this study, Friedman test was used in questions 9 and 10 to examine whether there is a 
significant difference between the respondents‟ perceptions in ranking the given options. 
The significance level used for this Friedman test is 1%. 
 
(vi) Interpretative Analysis 
In addition to these quantitative methods, an interpretative approach was employed to 
provide further meaning to the results of the questionnaires and in-depth understanding of 
the issues in an integrated manner. This interpretative approach interacts the primary data 
findings with the literature review in order to provide better understanding of the findings 
of the questionnaire analysis.   
 
6.7.2.2 Qualitative data analysis 
 
Analysis of the qualitative data collected through the semi-structured interviews is more 
complex and demanding than that of quantitative data. This means that unless great care 
is taken in its analysis, it may cause real harm to the research itself (Robson, 2011). 
 
Since the interviews were based on open-ended questions, the researcher transcribed all 
recorded interviews and read the interviews‟ notes and transferred them into segments 
representing complete thoughts on a single question or topic, in line with the original 
research questions. All transcribed interviews were broken into coded segments 
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representing complete thought statements. Answers were codified according to the most 
common responses provided by interviewees. After coding, the interview segments were 
transferred from word processing format into a spreadsheet for further analysis. 
 
As Charmaz (1983:114) also states “Codes serve to summarize, synthesize, and sort 
many observations made of the data ... coding becomes the fundamental means of 
developing the analysis ... Researchers use codes to pull together and categorize a series 
of otherwise discrete events, statements, and observations which they identify in the data 
… At first the data may appear to be a mass of confusing, unrelated, accounts. But by 
studying and coding, the researcher begins to create order”. Thus, the qualitative data 
collected through interview schedule were analysed by the use of coding analysis, which 
was conducted manually rather than with the help of a software, such as n-vivo.  
 
The generated findings through coding analysis were also subjected to interpretative 
analysis with the objective of developing a better understanding of the data and findings. 
This social constructivist oriented method helps to develop an integrative approach to the 
data to render a rich qualitative analysis. 
 
6.8 DIFFICULTIES AND LIMITATIONS 
 
This study, as any research, has experienced a number of challenges and constraints 
which may have limited the range of the study both for the questionnaire and the 
interviews. These issues are as follows: 
 
Limitation of the time available to the researcher was no doubt a restricting factor as he 
was unable to increase the sample size, as to do so would have called for more resources 
than were at his disposal. The coverage of the sample used in this research, for both the 
questionnaire and the interviews, can be extended to a larger number of banks across a 
wider scope of countries to enrich the findings. However, due to limitations of time and 
costs this was unfortunately not possible. Also, a more comprehensive data collection 
may help address some of the other data-related issues recognized in this paper; 
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The fact that the researcher is an Islamic banker known to most of the respondents added 
some sensitivity. Some respondents were worried about the conflict of interest and potential 
use of the information provided by the researcher‟s employer, despite assurances that the 
researcher is acting in his personal rather than professional capacity. 
 
It should also be noted that some respondents expressed a degree of suspicion concerning the 
objectives of the study despite assurances regarding their anonymity and the strict 
confidentiality. 
 
Other difficulties include:  
(i)  Incomplete questionnaires and ineligible text; 
(ii)  void or biased responses; and finally 
(iii) Due to the sampling technique limitations, which have been highlighted, this 
study is unable to use more robust statistical tools in analysing the data, such as 
parametric statistical tools, which arguably are more powerful. 
 
6.9 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter aimed to render a discussion of the research process by identifying the details of 
the research and its conduct. Initially, the research objectives and questions were 
developed and then the research propositions were formulated. The chapter began by 
explaining the importance of research design and its significant role in planning the overall 
research project. It also explained the chosen research methodology for this thesis and the 
justification therein. Research methods in the form of survey questionnaires and semi-
structured interviews were discussed in some detail, emphasizing their relevance to this 
research as confirmed by both the research questions and hypotheses. Data reliability and 
validity were also discussed with relevance to this study. In addition, the stages of conducting 
the fieldwork were briefly explained with emphasis on the practical phases of collecting the 
primary data.  
 
The final part of this chapter discussed the statistical techniques which were used in order 
to analyse the collected data. In this research, non-parametric statistical tests were used 
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due to the violations of the distribution assumptions of parametric tests, namely due to 
not having normally distributed data. Having discussed the research instrument, the 
survey and interview samples, the pilot study, the administration of the research 
instruments and the form of data analysis, the following chapters present the findings of 
the empirical work conducted. 
 
271 
CHAPTER 7 
PROFILING PERSPECTIVES ON RISK DIMENSIONS IN ISLAMIC 
FINANCE: DESCRIPTIVE QUESTIONNAIRE DATA ANALYSIS  
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter, the first of the empirical chapters, summarises the descriptive findings from 
the collected primary data in terms of providing a quantitative analysis of respondents’ 
answers to the self-administrated questionnaire. The questionnaire follows the structure 
explained in the Research Methodology Chapter with the aim of empirically answering 
the research questions.  
 
The chapter begins by providing a descriptive analysis of the general characteristics of 
the respondents. Then the research questions and hypotheses, explained in the previous 
chapter, are tested and general observations are made of the findings. Cross tabulation 
and descriptive statistics are used to provide indications of respondents’ perceptions. The 
findings are examined with respect to the extant literature review, while the second part 
of quantitative analysis – inferential statistics – is used in the following chapter. A more 
complete discussion of the research findings will be provided in Chapter 10 in the context 
of existing knowledge and information, and also in association with the findings of the 
qualitative interview analysis that will be separately presented in Chapter 9.  
 
7.2 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, the questionnaire survey was conducted between February 
and November 2010. The questionnaires were distributed to 110 respondents in 18 
selected countries among 6 global regions. The final sample comprised of 72 surveys – a 
final response rate of 65.5%. The sample represented a diverse geographic spread of 
institutions, and respondents were spread across different departments and held different 
positions within their organizations.   
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7.2.1 Characteristics of the Respondents 
 
The first part of the questionnaire aimed at identifying different characteristics of the 
respondents. Among the many variables used in the study, the main control variables 
used to assess the respondents’ profiles are the primary location of the financial 
institution, nature of operations and activities, and the accounting standards used. These 
control variable aim to test the effect of these characteristics on the respondents’ answers.  
 
Table 7.1 depicts the findings in relations to the primary country of operation of financial 
institution, which indicates that the majority of participating banks are located in the UK 
followed by Egypt, Bahrain, and France. GCC countries and Malaysia follow; while 
Jordan, Pakistan, Palestine, Singapore, and Turkey each is represented by one financial 
institution in the sample. 
 
Table 7.1: Geographic Distribution of the Study Sample  
 
 
In addition, Table 7.2 combines the financial institution’s main region of operation 
together with the respondents’ positions. As can be seen in Table 7.2., Heads of Risk 
Country Number of Questionaires Percent of Final Sample
UK 21 29%
Egypt 9 13%
Bahrain 6 8%
France 4 6%
Germany 4 6%
Qatar 4 6%
Kuwait 3 4%
Malaysia 3 4%
Saudi Arabia 3 4%
Syria 3 4%
UAE 3 4%
Switzerland 2 3%
USA 2 3%
Jordan 1 1%
Pakistan 1 1%
Palestine 1 1%
Singapore 1 1%
Turkey 1 1%
Total 72 100%
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Management and Risk Managers are represented by more than 32% of the sample, 
followed by General Managers and Managing Directors. Respondents included only one 
Head of Investment Banking and one Shari’ah Scholar. The participants’ length of 
service at their organisations does not form part of this questionnaire. 
 
Table 7.2: Breakdown of the Positions of the Participants  
  
The nature of the participating financial institutions is also investigated. As can be seen in 
Table 7.3, out of the 72 institutions which participated in this study, 34.7% were fully-
fledged Islamic banks, with the remainder being conventional banks with Islamic 
activities (19.4%), conventional banks (27.8%), and others (18.1%). 
 
  
Participant's Role Americas Europe GCC Other Other Middle EastSoutheast AsiaTotal (Count) Total (%)
Analyst 1 2 2 5 7%
Auditor 2 2 3%
CEO 2 1 1 1 5 7%
Chief Financial Officer 1 1 2 3%
Consultant 2 2 3%
Director 5 1 6 8%
General Manager 4 6 10 14%
Head of Investment Banking 1 1 1%
Head of Risk Management 8 3 11 15%
Managing Director 1 4 3 8 11%
Risk Manager 1 4 3 1 3 12 17%
Senior Analyst 3 1 4 6%
Senior Trader 1 1 2 3%
Shari’ah  Scholar 1 1 1%
Solicitor 1 1 1%
Total (Count) 2 31 19 2 14 4 72
Total (%) 3% 43% 26% 3% 19% 6% 100%
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Table 7.3: Nature of Financial Institution 
 
 
Since the operational nature of the participating institutions has implications for some of 
the questions in the questionnaire, the nature of activities of the financial institutions are 
also examined. As depicted in Table 7.4., respondents are almost equally distributed 
among retail banking (14%), commercial banking (15%), and investment banking (15%). 
24% of respondents stated that their institutions offer both retail and commercial banking, 
while 14 % considered their institutions as integrated bank or private equity house. The 
‘Other’ category (18%) comprises of audit, consulting, and law firms, together with 
rating agencies and Shari’ah scholars. 
  
Table 7.4: Activities of Financial Institution 
  
Finally, the accounting standards utilized by the sampled financial institutions were also 
enquired in the questionnaire. As illustrated in Figure 7.1, the majority of participating 
banks use international accounting standards (53%), 8.3% use AAOIFI standards, 13.9% 
Nature of Institution Americas Europe GCC Other Other Middle East Southeast Asia Total
Audit Firm 3% 3%
Brokergae 1% 1%
Consulting Firm 3% 3%
Conventional Bank 3% 11% 4% 10% 28%
Conventional Bank with Islamic activities 10% 10% 19%
Fully-fledged Islamic Bank 7% 13% 3% 7% 6% 35%
Law Firm 3% 3%
Rating Agency 7% 7%
Sharia'a Scholar 1% 1%
Total 3% 43% 26% 3% 19% 6% 100%
Region
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use local accounting standards, while 6.9% of respondents said their institutions adapt 
both AAOIFI and international standards concurrently. 18% of respondents fall under the 
‘Not Applicable’ category as these respondents are not working for financial institutions. 
 
Figure 7.1: Accounting Standards Used by Financial Institution   
 
 
7.2.2 Locating Risk Perception 
7.2.2.1 Perceptions on risk issues in Islamic banks 
7.2.2.1.1. Overall risks faced by Islamic banks 
 
Respondents were asked in Question 7 to express their perceptions about the severity of 
risks facing IFIs by indicating the degree of importance of each risk on a 5-point Likert 
scale (ranking from Very Unimportant = 1 to Very Important = 5). In addition, Question 
8, being an open-ended question, requested respondents to list any additional risk(s) – in 
order of seriousness – that could affect IFIs. 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 7.5 demonstrates the importance attached to each of the 
risk areas by the participants as faced by their financial institution. As can be seen from 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
AAOIFI standards
International & AAOIFI standards
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Not Applicable
Conventional Bank
Conventional Bank with Islamic activities
Fully-fledged Islamic Bank
Others
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Table 7.5,  the mean values for the risk categories are between 4.01 and 2.72, the median 
is between 4 and 2, and the mode is between 5 and 2. However, due to the nature of the 
data collected by using a Likert scale, the median and the mode seem to be more 
appropriate measurements for this study. According to Howell (1997), the major 
advantage of the median and the mode is that unlike the mean, they are unaffected by 
extreme scores. Another advantage of these measures, when contrasted with the mean, is 
that they do not require any assumptions about the interval properties of the scale. 
 
Table 7.5: Descriptive Statistics for Each Type of Risk (Aggregate Results) 
  
Notes: n = Number of responses; 
N/S indicates that the differences of the responses are not significant at 5% using the Chi square test of 
significance 
 
Furthermore, Chi-square test, a non-parametric test, is used to explore frequency data in 
order to test whether the data represent good fit or not. This study uses a significance 
level of 5%. Since, for this question, for most risks (except Displaced Commercial Risk 
and Corporate Governance Risk) the P-value is less than 0.05, it is concluded that for 
most risks there is goodness of fit between the data.  
 
On an aggregate level, as can be seen from Table 7.5, liquidity risk is perceived as the 
most severe risk facing IFIs with the highest mean value of 4.01 followed by asset-
 
277 
liability management risk (3.94), and reputation risk (3.92). Concentration, credit, and 
Shari’ah-non-compliance risks followed the initial risk categories but were not 
recognized as critical as the top risks by the participants. Among the risks listed, market 
risk was considered as the least risky (2.72).  
 
It is no surprise that liquidity and ALM risks are ranked as the highest risks facing the 
industry. The limited range of possible funding sources for IFIs and the consistent focus 
on longer-term assets leads to concentrated liabilities, imbalanced funding mixes, and 
stretched capital management strategies. The two risks are closely correlated and the 
impact of liquidity risk is magnified by the lack of money market instrument to manage 
liquidity. These two risks, together with reputation and concentration risks, support 
research Hypothesis 1 about the top risks facing IFIs.  
 
Shari’ah-non-compliance risk has been ranked sixth as it is likely to be a significant and 
unique risk for IFIs, as Shari’ah-compliance should be the core focus of every IFI. Any 
divergence from Shari’ah principles exposes the IFI to a wide range of risks at different 
levels as discussed in previous chapters.   
 
Operational risk has been ranked tenth by respondents; this is not in line with the 
researcher’s expectations as operational risk could be critical to IFIs due to their specific 
contractual features. In addition, because of the relatively new nature of Islamic banking, 
a lot of the issues related to the operations need to be instituted. These include people’s 
risk, creating computer programmes, and legal documents, etc. It should be noted that 
Research Hypothesis 1 does not consider operational risk to be among the top five risks; 
however, a higher ranking was expected. 
 
Market risk (incorporating rate of return risk, currency risk, commodity risk, benchmark 
risk, and mark-up risk) is incurred on instruments like commodities and currencies traded 
in well-traded markets appears to be less risky for Islamic banks. This risk arises from 
movements in the prices of goods/securities are usually a part of the trading book of a 
bank. On the banking book, conventional banks trade in currencies, indices, and bonds to 
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boost their profitability and to keep a part of their assets in liquid money-market 
instruments. Market risk tends to be more speculative in nature. However, the majority of 
the Shari’ah scholars forbid the sale of debt, and trading in sukuk is almost non-existent 
among IFIs as most of them hold the sukuk till maturity. Islamic banks, however, can 
trade in commodities and assets-backed securities; however, not too many IFIs are 
involved in this, and this may be a reason for a low ranking of market risk. 
 
Equity investment risk was intentionally separated from market risk in the questionnaire 
as PLS through musharakah and mudarabah contracts should be the essence of Islamic 
banking. Unfortunately, IFIs in practice tend to allocate limited funds to equities and 
therefore equity investment risk was ranked among the lowest risks recognized by 
bankers. As more IFIs shift their strategic attention to equities after the drying up of 
international money markets and the attractive equity investment opportunities emerging 
following the recent crisis, equity investment risk is expected to attract more attention in 
the Islamic banking world. 
 
Of note is the low rank given to displaced commercial risk, as the practice of smoothing 
investment returns through ‘profit equalisation reserves’, ‘investment risk reserves’, and 
active management of mudarib fees is a very common feature of IFIs to avoid random, 
business, and confidence-driven liquidity crises. In addition, it was observed that some 
respondents did not understand what is meant by displaced commercial risk, despite 
defining it in the questionnaire. This was reflected in the relatively lower number of 
responses for this risk category (69) compared to the others.   
 
In order to examine the risk perceptions further, Table 7.6 breaks down the risk 
perceptions according to the nature of financial institutions: Islamic banks, conventional 
banks (including those offering Islamic activities), and ‘Others’. For each category of the 
financial institutions, the mean ranking of risk categories are presented.   
 
  
 
279 
Table 7.6: Risk Perception Among Different Groups 
  
Note: Conventional banks include Islamic subsidiaries 
 
The results depicted in Table 7.6 can be summarised as follows: 
(i) The top 4 risks identified by Islamic bankers are the same top 4 risks ranked by 
the total sample in aggregate (see Table 7.5); 
(ii) 3 out of the top 4 risks identified by Islamic bankers are also listed by 
conventional bankers among the top 4 risks; 
(iii) Only 2 out of the top 4 risks identified by Islamic bankers are among the top 4 
risks ranked by ‘Others’; these are Reputation and ALM risks; 
(iv) Different patterns exist for the last 4 risk categories; however, no trends could be 
identified; 
(v) Islamic Bankers’ risk perception of Corporate Governance risk (2.96) is 
noticeably lower than the risk perception of Conventional bankers (3.29) and 
Others (3.46). This opposes literature review which indicates that weak corporate 
governance structures are a general feature of Islamic banking. Also, the 
inferential statistics analysis in Chapter 8 proves that Corporate Governance is 
the most statistically significant risk facing IFIs across a number of control 
variables. In fact, Corporate Governance is a significant risk facing IFIs. 
However, the Islamic bankers included in this sample are mainly from the 
Middle East and the GCC, and their risk perceptions are influenced by cultural 
and social aspects.       
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks Others
Risk Mean Risk Mean Risk Mean
Liquidity Risk 4.48 Liquidity Risk 3.79 Reputation Risk 4.23
Asset-Liability Management Risk 4.44 Credit Risk 3.62 Shari’ah -Non-Compliance Risk 4.00
Reputation Risk 4.44 Asset-Liability Management Risk 3.62 Asset-Liability Management Risk 3.85
Concentration Risk 4.36 Concentration Risk 3.47 Credit Risk 3.69
Shari’ah -Non-Compliance Risk 4.24 Legal Risk 3.47 Liquidity Risk 3.69
Credit Risk 3.96 Reputation Risk 3.41 Concentration Risk 3.62
Legal Risk 3.56 Corporate Governance Risk 3.29 Market Risk 3.54
Equity Investment Risk 3.16 Shari’ah -Non-Compliance Risk 3.21 Corporate Governance Risk 3.46
Operational Risk 3.00 Displaced Commercial Risk 3.18 Legal Risk 3.38
Corporate Governance Risk 2.96 Operational Risk 2.85 Operational Risk 3.00
Fiduciary Risk 2.79 Fiduciary Risk 2.71 Equity Investment Risk 2.92
Displaced Commercial Risk 2.76 Equity Investment Risk 2.62 Fiduciary Risk 2.75
Market Risk 2.48 Market Risk 2.58 Displaced Commercial Risk 2.64
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It should also be noted that the results in Table 7.6 indicate that bankers, whether Islamic 
or non-Islamic, have better understanding about the Islamic banking model and its risk 
architecture than non-bankers (Others) who tend to be more theoretical in their approach. 
 
In supporting the findings in Table 7.6, Table 7.7 spreads the responses of each group 
across the 5 scaling criteria through frequency distribution. This provides a better 
understanding of the risk perception of each group and helps to reach significant findings. 
 
Table 7.7: Frequency Distribution of Risk Perceptions 
  
Note 1: Scale: 1 = Very Unimportant (VU), 2 = Unimportant (U), 3 = Neutral (N), 4 = Important (I), 5 = 
Very Important (VI) 
Note 2: Conventional banks include Islamic subsidiaries 
 
As depicted by the frequency distribution in Table 7.7, there is similarity in risk 
perceptions between Islamic and conventional bankers. This will be further emphasized 
by the results of the Kruskall-Wallis test of significance in Chapter 8, which proves that 
there is a general trend in terms of risk perception that can be attributed to prevailing 
market conditions. 
 
Finally, under open ended Question 8, two respondents added political and country risks 
as additional risks facing IFIs. Most Muslim countries have a high degree of corruption, 
Risk VI I N U VU VI I N U VU VI I N U VU
Credit Risk 20% 60% 16% 4% 0% 18% 38% 35% 6% 3% 23% 31% 38% 8% 0%
Market Risk 8% 24% 8% 28% 32% 6% 12% 21% 55% 6% 23% 38% 15% 15% 8%
Operational Risk 8% 20% 44% 20% 8% 3% 29% 26% 32% 9% 8% 31% 23% 31% 8%
Equity Investment Risk 16% 24% 36% 8% 16% 9% 18% 26% 21% 26% 8% 15% 46% 23% 8%
Liquidity Risk 64% 24% 8% 4% 0% 35% 26% 24% 12% 3% 38% 23% 15% 15% 8%
ALM Risk 60% 28% 8% 4% 0% 29% 26% 24% 18% 3% 38% 31% 15% 8% 8%
Displaced Commercial Risk 8% 20% 36% 12% 24% 15% 39% 12% 15% 18% 9% 18% 27% 18% 27%
Shari’ah -Non-Compliance Risk 44% 36% 20% 0% 0% 15% 18% 41% 26% 0% 38% 23% 38% 0% 0%
Concentration Risk 52% 36% 8% 4% 0% 26% 24% 26% 18% 6% 23% 23% 46% 8% 0%
Reputation Risk 52% 40% 8% 0% 0% 26% 26% 18% 21% 9% 46% 38% 8% 8% 0%
Fiduciary Risk 8% 17% 33% 29% 13% 18% 6% 24% 35% 18% 8% 8% 42% 33% 8%
Corporate Governance Risk 12% 20% 32% 24% 12% 24% 26% 12% 32% 6% 31% 23% 15% 23% 8%
Legal Risk 16% 44% 24% 12% 4% 26% 12% 44% 18% 0% 15% 23% 46% 15% 0%
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks Others
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political instability, and weak currencies, which add political and country risks for IFIs. 
However, the lesson from the recent political unrest and revolutions in the Middle East is 
that political risk indeed matters and remains an important risk category area considering 
the volatility of the political circumstances. However, as an Islamic finance risk category, 
this was largely ignored. It should be also acknowledged that political risks are hard to 
predict and are not recurring. However, considering the recent and current political 
developments in the Middle East, if the questionnaire is to be administered now, namely 
after the eruption of the Middle Eastern revolutions, political risk would most likely to 
attract much higher scores given that most Islamic banks are located in, or directly 
affected by, the Middle Eastern events, which is the main liquidity source for Islamic 
financial institutions. Lastly, in locating the risk categories for the IFI, one respondent 
mentioned regulatory risk, and another added technical risks.  
 
7.2.2.1.2. Perceived risk levels of Islamic finance contracts 
The questionnaire also aims at locating the perceptions and opinions of the respondents 
on various Islamic modes of financing. While Question 9 covers the intensity of use of 
different Islamic finance contracts, Question 10 searches for feedback on the risks 
inherent or perceived to be attached in those contracts. Question 9 is only applicable to 
IFIs and conventional banks with Islamic activities, while such restriction does not hold 
for Question 10. 
 
(i) Intensity of use of different Islamic financial contracts 
 
Table 7.8 summaries the mean values of Islamic finance contracts. As expected, 
murabahah contracts are by far the most-used contracts. This ‘murabahah syndrome’ has 
been under criticism from many Islamic economists and some Shari’ah scholars, but 
unfortunately still remains the backbone of Islamic banking and finance. In addition to 
the findings in this study, the other studies in the literature also demonstrate that 
murabahah has been intensively used by IFIs for money market transactions, investment 
and retail activities. Recently, more banks began using walaka for money market 
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transactions to replace the commodity murabahah, which brings about more 
complications and raises Shari’ah concerns.  
 
The low mean values for musharakah and mudarabah in Table 7.8. reflect Islamic banks’ 
reluctance to hold risk-sharing assets. In addition, the analysis revealed that salam has a 
long way to go before becoming commonly used by Islamic banks. It is evident from the 
responses that the banks’ first preference is for financial instruments that are generated 
through debt creating, sale contracts and leasing instruments. This is enhanced by the 
responses about risk perception in different modes of financing. 
 
Table 7.8: Intensity of Use of Islamic Finance Contracts  
 
Notes: n = Number of responses; Question 9 is only applicable to IFIs and conventional banks with Islamic 
activities 
 
These findings are supported by the results of the Chi-square test as reported in Table 7.8, 
which indicated that the Chi-square values related to the goodness-of-fit of the risk 
categories are highly significant (p <1%).  
 
In addition, as depicted in Table 7.9, Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient between 
the medians of Islamic banks and conventional banks offering Islamic products shows 
that at 5% significance level the rankings of the two groups are correlated (ρ=0.9420 > 
0.714). 
 
 
 
 
Risk n Mean Median Mode Chi-square
Murabaha 39 6.95 1 1 0.00
Wakala 39 5.56 2 2 0.00
Ijarah 39 4.28 4 4 0.00
Mudaraba 39 4.00 4 4 0.01
Istisna’a 39 2.46 6 6 0.00
Musharaka 39 2.41 6 5 0.00
Salaam 39 2.33 6 7 0.00
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Table 7.9: Correlation Between Islamic and Conventional Banks in Using Islamic 
Finance Contracts  
  
 
(ii) Perceptions on risks attached to various Islamic finance contracts 
 
Table 7.10 emphasizes the perception that the profit-sharing modes of financing have 
higher risks, while fixed income contracts (such as ijara and murabahah) are perceived 
as least risky. The main reason for higher concern of partnership contracts may be that 
‘principals’ invested are not guaranteed under partnership modes of finance. In addition, 
these instruments are usually of long-term nature. This is particularly true for real estate 
projects, while fixed income contracts are perceived to have shorter maturities and to be 
less risky with some ‘implied’ guarantees. Even though ijarah contracts may be of long-
term, they can be adjusted to reflect changing market conditions. It is important to note 
that the manipulation of the contracts by Islamic finance practitioners made the equity 
and risk sharing contracts, for instance wakala, share the same risk characteristics like 
fixed income contracts. This created a gap in risk perceptions among different groups of 
respondents. These findings are supported by the results of the Chi-square test which 
indicates that the presence of goodness of fit for the financial contracts with high 
significance level (p <1%). 
 
  
Islamic banks Conventional Banks Difference (Difference)2
Median Median
Murabaha 1 1 0 0
Wakala 2 2.5 0.5 0.25
Mudaraba 4 3 -1 1
Ijarah 4 4 0 0
Musharaka 5 6 1 1
Istisna’a 6 6 0 0
Salam 6 5 -1 1
0.94196Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient  
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Table 7.10: Risk Perception in Islamic Finance Contracts  
  
Notes: n = Number of responses 
 
In addition, as shown in Table 7.11, Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient between 
the medians of Islamic banks and conventional banks offering Islamic products shows 
that the at 5% significance level the rankings of the two groups are correlated (ρ= 0.8929 
> 0.714). 
 
Table 7.11: Correlation Between Islamic and Conventional Banks in Risk 
Perception About Islamic Finance Contracts  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk n Mean Median Mode Chi-square
Mudaraba 72 6.21 1 1 0.00
Musharaka 72 5.89 2 1 0.00
Istisna’a 70 4.20 3.5 3 0.00
Salaam 71 3.75 4 5 0.00
Ijarah 71 3.73 4 2 0.01
Wakala 72 2.26 6 6 0.00
Murabaha 72 1.90 7 7 0.00
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Figure 7.2: Islamic Finance Contracts: Intensity of Use vs. Risk Perception 
 
 
In furthering the analysis, intensity of use of Islamic finance contracts correlated with the 
attached risk perceptions of the respective financial contracts. This is depicted in Figure 
7.2; which demonstrates that Islamic finance contracts that are perceived as higher risk 
(like mudarabah and musharakah) are much less used by banks than less risky contracts. 
In fact, murabahah scored the lowest mean on the risk matrix (1.90) compared to the 
highest mean on the intensity of use (6.95). This reflects the extent to which banks are 
shying away from risk taking or equity participation. Manipulation of the contracts 
changed the risk characteristics of these contracts from principles defined by Islamic 
finance. This manipulation made the Islamic finance contracts behave differently and 
thus perceived differently by practitioners on the risk scale. Thus, the Islamic financial 
institutions are heavily using less risky products regardless of the aspirational 
expectations related to asset-based Islamic finance. 
 
7.2.2.1.3. Additional risk issues facing IFIs 
 
Question 11 asked respondents for their views on some risk and risk management issues 
related to IFIs that were identified in the literature review. This is a closed question that 
provided eleven statements and respondents were requested to express their preference in 
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terms of how strongly they agree or disagree with each statement. The five-point Likert 
scale was used with answered labelled as ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, neutral’, ‘disagree’, 
and ‘strongly disagree’. The findings based on frequency results are summarized in 
Figure 7.3 and Table 7.12 which ranks the importance of statements according to their 
mean values.  
 
Table 7.12: Frequency Results of Responses to Statements Under Question 11  
 
Notes: n = Number of responses; Scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 = Disagree (D), 3 = Neutral (N), 4 = 
Agree (A), 5 = Strongly Agree (SA) 
 
As can be seen in Table 7.12, the Chi-square values indicate that the responses for all 
these statements but one are significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the findings 
indicate that the majority of respondents (56.9%) believe that risk for Islamic banks 
should be managed using different techniques than those used in conventional banking. 
Although more than 48% of respondents consider that the Islamic finance principles have 
naturally built-in conservatism within, around 75% of respondents think that the 
malpractices in Islamic banking in its current state made it a riskier mode of finance than 
conventional banking. 
 
 
Statement SA A N D SD n Mean Median Mode Chi-square
Non-Sharia’a compliance could severely damage 
the reputation of an Islamic bank 41.7% 44.4% 8.3% 5.6% 0.0% 72 4.22 4 4 0.00
Risk management for Islamic banks is more 
challenging than it is for conventional banks 22.2% 43.1% 22.2% 12.5% 0.0% 72 3.75 4 4 0.00
Variation among Sharia’a scholars’ opinions 
represent a major risk to Islamic banking 23.6% 36.1% 26.4% 9.7% 4.2% 72 3.65 4 4 0.00
AAOIFI and IFSB standards should be made 
mandatory on Islamic banks 18.1% 15.3% 23.6% 40.3% 2.8% 72 3.51 4 4 0.44
Depositors would hold the bank responsible for a 
lower rate of return on their deposits 12.5% 41.7% 27.8% 18.1% 0.0% 72 3.49 4 4 0.00
In an Islamic bank, a low rate of return on deposits 
will lead to withdrawal of funds 9.7% 34.7% 27.8% 27.8% 0.0% 72 3.26 3 4 0.00
There is naturally inherent conservatism in the 
principles of Islamic finance 8.3% 40.3% 23.6% 23.6% 4.2% 72 3.25 3 4 0.00
Corporate governance is generally weak in Islamic 
banks 8.3% 40.3% 23.6% 22.2% 5.6% 72 3.24 3 4 0.00
Islamic banking is more risky by nature  than 
conventional banking 8.3% 30.6% 12.5% 31.9% 16.7% 72 2.82 3 2 0.00
Risks for Islamic banks should be managed using 
same techniques used in conventional banking 9.7% 15.3% 18.1% 34.7% 22.2% 72 2.56 2 2 0.01
Islamic banking in its current state is a safer option 
than conventional banking 4.2% 4.2% 16.7% 51.4% 23.6% 72 2.14 2 2 0.00
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Figure 7.3 – Additional Risk Management Issues Facing IFIs 
 
 
The following salient points are identified in Table 7.12 and Figure 7.3: 
(i) The findings demonstrate that, although respondents do not perceive Islamic 
banking to be by nature a more risky model than conventional banking, the 
Islamic banks as it stands today could be more risky than the conventional 
banks; 
(ii) As the findings shows risk management for IFIs is more challenging than it is 
for conventional banks; 
(iii) The findings indicate that risks for IFIs cannot be managed using conventional 
risk management tools and techniques; 
(iv) The findings in Table 7.12 and Figure 7.3. show that not only IFIs face some 
risks that are different from their conventional peers, but these risks are also 
more serious and not well understood; 
Risks for Islamic banks should be managed using same techniques used in 
conventional banking
Islamic banking is more risky by nature  than conventional banking
Risk management for Islamic banks is more challenging than it is for 
conventional banks
There is naturally inherent conservatism in the principles of Islamic finance
In an Islamic bank, a low rate of return on deposits will lead to withdrawal of 
funds 
Depositors would hold the bank responsible for a lower rate of return on 
their deposits
Variation among Sharia’a scholars’ opinions represent a major risk to Islamic 
banking
Non-Sharia’a compliance could severely damage the reputation of an Islamic 
bank
AAOIFI and IFSB standards should be made mandatory for Islamic banks
Corporate governance is generally weak in Islamic banks
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(v) It can be generalised from the findings that Shari’ah principles carry natural 
inherent conservatism; 
(vi) It is important to state that despite the principles of Islamic finance, depositors 
seek competitive rates of return from IFIs; 
(vii) In addition to the risk categories identified in the previous section, displaced 
commercial risk and Shari’ah standardisation are obvious examples of 
additional challenges facing IFIs; 
(viii) As being a particular risk area for Islamic banking, Shari’ah-non-compliance 
risk could be a severe risk for IFIs. This is emphasised by the responses under 
Q 7; 
(ix) As the findings demonstrate, majority of respondents do not believe that 
AAOIFI and IFSB standards should be made mandatory for Islamic banks; 
(x) Importantly, the results also demonstrate that weak corporate governance is 
noticeable among IFIs. 
 
7.2.2.2 Gauging perceptions on capital adequacy for Islamic banks 
 
This section addresses capital adequacy issues facing IFIs as perceived by the 
participants. It tackles the research questions concerning whether Basel II and Basel III 
Accords were drafted with conventional banking model in mind, and also aims to identify 
the appropriate capital requirement levels for Islamic banks as perceived by the 
participants. 
 
As shown by Figure 7.4, the majority of respondents (59.7%) expressed their adherence 
to Basel II guidelines. Interestingly, 12.9% of the participants stated that their institution 
use IFSB standards on capital adequacy, and 6.9% stated that they use local standards 
imposed by the regulator (mainly Egyptian banks), which are highly likely to be derived 
mainly from Basel II guidelines. 
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Figure 7.4: Frequency Distribution of Capital Adequacy Standards Used by 
Respondents 
 
 
Among those implementing Basel II (43 respondents), the majority of the participants 
stated that their institution use the less sophisticated approaches to calculate credit, 
market, and operational risks due to their relatively limited size of operations and the 
absence of advanced IT systems, as summarised in Table 7.13. Conventional 
multinational banks use a combination of different approaches for different portfolios; 
however, the ‘Advanced’ techniques dominate. As the findings demonstrate, among IFIs, 
it is mainly the Islamic windows of big international banks that selected the ‘Advanced’ 
capital adequacy approaches as they make use of the infrastructure and systems available 
at their parent companies. 
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Table 7.13: Descriptive Statistics for Question 13: Capital Requirement 
Methodologies Used   
 
Notes: n = Number of responses; For multinational banks that use more than one methodology, the most 
advanced methodology is the one counted. 
 
 
The participants were asked to evaluate the capital requirements for Islamic and 
conventional banks. The responses to Question 14 in Figure 7.5 and Table 7.14 produced 
unexpected findings, as more than 65% of participants believe that capital requirements 
for IFIs should be higher than those of their conventional peers. This could be 
understood, as it stands today, that Islamic banking carries more risks and, hence, should 
have higher capital buffers in order to enable IFIs absorb unexpected losses. 
 
Figure 7.5 Evaluating Capital Requirements for Islamic Banks vs. Conventional 
Banks
 
 
n Percentage of Total
Credit Risk 
Standardised Approach    25 59.5%
Foundation  IRB 5 11.9%
Advanced IRB 12 28.6%
Total 42 100.0%
Market Risk
Standardised Approach    29 69.0%
Internal Models Approach 13 31.0%
Total 42 100.0%
Operational Risk 
Basic Indicator Approach    24 57.1%
Advanced Measurement Approach 18 42.9%
Total 42 100.0%
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Table 7.14: Evaluating Capital Requirements for Islamic Banks vs. Conventional 
Banks  
 
 
The participants’ opinions on Basel II and IFSB Capital Adequacy Standards were also 
questioned, as question 15 in the questionnaire asked respondents for their views on 
additional capital adequacy issues. This closed question provided five statements, and 
respondents were requested to express their preference in terms of how strongly they 
agree or disagree with each statement. The results, using the five-point Likert scale, are 
summarized below. The frequency results for the whole sample are summarized by 
Figure 7.6, while Table 7.15 which breaks down the findings for Islamic bankers and 
non-Islamic bankers (including Islamic subsidiaries, conventional banks, and others) and 
ranks the importance of statements according to their mean values.  
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Figure 7.6: Perceptions About Capital Adequacy Standards 
 
 
Table 7.15: Breakdown of Perceptions About Capital Adequacy Standards 
  
Notes: n = Number of responses; Scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 = Disagree (D), 3 = Neutral (N), 4 = 
Agree (A), 5 = Strongly Agree (SA) 
Basel II standards should be equally applied to Islamic banks without 
modification
IFSB  standard on Capital Adequacy should be used by Islamic banks 
rather than Basel II
Basel II standards should be reviewed after failing to prevent the 
current crisis
The proposed Basel III rules would be easily applicable to Islamic 
banks
Stricter capital, leverage, and liquidity rules, as proposed under Basel 
III, are likely to prevent another financial crisis
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Fully-fledged Islamic Banks
Statement SA A N D SD n Mean Median Mode Chi-square
Basel II standards should be reviewed after failing to 
prevent the current crisis 40.0% 48.0% 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25 4.28 4 4 0.00
IFSB  standard on Capital Adequacy should be used by 
Islamic banks rather than Basel II 24.0% 12.0% 44.0% 16.0% 4.0% 25 3.36 3 3 0.02
Stricter capital, leverage, and liquidity rules, as proposed 
under Basel III, are likely to prevent another financial 
crisis. 4.0% 20.0% 48.0% 24.0% 4.0% 25 2.96 3 3 0.00
Basel II standards should be equally applied to Islamic 
banks without modification 4.0% 32.0% 20.0% 32.0% 12.0% 25 2.84 3 2 0.11
The proposed Basel III rules would be easily applicable 
to Islamic banks 0.0% 8.0% 48.0% 36.0% 8.0% 25 2.56 3 3 0.00
Non-Islamic Bankers (including Islamic subsidiaries and conventional banks) 
Statement SA A N D SD n Mean Median Mode Chi-square
Basel II standards should be reviewed after failing to 
prevent the current crisis 36.2% 51.1% 12.8% 0.0% 0.0% 47 4.23 4 4 0.00
Basel II standards should be equally applied to Islamic 
banks without modification 21.3% 25.5% 25.5% 23.4% 4.3% 47 3.36 3 3 0.11
IFSB  standard on Capital Adequacy should be used by 
Islamic banks rather than Basel II 21.3% 14.9% 36.2% 21.3% 6.4% 47 3.23 3 3 0.02
The proposed Basel III rules would be easily applicable 
to Islamic banks 0.0% 6.4% 74.5% 10.6% 8.5% 47 2.79 3 3 0.00
Stricter capital, leverage, and liquidity rules, as proposed 
under Basel III, are likely to prevent another financial 
crisis. 2.1% 6.4% 57.4% 31.9% 2.1% 47 2.74 3 3 0.00
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From Table 7.15 and Figure 7.6, the following generalisation can be made:  
(i) On aggregate level, the majority of respondents had ‘No’ views about the new Basel 
III standards and their effects on Islamic banking and financial stability in general.  This 
shows that there is still lack of clarity about Basel III and its potential impacts. Around 
one third of respondents do not believe that the new standards, with its stricter capital, 
leverage, and liquidity rules, are likely to prevent another financial crisis. Almost the 
same percentage of respondents does not think that Basel III standards will be easily 
applicable to IFIs. The break down between Islamic and non-Islamic bankers reveals the 
same pattern.  
(ii)  A similar pattern exists between the two groups regarding their views about the 
failings of Basel II to prevent the recent crisis. The majority of respondents support this 
view with zero responses ‘D’ or ‘SD’ with the need to review Basel II standards.   
(iii) While most non-Islamic bankers (46.8%) believe that Basel II standards should be 
equally applied to IFIs without modification, most Islamic banker support the opposite 
(44%). On aggregate level no consensus pattern is obvious, with the ‘SA’ and ‘A’ side 
scoring slightly higher than ‘D’ and ‘SD’ side. 
(iv) A Similar pattern exists between views of the two groups regarding the use of IFSB 
standards by IFIs with the majority favouring the ‘SA’ and ‘A’ side to ‘D’ and ‘SD’ side. 
(v) As shown in Table 7.15, Islamic and non-Islamic bankers rank the statements 
differently. This divergence in the mean rankings reflects differences in risk perceptions.  
  
It should be noted that these findings are supported by the Chi-square values as depicted 
in Table 7.15, which indicate that the data for all statements, but one, represent a good fit 
at the 5% level.  
 
7.2.2.3 Credit crisis and Islamic banks 
 
This last section of Part Two of the questionnaire aimed to reveal the respondents’ views 
on different issues relating to the current global crisis. This closed question provided nine 
statements and respondents were requested to express their opinion in terms of how 
strongly they agree or disagree with each statement. The frequency results for the entire 
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sample are summarized by Figure 7.7, while Table 7.16 breaks down the findings for 
Islamic bankers and non-Islamic bankers (including Islamic subsidiaries, conventional 
banks, and others), and ranks the importance of statements according to their mean 
values.  
 
Figure 7.7: Perceptions on Islamic Banking and the Global Financial Crisis 
 
The findings in Figure 7.7 and Table 7.16 can be generalised as follows: 
 
As can be seen from the responses, both groups support the view that IFIs are more 
resilient to economic shock than their conventional peers. 72 % of Islamic banker ranked 
this statement either ‘SA’ or ‘A’, while 40% of non-Islamic bankers are either ‘SA’ or 
‘A’. 
In addition, on aggregate level more than 66% of respondents support the view that the 
current crisis would not have happened under a true Islamic banking system. This was 
further emphasized by 34.7% who believe that Islamic finance can solve the global crisis. 
A break down between the two groups shows varying patterns: 76% of Islamic bankers as 
Islamic banks are more resilient to economic shocks than their conventional  
peers
The recent crisis would not have happened under a true Islamic banking 
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Islamic finance can solve the global crisis
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5.6%
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the total of ‘Strongly Agree’ or ‘Agree’ stated that the crisis would not have happened 
under a true Islamic banking system, a view shared by circa 61% of non-Islamic bankers. 
However, while the majority of the former support the view that Islamic finance can 
solve the global crisis; the majority of non-bankers decline this view. 
 
Table 7.16: Perceptions on Islamic Banking and the Financial Crisis 
  
Notes: n = Number of responses; Scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 = Disagree (D), 3 = Neutral (N), 4 = 
Agree (A), 5 = Strongly Agree (SA) 
Total Sample
Statement SA A N D SD n Mean Median Mode Chi-square
Risk management must be embedded institutionally 48.6% 30.6% 20.8% 0.0% 0.0% 72 4.28 4 5 0.00
Consolidation is needed among smaller Islamic banks 43.1% 26.4% 27.8% 2.8% 0.0% 72 4.10 4 5 0.00
Banks in general  used to rely heavily on rating agencies 26.4% 30.6% 34.7% 5.6% 2.8% 72 3.72 4 3 0.00
The recent crisis would not have happened under a true Islamic 
banking system
25.0% 41.7% 16.7% 11.1% 5.6% 72 3.69 4 4 0.00
Islamic banks will emerge stronger from the current crisis 15.3% 50.0% 19.4% 9.7% 5.6% 72 3.60 4 4 0.00
Islamic banks are more resilient to economic shocks than their 
conventional  peers
25.0% 26.4% 26.4% 16.7% 5.6% 72 3.49 4 4 0.00
Islamic banks rely less on rating agencies than conventional banks 8.3% 25.0% 43.1% 20.8% 2.8% 72 3.15 3 3 0.00
Islamic finance could have solved the global crisis 9.7% 25.0% 37.5% 18.1% 9.7% 72 3.07 3 3 0.00
Islamic finance industry should develop its own rating agencies 12.5% 20.8% 29.2% 23.6% 13.9% 72 2.94 3 3 0.00
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks
Statement SA A N D SD n Mean Median Mode Chi-square
Risk management must be embedded institutionally 32.0% 40.0% 28.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25 4.04 4 4 0.00
Banks in general  used to rely heavily on rating agencies 28.0% 48.0% 20.0% 4.0% 0.0% 25 4.00 4 4 0.00
Islamic banks are more resilient to economic shocks than their 
conventional  peers
40.0% 32.0% 8.0% 20.0% 0.0% 25 3.92 4 5 0.01
The recent crisis would not have happened under a true Islamic 
banking system
20.0% 56.0% 16.0% 8.0% 0.0% 25 3.88 4 4 0.00
Consolidation is needed among smaller Islamic banks 28.0% 36.0% 32.0% 4.0% 0.0% 25 3.88 4 4 0.01
Islamic banks will emerge stronger from the current crisis 24.0% 32.0% 36.0% 8.0% 0.0% 25 3.72 4 3 0.02
Islamic finance can solve the global crisis 16.0% 40.0% 32.0% 12.0% 0.0% 25 3.60 4 4 0.01
Islamic banks rely less on rating agencies than conventional banks 12.0% 20.0% 24.0% 36.0% 8.0% 25 2.92 3 2 0.20
Islamic finance industry should develop its own rating agencies 20.0% 12.0% 24.0% 28.0% 16.0% 25 2.92 3 2 0.74
Non-Islamic Bankers (including Islamic subsidiaries, conventional banks, and others) 
Statement SA A N D SD n Mean Median Mode Chi-square
Risk management must be embedded institutionally 57.4% 25.5% 17.0% 0.0% 0.0% 47 4.40 5 5 0.00
Consolidation is needed among smaller Islamic banks 51.1% 21.3% 25.5% 2.1% 0.0% 47 4.21 5 5 0.00
The recent crisis would not have happened under a true Islamic 
banking system
27.7% 34.0% 17.0% 12.8% 8.5% 47 3.60 4 4 0.03
Banks in general  used to rely heavily on rating agencies 25.5% 21.3% 42.6% 6.4% 4.3% 47 3.57 3 3 0.00
Islamic banks will emerge stronger from the current crisis 10.6% 59.6% 10.6% 10.6% 8.5% 47 3.53 4 4 0.00
Islamic banks rely less on rating agencies than conventional banks 6.4% 27.7% 53.2% 12.8% 0.0% 47 3.28 3 3 0.00
Islamic banks are more resilient to economic shocks than their 
conventional  peers 17.0% 23.4% 36.2% 14.9% 8.5% 47 3.26 4 4 0.04
Islamic finance industry should develop its own rating agencies 8.5% 25.5% 31.9% 21.3% 12.8% 47 2.96 3 3 0.08
Islamic finance can solve the global crisis 6.4% 17.0% 40.4% 21.3% 14.9% 47 2.79 3 3 0.00
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Furthermore, most respondents (56.9%) agree that banks in general heavily relied on 
rating agencies. The same view is shared among the Islamic and non-Islamic bankers. In 
aggregate, there was no consensus whether Islamic banks rely less or more on rating 
agencies than conventional banks; however, surprisingly enough, more non-Islamic 
bankers believe that IFIs rely less on rating agencies than Islamic bankers, whose 
majority declined such a view. 
 
Moreover, some respondents believe that conventional rating agencies do not fully 
understand and appreciate certain aspects of Islamic financial institutions, principally the 
fiduciary aspect, and that conventional rating methodologies do not recognise the need 
for a different approach to capital adequacy calculation and accounting standards. 
However, there is no consensus whether the Islamic finance industry needs to develop its 
own rating agencies either on the aggregate level or by the non-Islamic bankers. The 
majority of Islamic bankers did not support such a view (44%). Although there are some 
important differences between Islamic and conventional banks that must be properly 
understood and considered, these can be incorporated within the existing rating 
frameworks. 
 
The results also demonstrate that more than 69% of respondents support consolidation 
among smaller Islamic banks; as the prevailing opinion state that there are far too many 
Islamic banks to serve this growing market, but only a handful have the size necessary to 
compete on a global stage. Same pattern could be traced on break down of findings 
among the two groups. 
 
Lastly, the findings in Table 7.16 and Figure 7.7 show that, on aggregate level, most 
respondents agreed that Islamic banks will emerge stronger from the current crisis as they 
provide an ethical banking alternative (65.3%). A similar pattern exists between the two 
groups as 56% of Islamic bankers and 70.2% of non-Islamic bankers support the view 
that Islamic banks will emerge stronger from the crisis.  
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7.2.3 Perceptions on Risk Management and Mitigation 
 
The third part of the questionnaire aims to examine the risk management and hedging 
techniques used within individual Islamic banks. Risk mitigation has recently come under 
spot lights within Islamic banking in particular with the emergence of a number of 
defaults in the Gulf region. Traditionally, the unique nature of risks faced by Islamic 
banks, combined with the restrictions added by Shari’ah, makes risk mitigation for 
Islamic banks a difficult and complex process. There are risks that Islamic banks, similar 
to their conventional counterparts, can manage and control through appropriate risk 
policies, controls, and traditional risk management tools. However, there are other risks 
that banks cannot eliminate and can only be reduced or moderated by transferring or 
selling those risks in well-defined markets. The challenge is, however, that most of the 
conventional hedging tools do not so far comply with the Shari’ah requirements, which 
limits the available tools of risk management for Islamic banks. 
 
7.2.3.1 Risk management and reporting 
 
The first part in this section aims to depict the findings related to risk management 
reporting used by the institutions of the participants.  Table 7.17 shows the different risk 
management reports that participating banks produce and the frequency of publishing 
those reports, while Table 7.18 shows the frequency distribution of the findings among 
Islamic and conventional banks (including Islamic subsidiaries). 
 
As depicted by Table 7.17, the most widely used reports in general are capital 
requirement, liquidity risk, and credit exposure reports, followed by industry 
concentration risk and profit rate risk reports. Commodity risk report is the least used 
with 29% of respondents indicating it is not used. Some institutions produce other 
specific reports not listed in the questionnaire like market risk report (10%), stress testing 
report (5%), counterparty concentration report (7%), and collateral management report 
(3%).  
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Table 7.17: Risk Management Reports – Market Practice 
 
In terms of frequency of producing these reports, credit exposure report is the most 
produced daily report, followed by liquidity risk report, and profit rate risk report. 
Classified accounts report is the least produced daily report (27%) as banks tend to 
produce it on monthly basis. As the findings show, 31 institutions indicate that they 
produce industry concentration risk report on monthly basis, followed by classified 
accounts report (47%) and operational risk report (37% respondents). A small number of 
respondents indicated that they produce some reports annually. Finally, few respondents 
indicated that they do not know the frequency of reports’ production; this is because these 
respondents work in non-risk management rules like traders and financial officers. 
 
The analysis in Table 7.18 in a comparative manner shows that IFIs use the same risk 
management techniques as conventional banks for managing the risks, in particular 
liquidity, credit, and market risks. Nevertheless, the spread and frequency of utilising 
these techniques is lower among Islamic banks compared to their conventional peers. 
Generally, IFIs still use less technically advanced risk measurement approaches as they 
are still in the emerging phase and do not have sufficient resources and systems to use 
more technically advanced techniques. The most widely used report among IFIs on daily 
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basis is liquidity risk report, followed by credit exposure report and profit rate risk report. 
Commodity risk and equity mark-to-market reports are the least used by IFIs in this 
survey.  
 
Table 7.18: Risk Management Reports – Islamic vs. Conventional Banks 
  
7.2.3.2 Risk measurement  
 
In addition to risk management reports, financial institutions use various techniques to 
measure and analyse risks. Table 7.19 exhibits different techniques used to measure and 
assess risks. There may be a variety of formats in which these techniques can be used, 
ranging from simple analysis to sophisticated models. The most common technique used 
Fully- fledged Islamic Banks
Report Daily Weekly Monthly Yearly Never Don’t know Total Responses
Capital requirement report 36% 24% 36% -      -      4% 100%
Operational risk report 32% 8% 44% 4% -      4% 92%
Profit rate risk report 48% 8% 36% -      -      4% 96%
Foreign exchange risk report 28% 24% 32% -      -      8% 92%
Liquidity risk report 52% 36% 12% -      -      -            100%
Commodity risk report 8% -           20% -      68% 4% 100%
Country risk report 28% 32% 40% -      -      -            100%
Equity mark-to-market report 16% 12% 36% 12% 12% 12% 100%
Classified accounts report -         4% 48% 40% -      -            96%
Industry concentration risk report 16% -           76% 4% -      -            96%
Credit exposure report 48% 8% 44% -      -      -            100%
Large exposure report 28% -           56% -      8% 8% 100%
Other risk reports                     0%
Market Risk 4% -           4% -      -      -            8%
Stress Testing -         -           8% -      -      -            8%
Counterparty Concentration 4% -           4% -      -      -            8%
Collateral Management 4% -           -            -      -      -            4%
Conventional banks (including Islamic subsidiaries) 
Report Daily Weekly Monthly Yearly Never Don’t know Total Responses
Capital requirement report 50% 24% 26% -      -      -            100%
Operational risk report 41% 24% 32% -      -      3% 100%
Profit rate risk report 62% 12% 24% -      -      3% 100%
Foreign exchange risk report 53% 18% 26% -      -      -            97%
Liquidity risk report 68% 18% 15% -      -      -            100%
Commodity risk report 62% 9% 26% -      -      3% 100%
Country risk report 74% 6% 21% -      -      -            100%
Equity mark-to-market report 76% 12% 12% -      -      -            100%
Classified accounts report 47% 3% 47% -      -      -            97%
Industry concentration risk report 62% 0% 35% -      -      3% 100%
Credit exposure report 82% 0% 18% -      -      -            100%
Large exposure report 79% 0% 18% -      -      -            97%
Other risk reports                     
Market Risk 6% -           6% -      -      -            12%
Stress Testing -           3% -      -      -            3%
Counterparty Concentration 3% -           3% -      -      -            6%
Collateral Management 3% -           -            -      -      -            3%
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by IFIs as indicated by respondents is maturity matching analysis (88%), followed by 
reliance on external ratings provided by rating agencies (84%), internal based rating and 
Gap analysis (76% each). Only 56% indicated they use VAR models, while Simulation 
techniques are used by just 6 IFIs in the sample to assess different risks.  
 
Comparing these figures to the responses by conventional bankers emphasises the fact 
that risk management techniques in Islamic banking are not as sophisticated as in the 
conventional banking world. The most common technique used by conventional banks is 
external ratings provided by rating agencies (94.1%), followed by maturity matching 
analysis (91.2%), internal based rating (88.2%), and duration analysis (85.3%). 
 
Moreover, the results for this question confirm those obtained by Q11 as reported in the 
preceding section. As discussed in Section 7.2.2.1.3, more than 65% of respondents either 
Agree or Strongly Agree that risk management for IFIs is more challenging as compared 
to the conventional banks. In addition, around 57% of respondents believe that risk 
management for IFIs should not use the same tools as conventional banks.   
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Table 7.19: Risk Measurement Techniques 
 
 
Notes: a) Question 18 is only applicable to respondents in the banking field, whether Islamic or 
conventional; b) Conventional banks include Islamic subsidiaries. 
 
 
7.2.3.3 Risk mitigation 
 
A comparative analysis was conducted on risk mitigation between Islamic and 
conventional banks. As can be seen in Figure 7.8., 72.2% of respondents believe that risk 
mitigation techniques in Islamic banking are less advanced than conventional banking 
(Figure 7.8). Table 7.20 provides detailed analysis of the findings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Responses Percentage Total Responses Percentage 
Internal based ratings 19 76.0% 30 88.2%
Credit ratings by rating agencies 21 84.0% 32 94.1%
Gap analysis 19 76.0% 28 82.4%
Duration analysis 17 68.0% 29 85.3%
Maturity matching analysis 22 88.0% 31 91.2%
Earnings at risk 11 44.0% 27 79.4%
Value at risk 14 56.0% 23 67.6%
Stress testing 15 60.0% 22 64.7%
Simulation techniques 6 24.0% 16 47.1%
Risk Adjusted Rate of Return on Capital (RAROC) 8 32.0% 26 76.5%
Others                                  
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks Conventional Banks
Risk Management Technique 
Ranking Fully-fledged Islamic Banks Conventional Banks
1 Maturity matching analysis Credit ratings by rating agencies
2 Credit ratings by rating agencies Maturity matching analysis
3 Internal based ratings Internal based ratings
4 Gap analysis Duration analysis
5 Duration analysis Gap analysis
6 Stress testing Earnings at risk
7 Value at risk RAROC
8 Earnings at risk Value at risk
9 RAROC Stress testing
10 Simulation techniques Simulation techniques
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Figure 7.8: Risk Mitigation in Islamic Banking vs. Conventional Banking 
 
 
Table 7.20: Risk Mitigation in Islamic Banking 
 
 
The results depicted in Table 7.20 can be summarised as follows: 
 
(i) The majority of respondents (72.2%) believe that risk mitigation in Islamic 
banking is less advanced than conventional banking. The main responses came 
from fully-fledged Islamic banks in the GCC (12.5%), followed by conventional 
banks in Other Middle East (9.7%) and Islamic subsidiaries in the GCC (6.9%); 
32%
1%
1%
13%
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19%
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6%
8%
6%
4%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Less Advanced
Similar
More Advanced
Don’t know
Fully-fledged Islamic Bank
Conventional Bank with Islamic activities/ 
Windows
Conventional Bank
Others
Region Fully-fledged Islamic Bank Conventional Bank Conventional Bank with Islamic activities Others Total
Don’t know Europe 0.0% 2.8% 2.8% 1.4% 6.9%
GCC 0.0% 2.8% 1.4% 1.4% 5.6%
Other Middle East 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 2.8%
Less Advanced Americas 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 1.4% 2.8%
Europe 6.9% 6.9% 5.6% 1.4% 20.8%
GCC 12.5% 1.4% 6.9% 1.4% 22.2%
Other 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 4.2%
Other Middle East 5.6% 9.7% 0.0% 1.4% 16.7%
Southeast Asia 4.2% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 5.6%
Similar Americas 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 1.4% 2.8%
Europe 0.0% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 4.2%
GCC 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 1.4% 2.8%
Southeast Asia 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 2.8%
Total 34.7% 27.8% 19.4% 18.1% 100%
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(ii) 15.3% of the respondents indicated that they ‘Don’t know’ whether risk 
mitigation techniques in Islamic banking are more or less advanced than those 
used is conventional banking. Within this category, conventional banks in 
Europe, conventional banks in the GCC, and Islamic subsidiaries in Europe had 
the main responses with 2.8% of total responses each; 
(iii)  12.5% of respondents believe that risk mitigation techniques are similar in 
Islamic and conventional banking. The main responses in this category came 
from Europe (4.2%), followed by Americas, GCC, and Southeast Asia with 1.4% 
each;  
(iv)  No respondents believe that risk mitigation techniques are more advanced in 
Islamic banking than in conventional banking. 
 
In searching for risk and risk management attitudes in Islamic banks, the participants 
were also asked to express their opinions on risk mitigation techniques. These results 
obtained from Question 19 were confirmed by the poor responses for Question 20 about 
the techniques IFIs use to mitigate their risks as summarised in Table 7.21.  
 
This question is only applicable to fully-fledged Islamic banks and Islamic subsidiaries of 
conventional banks as the listed risk mitigation techniques are all Shari’ah-compliant. As 
summarised in Table 7.21, collateral arrangements is the most commonly used technique 
(92.3%), followed by Islamic currency forwards (82.1%), guarantees (76.9%). Dual 
currency murabahah represented under ‘Others’ is the least used risk mitigation 
techniques at 2.6% of responses. 
 
Table 7.21: Risk Mitigation Techniques  
 
Notes: Question 20 is applicable only to Islamic banks & conventional banks with Islamic activities. Total 
sample for this question = 39 respondents. 
Risk Mitigation Technique Total Responses Percentage of Total Sample 
On-balance sheet netting 25 64.1%
Collateral arrangements 36 92.3%
Islamic options 10 25.6%
Islamic swaps 14 35.9%
Guarantees 30 76.9%
Islamic currency forwards 32 82.1%
Parallel contracts 12 30.8%
Other (Please Specify)                                        1 2.6%
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The reasons for the lack of usage of Shari’ah-compliant risk mitigation techniques may 
be because those techniques are subject to different interpretation by Shari’ah scholars. 
Other reasons may include that, as previously indicated in Table 7.8 (section 7.2.2.1), 
salam and istisna’a contracts are not widely used in IFIs. As explained in Chapter 3, 
there have been substantial efforts in developing Shari’ah-compliant hedging 
instruments; however, much of this progress remains localised with limited scope for 
cross-border application and further work is still needed. 
 
7.2.4 Evaluating the Practice of Islamic Banking  
 
This last section aims to analyse the opinions and the evaluation of the participants on the 
practice of Islamic banking. One of the main statements considered in this section is the 
proposition that Islamic banking has been diverting from its roots by mimicking 
conventional banks. In doing so, Question 21, a closed question, provided four 
statements, and respondents were requested to express their preference in terms of how 
strongly they agree or disagree with each statement. The frequency results for the entire 
sample are summarized by Figure 7.9, while Table 7.22 breaks down the findings 
between Islamic bankers and non-Islamic bankers (including Islamic subsidiaries, 
conventional banks, and others), and ranks the importance of statements according to 
their mean values.  
 
As can be seen from the findings depicted in Table 7.22 and Figure 7.9, on both 
aggregate and individual levels, the majority of respondents either ‘Strongly Agree’ or 
‘Agree’ with the four statements. Although Islamic finance provides an ethical banking 
alternative, IFIs need to reform before they can exploit the ethical foundation in the 
Islamic banking model. The responses between Islamic bankers and non-Islamic bankers 
were close, with the former’s responses being closer to ‘SA’ than the latter. These 
findings are supported by the significant results of the Chi-square test (p <1%). However, 
the mean rankings for the responses of Islamic bankers are higher than those of non-
Islamic bankers across all statements, reflecting higher risk perceptions. 
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Figure 7.9: Frequency Distribution for Question 21 - Current Practices in Islamic 
Banking
 
 
Table 7.22: Breakdown of Perceptions About Current Practices in Islamic Banking 
  
Notes: n = Number of responses; Scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 = Disagree (D), 3 = Neutral (N), 4 = 
Agree (A), 5 = Strongly Agree (SA) 
Islamic banks have been mimicking conventional models.
Islamic finance provides an ethical banking alternative. 
There is a difference between the current practice and principles of 
Islamic banking. 
Islamic banks need to reform to be successful.
25.0%
27.8%
33.3%
31.9%
40.3%
27.8%
33.3%
29.2%
27.8%
41.7%
31.9%
34.7%
6.9%
2.8%
1.4%
4.2%
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
72 Respondents
Total Sample
Statement SA A N D SD n Mean Median Mode Chi-square
There is difference between the current practice and 
principles of Islamic banking. 
33.3% 33.3% 31.9% 1.4% 0.0% 72 3.99 4 4 0.00
Islamic banks need to reform to be successful. 31.9% 29.2% 34.7% 4.2% 0.0% 72 3.89 4 3 0.00
Islamic banks have been mimicking conventional 
models.
25.0% 40.3% 27.8% 6.9% 0.0% 72 3.83 4 5 0.00
Islamic finance provides an ethical banking alternative. 27.8% 27.8% 41.7% 2.8% 0.0% 72 3.81 4 3 0.00
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks
Statement SA A N D SD n Mean Median Mode Chi-square
There is difference between the current practice and 
principles of Islamic banking. 
44.0% 32.0% 20.0% 4.0% 0.0% 25 4.16 4 4 0.01
Islamic finance provides an ethical banking alternative. 
44.0% 20.0% 36.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25 4.08 4 5 0.00
Islamic banks need to reform to be successful. 28.0% 40.0% 28.0% 4.0% 0.0% 25 3.92 4 4 0.01
Islamic banks have been mimicking conventional 
models.
28.0% 44.0% 16.0% 12.0% 0.0% 25 3.88 4 5 0.00
Non-Islamic Bankers (including Islamic subsidiaries, conventional banks, and others) 
Statement SA A N D SD n Mean Median Mode Chi-square
There is difference between the current practice and 
principles of Islamic banking. 
27.7% 34.0% 38.3% 0.0% 0.0% 47 3.89 4 4 0.00
Islamic banks need to reform to be successful. 34.0% 23.4% 38.3% 4.3% 0.0% 47 3.87 4 3 0.00
Islamic banks have been mimicking conventional 
models.
23.4% 38.3% 34.0% 4.3% 0.0% 47 3.81 4 3 0.00
Islamic finance provides an ethical banking alternative. 19.1% 31.9% 44.7% 4.3% 0.0% 47 3.66 4 3 0.00
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7.2.5 The Future of Islamic Banking 
 
The last section of the questionnaire includes a forward-looking question that explores 
different strategies IFIs should follow in order to prepare for the future. The participants 
were provided a number of statements and were asked to express their opinions. The 
results related to the growth strategies for IFIs are presented in Table 7.23. 
 
Table 7.23: Growth Strategies for IFIs 
  
Total Sample
Strategy n Mean Median Mode Chi-square
Improved risk management 72 6.75 2 1 0.0
Better risk mitigation 72 6.33 2 2 0.0
Enhanced morality – Back to roots 72 5.72 3 5 0.0
Diversification – reduce concentration 72 5.24 3 3 0.0
Innovation 72 3.26 6 8 0.0
Standardization 72 3.14 7 7 0.0
Mergers and Acquisitions 72 3.08 6 6 0.0
Organic growth in home market 72 2.49 7 8 0.0
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks
Strategy n Mean Median Mode Chi-square
Improved risk management 25 6.64 2 1 0.0
Enhanced morality – Back to roots 25 5.96 3 1 0.1
Better risk mitigation 25 5.88 3 4 0.0
Diversification – reduce concentration 25 4.44 4 8 1.0
Innovation 25 3.72 5 6 0.3
Mergers and Acquisitions 25 3.32 6 6 0.1
Organic growth in home market 25 3.16 7 8 0.1
Standardization 25 2.88 7 7 0.0
Non-Islamic Bankers (including Islamic subsidiaries, conventional banks, and others) 
Strategy n Mean Median Mode Chi-square
Improved risk management 47 6.81 2 1 0.0
Better risk mitigation 47 6.57 2 2 0.0
Diversification – reduce concentration 47 5.66 3 3 0.0
Enhanced morality – Back to roots 47 5.60 4 5 0.0
Standardization 47 3.28 6 8 0.0
Innovation 47 3.02 6 8 0.0
Mergers and Acquisitions 47 2.96 6 6 0.0
Organic growth in home market 47 2.13 7 8 0.0
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Table 7.23 reveals that both Islamic and non-Islamic bankers (including Islamic 
subsidiaries, conventional banks, and others) consider improved risk management and 
mitigation practices among the top priorities IFIs should focus on in their development 
plans. While Islamic bankers ranked ‘Enhanced morality – Back to roots’ second (mean= 
5.96), non-Islamic bankers ranked it in the fourth place (mean = 5.60). ‘Diversification’ 
was highly ranked by both groups, while mergers and acquisitions, and organic growth in 
home market received lower ranking. Non-Islamic bankers ranked ‘Standardisation’ 
higher than Islamic bankers.  
 
These findings are supported by the significant results of the Chi-square test for most 
strategies. In addition, Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient shows that the at 5% 
significance level the rankings of the two groups are correlated (ρ= 0.9405>0.643) as 
depicted in Table 7.24.  
 
Table 7.24: Correlation Between Perceptions of Islamic and Conventional Banks 
About Growth Strategies for IFIs 
  
7.3 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter is the first empirical analysis chapter of the quantitative data assembled 
through survey questionnaire where mainly descriptive statistics were applied to the 
primary data. Frequency distribution is among the descriptive statistics used, in addition 
to Spearman’s correlation coefficient test and Chi-square test. The analyses produced 
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results on different aspects of risk management in Islamic banking, which are 
summarized and explained in the context of the research objectives.  
 
The findings in this chapter show that, although IFIs face additional risks to those faced 
by conventional financial institutions, both Islamic and conventional bankers have similar 
perceptions about risk management in Islamic banking. Liquidity, ALM, and 
concentration risk were among the top risks identified by both groups. Moreover, profit-
sharing modes of financing and product-deferred sales are perceived to be more risky 
than murabahah, wakalah and ijarah. This explains why IFIs shy away from such 
instruments due to their lack of appetite for risky assets, which in turn is due to IFIs 
trying to emulate the conventional model. The manipulation of the contracts by Islamic 
finance practitioners, in order to mimic conventional products, made the risk perception 
of equity and risk sharing contracts, for instance wakalah, similar to risk perception of 
fixed income contracts like murabahah. This manipulation made the contracts behave 
differently and created a gap in risk perceptions.  
 
The findings also indicate that, although IFIs are doing comparatively well in terms of 
their general risk management and reporting, they are still perceived as using less 
advanced risk management approaches. Shari’ah-compatible risk mitigation techniques 
are also not widely used by IFIs. Developing Shari’ah-compliant risk mitigation and 
hedging tools, in addition to improving risk management and reporting practices, 
represent a serious challenge to Islamic banking in order to lift itself to the next level. 
Most IFIs use Basel II capital adequacy standards, with greater use of basic and 
standardised approaches rather than advanced models. This is due to the relative 
simplicity of their capital requirements. The majority of respondents perceived that Basel 
II could be applied to IFIs, but with a few amendments. 
 
It is interesting to note that both Islamic and non-Islamic bankers share the view that, 
although IFIs have shown resilience, they are not immune from economic shocks. 
Broadly speaking, Islamic banking had a relatively ‘mild crisis’ in that it suffered less 
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damage as a result of the global economic and financial turmoil of the past few years than 
conventional banking. 
 
Empirical evidence shows that Islamic banking is expected to emerge stronger from the 
crisis, provided some conditions are met, such as: ‘further innovation’, ‘enhanced 
transparency’, ‘more robust risk-management architecture and culture’, and above all, 
‘enhanced Shari’ah-compliance’.  
 
After providing some descriptive analysis of the general characteristics of the sample, 
and examining the research questions and hypotheses, the findings of this chapter will be 
further analysed by the inferential statistical analysis in Chapter 8, which studies the 
attitudes of the respondents by providing a comparative analysis between several 
identified groups or respondents’ categories. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ANALYSING PERCEPTIONS ON RISK AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
DIMENSIONS AND ISSUES: INFERENTIAL STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is a continuation of the previous chapter in analysing the quantitative data 
represented by the survey questionnaire. In this chapter inferential statistics are employed 
for exploring and analysing the opinions and attitudes of the respondents by providing a 
comparative analysis between several identified groups or respondents‟ categories. In 
addition, the chapter considers some determinants and factors which contribute to the 
perception and knowledge of the respondents concerning risk management in Islamic 
banking. 
 
As mentioned earlier in the research methodology chapter, the analysis in the present 
chapter employs several inferential statistics tools for non-parametric data analysis, 
ranging from cross-tabulation, Friedman test, Kruskall-Wallis test, Chi-square tests to 
factor analysis and MANOVA multivariate analysis of variance. Each of these statistical 
analyses will be used in the relevant section of the chapter; a brief description of it will be 
presented prior to its application, and the result will subsequently be interpreted. The 
chapter is divided into six broad sections in line with the main parts of the questionnaire 
and in accordance to the thematic division used in the interview analysis in the following 
chapter. Each section is developed to find satisfactory answers to one or more of the main 
research questions and their sub-questions as previously explained in the thesis. This 
chapter concludes with a brief summary of the overall analysis and findings. 
 
It should be noted that in order to avoid details, various analyses were brought together 
under one table to consolidate the analysis in a concise manner. 
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8.2 RISK PERCEPTION 
 
It is highly expected that the respondents have different risk perceptions and 
understanding of risk management in Islamic banking according to their background, 
region, position within the organisation, nature of the FI, and other control variables. 
Therefore, this section analyses the respondents‟ opinions according to the selected 
category of the respondents‟ profile. 
 
8.2.1 Risk Issues in Islamic Banks 
8.2.1.1 Overall risks faced by Islamic banks 
 
The first factor to be examined is the respondents‟ perceptions about the severity of risk 
facing IFIs. Descriptive statistics for Q7, in Chapter 7, showed that Islamic and 
conventional bankers share similar views about the top risks facing IFIs, unlike non-
bankers who adopted a more theoretical approach in their views. This section will 
investigate further to examine the difference in perceptions among different subgroups of 
respondents. For this purpose, the researcher has employed the Kruskall-Wallis (K-W) 
tests for „region‟, „country‟, „respondent‟s position‟, „nature of FI‟, „nature of activities‟ 
and „accounting standards‟. 
 
The first control variable is „region‟. The results from the K-W test for the entire research 
sample in Table 8.1 indicate that there is no statistically significant difference among 
various regions in the risk perception (P value >0.05) except for Corporate Governance 
Risk (P value = 0.002), , which is also evident from the mean ranking. With a 
“relaxation” of the confidence level to 0.06, we can accept Displaced Commercial Risk as 
significant as well. 
 
Table 8.1 – K-W Test Results by Region for Question 7 (Entire Research Sample) 
Risk Region N 
K-W Test 
Mean Rank 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Credit Risk                     
Americas 2 54 6.05 0.301 
Europe 31 32.19     
GCC 19 40.13     
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Other 2 22.25     
Other Middle East 14 37.54     
Southeast Asia 4 47.38     
Total 72       
Market Risk 
Americas 2 63 10.568 0.061 
Europe 30 41     
GCC 19 29     
Other 2 31.75     
Other Middle East 14 36.04     
Southeast Asia 4 20.25     
Total 71       
Operational 
Risk 
Americas 2 38 4.496 0.48 
Europe 31 35.58     
GCC 19 41.68     
Other 2 37.75     
Other Middle East 14 28.39     
Southeast Asia 4 46     
Total 72       
Equity 
Investment 
Risk 
Americas 2 63 10.34 0.066 
Europe 31 40.37     
GCC 19 36.29     
Other 2 48     
Other Middle East 14 27     
Southeast Asia 4 21.75     
Total 72       
Liquidity Risk  
Americas 2 23 5.89 0.317 
Europe 31 39.42     
GCC 19 38.18     
Other 2 43.25     
Other Middle East 14 26.79     
Southeast Asia 4 43.25     
Total 72       
Asset-Liability 
Management 
Risk 
Americas 2 24.5 3.482 0.626 
Europe 31 39.53     
GCC 19 37.39     
Other 2 32.5     
Other Middle East 14 29.57     
Southeast Asia 4 41     
Total 72       
Displaced 
Commercial 
Risk  
Americas 2 36 11.002 0.051 
Europe 29 28.64     
GCC 19 45.79     
Other 2 49.5     
Other Middle East 13 34.04     
Southeast Asia 4 25.25     
Total 69       
Shari’ah-Non-
Compliance 
Risk 
Americas 2 42.5 4.49 0.481 
Europe 31 39.11     
GCC 19 36.18     
Other 2 52.25     
Other Middle East 14 27.93     
Southeast Asia 4 36.88     
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Total 72       
Concentration 
Risk 
Americas 2 41 5.869 0.319 
Europe 31 37.9     
GCC 19 35.21     
Other 2 51     
Other Middle East 14 28.21     
Southeast Asia 4 51.25     
Total 72       
Reputation 
Risk  
Americas 2 33 3.644 0.602 
Europe 31 34.68     
GCC 19 35.53     
Other 2 58.5     
Other Middle East 14 36.64     
Southeast Asia 4 45.5     
Total 72       
Fiduciary 
Risk 
Americas 2 33 4.978 0.419 
Europe 30 34.12     
GCC 19 33.89     
Other 2 13.75     
Other Middle East 13 42.77     
Southeast Asia 4 42     
Total 70       
Corporate 
Governance 
Risk 
Americas 2 57 19.086 0.002 
Europe 31 45.98     
GCC 19 29.21     
Other 2 49.25     
Other Middle East 14 26.07     
Southeast Asia 4 17.5     
Total 72       
Legal Risk 
Americas 2 26 2.067 0.84 
Europe 31 38.19     
GCC 19 34.58     
Other 2 48.5     
Other Middle East 14 33.93     
Southeast Asia 4 40.75     
Total 72       
 
Repeating the K-W test with „region‟ as the control variable for different samples of data, 
in terms of the institutional nature of respondents, gives consistent results as illustrated by 
Table 8.2 which confirms that there is a difference in the risk perception about corporate 
governance risk among regions due to fundamental market reasons. In other words, there 
is a significant difference between regions when institutional settings were also 
considered. 
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Table 8.2 – K-W Test Results by Region for Question 7 for Selected Sample Data 
  Fully-fledged Islamic 
Banks, Conventional 
Banks with Islamic 
Activities, and 
Conventional Banks 
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Banks &  
Conventional Banks 
with Islamic 
Activities 
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Banks 
Risk Chi-
Square 
Asymp. Sig. 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Credit Risk                     6.037 0.303 2.65 0.618 2.384 0.666 
Market Risk 8.4 0.136 2.962 0.564 1.331 0.856 
Operational Risk 4.181 0.524 4.241 0.374 1.222 0.874 
Equity Investment Risk 
9.399 0.094 3.188 0.527 6.795 0.147 
Liquidity Risk  5.266 0.384 0.096 0.999 0.938 0.919 
Asset-Liability Management 
Risk 
2.404 0.791 0.894 0.925 3.006 0.557 
Displaced Commercial Risk  
9.785 0.082 7.992 0.092 7.219 0.125 
Shari’ah-Non-Compliance Risk 
4.609 0.465 1.387 0.846 6.283 0.179 
Concentration Risk 7.318 0.198 2.751 0.6 4.077 0.396 
Reputation Risk  4.388 0.495 2.795 0.593 2.223 0.695 
Fiduciary Risk 5.846 0.322 3.128 0.537 9.058 0.06 
Corporate Governance Risk 
17.733 0.003 14.866 0.005 9.745 0.045 
Legal Risk 2.656 0.753 2.904 0.574 3.398 0.494 
 
In addition, examining the mean rankings across different regions for corporate 
governance risk confirms the existence of structural pattern. As apparent from Table 8.3 
below, the rankings do not change much when conducting K-W with different samples 
identifying different institutional settings. The inclusion of conventional banks and non-
bankers in the test sample gives similar results. „Americas‟ disappear when conventional 
banks are excluded from the test sample as there were no respondents from IFIs in the 
„Americas‟ in this research sample. Also, the difference in values between the highest and 
the lowest mean rankings is noticeable, which confirms that that the distribution of 
corporate governance risk is significantly different across regions.  
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Table 8.3 – K-W Test Mean Rankings for Corporate Governance Risk for Different 
Sample Data 
 
Corporate 
Governance 
Risk 
Full Sample 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Banks, 
Conventional 
Banks with Islamic 
Activities, and 
Conventional 
Banks 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Banks &  
Conventional 
Banks with Islamic 
Activities 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Banks 
Region 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Americas 57 1
st
  47.75 1
st
  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Europe 45.98 3
rd
  39.78 3
rd
  28.75 1
st
  19 1
st
  
GCC 29.21 4
th
  24.74 4
th
  17.34 3
rd
  13.61 3
rd
  
Other 49.25 2
nd
  41.25 2
nd
  27.75 2
nd
  18.75 2
nd
  
Other Middle 
East 
26.07 5
th
  22.25 5
th
  12.1 4
th
  8.3 4
th
  
Southeast Asia 17.5 6
th
  14.88 6
th
  10.38 5
th
  7.13 5
th
  
 
There is a pattern regardless of the nature of the respondents included in the sample, 
which implies that there are structural issues determined by the nature of the market, 
which can be explained by fundamental market reasons. Although corporate governance 
practices have material impacts on a bank‟s risk profile, IFIs do not generally have robust 
corporate governance frameworks in place particularly in the GCC, Middle East, and 
Southeast Asia. 
 
The same pattern could be identified, although to a lesser extent, when examining 
concentration risk, one of the main risk identified by respondents as explained in the 
previous chapter. Table 8.4 confirms that there are fundamental market reasons for the 
difference in mean rankings among different regions. The mean ranking for K-W test for 
the full sample ranks Southeast Asia first (51.25), followed by „Other‟ (51), Americas 
(41), while „Other Middle East‟ comes last with mean rank of 28.21. This ranking 
changes little when conducting the K-W test for different samples using different 
institutional settings, which confirms that for concentration risk there is a significant 
difference between regions when institutional settings are also applied. 
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Table 8.4 – K-W Test Mean Rankings for Concentration Risk for Different Sample 
Data 
Concentration 
Risk 
Full Sample 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Banks, 
Conventional 
Banks with 
Islamic Activities, 
and Conventional 
Banks 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Banks &  
Conventional 
Banks with 
Islamic Activities 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Banks 
Region 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Americas 41 3
rd
  31.75 4
th
  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Europe 37.9 4
th
  34.83 3
rd
   21.38 3
rd
  16.8 2
nd
   
GCC 35.21 5
th
  26.58 5
th
  17.59 5
th
  12.28 4
th
   
Other 51 2
nd
  38.75 2
nd
  24.75 2
nd
  13.5 5
th
   
Other Middle 
East 
28.21 6
th
  22.25 6
th
  17.8 4
th
  8.8 4
th
  
Southeast Asia 51.25 1
st
  40.13 1
st
  25.88 1
st
  14.88 1
st
  
 
Furthermore, examining the mean rankings across different raw data for other significant 
risks like credit and liquidity risks (as identified by the respondents in Chapter 7) shows 
that rankings remain very similar between fully-fledged Islamic banks and fully-fledged 
Islamic Banks combined with Islamic subsidiaries of conventional banks. However, 
adding conventional banks with no Islamic activities to the sample change the rankings 
slightly as summarized in Tables 8.5 and 8.6. Under credit risk, for instance, when only 
fully-fledged Islamic banks are included in the sample, Southeast Asia ranks first (15.63), 
followed by Other Middle East (13.2), Europe (13.1), GCC (13), and Other (7). Also, the 
difference in values between the mean rankings is minimal reflecting the close perception 
among different regions. When the institutional sample settings change to include Islamic 
subsidiaries as well, this pattern of mean rankings remains very similar. However, 
changing the institutional sample settings to include conventional banks change the 
rankings and the gap between mean values become wider. Of note is the existence of the 
same pattern when non bankers are also included in the sample. This shows that for credit 
risk, there is a difference between regions when conventional banks and other non-
banking respondents are also considered. Islamic and conventional bankers have different 
risk perceptions about credit risk across various regions.  
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Table 8.5 – K-W Test Mean Rankings for Credit Risk for Different Sample Data 
Credit Risk Full Sample 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Banks, 
Conventional 
Banks with 
Islamic Activities, 
and Conventional 
Banks 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Banks &  
Conventional 
Banks with 
Islamic Activities 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Banks 
Region 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Americas 54 1
st
  44.25 1
st
  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Europe 32.19 5
th 
 25.45 5
th 
 18.58 4
th
  13.1 3
rd
   
GCC 40.13 3
rd
 32.61 3
rd
 20.72 3rd  
 
 13 4th   
 
 
Other 22.25 6
th
 18 6
th
 11 5
th
  7 5
th
  
Other Middle 
East 
37.54 4
th
 30.17 4
th
 21 2
nd
 13.2 2
nd
 
Southeast Asia 47.38 2
nd
   38.75 2
nd
   24.63 1
st
   15.63 1
st
   
 
Table 8.6 shows that the same trend exists for liquidity risk. K-W test results for different 
institutional samples indicate a similar pattern between samples of fully-fledged Islamic 
banks and fully-fledged Islamic banks combined with Islamic subsidiaries. Also, there is 
another similar pattern between the full sample and a sample comprising fully-fledged 
Islamic banks, Islamic subsidiaries, and conventional banks. This empathises that Islamic 
and conventional bankers have different risk perceptions about liquidity risk across 
various regions, while the perceptions of Islamic subsidiaries is the same like that of 
fully-fledged Islamic banks. 
 
Table 8.6 – K-W Test Mean Rankings for Liquidity Risk for Different Sample Data 
Liquidity Risk Full Sample 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Banks, 
Conventional 
Banks with 
Islamic Activities, 
and Conventional 
Banks 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Banks &  
Conventional 
Banks with 
Islamic Activities 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Banks 
Region 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Americas 23 6
th
  17.75 6
th
  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Europe 39.42 3
rd
   33.65 3
rd
   19.29 5
th
  12 5
th
  
GCC 38.18 4
th
  30.58 4
th
  20.47 2
nd
  14.61 2
nd
  
Other 43.25 2
nd
  34.75 2
nd
  20 3
rd
  12 3
rd
  
Other Middle 
East 
26.79 5
th
  22.67 5
th
  20.2 1
st
  12.3 1
st
  
Southeast Asia 43.25 1
st
  34.75 1
st
  20 3
rd
   12 3
rd
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The findings indicate that there is an observed pattern, which can be generalised to most 
of the risk categories. This can only be explained by market realities. 
 
The K-W test was conducted in a similar manner according to „country‟ as control 
variable; the results confirm those produced by the test conducted according to the 
„region‟. 
 
In addition, an attempt was made to test the impacts of the „respondent‟s position‟ and 
„accounting standards‟ on the risk perception, however, the results show that there are no 
significant differences as summarised in Table 8.7. 
 
Table 8.7 – K-W Test Results by Respondent’s Position and Accounting Standards 
for Question 7 (Entire Research Sample) 
  
K-W according to 
Respondent’s Position 
K-W according to 
Accounting Standards 
Risk Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
Credit Risk                     11.817 14 0.621 1.098 4 0.778 
Market Risk 20.115 14 0.127 1.616 4 0.656 
Operational Risk 15.095 14 0.372 3.472 4 0.324 
Equity Investment Risk 7.749 14 0.902 6.584 4 0.086 
Liquidity Risk  13.051 14 0.522 7.051 4 0.07 
ALM Risk 7.108 14 0.93 5.677 4 0.128 
Displaced Commercial Risk  15.899 13 0.255 5.266 4 0.153 
Shari’ah-Non-Compliance Risk 22.246 14 0.074 6.074 4 0.108 
Concentration Risk 16.891 14 0.262 5.79 4 0.122 
Reputation Risk  13.971 14 0.452 4.421 4 0.219 
Fiduciary Risk 17.288 14 0.241 0.525 4 0.913 
Corporate Governance Risk 18.487 14 0.186 5.596 4 0.133 
Legal Risk 11.305 14 0.662 0.668 4 0.881 
 
Finally conducting the K-W test to examine the significance of perceived differences 
among various risk groups for the entire research sample according to the „nature of Fl‟ 
provided dispersed results. Table 8.8 shows that liquidity, ALM, Shari’ah-non-
compliance, concentration, reputation, and displaced commercial risks have significant p 
values, while the remaining risks do not.  
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Table 8.8 – K-W Test Results by Nature of FI for Question 7 (Entire Research 
Sample) 
 
 
Further examination of the mean rankings for risks with significant p value, as 
summarised in Table 8.9, confirms the dispersion of data as no trend could be established. 
In general, fully fledged Islamic banks and conventional banks with Islamic activities 
have higher mean values than conventional banks alone and „Others‟, particularly for 
liquidity, ALM, and displaced commercial risks. This trend, nonetheless, slightly changes 
for concentration and reputation risks. Of note is also the proximity of mean value among 
fully fledged Islamic banks and Islamic subsidiaries, which reflects the similar perception 
about risks in Islamic banking. One possible reason for this can be the similar knowledge 
and awareness about Islamic banking products and structures among those professionals 
with hands on experience in Islamic banking. This confirms the findings of section 7.2.2 
in the previous chapter.  
 
  
Risk Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig.
Credit Risk                    2.943 3 0.4
Market Risk 6.238 3 0.101
Operational Risk 3.237 3 0.357
Equity Investment Risk 3.599 3 0.308
Liquidity Risk 8.818 3 0.032
Asset-Liability Management Risk 9.381 3 0.025
Displaced Commercial Risk 13.528 3 0.004
Sharia’a Non-Compliance Risk 15.674 3 0.001
Concentration Risk 16.629 3 0.001
Reputation Risk 11.257 3 0.01
Fiduciary Risk 0.796 3 0.851
Corporate Governance Risk 1.511 3 0.68
Legal Risk 4.146 3 0.246
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Table 8.9 – K-W Test Results by Risk Categories in Relation to Nature of FI for 
Question 7 (Entire Research Sample) 
Risk  
Liquidity 
Risk  
ALM Risk 
Displaced 
Commercial 
Risk  
Shari’ah-
Non-
Compliance 
Risk 
Conc. Risk Rep.Risk  
Nature of FI N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Ra
nk 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Bank 
25 44.64  1
st
 45.18  1
st
 31.98  2
nd
  46.88  1
st
 48.48  1
st
 44.7  1
st
 
Islamic 
subsidiary 
14 38.29  2
nd
 35.64  2
nd
 52  1
st
  25.46  4
th
  27.93  3
rd
  32.5  3
rd
  
Conventional 
Bank 
20 28  4
th
 27.05  4
th
 29.13  4
th
 27.73  3
rd
  35.85 2
nd
  25.93  4
th
 
Others 13 32  3
rd
 35.27  3
rd
 30.36  3
rd
 41.92  2
nd
  23.69 4
th
  41.31  2
nd
  
Total 72                         
 
Based on the above results, it can be concluded that three control variables (region, 
country, and nature of FI) contribute to some significant differences about risk perception 
among respondents, but not for all risks. In addition, this can also be supported by the fact 
that there is no significant difference in perception levels between respondents from 
stand-alone Islamic banks and Islamic subsidiaries. Initially, it was expected that 
respondents from stand-alone Islamic banks have stronger perception compared to those 
from Islamic subsidiaries for two reasons: firstly, stand-alone Islamic banks have been in 
existence much longer than Islamic subsidiaries, and, secondly, the respondents from 
stand-alone Islamic banks have the advantage of dealing with only Islamic banking 
products and services, whereas Islamic subsidiaries still need to operate side-by-side with 
their respective conventional counterpart in sharing the same operating platforms and 
buildings. Nevertheless, the results have indicated otherwise. Differences could be 
spotted between perceptions of conventional banks and stand-alone Islamic banks, and 
more noticeably between the perceptions of bankers and non-bankers, represented by 
„Others‟. This could be because bankers, whether Islamic or non-Islamic, have hands-on 
experience and better understanding of the Islamic banking model and its risk 
architecture than non-bankers who tend to be more theoretical in their approach. 
 
 
 
321 
 
8.2.1.2 Islamic finance contracts 
 
Questions 9 and 10 seek respondents‟ views on various Islamic modes of financing. 
Question 9 targets institutions that use Islamic finance contracts only, therefore, when 
conducting the K-W test for Q9 only stand-alone Islamic banks and Islamic subsidiaries 
were included in the data analysis.  
 
8.2.1.2.1 Intensity of use of different Islamic finance contracts 
 
Table 8.10 shows that regardless of neither the respondent‟s position nor the nature of 
activities, banks use the Islamic finance contracts in similar pattern; all products had p 
value > 0.05. However, K-W test results according to „region‟ indicate that there is 
significant difference in the use of mudarabah across different regions. Moreover, there 
is significant difference in the use of wakala and Salaam according to the nature of FI. 
 
Table 8.10 – K-W Test Results for Question 9 for Selected Sample Data 
  K-W according 
to Region 
K-W according 
to Respondent‟s 
Position 
K-W according 
to Nature of FI 
K-W according 
to Nature of 
Activities 
Contract 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Murabahah  0.867 0.929 6.847 0.445 0.178 0.674 2.81 0.729 
Wakala 1.273 0.866 6.472 0.486 6.875 0.009 6.946 0.225 
Mudarabah 10.283 0.036 3.999 0.78 3.692 0.055 1.334 0.931 
Ijarah 7.573 0.109 10.752 0.15 0.111 0.739 4.572 0.47 
Musharakah 2.085 0.72 5.511 0.598 0.727 0.394 2.85 0.723 
Istisna’a 2.07 0.723 3.622 0.822 2.064 0.151 8.831 0.116 
Salaam 4.794 0.309 10.661 0.154 4.729 0.03 3.073 0.689 
Friedman test 0.00 
 
The Friedman test is used to find a tendency for some variables to receive higher ranks 
than others, i.e. to test whether the ranking is significant or not. The results of the test 
reflect that ranking for this question is significant. 
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Table 8.11 – K-W Test Mean Rankings for Mudarabah According to Region  
 Region N Mean Rank 
Mudarabah Europe 12 17.71 
GCC 16 16.47 
Other 2 16.50 
Other Middle East 5 32.50 
Southeast Asia 4 27.13 
Total 39  
 
As can be seen in Table 8.11, Other Middle East and Southeast Asia use mudarabah the 
most with means values of 32.5 and 27.13 respectively, while Europe (17.71) and the 
GCC (16.74) rank less on the use of mudarabah as FIs in these regions tend to rely more 
on murabahah, wakala, and ijarah. This should be explained by the economies of the 
regions in question, as the lack of financial depth may necessitate more use of equity 
financing.   
 
Table 8.12 – K-W Test Mean Rankings for Wakala and Salaam According to Nature 
of FI  
 Nature of Financial Institution N Mean Rank 
Wakala Fully-fledged Islamic Bank 25 17.08 
Conventional Bank with 
Islamic activities/ Windows 
14 25.21 
Total 39  
Salaam Fully-fledged Islamic Bank 25 22.86 
Conventional Bank with 
Islamic activities/ Windows 
14 14.89 
Total 39  
 
As depicted by Table 8.12, Islamic subsidiaries (25.21) tend to use wakala more than 
fully-fledged Islamic banks (17.08), while the picture is reversed for the use of salaam, 
where the disparity between mean values of the two groups is wide 
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In addition, Q9 was re-tested by excluding Islamic subsidiaries from the sample. 
However, there were no significant differences between the use of different contracts 
across different control variables: region, respondent‟s positions, nature of activities, and 
accounting standards. 
 
8.2.1.2.2 Risk perception for different Islamic finance contracts 
 
Unlike Q9 which targeted FI using Islamic finance contracts, Q10 seeks risk perceptions 
for these contracts. The feedback of all respondents is valuable; therefore, the K-W test is 
conducted on the entire research sample. 
 
Table 8.13 – K-W Test results for Question 10 (Risk Seriousness) by Region for 
Entire Sample 
Contract Region N 
K-W Test 
Mean Rank 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Murabahah  
Americas 2 28.75 11.554 0.041 
Europe 31 38.63     
GCC 19 43.13     
Other 2 54     
Other Middle East 14 25.93     
Southeast Asia 4 20.63     
Total 72       
Wakala 
Americas 2 33 4.682 0.456 
Europe 31 32.26     
GCC 19 37.29     
Other 2 33     
Other Middle East 14 42.14     
Southeast Asia 4 49.38     
Total 72       
Mudarabah 
Americas 2 28.25 1.983 0.851 
Europe 31 36.77     
GCC 19 37     
Other 2 28.25     
Other Middle East 14 34.64     
Southeast Asia 4 46.75     
Total 72       
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Ijarah 
Americas 2 33.25 4.637 0.462 
Europe 31 35.85     
GCC 19 34.08     
Other 2 39.5     
Other Middle East 13 43.88     
Southeast Asia 4 20.25     
Total 71       
Musharakah 
Americas 2 36.75 3.503 0.623 
Europe 31 39.85     
GCC 19 33.05     
Other 2 36.75     
Other Middle East 14 37.64     
Southeast Asia 4 22.63     
Total 72       
Istisna’a 
Americas 2 46.5 6.413 0.268 
Europe 29 37.4     
GCC 19 33.21     
Other 2 46.5     
Other Middle East 14 27.5     
Southeast Asia 4 49.63     
Total 70       
Salaam 
Americas 2 59.75 4.569 0.471 
Europe 31 35.13     
GCC 19 35.53     
Other 2 28.75     
Other Middle East 13 33     
Southeast Asia 4 46.5     
Total 71       
Friedman test 0.00 
 
As can be seen in Table 8.13, the results of Friedman test reflect that ranking for this 
question is significant, indicating that there is a significant difference between the risk 
perceptions for Islamic contracts.  
 
K-W test results according to „region‟, as illustrated in Table 8.13, indicate that 
murabahah is the only contract that reflects significant results across regions. This is 
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expected because murabahah is extensively used globally. Moreover, mean rankings for 
murabahah, in Table 8.14, show that „Other‟ regions, like Turkey and Pakistan, have a 
higher ranking (54.0) than the GCC (43.13) and Europe (38.63), while the remaining 
regions follow. This can be attributed to two main reasons. First, the European and GCC 
markets are more sophisticated in their financial awareness about risk management, 
products‟ structures, and the use of risk hedging techniques than Turkey and Pakistan, 
which has a direct impact on the risk perception among those markets. Second, at the 
time of conducting this questionnaire, European and GCC markets enjoyed stable 
political environment and „relatively‟ less volatile business cycles compared to „Others‟. 
 
Table 8.14 – K-W Test Mean Rankings for Murabahah According to Region (Entire 
Research Sample) 
Contract Region N 
K-W Test 
Mean Rank 
Chi-Square Asymp. Sig. 
Murabahah  
Americas 2 28.75 11.554 0.041 
Europe 31 38.63     
GCC 19 43.13     
Other 2 54.0     
Other Middle East 14 25.93     
Southeast Asia 4 20.63     
Total 72       
 
Repeating the K-W test with „region‟ as the control variable for different institutional 
samples of data gives consistent results as depicted by Table 8.15, which confirms that 
there is a difference in the risk perception about murabahah among regions in comparing 
according to institutional nature due to fundamental market reasons. 
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Table 8.15 – K-W Test Results by Region for Question 10 for Selected Institutional 
Data 
  
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Banks, Conventional 
Banks with Islamic 
Activities, and 
Conventional Banks 
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Banks &  Conventional 
Banks with Islamic 
Activities 
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Banks 
  Chi-Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Murabahah  14.146 0.015 13.497 0.009 9.788 0.044 
Wakala 4.339 0.502 3.369 0.498 3.927 0.416 
Mudarabah 2.043 0.843 1.896 0.755 2.255 0.689 
Ijarah 6.546 0.257 2.152 0.708 4.189 0.381 
Musharakah 2.647 0.754 3.601 0.463 4.015 0.404 
Istisna’a 7.964 0.158 3.241 0.518 5.859 0.21 
Salaam 5.065 0.408 1.954 0.744 1.937 0.747 
 
In addition, examining the mean rankings across different regions for murabahah 
confirms the existence of a structural pattern. As apparent from Table 8.16, the rankings 
are similar when conducting the K-W with different raw data. The inclusion of 
conventional banks and non-bankers in the test sample gave similar results. „Americas‟ 
disappear when conventional banks are excluded from the test sample as there were no 
respondents from Islamic banks in the „Americas‟ in this research sample.  
 
Table 8.16 – K-W Test Mean Rankings for Murabahah According to Region for 
Selected Institutional Data 
 Murabahah Full Sample 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Banks, 
Conventional 
Banks with Islamic 
Activities, and 
Conventional 
Banks 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Banks &  
Conventional 
Banks with 
Islamic Activities 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Banks 
Region 
K-W 
Test 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
K-W 
Test 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
K-W 
Test 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
K-W 
Test 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Americas 28.75 4
th
  23 4
th
  N/A   N/A   
Europe 38.63 3
rd
 34.48 2
nd
  23.83 2
nd
  17.1 2
nd
  
GCC 43.13 2
nd
  34.42 3
rd
   22 3
rd
   14.78 3
rd
   
Other 54 1
st
  43.5 1
st
  27 1
st
  19 1
st
  
Other Middle 
East 
25.93 5
th
  19.13 5
th
  10 4
th
   7.9 4
th
   
Southeast Asia 20.63 6
th
  16 6
th
  9.5 5
th
   7.25 5
th
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As depicted by Table 8.16, there is a general pattern in terms of perception about 
murabahah-related issues. Such regional and institutional differences can be attributed to 
market conditions prevailing in each region. 
 
Furthermore, using the entire research sample, attempts were made to test the impact of 
the respondent‟s positions, nature of FI, nature of activities, and accounting standards on 
the risk perception. However, the results, as depicted in Table 8.17, show that there are 
no significant differences except for murabahah contracts which had significant risk 
perception according to accounting standards (p = .028), and nature of FI (0.03). 
 
Table 8.17 – K-W Test Results for Q10 (Perceived Risk Seriousness) for Entire 
Sample Data 
  
K-W according to 
Respondent’s 
Position 
K-W according to 
Nature of FI 
K-W according to 
Accounting 
Standards 
K-W according to 
Nature of 
Activities 
Contract Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig 
Murabahah  19.85 0.14 8.75 0.03 10.90 0.028 4.08 0.67 
Wakala 17.98 0.21 2.23 0.53 3.87 0.42 2.68 0.85 
Mudarabah 14.02 0.45 0.27 0.97 2.82 0.59 4.36 0.63 
Ijarah 13.99 0.45 7.07 0.07 6.13 0.19 9.06 0.17 
Musharakah 19.02 0.16 1.50 0.68 3.18 0.53 2.34 0.89 
Istisna’a 19.46 0.15 0.49 0.92 4.87 0.30 1.69 0.95 
Salaam 18.39 0.19 0.97 0.81 3.52 0.48 1.69 0.95 
 
8.2.1.3 Additional Risk Issues Facing IFIs 
 
Q11 aimed at exploring the perceptions of the participants in relation to a number of risks 
related statements. For this, the K-W test was employed to determine if there were any 
statistical significant differences across the categories of respondent profiles.  
 
Table 8.18 shows the K-W test results for the „nature of FI‟ variable. Statements 1, 2, 3, 
4, 8, 10, and 11 are statistically significant, which reflects that there are significant 
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differences in the risk perception among respondents according to the nature of their FI. It 
should be noted that insignificant categories are eliminated and hence are not depicted in 
the table. Table 8.18 also breaks down the mean rankings for these statements.   
Statements: 
1.  Risks for Islamic banks should be managed using same techniques used in 
conventional banking.  
2.  Islamic banking is more risky by nature than conventional banking. 
3.  Risk management for Islamic banks is more challenging than it is for 
conventional banks.  
4.  There is naturally inherent conservatism in the principles of Islamic finance. 
5.  In an Islamic bank, a low rate of return on deposits will lead to withdrawal of 
funds. 
6.  Depositors would hold the bank responsible for a lower rate of return on their 
deposits. 
7.  Variation among Shari’ah scholars‟ opinions represents a major risk to Islamic 
banking.  
8.  Non-Shari’ah compliance could severely damage the reputation of an Islamic 
bank. 
9.  AAOIFI and IFSB standards should be made mandatory for Islamic banks. 
10.  Corporate governance is generally weak in Islamic banks. 
11.  Islamic banking in its current state is a safer option than conventional banking 
 
Table 8.18 – K-W Test Results for Question 11 for the Full Research Sample 
According to Nature of FI 
    Statement 
    1 2 3 4 8 10 11 
Chi-Square   9.73 28.631 7.969 36.833 12.224 23.692 15.743 
Asymp. Sig.   0.021 0.00 0.047 0.00 0.007 0.00 0.001 
Nature of FI N Mean Rank 
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Bank 
25 28.68 21.92 37.06 55.5 38.9 23.86 42.92 
Conventional Bank with 
Islamic Activities 
14 41.36 33 25 26.21 23.79 30.46 39.14 
Conventional Bank 20 46.05 44.55 37.48 22.45 34.35 47.4 38.85 
Others 13 31.62 55.92 46.31 32.65 48.88 50.54 17.69 
Total 72               
Only statements with significant p value are displayed in the table 
 
Studying the mean ranking for each statement does not reveal a certain pattern governing 
the data; the data is widely dispersed with no clear trend of ranking according to nature of 
FI.  
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Repeating the K-W test for the entire research sample using other control variables (such 
as region, position of respondent, nature of activities, and accounting standards) gives 
similar results as seen in Table 8.19, which confirms that there is a significant difference 
in the risk perception among various groups. With a „relaxation‟ of the significance level 
to 0.06, more statements can be considered as significant. An attempt was made to study 
the mean ranking for each statement within each test, however, the results did not reveal a 
certain pattern, and the data is widely dispersed with no clear ranking trend. 
 
Table 8.19 – K-W Test Results for Question 11 for the Full Research Sample 
According to Various Control Variables 
Statement 
Region 
Position of 
Respondent 
Nature of Activities 
Accounting 
Standards 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
1 9.695 0.084 18.272 0.195 7.736 0.258 9.534 0.049 
2 29.87 0.00 32.308 0.004 31.623 0.00 22.755 0.00 
3 11.308 0.046 23.068 0.059 9.59 0.143 5.236 0.264 
4 24.749 0.00 24.06 0.045 18.209 0.006 15.894 0.003 
5 9.5 0.091 18.734 0.175 5.504 0.481 6.408 0.171 
6 10 0.075 18.471 0.186 1.598 0.953 0.937 0.919 
7 19.217 0.002 24.05 0.045 14.798 0.022 7.077 0.132 
8 4.523 0.477 18.66 0.178 12.829 0.046 8.222 0.084 
9 16.245 0.006 16.724 0.271 11.293 0.08 8.495 0.075 
10 33.479 0.00 25.222 0.032 25.108 0.00 17.862 0.001 
11 14.644 0.012 22.839 0.063 23.755 0.001 21.018 0.00 
 
Factor Analysis for Question 11 
In order to provide further statistical robustness to the analysis, factor analysis was 
conducted. Factor analysis seeks to discover if the observed variables can be explained 
largely or entirely in terms of a much smaller number of variables called the factors.  
 
As there are eleven statements for Q11, all analysing the respondents‟ perceptions of 
different risk issues in Islamic banking, the researcher felt that reducing these statements 
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into a more manageable number would enhance the analysis and would tell more about 
how respondents perceived these issues. Hence, factor analysis is deemed to be relevant 
in this respect as the main task of factor analysis is to cluster the related group of 
variables through their common variance (Pallant, 2007). 
 
In order to test the factorability of the data in terms of sampling adequacy, there are two 
statistical measures available in the SPSS software that can be used: Bartlett‟s test of 
Sphericity and also the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test. As laid down in Pallant (2007), 
for the factor analysis to be considered as appropriate, the Bartlett‟s test of Spehericity 
value should be significant (P<.05), while for the KMO test, the suggested minimum 
outcome must be at least 0.6 (KMO score ranging from 0 to 1). The KMO test‟s 
benchmarks are as follows: KMO measure in the 0.90s the sampling is considered as 
marvellous. If the outcome is in the 0.80s, then the sampling is considered as meritorious, 
if it is in 0.70 then the sample is middling, if it is in the 0.60s then the sample is 
mediocre, if it is in 0.50s then the sample deemed as miserable and lastly if it is below 
than 0.50 then the sample is unacceptable (Pallant, 2007). 
 
Table 8.20 presents the results of KMO and also Bartlett‟s test for this factor analysis. 
 
Table 8.20 - KMO and Bartlett’s Test Results for the 11 Items  Combined 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 0.760 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 268.223 
df 55 
Sig. 0.000 
 
The outcome of the KMO measure for all 11 items combined, related to the risk 
perception, produced the value of 0.760, which is higher than 0.60, therefore the factor 
analysis is appropriate for this study. In addition, the significant P-Value as presented in 
the table of 0.000 is significantly lower than critical P-Value of 0.05. Therefore, the 
identity matrix can be rejected. Based on the very encouraging results from the both 
testing, factor analysis may be performed. 
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The second step is to choose the most suitable method of data extraction. As discussed in 
Chapter 6, the researcher selected principle component analysis (PCA) as it is deemed to 
be the most suitable method for the data at hand. PCA involves determining the patterns 
with the objective of studying the similarities and the differences among the components 
of the data set. 
 
After determining the factors, the next step in order to facilitate the interpretation 
selection of rotation method is very important. In this regard, orthogonal (uncorrelated) 
and oblique (correlated) approaches are the two main techniques to rotation (Pallant, 
2007). Results of the orthogonal rotation are easier to interpret, describe, and report 
(Field, 2009). There are various rotational approaches in SPSS within both orthogonal 
and oblique categories. Varimax, Quartimax, and Equamax are typically orthogonal 
approaches of rotation, whereas Direct Oblimin, Quartimin, and Promax are oblique 
methods. Varimax is the most commonly used orthogonal technique in order to reduce 
the number of variables whereas direct oblimin technique is generally used for the 
oblique method. The researcher opted for Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization as 
Table 8.21 suggests.  
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Table 8.21 - Total Variance Explained for Q11  
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 3.732 33.926 33.926 3.732 33.926 33.926 3.103 28.214 28.214 
2 1.887 17.151 51.076 1.887 17.151 51.076 2.013 18.296 46.509 
3 1.439 13.078 64.155 1.439 13.078 64.155 1.941 17.646 64.155 
4 .982 8.929 73.084       
5 .675 6.136 79.219       
6 .571 5.190 84.410       
7 .443 4.023 88.433       
8 .370 3.366 91.799       
9 .349 3.171 94.970       
10 .299 2.722 97.692       
11 .254 2.308 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Table 8.21 presents the output of the number of factors that are retained according to 
Kaiser‟s criterion, in which all the eigenvalues are more than 1.0. In this situation, there 
are three factors that will be retained, since the eigenvalues are 3.732, 1.887 and 1.439 
respectively. The screen plot, which is basically a graph of the eigenvalues, shows that 
the eleven variables could be reduced to only three as the graph slopes down steeply 
before becoming parallel to the horizontal line. It is therefore clear from the plot that 
there is only a three factor solution to this question. Therefore it was decided to retain the 
three factors.  
 
According to Pallant (2007), the eigenvalue has to be greater than 1.0 to be regarded as 
significant and to be used in determining the factors. The assumption here is that the 
eigen values stand for the amount of total variation represented by the factors and this 
means that an eigenvalue of 1.0 or above indicates a high level of variation. Table 8.21 
shows that there are three factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0. This means that the 
original eleven items can be simply reduced to three factors. The three component 
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solution explained 64.2% of the variance with component 1 contributing 33.9%, 
component 2 contributing 17.1%, and component 3 contributing 13.1%. The explanatory 
power of the first factor is very high. 
 
Figure 8.1 – Screen Plot for Q11 
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Table 8.22 - Rotated Component Matrix
a 
for Q 11 
 
 
Component 
1 Risk 
Perception 
2 Shari’ah 
Compliance 
3 Rate 
of 
Return 
1- Risks for Islamic banks should be managed using same 
techniques used in conventional banking 
.134 -.770 -.168 
2- Islamic banking is more risky by nature  than 
conventional banking 
.806 -.237 .061 
3- Risk management for Islamic banks is more 
challenging than it is for conventional banks 
.521 .301 .400 
4- There is naturally inherent conservatism in the 
principles of Islamic finance 
-.484 .627 -.289 
5- In an Islamic bank, a low rate of return on deposits will 
lead to withdrawal of funds  
.062 -.012 .882 
6- Depositors would hold the bank responsible for a lower 
rate of return on their deposits 
-.010 -.059 .886 
7- Variation among Shari’ah scholars‟ opinions represent 
a major risk to Islamic banking 
.584 -.448 -.006 
8- Shari’ah-Non-Compliance could severely damage the 
reputation of an Islamic bank 
.038 .647 -.098 
9- AAOIFI and IFSB standards should be made 
mandatory on Islamic banks 
-.693 .419 .112 
10- Corporate governance is generally weak in Islamic 
banks 
.790 -.145 .253 
11- Islamic banking in its current state is a safer option 
than conventional banking 
-.693 -.241 .121 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
 
Table 8.22 further provides Rotated Component Matrix by distributing all variables to the 
identified three components. The factors in each component have some common 
characteristics and measure the same phenomenon and, therefore, each component is 
named with a general description of the factors or variables it includes. For instance, 
factors in component one deal with the respondents‟ risk perception. The factors in 
component two deal with Shari’ah principles and its impact on the risk profile of an IFI, 
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while the factors in component three deal with the rate of return paid by IFI and its effect 
on depositors‟ behaviour and perception of how safe the IFI is. Thus the results indicate 
that all these statements can be explained with three main components. 
 
After conducting factor analysis one way between groups, a MANOVA test was 
computed in order to investigate if there is any significant difference between the three 
component groups in relation to same control variables. This will help to locate the 
impact or significance of each control variable on the established distribution.  
 
The outputs of the relevant tests are presented in terms of data conforming to the 
assumptions before the main MANOVA analysis. In this sense, the sig. value of the 
Box‟s Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices should not be lower than 0.001 in terms of 
not violating the assumption (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2006). In this example, the output of 
the Box‟s Test shows that there is no violation of assumption of homogeneity of 
variances of variance-covariance matrices since the sig. value of 0.248 is higher than the 
critical value of 0.001. 
 
Table 8.23 – Box’s Test of Equality of Covariance Matricesa 
Box's M 27.466 
F 1.209 
df1 18 
df2 544.584 
Sig. 0.248 
Tests the null hypothesis that the observed covariance matrices of the dependent variables are equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Region 
 
Additionally, the output of the Levene‟s Test of Equality of Error Variances is explored. 
The results in the Sig. column show that sig. values of „Risk Perception‟ (0.806), 
„Shari’ah Compliance‟ (0.121), and „Rate of Return‟ (0.112) are higher than 0.05. Thus, 
there is no violation of the assumption of equality of variances for these three factors. 
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Table 8.24 - Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
 F df1 df2 Sig. 
Risk Perception .458 5 66 .806 
Shari’ah Compliance 1.818 5 66 .121 
Rate of Return 1.867 5 66 .112 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Region 
 
After performing the Box‟s Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices and Levene‟s test, 
the set of multivariate test was employed. Pallant (2007) states that multivariate tests of 
significance demonstrate if there are any significant differences amongst the groups; the 
sig. value should be lower than 0.05 in order to find a statistically significant result. There 
are several statistics which are also used in the SPSS such as Pillai‟s Trace, Wilks‟ 
Lambda, Hotelling‟s Trace, and Roy‟s Largest Root. In this research Wilks‟ Lambda 
result is taken into account since it is one of the most commonly used statistics 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2006). The results of the Wilks‟ Lambda show that there is a 
statistically significant difference between regions in relation to the perceptions on the 
three components since the sig. value of 0.00 is quite lower than the critical level of 0.05. 
 
Table 8.25 - Multivariate Tests 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept Pillai’s Trace .995 4017.889
a
 3.000 64.000 .000 .995 
Wilks’ Lambda .005 4017.889
a
 3.000 64.000 .000 .995 
Hotelling’s Trace 188.339 4017.889
a
 3.000 64.000 .000 .995 
Roy’s Largest Root 188.339 4017.889
a
 3.000 64.000 .000 .995 
Region Pillai's Trace .568 3.083 15.000 198.000 .000 .189 
Wilks’ Lambda .472 3.693 15.000 177.077 .000 .222 
Hotelling’s Trace 1.036 4.330 15.000 188.000 .000 .257 
Roy’s Largest Root .951 12.550
c
 5.000 66.000 .000 .487 
a. Exact statistic 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
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Since, multivariate test suggests that there is a statistically significant difference, a further 
investigation is conducted. Thus, in order to reveal if there is a difference in terms of 
region on „Risk Perception‟, „Shari’ah Compliance‟, „Rate of Return‟ or only to some 
extent. Tests of Between Subjects Effects provide this information. Bonferroni 
adjustment, which is one of the most commonly employed methods, gives this 
information when the alpha level of 0.05 is divided by the number of dependent variables 
(Pallant, 2007). In this example, since there are three dependent variables, therefore, 0.05 
is divided by three and the new alpha level is 0.0167. As can be seen in the Tests of 
Between-Subjects Effects in Table 8.26, the results indicate that the dependent variables 
„Risk Perception‟ and „Shari’ah Compliance‟ have significant values of 0.000, while 
„Rate of Return‟ has a Sig. value of 0.671 which is higher than the critical value of 
0.0167 for this example.  
 
Furthermore, Tests of Between-Subjects Effects provide the effect size. Partial Eta 
Squared is used to determine the impact of independent variable on dependents variables, 
and it signifies the percentage of the variance in the dependent variable which is 
explained by the independent variable (Pallant, 2007). In this question, the effect of 
„region‟ (independent variable) on „Risk Perception‟ and „Shari’ah Compliance‟ 
(dependent variables) can be evaluated by the Partial Eta Squared which is depicted in the 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects in Table 8.26. The importance of this impact is 
explored using the effect size values. Cohen (2005) categorises the effect size of 0.01 as a 
small effect, 0.06 as a medium effect whereas 0.14 as a large effect. 
 
Therefore, the effect size values for this case are 0.459 and 0.344, which are deemed 
large effect sizes using Cohen‟s. These results signify 45.9% and 34.4% of the variances 
in „Risk Perception‟ and „Shari’ah Compliance‟ scores are explained respectively by the 
region. 
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Table 8.26 - Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type I Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model Risk Perception 18.683
a
 5 3.737 11.212 .000 .459 
Shari’ah Compliance 14.314 5 2.863 6.937 .000 .344 
Rate of Return 1.537 5 .307 .638 .671 .046 
Intercept Risk Perception 738.561 1 738.561 2216.046 .000 .971 
Shari’ah Compliance 886.673 1 886.673 2148.655 .000 .970 
Rate of Return 629.139 1 629.139 1305.938 .000 .952 
Region Risk Perception 18.683 5 3.737 11.212 .000 .459 
Shari’ah Compliance 14.314 5 2.863 6.937 .000 .344 
Rate of Return 1.537 5 .307 .638 .671 .046 
Error Risk Perception 21.996 66 .333    
Shari’ah Compliance 27.236 66 .413    
Rate of Return 31.796 66 .482    
Total Risk Perception 779.240 72     
Shari’ah Compliance 928.222 72     
Rate of Return 662.472 72     
Corrected Total Risk Perception 40.679 71     
Shari’ah Compliance 41.549 71     
Rate of Return 33.333 71     
a. R Squared = .459 (Adjusted R Squared = .418) 
 
MANOVA test according to Nature of FI for Question 11 
After conducting a MANOVA test according to „region‟ as the independent variable, 
another MANOVA test was computed according to „nature of FI‟ as the independent 
variable in order to investigate if there is any significant difference between the three 
dependent factors identified by the factor analysis.  
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In this case, the output of the Box‟s Test in Table 8.27 shows that there is no violation of 
the assumption of homogeneity of variances of variance-covariance matrices since the 
sig. value of 0.080 is higher than the critical value of 0.001 
 
Table 8.27 - Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matricesa 
Box’s M 29.551 
F 1.497 
df1 18 
df2 9866.884 
Sig. 0.080 
Tests the null hypothesis that the observed covariance matrices of the dependent variables are equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + NatureFI 
 
Additionally, the output of the Levene‟s Test of Equality of Error Variances is explored. 
The results in the Sig. column show that sig. values of „Risk Perception‟ (0.753), 
„Shari’ah Compliance‟ (0.427), and „Rate of Return‟ (0.077) are higher than 0.05. Thus, 
there is no violation of the assumption of equality of variances for these three factors. 
 
Table 8.28 -  Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
 F df1 df2 Sig. 
Risk Perception .400 3 68 .753 
Shari’ah Compliance .938 3 68 .427 
Rate of Return 2.386 3 68 .077 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + NatureFI 
 
The results of the Wilks‟ Lambda in Table 8.29 show that there is a statistically 
significant difference according to nature of FI since the sig. value of 0.00 is quite lower 
than the critical level of 0.05. 
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Table 8.29 -  Multivariate Testsc 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept Pillai’s Trace .995 4340.694
a
 3.000 66.000 .000 .995 
Wilks’ Lambda .005 4340.694
a
 3.000 66.000 .000 .995 
Hotelling’s Trace 197.304 4340.694
a
 3.000 66.000 .000 .995 
Roy’s Largest Root 197.304 4340.694
a
 3.000 66.000 .000 .995 
NatureFI Pillai’s Trace .621 5.921 9.000 204.000 .000 .207 
Wilks’ Lambda .478 6.335 9.000 160.777 .000 .218 
Hotelling’s Trace .890 6.396 9.000 194.000 .000 .229 
Roy’s Largest Root .534 12.100
b
 3.000 68.000 .000 .348 
a. Exact statistic 
b. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
c. Design: Intercept + NatureFI 
 
 
Since the multivariate test suggests that there is a statistically significant difference, a 
further investigation is conducted. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects provide this 
information. In this case, since there are three dependent variables, therefore, 0.05 is 
divided by three and the new alpha level is 0.0167. As can be seen in the Tests of 
Between-Subjects Effects in Table 8.30, the results indicate that the dependent variables 
„Risk Perception‟ and „Shari’ah Compliance‟ have significant values of 0.000, while 
„Rate of Return‟ has a Sig. value of 0.234 which is higher than the critical value of 
0.0167 for this example. Furthermore, the effect size values as evaluated by the Partial 
Eta Squared for this case are 0.301 and 0.336, which are deemed large effect sizes using 
Cohen‟s. These results signify 30.1% and 33.6% of the variances in „Risk Perception‟ 
and „Shari’ah Compliance‟ scores are explained respectively by the nature of FI. 
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Table 8.30 - Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model Risk Perception 12.240
a
 3 4.080 9.755 .000 .301 
Sharia Compliance 13.952
b
 3 4.651 11.459 .000 .336 
Rate of Return 2.014
c
 3 .671 1.457 .234 .060 
Intercept Risk Perception 715.613 1 715.613 1711.036 .000 .962 
Shari’ah Compliance 799.581 1 799.581 1970.166 .000 .967 
Rate of Return 570.736 1 570.736 1239.172 .000 .948 
NatureFI Risk Perception 12.240 3 4.080 9.755 .000 .301 
Sharia Compliance 13.952 3 4.651 11.459 .000 .336 
Rate of Return 2.014 3 .671 1.457 .234 .060 
Error Risk Perception 28.440 68 .418    
Sharia Compliance 27.597 68 .406    
Rate of Return 31.319 68 .461    
Total Risk Perception 779.240 72     
Shari’ah Compliance 928.222 72     
Rate of Return 662.472 72     
Corrected Total Risk Perception 40.679 71     
Shari’ah Compliance 41.549 71     
Rate of Return 33.333 71     
a. R Squared = .301 (Adjusted R Squared = .270) 
b. R Squared = .336 (Adjusted R Squared = .306) 
c. R Squared = .060 (Adjusted R Squared = .019) 
 
Conducting the MANOVA test according to „region‟ and „nature of FI‟ as independent 
variables provided consistent results. It can be concluded that „Risk Perception‟ and 
„Shari’ah Compliance‟ are significant dependent variables and have strong explanatory 
power, while „Rate of Return‟ does not follow the pattern.  
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8.2.2 Capital Adequacy for Islamic Banks 
 
This section addresses capital adequacy challenges facing IFIs. It tackles the 
controversial issues regarding the applicability of Basel II and Basel III accords to IFIs, 
and the appropriate capital requirement levels for Islamic banks. 
 
The results of the K-W test in Table 8.31 show that all statements are statistically 
significant (P value < 0.05) except for Statement 5 (P value = 0.358) implying that 
regional differences in relation to capital adequacy is significant. 
 
Statements as depicted in the following tables and their coding are:  
1.  Basel II standards should be equally applied to Islamic banks without 
modification.  
2.  IFSB standard on Capital Adequacy should be used by Islamic banks rather than 
Basel II. 
3.  Basel II standards should be reviewed after failing to prevent the current crisis. 
4.  The proposed Basel III rules would be easily applicable to Islamic banks. 
5.  Stricter capital, leverage, and liquidity rules, as proposed under Basel III, are 
likely to prevent another financial crisis. 
 
Table 8.31 – K-W Test Results by Region for Q15 (Capital Adequacy) for Entire 
Research Sample 
  Statement 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Chi-Square 18.081   24.185   20.089   20.24   5.502   
Asymp. Sig. 0.003 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.358 
 
Region N 
Mean 
Rank N 
Mean 
Rank N 
Mean 
Rank N 
Mean 
Rank N 
Mean 
Rank 
Americas 2 59.25 2 22 2 27.5 2 57 2 28 
Europe 31 45.13 31 24.66 31 30.26 31 45.06 31 32.06 
GCC 19 23.16 19 51.24 19 50.71 19 24.24 19 40.39 
Other 2 18 2 48.5 2 59 2 28.75 2 28 
Other Middle 
East 
14 34.54 14 42.86 14 33.29 14 32.39 14 39.93 
Southeast Asia 4 37.75 4 37.25 4 21.88 4 36.38 4 48.88 
Total 72   72   72   72   72   
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Conducting the K-W test with „nature of FI‟ as the control variable for the entire research 
sample gives different results as illustrated by Table 8.32. All statements are statistically 
insignificant except Statement 5 that shows different views between bankers (whether 
Islamic or conventional) and non-bankers, which is also evident from the mean ranking. 
This implies that the nature of FI is not a statistically determining factor; and that the 
opinions of the respondents are rather similar.   
 
Table 8.32 – K-W Test Results by Nature of FI for Q15 (Capital Adequacy) for 
Entire Research Sample 
  Statement 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Chi-Square 5.611   5.127   5.781   4.07   9.79   
Asymp. Sig. 0.132   0.163   0.123   0.254   0.02   
Nature of FI N Mean 
Rank 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Bank 25 30.92 25 37.9 25 37.4 25 31.86 25 39.98 
Conventional 
Bank with Islamic 
Activities 
14 33.93 14 45.71 14 46.14 14 34.57 14 40.75 
Conventional 
Bank 20 45 20 32.05 20 32 20 39.73 20 38.78 
Others 13 36.92 13 30.73 13 31.31 13 42.54 13 21.73 
Total 72   72   72   72   72   
 
Furthermore, repeating the K-W test with „nature of activities‟ and „respondent‟s 
position‟ as control variables for the entire research sample gives consistent results to 
those results of K-W according to „nature of FI‟ as illustrated by Tables 8.33 and 8.34 
respectively. For „nature of activities‟, statements are statistically insignificant, except 
statements 1 and 3, while, as depicted by Table 8.34 for „respondent‟s position‟, all 
statements are statistically insignificant, except statement 5. This reflects the difference in 
opinions among different groups regarding the newly developed Basel III capital and 
liquidity standards and their applicability to Islamic banking.  
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Table 8.33 – K-W Test Results by Nature of Activities for Question 15 (Entire 
Research Sample) 
  Statement 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Chi-Square 8.467 
  
12.532 
  
11.053   13.98   14.255   
Asymp. Sig. 0.206 
  
0.051 
  
0.087   0.03   0.027   
Nature of Activities 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
Commercial banking 11 34.91 11 39.68 11 38.95 11 29.23 11 42.86 
Integrated banking 9 38.67 9 37.5 9 39 9 40.61 9 36.33 
Investment Banking 11 44.09 11 23.86 11 24.23 11 48.32 11 37.91 
Private Equity House 1 67 1 11.5 1 27.5 1 44 1 43 
Retail & commercial 
banking 
17 37.35 17 39.79 17 38.35 17 33.26 17 45.71 
Retail banking 10 22.9 10 50.4 10 49.55 10 24.7 10 31 
Other 13 36.92 13 30.73 13 31.31 13 42.54 13 21.73 
Total 72 
  
72 
  
72 
  
72 
  
72 
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Table 8.34 – K-W Test Results by Position of Respondent for Question 15 (Entire 
Research Sample) 
  Statement 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Chi-Square 12.056 
  
12.503 
  
16.546   19.49   29.835   
Asymp. Sig. 0.602 
  
0.566 
  
0.281   0.147   0.008   
Position of Respondent 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
Analyst 5 43 5 32.5 5 29.3 5 44 5 43 
Senior Analyst 4 37.75 4 27.75 4 21.88 4 44 4 13 
Auditor 2 42.25 2 42 2 16.25 2 57 2 13 
CEO 5 36.9 5 34.3 5 29.3 5 37 5 34.7 
Chief Financial Officer 2 9 2 64.5 2 59 2 13.5 2 13 
Consultant 2 27.25 2 42 2 43.25 2 23.75 2 13 
Director 6 39.17 6 22 6 29 6 48.33 6 31.92 
General Manager 10 37.8 10 36.6 10 37.85 10 33.85 10 47.7 
Head of Investment 
Banking 
1 3 1 64.5 1 59 1 3.5 1 13 
Head of Risk 
Management 
11 33.27 11 37.95 11 36.91 11 39.91 11 33.64 
Managing Director 8 37.81 8 38.88 8 40.44 8 28.75 8 48.06 
Risk Manager 12 41.63 12 35.17 12 38.75 12 34.33 12 41.92 
Senior Trader 2 41 2 38 2 59 2 44 2 57.25 
Shari’ah Scholar 1 3 1 64.5 1 59 1 13.5 1 13 
Solicitor 1 51.5 1 32.5 1 27.5 1 44 1 43 
Total 72 
  
72 
  
72 
  
72 
  
72 
  
 
8.2.3. Credit Crisis and Islamic Banks 
This section of the questionnaire seeks respondents‟ views on different issues relating to 
the recent global crisis. For this purpose, Question 16 of the survey presented 9 
statements to respondents. This part applied to all the respondents, which means replies 
from all institutional samples of data were obtained by asking respondents to answer 
using a 5-point Likert scale (ranking from Strongly Agree = 5 to Strongly Disagree = 1). 
Table 8.35 employs K-W test to examine the significant difference among respondents‟ 
perceptions according to the „region‟. 
 
 
 
 
346 
Statements that are tested in this section and their coding are as follows: 
1.  Islamic banks are more resilient to economic shocks than their conventional 
peers. 
2.  The recent crisis would not have happened under a true Islamic banking system. 
3.  Islamic finance could have solved the global crisis. 
4.  Risk management must be embedded institutionally. 
5.  Banks in general used to rely heavily on rating agencies. 
6.  Islamic banks rely less on rating agencies than conventional banks. 
7.  Islamic finance industry should develop its own rating agencies. 
8.  Islamic banks will emerge stronger from the current crisis. 
9.  Consolidation is needed among smaller Islamic banks. 
 
Table 8.35 – K-W Test Results by Region for Question 16 (Entire Research Sample) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Chi-Square 11.052 19.879 27.446 14.571 10.877 4.863 18.587 11.171 3.695 
Asymp. Sig. 0.05 0.001 0.00 0.012 0.054 0.433 0.002 0.048 0.594 
Region Mean Rank 
Americas 30.25 29 9 55 30.75 33 38 31 44.5 
Europe 28.39 27.08 26.1 42.5 33.89 34.16 25.11 30.05 39.06 
GCC 44.76 50.87 51.37 38.05 47.42 43.16 49.32 48.29 29.5 
Other 52.5 41 56.5 17.25 52.75 51.25 43.5 31 32 
Other Middle 
East 
38.86 41.93 35.43 26.71 29.29 33.57 41.89 38.04 38.93 
Southeast Asia 47 23.75 54 17.25 24.88 27.63 40.75 30.63 39.63 
N for all statements = 72 
 
The results in Table 8.35 show that most statements are statistically significant (P value < 
0.05). With a “relaxation” of the confidence level to 0.06, we can accept all statements, 
except statements 6 and 9. Mean rankings reveal that, although there is no clear pattern 
that could be traced, „GCC‟ and „Other‟ categories are usually ranked at the top for most 
statements. This emphasises the fact that respondents from these two regions are more 
aggressive than those from other regions in their views about the credit crunch and 
Islamic finance. Thus the findings indicate that there are statistically different and 
significant opinions among the respondents coming from different regions.     
 
In addition, attempts were made to test the impacts of „nature of the FI‟, „nature of 
activities‟, „accounting standards‟, and „respondent‟s position‟ on the responses, the 
results are summarised in Tables 8.36 to 8.39. 
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Table 8.36 – K-W Test results by Nature of FI for Question 16 (Entire Research 
Sample) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Chi-Square 4.614 1.698 12.818 4.531 5.573 5.631 2.965 4.369 4.238 
Asymp. Sig. 0.202 0.637 0.005 0.21 0.134 0.131 0.397 0.224 0.237 
Region Mean Rank 
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Bank 
41.6 38.46 46.2 30.44 42.02 31.48 35.64 37.3 31.54 
Conventional Bank with 
Islamic Activities 
38.21 35.29 40.25 36.07 36.82 42.93 43.32 43.07 33.96 
Conventional Bank 34.95 38.75 27.38 40.83 28.1 33.23 37.05 29.53 43.1 
Others 27.23 30.58 27.85 41.96 38.46 44.27 29.96 38.62 38.62 
N for all statements = 72 
 
With the exception of statement 3 (p = 0.005), there is no statistically significant 
difference among all other statements. Mean ranking for statement 3, as seen in Table 
8.36, shows that Fully-fledged Islamic Banks are far more aggressive in their belief that 
Islamic finance could have solved the global crisis than other categories (46.2), followed 
by Islamic Subsidiaries (40.25), then by Others and Conventional Banks. This is 
consistent with the K-W test result according to „region‟ as the control variable (Table 
8.35) because respondents from the „GCC‟ and „Other‟ regions in this research sample 
are mainly Fully-fledged Islamic Banks and Islamic Subsidiaries.  
 
Table 8.37– K-W Test Results by Nature of Activities for Question 16 (Entire 
Research Sample) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Chi-Square 12.156 8.402 11.446 12.029 4.862 15.608 10.263 6.527 2.581 
Asymp. Sig. 0.059 0.21 0.076 0.061 0.562 0.016 0.114 0.367 0.859 
Region Mean Rank 
Commercial banking 41.36 41.59 46.73 36.86 37.41 31.32 39.86 34.27 35.77 
Integrated banking 38.94 32.61 27.61 45.5 24.22 35.89 34.61 29.11 39.39 
Investment banking 27.55 25.95 29.45 42.95 33.68 22.68 28.32 29.82 36.27 
Private Equity House 7 39.5 34 55 42.5 1.5 19 18.5 12.5 
Retail & commercial 
banking 
39.29 40.85 39.88 30.03 39.38 37.59 37.35 40.38 38.21 
Retail banking 49.05 46 46.75 22.95 41.6 49.5 52.3 45.4 31.7 
Other 27.23 30.58 27.85 41.96 38.46 44.27 29.96 38.62 38.62 
N for all statements = 72 
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The same statements are further investigated in relation to the nature of activities. As 
depicted by Table 8.37, only statement 6 is statistically significant. With a relaxation of 
the confidence level to 0.06, one can also accept statement 1. For both statements 1 and 6, 
„Retail banking‟ is the most aggressive category according to mean rankings, and „Private 
Equity Houses‟ is by far the least aggressive. Other categories fall in-between, without a 
particular trend that can be established. These results confirm the K-W test results 
according to „region‟ (Table 8.35), as out of the 10 retail banks included in the research 
sample, 5 are located in the „GCC‟ and one is located in „Other‟. It should be noted that 
the sole Private Equity House in this research sample is also located in the „GCC‟. 
Furthermore, results from Table 8.37 are also consistent with the K-W test results 
according to „nature of FI‟ (Table 8.36) because 8 out of the 10 retails banks included in 
the research sample are Fully-fledged Islamic Banks, and the other 2 are Islamic 
subsidiaries. The one Private Equity House is also a fully-fledged Islamic Bank. 
 
Table 8.38– K-W Test Results by Accounting Standards for Question 16 (Entire 
Research Sample) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Chi-Square 6.86 7.494 11.839 8.564 11.496 6.621 10.72 5.72 4.252 
Asymp. Sig. 0.143 0.112 0.019 0.073 0.022 0.157 0.03 0.221 0.373 
Region Mean Rank 
AAOIFI standards 52.5 51.5 54.83 28.17 45.42 49.5 57 43.25 22.25 
International & AAOIFI 
standards 
40.9 49.1 54.5 45.6 58.9 29.7 49.8 52.6 33.1 
International standards 36.79 33.74 34.33 38.32 34.61 34.32 33.12 32.76 39.08 
Local accounting 
standards 
35.65 39.4 36 22.95 24.6 30.3 38.9 35.85 34.2 
N/A 27.23 30.58 27.85 41.96 38.46 44.27 29.96 38.62 38.62 
N for all statements = 72 
 
Table 8.38 shows that only statements 3, 5, and 7 are statistically significant according to 
accounting standards. Mean rankings reflect that for these three statements, „AAOIFI‟ 
and „International & AAOIFI standards‟ are always top ranked, then followed by other 
criteria. These results confirm the K-W results for the previous control variables in 
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Tables 8.35 to 8.37; therefore, the results indicate that the perceived views in relation to 
accounting standards are statistically significant for these three statements. 
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Table 8.39– K-W Test Results by Respondent’s Position for Question 16 (Entire 
Research Sample) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Chi-Square 17.068 19.453 19.773 13.82 23.564 14.194 23.054 15.677 17.272 
Asymp. Sig. 0.253 0.148 0.137 0.463 0.052 0.435 0.059 0.333 0.242 
Region Mean Rank 
Analyst 36.9 40.1 24 39.9 19 33 40.2 24.3 52 
Senior Analyst 26.13 35 39.63 40.75 21.25 45.25 21.5 34.63 45.88 
Auditor 30.25 51.5 14 55 63 33 47 25.75 57 
CEO 32.1 33.3 39 39.9 46 24.1 18.5 26.4 38.1 
Chief Financial Officer 63.5 63.5 56.5 40.75 52.75 39.75 68 55.25 32 
Consultant 41.25 51.5 41.5 31.5 63 51.25 43.5 55.25 29.25 
Director 21 20.83 15.67 42.42 30.33 41.17 18.42 35.17 33.83 
General Manager 30 41.2 34.5 27.65 30.75 31.75 40.8 33.5 28.1 
Head of Investment Banking 63.5 39.5 69 55 63 57.5 68 67 32 
Head of Risk Management 38.23 36.59 41.27 37.77 43.55 32.55 39.14 40.82 30.45 
Managing Director 46.94 45.5 41.5 25.44 28.94 49.81 40 43.31 34.06 
Risk Manager 40 26.25 38.79 36.13 33.92 30.42 32.88 32.88 47.04 
Senior Trader 30.25 29 34 55 42.5 33.75 47 37.5 22.25 
Shari’ah Scholar 63.5 63.5 69 8 63 69.5 68 67 12.5 
Solicitor 19 8.5 34 55 42.5 33 38 18.5 12.5 
N for all statements = 72 
 
The potential impact of the respondents‟ positions on the same statements is also 
investigated. The p values in Table 8.39 show that there are no significant differences 
according to respondent‟s position. By relaxing the confidence level to 0.06, one can also 
accept statements 5 and 7. No pattern could be concluded by studying the mean ranking. 
The only obvious conclusion is that Shari’ah scholars ranked the highest mean and 
Solicitors had the lowest mean values for most, but not all, statements. This is expected 
because Shari’ah scholars tend to be more conservative in their views about Islamic 
banking and Shari’ah compliance, while Solicitors usually focus more on legal structures 
rather than the Shari’ah side of transactions.  
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Factor Analysis for Q16 (Credit Crisis and Islamic Finance) 
 
To locate the perception of the participants regarding the credit crisis in relation to a 
number of issues related to Islamic finance, they were provided with a number of 
statements. The opinions are analysed through factor analysis. 
 
As previously explained, factor analysis seeks to discover if the observed variables can be 
explained largely or entirely in terms of a much smaller number of variables called the 
factors.  
 
As there are nine statements for Q16, analysing the respondents‟ perceptions towards 
Islamic banking and the global credit crisis, the researcher felt that reducing these 
statements into more a manageable number would enhance the analysis and would tell 
more about how respondents perceived these issues. Hence, factor analysis is deemed to 
be relevant in this respect as the main task of factor analysis is to cluster the related group 
of variables through their common variance. 
 
In order to test the factorability of the data in terms of sampling adequacy, Table 8.40 
presents the results of KMO and also Bartlett‟s test for this factor analysis. 
 
Table 8.40 - KMO and Bartlett’s Test Results for the 9 Items Combined 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 0.844 
Bartlett‟s Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 173.046 
df 36 
Sig. 0.000 
The outcome of the KMO measure for all 9 items combined, related to the respondents‟ 
perception, showed the value of 0.844, which is higher than 0.60, implying that the factor 
analysis is appropriate for this study. In addition, the significant P-Value of 0.000 is 
significantly lower than critical P-Value of 0.05. Therefore, the identity matrix can be 
rejected. Based on the very encouraging results from the both testing, factor analysis may 
be performed. 
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In the second step PCA is used for data extraction, and then Varimax rotation was used in 
order to reduce the number of variables as in Table 8.41 which presents the output of the 
number of factors that are retained according to Kaiser‟s criterion, in which all the 
eigenvalues are more than 1.0. In this situation, there are three factors that will be 
retained, since the eigenvalues are 3.170, 1.356 and 1.332 respectively. 
 
The results indicate that these three components can explain the 64.9% of the total 
variation, which hence satisfies the use of factor analysis. 
 
Table 8.41 - Total Variance Explained for Q16 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 3.682 40.906 40.906 3.170 35.225 35.225 
2 1.136 12.617 53.523 1.356 15.064 50.289 
3 1.031 11.456 64.980 1.322 14.691 64.980 
4 .746 8.287 73.267    
5 .637 7.081 80.348    
6 .523 5.813 86.161    
7 .459 5.098 91.260    
8 .402 4.472 95.732    
9 .384 4.268 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Figure 8.2, which is basically a graph of the eigenvalues, shows that the nine variables 
could be reduced to only three as the graph slopes down steeply before becoming parallel 
to the horizontal line after the third component. It is clear from the plot that there is only a 
three factor solution to this question. Therefore it was decided to retain the three factors.  
 
Table 8.41 shows that there are three factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0, this 
means that the original nine items can be simply reduced to three factors. The three 
component solution explain 64.9% of the variance with component 1 contributing 40.9%, 
component 2 contributing 12.6%, and component 3 contributing 11.5%. The explanatory 
power of the first factor is very high. 
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Figure 8.2 – Screen Plot for Q16 
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Table 8.42 - Rotated Component Matrix
a 
for Q16 
 
Component 
1. Resilience of 
IFIs 2 
3 Risk management 
must be institutional 
1- Islamic banks are more resilient 
to economic shocks than their 
conventional  peers 
.776 -.050 -.238 
2- The recent crisis would not have 
happened under a true Islamic 
banking system 
.764 .081 -.082 
3- Islamic finance could have solved 
the global crisis 
.643 .468 -.146 
4- Risk management must be 
embedded institutionally 
-.100 -.189 .834 
5- Banks in general used to rely 
heavily on rating agencies 
.552 .447 .358 
6- Islamic banks rely less on rating 
agencies than conventional banks 
.454 -.029 -.583 
7- Islamic finance industry should 
develop its own rating agencies 
.743 .265 -.075 
8- Islamic banks will emerge 
stronger from the current crisis 
.706 -.007 -.211 
9- Consolidation is needed among 
smaller Islamic banks 
-.012 -.906 .156 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 9 iterations. 
 
Table 8.42 further provides a Rotated Component Matrix by distributing all variables to 
the identified three components. The test results showed no component for factor 2; 
therefore, the researcher accepted factors 1 and 3 only. The factors in each component 
have some common characteristics and measure the same phenomenon and, therefore, 
each component is named with a general description of the factors or variables it 
includes. For instance, factors in component one deal with „resilience of IFIs‟. The 
factors in component three deal with „risk management must be embedded 
 
355 
institutionally‟. The former includes seven statements, while the latter includes only two 
components. Thus, the heavy weight is with the „resilience of IFIs‟ component. 
 
MANOVA test according to Region for Question 16 
After conducting factor analysis a one way between groups a MANOVA test was 
computed in order to investigate if there is any significant difference between the two 
factors in relation to same control variables. This will help to locate the impact or 
significance of each control variable on the established distribution.  
 
MANOVA test was conducted according to „region‟ as the independent variable with the 
objective of testing the significance of „region‟ on the identified two components. In this 
case, the output of the Box‟s Test shows that there is no violation of assumption of 
homogeneity of variances of variance-covariance matrices since the sig. value of 0.013 is 
higher than the critical value of 0.001. 
 
Table 8.43 - Box’s Test of Equality of Covariance Matricesa 
Box's M 24.157 
F 2.342 
df1 9 
df2 824.888 
Sig. .013 
Tests the null hypothesis that the observed covariance matrices of the dependent variables are equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Region 
 
Additionally, the output of the Levene‟s Test of Equality of Error Variances is explored. 
The results in the Sig. column show that sig. values of „Resilience of IFIs‟ (0.681) and 
„Risk management must be institutional (0.236) are higher than 0.05. Thus, there is no 
violation of the assumption of equality of variances for these two factors. 
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Table 8.44 – Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
 F df1 df2 Sig. 
Resilience of IFIs .625 5 66 .681 
Risk management is institutional  1.398 5 66 .236 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Region 
 
The results of the Wilks‟ Lambda in Table 8.45 show that there is a statistically 
significant difference according to the region since the sig. value of 0.01 is quite lower 
than the critical level of 0.05. 
 
Table 8.45 - Multivariate Testsc 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept Pillai’s Trace .975 1255.030
a
 2.000 65.000 .000 .975 
Wilks’ Lambda .025 1255.030
a
 2.000 65.000 .000 .975 
Hotelling’s Trace 38.616 1255.030
a
 2.000 65.000 .000 .975 
Roy’s Largest Root 38.616 1255.030
a
 2.000 65.000 .000 .975 
Region Pillai’s Trace .370 2.992 10.000 132.000 .002 .185 
Wilks’ Lambda .646 3.175
a
 10.000 130.000 .001 .196 
Hotelling’s Trace .524 3.354 10.000 128.000 .001 .208 
Roy’s Largest Root .473 6.249
b
 5.000 66.000 .000 .321 
a. Exact statistic 
b. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
c. Design: Intercept + Region 
 
Since, multivariate test suggests that there is a statistically significant difference, a further 
investigation is conducted. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects provide this information. In 
this case, since there are two dependent variables, therefore, 0.05 is divided by two and 
the new alpha level is 0.025. As can be seen in the Tests of Between-Subjects Effects in 
Table 8.46, the results indicate that „Resilience of IFIs‟ has significant values of 0.000, 
while „Risk management must be institutional‟ has a sig. value of 0.242 which is higher 
than the critical value of 0.025 for this example. Furthermore, the effect size values as 
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evaluated by the Partial Eta Squared for „Resilience of IFIs‟ is 0.320, which are deemed 
large effect sizes using Cohen‟s criteria. It can be concluded that these results signify 
32% of the variances in „Resilience of IFIs‟ scores are explained respectively by the 
region. 
 
Table 8.46 - Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model Resilience of IFIs 13.209
a
 5 2.642 6.221 .000 .320 
Risk management is 
institutional  
2.821
b
 5 .564 1.384 .242 .095 
Intercept Resilience of IFIs 313.934 1 313.934 739.239 .000 .918 
Risk management is 
institutional  
438.911 1 438.911 1076.963 .000 .942 
Region Resilience of IFIs 13.209 5 2.642 6.221 .000 .320 
Risk management is 
institutional  
2.821 5 .564 1.384 .242 .095 
Error Resilience of IFIs 28.028 66 .425    
Risk management is 
institutional  
26.898 66 .408 
   
Total Resilience of IFIs 877.837 72     
Risk management is 
institutional  
1292.250 72 
    
Corrected Total Resilience of IFIs 41.237 71     
Risk management is 
institutional  
29.719 71 
    
a. R Squared = .320 (Adjusted R Squared = .269) 
b. R Squared = .095 (Adjusted R Squared = .026) 
 
An attempt was also made to see the effect of „nature of FI‟ on the identified components 
in factor analysis through MANOVA. However, no significant results could be 
established. 
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8.3 RISK MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING 
 
This part of the questionnaire examines the risk management and hedging techniques 
used within IFIs. Question 17 covers the frequency of producing risk management reports 
as perceived by the participants, and it is only applicable to financial institutions. 
 
Table 8.47 – K-W Test Results for Q17 (Risk Reporting) by Region for Selected 
Sample Data 
  
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Banks, Conventional 
Banks with Islamic 
Activities, & 
Conventional Banks 
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Banks &  Conventional 
Banks with Islamic 
Activities 
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Banks 
Frequency of producing: 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Capital Requirement Report         28.727 5 0 11.746 4 0.019 7.89 4 0.096 
Operational Risk Report 18.01 5 0.003 3.534 4 0.473 2.208 4 0.698 
Profit Rate Risk Report 20.859 5 0.001 8.04 4 0.09 4.539 4 0.338 
FX Risk Report 19.469 5 0.002 10.321 4 0.035 9.646 4 0.047 
Liquidity Risk Report 19.312 5 0.002 8.026 4 0.091 5.357 4 0.253 
Commodity Risk Report 9.405 5 0.094 6.636 4 0.156 7.297 4 0.121 
Country Report 11.58 5 0.041 6.554 4 0.161 5.218 4 0.266 
Equity mark-to-market Report 12.611 5 0.027 11.406 4 0.022 6.464 4 0.167 
Classified Accounts Report 16.91 5 0.005 9.651 4 0.047 5.386 4 0.25 
Industry Concentration Risk 
Report 
8.537 5 0.129 3.168 4 0.53 3.153 4 0.533 
Credit Exposure Report 9.479 5 0.091 10.937 4 0.027 12.452 4 0.014 
Large Exposure Report 10.155 5 0.071 9.408 4 0.052 7.111 4 0.13 
                    
As depicted by Table 8.47, the K-W test for fully-fledged Islamic Banks, conventional 
Banks with Islamic activities, and conventional Banks shows that, statistically, there is a 
significant difference among various regions in the frequency of producing risk reports (P 
value <0.05) except for Commodity Risk report (0.094), Industry Concentration Risk 
Report (0.129), Credit Exposure Report (0.091), and Large Exposure Report (0.071). 
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Hence, for the rest of the reports there are significant differences in the perceptions of the 
participants. Thus, for most of the reports „region‟ is a significant factor. 
 
Repeating the K-W test with „region‟ as the control variable for various institutional 
samples of data gives different results as the removal of conventional banks from the 
sample shows that the distribution of frequency of producing reports becomes the same 
across more reports, i.e. fewer risk reports show statistical significance in the frequency 
of production across regions. By removing Islamic subsidiaries from the sample and 
conducting the K-W test on Fully-fledged Islamic Banks exclusively, only two reports 
(FX Risk Report and Credit Exposure Report) become statistically significant across 
various regions.  
 
The results reflect the risk management culture difference between Islamic and 
conventional banks. By conducting the K-W on fully fledged IFIs only, there was little 
significance between the responses across different regions. However, expanding the 
sample to include Islamic subsidiaries of conventional banks increased the significant 
difference in risk reporting across regions. When the sample was expanded further to 
incorporate conventional banks, the significance in difference becomes more noticeable.   
 
Tables 8.48 to 8.55 examine the mean ranking for reports with statistically significant 
difference in frequency of production. 
 
In this particular case mean ranking requires clarification. Since during coding „daily 
reporting‟ was assigned value1; and „never‟ was assigned value 5, this has impact on the 
mean ranking. In other words, the better mean value here would be the lower value 
indicating better disclosure. 
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Table 8.48 - Frequency of Producing Capital Requirement Report         
  
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Banks, Conventional 
Banks with Islamic 
Activities, & 
Conventional Banks 
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks 
&  Conventional Banks with 
Islamic Activities 
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks 
Region 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Americas 2 13.5 1st  N/A   N/A N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
Europe 20 18.3 2nd  12 13.46 1st  5 8 1st  
GCC 19 32.03 4th  16 20.75 3rd   9 12.5 3rd   
Other 2 23.5 3rd 2 14.75 2nd   2 8.75 2nd   
Other Middle 
East 
12 47.63 6th  5 31.9 5th  5 19.5 5th  
Southeast Asia 4 37.5 5th  4 24.38 4th   4 14.38 4th   
Total 59   
 
39     25     
 
Table 8.49 - Frequency of Producing Operational Risk Report 
  
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Banks, Conventional 
Banks with Islamic 
Activities, & 
Conventional Banks 
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks 
&  Conventional Banks with 
Islamic Activities 
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks 
Region 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank N Mean 
Rank 
Rank N Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Americas 2 11.5 1st  N/A   N/A N/A  N/A   N/A N/A  
Europe 20 19.5 2nd  12 15.17 1st  5 9.1 1st  
GCC 19 33.08 4th  16 19.94 3rd   9 12.22 3rd   
Other 2 27.5 3rd  2 17 2nd   2 10.25 2nd   
Other Middle 
East 
11 40.18 6th  4 24.13 5th   4 14.63 5th   
Southeast Asia 3 38.17 5th  3 23.83 4th   3 13.83 4th   
Total 57     37     23     
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Table 8.50 - Frequency of Producing Profit Rate Risk Report 
  
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Banks, Conventional 
Banks with Islamic 
Activities, & 
Conventional Banks 
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks 
&  Conventional Banks with 
Islamic Activities 
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks 
Region 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Americas 2 17 1st  N/A   N/A N/A  N/A   N/A N/A  
Europe 20 18.95 2nd  12 13.67 1st  5 7.9 1st  
GCC 19 33.11 4th  16 20.56 2nd    9 12.61 2nd    
Other 2 32.5 3rd  2 21.5 3rd    2 12.75 3rd    
Other Middle 
East 
12 41.88 6th  5 27.5 5th   5 16.5 5th   
Southeast Asia 3 33.83 5th  3 22.5 4th   3 13 4th   
Total 58     38     24     
 
Table 8.51 - Frequency of Producing FX Risk Report 
  
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Banks, Conventional 
Banks with Islamic 
Activities, & 
Conventional Banks 
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks 
&  Conventional Banks with 
Islamic Activities 
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks 
Region 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank N Mean 
Rank 
Rank N Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Americas 2 13 1st  N/A   N/A N/A  N/A   N/A N/A  
Europe 19 19.18 2nd  11 13.5 1st  5 8 1st  
GCC 19 29.97 4th  16 17.66 3rd     9 9.67 2nd    
Other 2 29.5 3rd  2 17.25 2nd     2 10.75 3rd    
Other Middle 
East 
11 39.91 5th  4 29.5 5th   4 18.75 5th   
Southeast Asia 3 46 6th   3 27.5 4th   3 17.5 4th   
Total 56     36     23     
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Table 8.52 - Frequency of Producing Liquidity Risk Report 
  
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Banks, Conventional 
Banks with Islamic 
Activities, & 
Conventional Banks 
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks 
&  Conventional Banks with 
Islamic Activities 
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks 
Region 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Americas 2 18.5 1st  N/A   N/A N/A  N/A   N/A N/A  
Europe 20 19.78 2nd  12 13.5 1st  5 7 1st  
GCC 19 33.13 4th  16 22 3rd     9 14.44 3rd     
Other 2 31.25 3rd  2 21 2nd      2 12.5 2nd      
Other Middle 
East 
12 41.25 6th   5 24.4 4th    5 14.8 4th    
Southeast Asia 4 37.63 5th    4 25.5 5th    4 15.25 5th    
Total 59     39     25     
 
Table 8.53 - Frequency of Producing Country Report 
  
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Banks, Conventional 
Banks with Islamic 
Activities, & 
Conventional Banks 
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks 
&  Conventional Banks with 
Islamic Activities 
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks 
Region 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank N Mean 
Rank 
Rank N Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Americas 2 16.5 1st  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
Europe 20 25.13 2nd  12 18.79 1st  5 13.9 3rd  
GCC 19 27.47 3rd   16 16.53 2nd      9 9.17 1st      
Other 2 33.75 4th   2 20.75 3rd       2 12.25 2nd        
Other Middle 
East 
12 39 5th    5 28.1 5th     5 16.9 5th     
Southeast Asia 4 44.25 6th     4 27 4th     4 16 4th     
Total 59     39     25     
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Table 8.54 - Frequency of Producing Equity Mark-to-Market Report 
  
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Banks, Conventional 
Banks with Islamic 
Activities, & 
Conventional Banks 
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks 
&  Conventional Banks with 
Islamic Activities 
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks 
Region 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Americas 2 15.5 1st  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
Europe 20 22.55 2nd  12 15.13 1st  5 8.9 1st  
GCC 19 30.34 3rd   16 18.03 2nd      9 11.94 3rd       
Other 2 36.75 4th   2 23 3rd       2 13.25 4th        
Other Middle 
East 
12 39.96 6th   5 33.8 5th     5 19.8 5th     
Southeast Asia 4 39.63 5th    4 23.75 4th     4 11.88 2nd       
Total 59     39     25     
 
Table 8.55 - Frequency of Producing Classified Accounts Report 
  
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Banks, Conventional 
Banks with Islamic 
Activities, & 
Conventional Banks 
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks 
&  Conventional Banks with 
Islamic Activities 
Fully-fledged Islamic Banks 
Region 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank N Mean 
Rank 
Rank N Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Americas 2 8.5 1st  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
Europe 20 20 2nd  12 14.75 1st  5 11.9 3rd    
GCC 19 33.95 4th    16 19.78 3rd       9 12.28 4th        
Other 2 32.5 3rd    2 17 2nd        2 7.5 1st       
Other Middle 
East 
10 37.7 6th   4 32.5 5th     4 18.5 5th     
Southeast Asia 4 37.25 5th    4 20.88 4th     4 10.25 2nd       
Total 57     38     24     
 
The results presented in this section so far indicate a particular pattern. The trend is 
obvious: conventional banks, concentrated in Europe and the Americas, produce risk 
reports more frequently than Islamic banks. Risk management and reporting is more 
advanced in conventional banking than in Islamic banking.  
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8.4 RISK MEASUREMENT  
 
This section expands the descriptive analytical analysis conducted in Chapter 7 by 
examining the impact of various control variables on respondents‟ views regarding the 
use various techniques to measure and analyse risk. For this purpose, the researcher used 
K-W to determine if there were any statistical significant differences across the categories 
of respondent profiles specifically region, respondent‟s position, nature of FI, nature of 
activities, and accounting standards. Since this question targets FI only, the sample used 
for this question is restricted to bankers.  
 
Table 8.56 - K-W Test Results for Q18 (Risk Measurement) for Selected Sample 
Data According to Various Control Variables 
Risk Management 
Technique  
Region 
Respondent’
s Position 
Nature of FI 
Nature of 
Activities 
Accounting 
Standards 
Chi-
Sq. 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Sq. 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Sq. 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Sq. 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Internal based ratings 6.223 0.285 9.79 0.459 1.612 0.447 3.067 0.69 3.699 0.296 
Credit ratings by 
rating agencies 
1.58 0.904 6.81 0.743 3.396 0.183 8.01 0.156 11.78 0.008 
Gap analysis 17.56 0.004 10.8 0.372 0.516 0.773 6.884 0.229 7.119 0.068 
Duration analysis 15.69 0.008 14.2 0.163 2.468 0.291 6.559 0.256 7.151 0.067 
Maturity matching 
analysis 
8.155 0.148 5.78 0.833 0.344 0.842 10.79 0.056 6.028 0.11 
Earnings at risk 8.58 0.127 10.0 0.438 7.754 0.021 10.14 0.071 4.029 0.258 
Value at risk 10.98 0.052 13.0 0.222 1.926 0.382 5.731 0.333 5.134 0.162 
Stress testing 17.48 0.004 9.70 0.466 4.91 0.086 7.604 0.179 5.687 0.128 
Simulation techniques 14.60 0.012 19.2 0.038 6.64 0.036 13.05 0.023 7.708 0.052 
RAROC 19.65 0.001 16.0 0.097 12.29 0.002 10.79 0.056 7.373 0.061 
 
‘Region‟ and „nature of FI‟ are the control variables selected for analysis by mean 
ranking, being the control variables with the most significant results, and because these 
two variables are most essential to the difference in risk management techniques among 
banks. As can be seen in Table 8.56, „region‟ has five significant risk management 
techniques, and „nature of FI‟ has three significant techniques. Thus, they have the more 
significant variables compared to others, which justifies why they should be analysed 
further. 
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Table 8.57 – K-W Test Mean Rankings for Risk Measurement by Region for 
Selected Sample Data 
Risk Management 
Technique  
GAP 
analysis 
Duration 
analysis 
Stress 
testing 
Simulation 
techniques 
RAROC 
Nature of 
Financial 
Institution 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Americas 2 36  1
st
  36.5  1
st
  41  1
st
  48.5  1
st
  42.5  1
st
  
Europe 20 33.05  4
th
   35.03  3
rd
    36.58  3
rd
    36.7  2
nd
     33.65  3
rd
    
GCC 19 34.45  3
rd
  31.84  4
th
   30.13  4
th
   28.32  4
th
   36.29  2
nd
    
Other 2 36  1
st
  36.5  1
st
  41  1
st
  33.75  3
rd
   27.75  4
th
  
Other Middle East 12 18.79  6th  19.29  6th  21.33 5th   21.46 5th   15.46 6th    
Southeast Asia 4 21.25  5th  21.75  5th  11.5  6th   19  6th   20.38  5th    
Total 59                     
Only techniques with significant p value are further analysed by mean ranking 
 
Table 8.57 shows that conventional banks in relation to their regional location, 
concentrated outside of the GCC and Middle East, use more advanced risk management 
techniques than Islamic banks. The „Americas‟ are the most advanced across all 
techniques, followed often by „Other‟ or „Europe‟. The rest of the regional samples 
include mostly Islamic banks, their use of sophisticated risk measurements, however, is 
not as significant as in conventional banks in the Americas and Europe, as evidenced 
from mean ranking. 
 
Table 8.58 – K-W Test Mean Rankings for Risk Measurement by Nature of FI for 
Selected Sample Data 
Risk Management Technique  Earnings at risk 
Simulation 
techniques 
RAROC 
Nature of Financial 
Institution 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Rank 
Fully-fledged Islamic Bank 25 23.98  3
rd
  26.08  3
rd
  22.44  3
rd
  
Conventional Bank with Islamic 
activities 
14 34.18  2
nd
 27.43  2
nd
 38.29 1
st
  
Conventional Bank 20 34.6 1
st
   36.7 1
st
   33.65 2
nd
    
Total 59             
Only techniques with significant p value are further analysed by mean ranking 
 
These results in Table 8.58 confirm that there is a particular trend determined by the 
market realities. The use of risk management techniques in IFIs is not as sophisticated 
and widely spread as in the conventional banking world. Fully-fledged Islamic Bank rank 
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3rd across all techniques as not many IFIs use the more technically advanced risk 
measurement approaches, which is evidenced from the mean ranking in Table 8.58. 
 
8.5 RISK MITIGATION 
 
As previously discussed, risk mitigation and hedging are controversial issues in Islamic 
banking. Different mitigation techniques are subjected to different interpretation by 
Shari’ah scholars. There have been substantial efforts in developing Shari’ah-compliant 
hedging instruments, which are the subject of this section. These include: On-balance 
sheet netting, Collateral arrangements, Islamic options, Islamic swaps, Guarantees, 
Islamic currency forwards, and Parallel contracts. However, much of this progress 
remains localised with limited scope for cross-border application and further work is still 
needed as evident from the results of K-W test in Table 8.59. Question 20 targets 
institutions that use Islamic finance contracts only; therefore, when conducting the K-W 
test, only stand-alone Islamic banks and Islamic subsidiaries were included in the raw 
data in relation to five control variables: region, respondent‟s position, nature of FI, 
nature of activities, and accounting standards. 
 
Table 8.59 - K-W Test Results for Q20 (Risk Mitigation) for Selected Sample Data 
According to Various Control Variables 
Risk Mitigation 
Technique  
Region 
Respondent’s 
Position 
Nature of FI 
Nature of 
Activities 
Accounting 
Standards 
Chi-
Sq. 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
On-balance sheet 
netting 
9.65 0.086 22.841 0.011 44.91 0.00 8.483 0.132 5.371 0.147 
Collateral 
arrangements 
11.25 0.047 22.177 0.014 53.14 0.00 8.599 0.126 5.248 0.155 
Islamic options  16.94 0.005 20.417 0.026 46.59 0.00 15.034 0.01 9.811 0.02 
Islamic swaps 14.65 0.012 21.024 0.021 44.73 0.00 12.76 0.026 12.991 0.005 
Guarantees 8.64 0.124 24.37 0.007 52.24 0.00 11.293 0.046 6.088 0.107 
Islamic currency 
forwards 
9.98 0.076 23.579 0.009 54.59 0.00 8.787 0.118 5.287 0.152 
Parallel contracts 10.30 0.067 18.794 
0.043 45.59 0.00 12 0.035 6.838 0.077 
 
„Nature of FI‟ is the control variable selected for analysis by mean ranking as it has the 
highest number of significant results and because this variable is most essential to the 
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difference in risk mitigation techniques among financial institutions as illustrated in Table 
8.59. 
 
Table 8.60 – K-W Test Mean Rankings by Nature of FI for Selected Sample Data 
Risk Mitigation 
Technique  
On-
balance 
sheet 
netting 
Collateral 
arrangements 
Islamic 
options  
Islamic 
swaps 
Guarantees 
Islamic 
currency 
forwards 
Parallel 
contracts 
Nature of FI N Mean Rank 
Fully-fledged 
Islamic Bank 
25 19.2 19.94 19.68 20.02 18.88 20.22 19.46 
     (2nd)   (2nd)    (2nd)  (1st)    (2nd)  (1st)  (2nd)  
Conventional 
Bank with 
Islamic 
activities 
14 21.43 20.11 20.57 19.96 22 19.61 20.96 
      (1st)   (1st)   (1st)   (2nd)   (1st)  (2nd)    (1st) 
Total 39               
Note: Ordering in parentheses refers to mean ranking 
 
These results confirm that there is a general trend determined by the market realities. 
With the exception of Islamic swaps and Islamic currency forwards, Fully-fledged 
Islamic banks fell behind Islamic subsidiaries in using all other risk mitigation 
techniques. The latter group tends to benefit from the already developed risk mitigation 
platforms at their conventional parents. However, of notice is that the difference in the 
value of mean ranking between the two groups is small, which reflects that IFIs are 
progressing in the use risk mitigation but still the use of risk mitigation techniques in IFIs 
is not as developed as in conventional banking. 
 
8.6 ISLAMIC BANKING IN PRACTICE 
 
This section examines the proposition that Islamic banking has been diverting from its 
roots by mimicking conventional banks. In doing so, a K-W test was conducted using the 
entire sample according to nature of FI.  
This section aims to test the participants‟ perceptions in relation to the following 
statements. The coding of the statements as appeared in the tables is as follows: 
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1.  Islamic banks have been mimicking conventional models. 
2.  Islamic finance provides an ethical banking alternative. 
3.  There is difference between the current practice and principles of Islamic 
banking.  
4.  Islamic banks need to reform to be successful. 
 
Table 8.61 – K-W Test Results by Nature of FI for Question 21 (Entire Research 
Sample) 
 Nature of FI Statement 
    1 2 3 4 
Chi-Square 
  7.566   4.589   12.812   7.171   
Asymp. Sig. 
  0.056   0.205   0.005   0.067   
Nature of FI N 
Mean 
Rank Rank 
Mean 
Rank Rank 
Mean 
Rank Rank 
Mean 
Rank Rank 
Fully-fledged Islamic Bank 25 38.22  2
nd
  42.3 1
st
   40.94  2
nd
  37.24  2
nd
  
Conventional Bank with 
Islamic Activities 14 26.79  4
th
 37.86  2
nd
 29.89  4
th
 27  4
th
 
Conventional Bank 20 34.23  3
rd
 30.15  4
th
 27.18  3
rd
 35.2  3
rd
 
Others 13 47.15   1
st
   33.65  3
rd
 49.42   1
st
   47.31   1
st
   
Total 
72                 
 
As depicted by Table 8.61, only statement 3 is statistically significant, reflecting the 
similarities in views among respondents about the diversion between principles and 
current practices in Islamic banking. However, with a „relaxation‟ of the confidence level 
to 0.06, statement 1 can also be accepted as statistically significant. Furthermore, mean 
rankings reflect a pattern across all statements, with the exception of statement 2. Non-
bankers, others, scored the highest mean, followed by fully-fledged Islamic banks, 
conventional banks, and Islamic subsidiaries respectively. This reflects the risk appetite 
of each group. Interestingly, Islamic bankers are more critical of the current practices in 
the industry than their conventional peers. This could be explained by the fact that 
Islamic bankers are more educated about the underlying principles of Islamic finance and 
have a better understanding of current structures than conventional bankers. The „others‟ 
category comprises Shari’ah scholars, consultants, researchers, etc., whose better 
understanding of the ideologies of Islamic banking is reflected in their lack of satisfaction 
of Islamic banking at its current state (highest mean ranking for 3 statements).  
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Repeating the K-W test with „region‟ as the control variable for the entire research 
sample gives different results, as illustrated by Table 8.62. All statements are statistically 
insignificant, except statement 2, which shows the common dissatisfaction with the 
current status of Islamic banking across all regions.  
 
Table 8.62 – K-W Test Results by Region for Question 21 (Entire Research Sample) 
 Region Statement 
    1 2 3 4 
Chi-Square 
  
8.202   19.551   4.25   3.227   
Asymp. Sig. 
  
0.145   0.002   0.514   0.665   
Region 
N 
Mean 
Rank Rank 
Mean 
Rank Rank 
Mean 
Rank Rank 
Mean 
Rank Rank 
Americas 2 51.75 1
st
 9.5 6
th
 24.75 6
th
 27.5 6
th
 
Europe 31 40.45 2
nd
 29.24 4
th
 35.92 4
th
 38.42 2
nd
 
GCC 19 26.92 5
th
 46.71 2
nd
 36.66 3
rd
 38 3
rd
 
Other 2 51.75 1
st
 62.5 1
st
 60.5 1
st
 50 1
st
 
Other Middle East 14 35.39 4
th
 42.5 3
rd
 34.11 5
th
 32.14 4
th
 
Southeast Asia 4 40 3
rd
 23.75 5
th
 42.5 2
nd
 27.5 5
th
 
Total 72                 
 
Despites the similarities between views of respondents across various regions (only 
statement 2 has a significant p value), the mean ranking results show dispersed results; no 
trend can be established across various regions.  
 
In addition, an attempt was made to test the impact of the „respondent‟s position‟ on the 
views, however, the results show that there are no significant differences as all p value > 
0.05. 
 
8.7 THE NEXT CHAPTER IN ISLAMIC BANKING 
 
The last section of the questionnaire is a forward looking question that explores different 
strategies IFIs should follow in order to prepare for the day after tomorrow. For this, eight 
statements were provided to the respondents to disclose their opinion. The data were 
analysed through K-W test. 
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Table 8.63 - K-W Test Results for Q22 for the Entire Sample According to Various 
Control Variables 
Strategy 
Region 
Respondent's 
Position Nature of FI 
Nature of 
Activities 
Accounting 
Standards 
  
Chi-
Sq. 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Sq. 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Sq. 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Sq. 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Chi-
Sq. 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Improved risk 
management               
5.22 0.389 15.3 0.358 2.59 0.458 1.991 0.921 3.607 0.462 
Enhanced morality – 
Back to roots 
9.10 0.105 11.82 0.621 5.49 0.139 9.002 0.173 3.799 0.434 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
3.80 0.578 17.49 0.231 1.28 0.732 5.956 0.428 6.094 0.192 
Organic growth in 
home market 
10.83 0.055 13.98 0.451 8.57 0.036 2.965 0.813 2.216 0.696 
Better risk mitigation 9.07 0.106 16.07 0.309 7.28 0.063 9.697 0.138 3.556 0.469 
Innovation 1.42 0.921 12.13 0.596 3.04 0.385 12.17 0.058 1.435 0.838 
Diversification – 
reduce 
concentration 
5.09 0.404 17.36 0.238 5.06 0.167 6.979 0.323 6.118 0.191 
Standardization 7.14 0.21 21.59 0.087 10.5 0.015 5.246 0.513 5.301 0.258 
 
As shown in Table 8.63, „nature of FI‟ is the only control variable whose results had 
some statistically significant outcomes across different groups. „Organic growth in home 
market‟ and „Standardization‟ had p values of 0.036 and 0.015 respectively. The mean 
rankings of these two strategies according to „nature of FI‟ are examined in Table 8.64. 
As regards to other control variables, the opinions do not show differences but rather 
convergence. 
  
Table 8.64 – K-W Test Mean Rankings by Nature of FI for Entire Sample  
Strategy   
Organic growth in home 
market 
Standardization 
Nature of Financial 
Institution 
N Mean Rank Rank Mean Rank Rank 
Fully-fledged Islamic 
Bank 
25 31.68  3
rd
 38.88  2
nd
 
Conventional Bank with 
Islamic Activities 
14 28.86  4
th
 49.68 1
st
   
Conventional Bank 20 46.6  1
st
  28.65  4
th
 
Others 13 38.46  2
nd
 29.81  3
rd
 
Total 72         
 
As can be seen from Table 8.63, no particular pattern could be identified. For „Organic 
growth in home market‟, conventional banks were more aggressive with a high mean 
value (46.6), followed by others (38.46), Fully-fledged Islamic Bank (31.68), and finally 
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Islamic subsidiaries (28.86). However, this trend was almost reversed for 
„Standardization‟ with Islamic subsidiaries having the highest mean value (49.68), which 
is much higher than the rest of categories. Conventional banks rank last with a mean of 
28.65.  
 
8.8 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter represents the second part of the quantitative analysis for the questionnaire. 
The objective of this chapter was to gauge the perception of the respondents regarding 
different risk management and capital adequacy issues in Islamic banking, the effect of 
the recent global crisis on Islamic banking, and what the future holds for the industry. 
Various inferential statistical tools were employed to examine the relationship between 
the characteristics of the sample respondents and their risk perceptions. Kruskall-Wallis 
analysis was the most-performed test to find out if there were any significant differences 
caused by the respondents‟ category and this was subsequently interpreted.   
 
„Region‟ was the control variable that displayed the most statistically significant 
differences among respondents‟ perceptions for different parts of the questionnaire. 
Analysis according to „nature of FI‟,„ nature of activities‟ and „respondent‟s position‟ also 
revealed some general trends that can be attributed to prevailing market conditions. 
„Accounting standards‟ was used as control variable as well, however, the results did not 
often provide much statistical significance for this category.   
 
The differences among respondents‟ answers were scrutinized to test if there were 
significant differences due to characteristics. The next chapter takes the analysis one step 
further by qualitatively analysing the field interviews conducted with Islamic banking 
professionals, while further analysis was then carried out to make more sense of the 
available facts. Detailed analysis of the findings of this chapter, within the context of the 
findings of descriptive statistical analysis of the questionnaire and the interview analysis, 
is provided in an integrated manner in Chapter 10.  
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CHAPTER 9 
EXPLORING THE PERCEPTIONS ON RISK AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN ISLAMIC BANKING: 
INTERVIEW DATA ANALYSIS  
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter focuses on the qualitative analysis of data assembled through individual in-
depth interviews with Islamic banking professionals. In analysing the data, focused 
coding technique is used. The objective is to explore the responses of the interviewees in 
relation to risk practices as conducted in their financial institutions and banks. It is also 
considered that the findings from this chapter can help to substantiate the findings 
established in the earlier analyses, but also to develop further meaning in relation to the 
risk management practices. 
 
In this chapter, the primary data collected through in-depth interviews is summarized and 
analysed. The outcomes and results are matched with the research objectives. Although 
the outcomes from the interviews are mainly discussed in this chapter, views and quotes 
from interviewees are used as supporting arguments throughout this paper. 
 
It should be noted that focused coding method based on thematic understanding is 
utilised as the main method of analysis. 
 
9.2 INTERVIEW ANALYSIS 
 
A detailed explanation in relation to the process and analysis of interviews was dealt with 
in the Research Methodology Chapter. It should be reiterated that the interviews 
conducted with bankers, financiers, and Shari’ah scholars were audio recorded with the 
permission of the interviewees. When recording was not possible because of the 
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spontaneity to engage in the interview, notes were taken in shorthand by the interviewer; 
even when an interview was being recorded, shorthand notes were also kept.  
 
Interviews were transcribed and the interview notes were read several times, which 
helped to create the thematic areas but also the focused coding. In other words, notes 
were transferred into segments representing complete thoughts on a single question or 
topic, in line with the original research questions. All transcribed interviews, thus, were 
broken into coded segments representing complete thought statements. After coding, the 
interview segments were transferred from word processing format into a spreadsheet for 
further analysis. 
 
9.3 FORMING THE MAIN INTERVIEW THEMES  
 
The interview themes and questions were designed within the context of the main 
research questions and hypotheses explained in Chapter 6. The interviews covered the 
same topics as the questionnaire, as the main purpose of the semi-structured interviews 
was to prove or disprove the conclusions driven from the questionnaire data analysis. The 
main themes were: 
 
(i)  Risk perception in Islamic banking; 
(ii) Capital adequacy for Islamic banks; 
(iii) Islamic banking and the global credit crisis;  
(iv) Risk mitigation in Islamic banking; 
(v)  The dichotomy between the theory and practice of Islamic banking; 
(vi) The next chapter in Islamic banking. 
  
It should be noted that a theme may have occurred several times within an interview, but, 
for purposes of analysis, a theme was counted only once per interview. 
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9.4 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Prior to the interviews, an interview guide was prepared by listing the important topics to 
be covered and drafting a list of questions to be explored with the respondents, including 
sub-topics. Nevertheless, in-depth interviews are never rigidly defined. They are, by 
nature, structured to allow respondents the freedom to express their thoughts, feelings, 
and insights. Therefore, during the interviews, the phrasing of questions and their order or 
sequence were re-defined to fit the characteristics of each interview. 
 
The following were the main interview questions: 
 
Theme A - Risk perception in Islamic banking 
 
1. What are the main risks facing Islamic banks? 
2. Does the risk perception in Islamic banks differ from conventional banking, and 
in what sense? Are Islamic banks riskier than their conventional counterparts? 
3. Do you believe that Islamic banking products are structured differently as 
compared to conventional banking products?  
4. Do you think IFIs actually favour mark-up based contracts to profit-sharing 
contracts? Why? 
 
Theme B - Capital adequacy for Islamic banks 
 
5. How suitable are Basel II standards to Islamic banking?  
6. Do Islamic banks need to reserve more or less capital compared to their 
conventional peers? 
7. What impact will Basel III have on Islamic banks?? Will the Basel III standards 
consider Islamic banking?   
8. Are Basel III new regulatory standards more likely to prevent a major crisis 
similar to the recent one? Has Basel II failed in preventing the crisis?  
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Theme C - Islamic banking and the global credit crisis 
 
9. There is much debate about the resilience of Islamic banking against the financial 
crisis. Do you think that Islamic banking has really been resilient to the crisis, or 
does it suffer from the same flaws of conventional banking?  
10. Could the recent crisis have occurred under an Islamic banking system? Will the 
Islamic finance industry gain confidence after the current financial crisis?  
 
Theme D - Risk mitigation in Islamic banking 
 
11. What do you think about risk mitigation in Islamic banking? Do you consider it as 
Shari’ah-compliant? How important is hedging to the industry? 
 
Theme E - The dichotomy between the theory and practice of Islamic banking 
 
12. How Shari’ah-compliant is Islamic banking within its current practice? Do you 
believe that Islamic banks need to reform in order to be successful?  
 
Theme F - The next chapter in Islamic banking 
 
13. What strategies should Islamic banks focus on over the coming decade? What do 
you believe are the catalysts for the growth of Islamic banking? 
 
9.5 RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS 
9.5.1  Risk Perception in Islamic Banking 
 
This first part of the interview analysis aims at the participants‟ opinions regarding risk 
management issues in Islamic banking. Questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 explore how the risk 
perception in Islamic banking differs from conventional banking, the unique risk 
characteristics of IFIs, the risks inherent in Islamic banking contracts, and the risk 
management techniques used by IFIs. Tables 9.1 to 9.6 present the findings from the 
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focused coding analysis for Question 1 about the main risks facing Islamic banks. The 
results of the analysis for Question 2 are presented in Tables 9.7 to 9.9, while Tables 9.10 
to 9.12 summarise the findings for Question 3, which asks the participants whether they 
believe that Islamic banking products are structured differently than the conventional 
products.   
 
Table 9.1 – Results for Question 1 
Question 1 What are the main risks facing Islamic banks?  
Focused Coding 
1 Shari’ah-non-compliance risk 
2 Liquidity risk 
3 Asset liability management risk 
4 Concentration risk 
5 Reputational risk 
Theme: Main risks facing IFIs are liquidity risk, ALM risk, concentration risk, 
Shari’ah-non-compliance risk, and concentration risk. 
 
As can be seen from Table 9.1, several weaknesses and vulnerabilities have been 
identified by the respondents among IFIs in the areas of risk management and 
governance, particularly in terms of the handling of asset-liability maturity mismatches, 
Shari’ah-non-compliance, reputational risk, and real estate exposure and concentration 
risk. Respondents identified Shari’ah-non-compliance, liquidity, concentration, ALM, 
and reputational risks as the main risk facing IFIs. Tables 9.2 to 9.6 examine the 
respondents‟ answers regarding each of these identified risks.  
 
Table 9.2 – Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 1 
Shari’ah non-compliance risk 
Interview 1 The risk of being perceived as non-Shari’ah-compliant could severely 
damage the creditworthiness of an IFI 
Interview 3 AAOIFI has taken some steps in this regard with its institutional 
certifications of Shari’ah compliance 
Interview 4 Interface between Shari’ah and civil systems create range of risks 
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Some interviewees, particularly Shari’ah scholars and researchers, regarded Shari’ah-
non-compliance as a major risk, as it can have a material impact on the IFIs‟ risk profile, 
and its ripple effect can create other risks, particularly reputational and legal risks. 
Islamic finance disputes in courts, especially in international deals, are decided by judges 
trained under common law and not particularly under Islamic jurisprudence. This requires 
an interface between Shari’ah and civil law, thus adding additional legal risks. Moreover, 
respondents widely felt that the application of Shari’ah compliance as a commercial and 
defensive legal tool, like the distressed Investment Dar Company‟s own Shari’ah board 
retracting from its approval, undermines the credibility and ethical ethos that underpins 
Islamic finance. Given the consequences of such reversals, it is key for the industry that 
the approval process be extensively documented, formalised, and open to inspection. One 
Shari’ah scholar in interview 3 expressed that AAOIFI has taken some steps in this 
regard with its institutional certifications of Shari’ah compliance, but for a deeper, stable 
and more liquid market the concept needs to gain wider acceptance. 
 
Table 9.3 – Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 1 
Liquidity risk 
Interview 13 IFIs suffer from managing excessive liquidity, especially with regards 
to the management of short-term liquidity and overnight liquidity 
Interview 27 The liquidity/leverage trade-off for many IFIs is a double-edged sword 
Interview 30 Liquidity management is structurally difficult at IFIs  
Interview 33 Liquidity is one of the most critical issues for IFIs 
 
Table 9.4 – Focused Coding Number 3 for Question 1 
Asset liability management risk 
Interview 23 Handling of asset-liability maturity mismatches is a challenge 
 
As depicted by Tables 9.3 and 9.4, several respondents recognized liquidity and ALM 
risks as the most severe risks facing IFIs and stated that IFIs need to factor liquidity more 
fully into risk management. Respondents believe that both liquidity and ALM risks are 
strongly correlated. In the absence of a wide pool of Shari’ah-compliant and sufficiently 
liquid investment vehicles (especially in fixed income), IFIs find it difficult to manage 
their balance sheet from an asset-liability management perspective, especially with regard 
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to liquidity and margin-rate risk. IFIs use cash from deposits and short-term liquid assets 
to finance long-term liabilities. As a result, the liability makeup affects their funding 
structures differently and reflects an institution‟s specific asset-liability management 
policies. Most respondents, therefore, believe that IFIs‟ funding mix tends to be 
imbalanced, with the dominance of deposits, PSIAs and equity making IFIs‟ funding 
profile predominantly short-term at a time when the maturity of their asset classes is 
widening. To mitigate nascent maturity mismatches, some IFIs started issuing medium-
term sukuk to lengthen the maturity profile of their funding, but sukuk still represent a 
minor share of total liabilities. Subordinated sukuk and hybrid instruments have not been 
used yet; these are more expensive funding sources and incentives to issue them are 
limited given the relative abundance of capital in the region. IFIs are also increasingly 
focusing on retail deposits to boost liquidity, due to the deposits‟ sticky nature. As a 
result, according to the responses given by the interviewees, the Islamic banking industry 
is faced with a conundrum: its institutions maintain high concentrations in current/short-
term liabilities, but, at the same time, they are exposed to highly profitable, but illiquid, 
long-term assets (e.g. property and infrastructure, and sukuk), and they have limited 
access to long-term funding solutions. 
 
Table 9.5 – Focused Coding Number 4 for Question 1 
Concentration risk 
Interview 9 Reliance on limited funding sources 
Interview 12 Concentration risk is a time bomb that might bring down many IFIs, 
particularly in the GCC 
Interview 25 Real estate financing is one of IFIs' preferred habitats hence creating 
scary concentrations 
Interview 29 High concentration risk made it necessary for IFIs to maintain strong 
capitalisation 
 
As Table 9.4 shows, some respondents opined that IFIs tend to have a concentration base 
of assets and/or deposits; they face high concentration by name and sector, as well as 
high geographical concentration. This is inflated by the IFIs‟ limited geographic reach, as 
most IFIs are domestic players and only very few have material operations outside their 
home country. The limited scope of eligible asset creates asset concentration risk. Non-
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deposit liabilities could have concentration risk as well, due to the relatively small 
number of IFIs available to participate in the inter-bank market. There is also a limited 
range of Shari’ah-compliant instruments available for managing or transferring risks. 
Participants opined that the focus on tangibles had led to increased property-related 
financings at IFIs, affected by relatively undiversified nature of the economies. As the 
real estate markets are highly volatile in the GCC, the concentration risk is magnified. 
The recent crash in the property market has put several Islamic banks, whose assets are 
heavily concentrated in real estate, in dire straits.  
 
Table 9.6 – Focused Coding Number 5 for Question 1 
Reputational risk 
Interview 18 Because Islamic banking is at a its infancy stage of development, its 
reputational risk is critical 
 
Reputational risk is the last one among the top risks facing IFIs as identified by 
interviewees. Some participants, principally conventional bankers, indicated that 
reputational risk can have a material impact on the risk profile of an Islamic bank because 
the industry is still at its infancy stage of development. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the analysis of Question 1 revealed that the views of 
Islamic bankers, conventional bankers, and rating agency analysts were quite similar. 
Shari’ah scholars and researchers, on the other hand, had different perceptions, which 
tend to be more academic in nature. Some respondents also expressed that due to the 
nature of Islamic finance contracts, risk are strongly bundled together 
 
Question 2 examines the difference in risk management perceptions in Islamic banking 
vs. conventional banking. The results obtained are summarized in Tables 9.7 to 9.9. 
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Table 9.7 – Results for Question 2 
Question 2 Does the risk perception in Islamic banks differ from 
conventional banking, and in what sense? Are Islamic banks 
riskier their conventional counterparts? 
Focused Coding 
1 There are specific challenges in the management of risks in Islamic 
banks 
2 Islamic banking, as it stands today, carries more risks than the 
conventional model 
Theme: Risk management for Islamic banks is more challenging than it is for 
conventional banks. Theoretically, Islamic banks are safer than conventional 
banks. Practically, the story is different. 
 
Table 9.8 – Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 2 
There are specific challenges in the management of risks in Islamic banks 
Interview 6 Risk management is not the same for conventional and Islamic banking 
Interview 12 Risk management in Islamic banking is still evolving 
Interview 21 There are distinguished elements of an IFI‟s risk profile that need to be 
evaluated differently to those of a conventional bank 
Interview 24 The Islamic financial model works on the basis of risk sharing 
Interview 27 Risks in IFIs must be assessed in an integrated manner 
Interview 29 Risk management is Islamic banking is still below the desired level 
Interview 31 Risk management for Islamic banks is far more of a complex issue 
when compared to conventional banking 
Interview 33 Since the risk management needs of Islamic banking are not being met 
yet, the system is not functioning at its full potential 
 
As Table 9.8 shows, most interviewees believe that Islamic banking in its current state 
can be riskier than conventional banking because of the additional risk management and 
mitigation challenges and constraints the industry faces. As stated by the interviewees, 
since the risk management needs of Islamic banking are not being met yet, the system is 
not functioning at its full potential.  
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Table 9.9 – Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 2 
Islamic banking, as it stands today, carries more risks than the conventional 
model 
Interview 12 Unfortunately, Islamic bankers made the industry more risky than 
conventional banking 
Interview 14 Many IFIs swapped basic PLS concepts for conventional-like products   
Interview 18 Islamic banking suffers from weak risk management practices 
Interview 26 Islamic banking in its current practice is riskier than conventional 
banking 
Interview 29 IFIs face a whole additional array of risks not faced by conventional 
banks 
 
As depicted in Table 9.9, interviewees believe that no financial system is perfect. 
Although Islamic banking by default enjoys better risk management practices built into 
its principles, these principles tend to be ignored in favour of mimicking conventional 
risk solutions. Islamic banking products display unique features relating to credit, 
funding, liquidity, and other risks that need to be considered and which have an impact 
on risk management. Moreover, most interviewees asserted that IFIs paradoxically suffer 
from weak risk management practices. In fact, IFIs face a number of challenges in terms 
of risk management. Many sukuk are structured to resemble conventional bonds, meaning 
the risks of ownership are transferred to the issuer rather than shared by the investors. 
Whereas risk management is practiced widely in conventional financial markets, it is 
underdeveloped in Islamic finance. This gives rise to an array of risks which are not well- 
comprehended yet. 
Table 9.10 – Results for Question 3 
Question 3 Do you believe that Islamic banking products are structured 
differently as compared to conventional banking products?  
Focused Coding 
1 Islamic banking transactions have inherent features that induce 
financial stability 
2 Many of Islamic banking products aim to essentially replicate the 
products and processes of the conventional system 
Theme: Islamic finance products have special relationships between the 
contracting parties, however, Islamic banking has so far been unable to escape 
the trappings of conventional finance. 
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Table 9.11 – Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 3 
Islamic banking transactions have inherent features that induce financial stability 
Interview 8 The overarching principle of Islamic banking and finance products is 
that all forms of interest are forbidden 
Interview 12 PLS principle is a unique feature of Islamic finance 
 
Table 9.12 – Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 3 
Many of Islamic banking products aim to essentially replicate the products and 
processes of the conventional system 
Interview 14 If IFIs continue to mimic conventional products, they will weaken their 
value proposition 
Interview 17 Many of Islamic banking products aim to essentially replicate the 
products and processes of the conventional system 
Interview 20 Theoretically yes, very different. In practice, they are very similar 
Interview 30 IFIs are excessively replicating conventional financial instruments 
 
Most respondents agreed that Islamic banking products display unique features, and that 
developing risk management tools and practices is one of the biggest challenges for 
Islamic banks. This challenge also offers some opportunities to develop unique solutions 
that do not suffer from the weaknesses in the conventional banking model. In addition, 
respondents criticised adopting risk models from the conventional banking practice or 
making minor adjustments to best practices as this poses major challenges. Participants 
indicated that, unfortunately, most IFIs closely mimic western products, and hence IFIs 
are being exposed to similar risks like their conventional counterparts. Practitioners of 
Islamic finance to-date have been mimicking conventional products. This mimicking has 
resulted in a close correlation between the two systems. With the absence of advanced 
risk management and mitigation tools, and with the bundling of risks in Islamic finance 
contracts, Islamic banking ends up being more risky than the conventional model. 
 
In addition, participants indicated that through Shari’ah-compliant engineering most 
conventional contracts can be copied, at least conceptually. Some interviewees opined 
that, if IFIs continue to mimic conventional products, they will weaken the uniqueness of 
their value proposition and the powerful nature of their natural factors of differentiation. 
Participants recognize that Islamic banking might find it difficult to innovate because it 
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exists in a deeply-rooted conventional system. However, they strongly recommended that 
Islamic banks should start innovating Shari’ah-based solutions because if the industry is 
not innovating authentic products according to genuine Shari’ah principles, it might end 
up with the same failures as conventional banking. 
 
Table 9.13 – Results for Question 4 
Question 4 Do you think IFIs actually favour mark-up based contracts to 
profit-sharing contracts? Why? 
Focused Coding 
1 IFIs want to share rewards without sharing risks 
2 There is lack of appetite for risk-sharing assets 
Theme: Fixed income contracts are widely used and the use of PLS mode is 
negligible 
 
Table 9.14 – Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 4 
IFIs want to share rewards without sharing risks 
Interview 1 Risk sharing is the exception rather than the rule 
Interview 3 This „murabahah syndrome‟ is a disgrace to the industry 
Interview 24 Financial engineering in Islamic finance needs to focus on the 
development of products that foster Shari’ah principles instead of 
focusing only on the risk-return characteristics of the product 
 
Table 9.15 – Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 4 
There is lack of appetite for risk-sharing assets 
Interview 4 IFIs should engage on partnerships and equity-sharing financial assets, 
but in practice the portion of such assets on the balance sheets of 
Islamic banks is minimal 
Interview 21 There is limited innovation most of which is in the form of reverse 
engineering where the objective is to replicate the behaviour and 
risk/return profile of conventional products 
 
As depicted in Tables 9.14 and 9.15, interviewees, particularly Shari’ah scholars and 
consultants agree that while Islamic banking is asset-based and centres on risk sharing, in 
practice IFIs vary in terms of the level of risk sharing. For example, on the funding side 
PSIAs are being replaced in a several IFIs by time deposits based on reverse murabahah 
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transactions. These deposits do not have the risk-sharing features of PSIAs, since the 
return is almost guaranteed. On the asset side, risk sharing is the exception rather than the 
rule. Most financing is in the form of murabahah or wakala, making the IFIs‟ activities 
similar to conventional banks. Interviewees recommend that practitioners should not 
create instruments and investments that are identical in substance to conventional ones by 
combining a redundant succession of trades and labelling them with „new‟ Arabic names. 
The emphasis should be placed on innovation that encourages and favours particular 
types of investment (such as more tangible risk-sharing ones) and funding that is closer to 
Shari’ah principles. The tendency by some IFIs to blindly replicate and repackage some 
exotic products of conventional finance through cosmetic changes to make them 
Shari’ah-compliant should be curbed. Respondents expressed their worry that some 
initiatives to design some forms of „Shari’ah-compliant‟ subprime instrument have been 
undertaken before the crisis happened – fortunately there were enough wisdom among 
Shari’ah boards that these instruments did not really see the light. 
 
9.5.2  Capital Adequacy for Islamic Banks 
 
This section, through questions 5, 6, 7, and 8, examines the suitability of Basel II and III 
standards to IFIs, compare capital requirement levels between Islamic and conventional 
banks, and assess the credibility of Basel II after failing to prevent one of the most 
damaging financial crises. The results obtained are given in Tables 9.16 to 9.28 
 
Table 9.16 - Results for Question 5 
Question 5 How suitable are Basel II (and potentially Basel III) standards to 
Islamic banking?  
Focused Coding 
1 Basel II can be applied to Islamic banks 
2 IFIs need their own standards 
Theme: With a few amendments, Basel II becomes applicable to IFIs 
 
Interviewees had varying views about the suitability of Basel II and potentially Basel III 
to Islamic banking. In general, respondents, particularly bankers and rating agencies‟ 
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analysts agree that with a few amendments, Basel II becomes applicable to IFIs. Results 
of the focused coding analysis is summarised in Tables 9.17 and 9.18. 
 
Table 9.17 – Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 5 
Basel II (and potentially Basel III) standards can be applied to Islamic banks 
Interview 13 IFSB Principles are difficult to implement, particularly in the West 
Interview 17 Application of Basel II is a matter of adjusting the standards to the 
needs of Islamic banks 
Interview 21 Basel II can be applied to Islamic banks 
Interview 30 Applying other standards than Basel II to IFIs will make it a not level 
playing field 
 
Table 9.18 – Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 5 
IFIs need their own standards 
Interview 2 The risk-sharing feature necessitates the use of different capital rules 
Interview 6 Cannot apply conventional definition of capital to Islamic banking 
Interview 9 IFSB Principles on capital adequacy provide motivation for better risk 
management 
Interview 12 Basel II was drafted with conventional banking very much in mind 
Interview 19 IFSB Principles incentivises banks to be more transparent 
 
As demonstrated by Table 9.18, Shari’ah scholars and consultants interviewed shared the 
belief that conventional capital adequacy standards do not fully understand and 
appreciate certain aspects of IFIs, principally the fiduciary aspect, and that Basel II 
methodologies do not recognise the need for a different approach to capital adequacy 
calculation. Another problem mentioned by Islamic bankers related to the lack of ratings 
in IFIs and their corporate customer; and the fact there is no historical data to implement 
Basel II. However, as Table 9.17 depicts, the majority of bankers and analysts 
interviewed believed that Basel II standards could be applied to Islamic banking with a 
few amendments to accommodate its unique model. They argue that, although there are 
some important differences between Islamic and conventional banks that must be 
properly understood and considered, these can be incorporated within the existing Basel 
framework. With Basel II being widely applied consistently across the globe, some 
regulators hesitate to applying bespoke capital rules to Islamic banks in order to ensure a 
level playing field for all banks.  
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Question 6 examines the participants‟ perception regarding the level of capital reserves 
that IFIs should hold in comparison to capital held by conventional banks. Looking at the 
theme in Table 9.19 and the respondents‟ answers in Tables 9.20 and 9.21, it is evident 
that most interviewees believe that IFIs should hold higher capital levels than their 
conventional counterparts because the Islamic banking business model at its current state 
carries more risks. 
 
Table 9.19 – Results for Question 6 
Question 6 Do Islamic banks need to reserve more or less capital their 
conventional peers? 
Focused Coding 
1 Less capital 
2 More capital 
Theme: IFIs are exposed to higher risks, thus should reserve more capital 
 
Table 9.20 – Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 6 
Less capital 
Interview 1 If IFIs genuinely apply Shari’ah principles, they will require much 
lower capital reserves than they currently do.  
Interview 2 The risk-sharing feature necessitates the use of different capital rules. 
The better the disclosure and risk-sharing the Islamic banks applies, the 
lower capital it needs to reserve   
Interview 23 If PSIAs absorb losses, IFIs should keep less capital aside 
 
Table 9.21 – Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 6 
More capital 
Interview 8 IFIs have historically been keeping higher capital buffers anyway 
Interview 11 IFIs have recently accumulated more capital buffers than their 
conventional peers due to rising non-performing loans. 
Interview 21 IFIs are more risky than conventional banks, thus should reserve more 
capital 
Interview 25 Due to their nature of operations, IFIS should reserve more capital 
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In theory, the risk-sharing principles inherent in Islamic banking should make IFIs less 
vulnerable to economic shocks and thus reserve less capital levels than their conventional 
peers as they could “pass through” economic losses to PSIAs. This is the view expressed 
by some participants like Shari’ah scholars and Middle Eastern consultants, as Table 9.20 
shows. Unfortunately, the theory is a long way from fact in the current practice as argued 
by the participants‟ views in Table 9.21. This submerges the inherent stability within 
IFIs, rendering then as riskier than conventional banks, and hence requiring higher capital 
buffers. In addition, several bankers and consultants interviewed revealed that many IFIs 
do not have an internal performance management approach to measure the cost of 
liquidity and capital in their business decisions. This can lead to suboptimal choices made 
by the management teams. IFIs, thus, need to change how they measure performance by 
taking into consideration actual cost of liquidity and capital. By adjusting for true cost of 
liquidity and capital, the profitability picture can change considerably. As indicated by 
the respondent from interview 11, capital levels among IFIs have increased compared to 
prior years and are at levels much higher than global peers. However, that extra capital 
buffer should not be taken for granted and IFIs need to be mindful of rising non-
performing loans. Moreover, some interviewees warned that, with the tightening of new 
Basel III capital standards, IFIs have to pay greater attention to capital management as 
profitability will be impacted. 
 
Table 9.22 – Results for Question 7 
Question 7 What impact will Basel III have on Islamic banks? Do the Basel III 
standards consider Islamic banking?   
Focused Coding 
1 Too early to judge 
2 Basel III will have bigger impact on conventional banks due to their 
business models 
3 Basel III will impact all banks 
Theme: Basel III will affect all banks, however, its impact on conventional 
banking will be higher than on Islamic banking 
 
It is interesting to note that despite a general lack of absolute clarity about Basel III and 
its potential impact on IFIs as indicated by Table 9.22. Most interviewees agreed that 
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Basel III is a fact that is here to stay. There is also a general belief among respondents 
that although Basel III is more demanding than Basel II with regard to addressing 
systemic risk, it may not be the last of the Basel series. This is mainly because risk is 
inherent in the complex global financial markets of increasing sophistication. Participants 
were generally divided among three groups as summarised by Tables 9.23 to 9.25. The 
general theme agreed upon by most interviewees is that Basel III will affect all banks, 
however, its impact on conventional banking will be higher than on Islamic banking. 
 
Table 9.23 – Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 7 
Too early to judge 
Interview 28 The ink is barely dry on Basel III Accord 
Interview 32 Basel III has an extended implementation period making its impact 
relatively irrelevant at the time being 
 
The first group believed that Basel III new regulatory standards are still recently fresh 
and have a prolonged implementation timeline. No clear idea has been formed yet on 
their potential effects on IFIs. For most Basel III proposals, implementation is postponed 
until 2018, 10 full years after the peak of the financial crisis, which is beyond what would 
have been reasonable to assume. This group consists mainly of analysts at rating agencies 
and consultants.  
 
Table 9.24 – Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 7 
Basel III will have bigger impact on conventional banks due to their business 
models 
Interview 12 Islamic banks have been addressing procyclicality issues way before 
Basel III proposals 
Interview 13 Most IFIs are capital rich and have liquidity buffers, therefore the 
newly proposed capital & liquidity ratios will have minimal effect    
 
Table 9.24 summarises the views of the second group of interviewees which argued that 
the counter-cyclical capital buffer concept introduced by Basel III (as opposed to Basel 
II, which has been widely criticised for encouraging pro-cyclicality) has been at the heart 
of Islamic banking via the PLS financing. IFIs will be less impacted by Basel III because 
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of smaller market and counterparty risk exposures and lower level of debt. They are 
expected to meet the more stringent requirements without raising additional capital. This 
group was dominated by Islamic bankers. 
 
Table 9.25 – Focused Coding Number 3 for Question 7 
Basel III will impact all banks 
Interview 5 The increased risk-weighting for assets across the board will affect IFIs 
Interview 21 Common equity will be squeezed much harder 
Interview 23 Any new regulation will affects all banks, whether Islamic or 
conventional 
 
The third group of participants, comprising of consultants and solicitors, opined that the 
tightening of capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements will affect all banks, Islamic 
and non-Islamic, alike. While the definition of capital and the deductions in capital 
calculations are less likely to affect IFIs as their capital structures tend to comprise 
mainly core tier one capital. 
 
Question 8 aims to get the interviewees‟ perceptions of the failure of Basel II to prevent 
the recent crisis and whether the newly proposed Basel III standards will help to prevent 
similar crises. Despite divergence among the participants‟ views, the theme as shown in 
Table 9.26 is that the shortcomings in Basel II are definitely addressed in Basel III. 
Participants expressed their doubt that Basel III will succeed in preventing another major 
crisis because crises are part of business cycles.  
 
Table 9.26 – Results for Question 8 
Question 8 Are Basel III new regulatory standards more likely to prevent a 
major crisis like the recent one? Did Basel II fail in preventing the 
crisis? 
Focused Coding 
1 Failings of Basel II needed to be addressed, Basel III addresses those 
issues 
2 The soundness of Basel III is mutually linked to powerful regulatory 
and economic reinforcements 
Theme: Shortcomings in Basel II are definitely addressed in Basel III 
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Table 9.27 – Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 8 
Failings of Basel II needed to be addressed, Basel III addresses those issues 
Interview 12 Basel II totally failed to prevent the crisis 
Interview 25 Basel II got it wrong on different fronts: procyclicality, liquidity, stress 
testing to name a few 
 
Table 9.28 – Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 8 
The soundness of Basel III is mutually linked to powerful regulatory and 
economic reinforcements 
Interview 4 Basel III is intended to promote a more resilient banking sector and 
eliminate systemic risk, but so did Basel II 
Interview 14 Don‟t blame Basel II, blame the system based on greed and lack of 
morals 
Interview 16 Basel II is correct in principle but wrong in implementation 
 
There was unarguably divergence among respondents for the question on the potential 
capacity of Basel III to prevent a major crisis as the recent one and whether Basel II has 
failed in preventing the crisis. As the results in Table 9.26 show, those in the West are 
focusing on the need for increased buffers for both capital and liquidity, while those in 
the East are focusing on comprehensive coverage of risk management, enhanced stress-
testing and the need for risk and capital management to align and be a core part of a 
bank‟s strategy. In general both camps agree that supervisory discretion will influence 
detailed implementation and leave scope for some jurisdictions to apply a more rigid 
interpretation of Basel III than elsewhere. Political issues and the debate around the 
implementation and operation of supervisory challenges mean on-going fear of an uneven 
playing field. If different jurisdictions implement Basel III in different ways, issues seen 
under Basel I and Basel II with respect to international regulatory arbitrage may continue 
to disrupt the overall stability of the financial system. Moreover, compared with the 
implementation of Basel II, this enhanced level of dynamism, complexity and 
interdependency within the global regulatory landscape will add significant challenges to 
the implementation of Basel III. 
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A number of respondents, particularly researchers and consultants, believe that the Basel 
III proposals are unlikely to be the last word on reforms of the banking industry 
following the credit crunch. Interviewees asserted that Basel III is sometimes sold as the 
solution to the outstanding issues left by Basel I and II. Some stated that while history 
does not repeat, it sure does show similarities, and it is very unlikely that Basel III will be 
the answer to all the banking problems. Banks must therefore retain flexibility to 
accommodate years of fine tuning and future reforms. 
 
During the current tumultuous economic times, a higher capital buffer will generally 
reduce volatility and improve the intrinsic financial strength of banks. Increased capital 
requirements, increased cost of funding, and the need to reorganise and deal with 
regulatory reform will put pressure on margins and operating capacity. Investor returns 
will decrease at a time when banks need to encourage enhanced investment to rebuild and 
restore buffers. This will drive banks to go up the risk curve to make up for lost 
profitability.  
 
9.5.3  Islamic Banking and the Global Credit Crisis 
 
A lot has been said about Islamic finance being resilient in the wake of the global 
financial crisis, but once the dust of the financial crisis settled, it has become clear that 
not necessarily everything is well in Islamic finance. The assumption at one point early in 
the crisis was that Islamic banking would be totally unaffected and would sail through the 
crisis unaffected. However, the crisis has flushed out the false premise that Islamic 
banking is disconnected from conventional banking, and that it is immune to economic 
crises.  
 
Questions 9 and 10 aim to explore the market feedback regarding the long-debated issue 
of whether IFIs are recession proof. Is Islamic banking actually more resilient than 
conventional banking? Could the current crisis have occurred under an Islamic banking 
system? The results of the focused coding analysis are presented as follows: 
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Table 9.29 – Results for Question 9 
Question 9 There is much debate about the resilience of Islamic banking 
against the financial crisis. Do you think that Islamic banking has 
really been resilient to the crisis, or does it suffer from the same 
flaws of conventional banking? 
Focused Coding 
1 IFIs were not caught by toxic assets as Shari’ah prohibits interest 
2 Islamic banking had similar problems like conventional 
Theme: IFIs have shown some resilience but they are not risk immune 
 
 
Table 9.30 – Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 9 
IFIs were not caught by toxic assets as Shari’ah prohibits interest 
Interview 17 Islamic banks have been lucky so far 
Interview 23 IFIs have displayed strong resilience 
 
 
Table 9.31 – Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 9 
Islamic banking had similar problems like conventional 
Interview 4 To some extent Islamic lenders were not applying best practices and 
that may have led to the large amount of non-performing loans and 
others 
Interview 13 Lack of liquidity is squeezing sukuk issuance 
Interview 21 IFIs are part of the globalised financial system – they are not immune 
from the credit crisis 
Interview 25 IFIs have all been penalized by their investment portfolios 
Interview 26 The industry faced its greatest ever test. Some IFIs came close to 
collapse 
Interview 33 IFIs have always displayed funding imbalances, but this had worsened 
as the crisis reached its peak 
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Table 9.32 – Results for Question 10 
Question 10 Could the recent crisis have occurred under an Islamic banking 
system? Will the industry gain confidence after the current 
financial crisis? 
Focused Coding 
1 The crisis served as a wake-up call for Islamic banks 
2 The crisis had less severe impact on Islamic banking 
3 Crisis provides opportunity for IFIs 
Theme: Even if Islamic finance had been prevailing, at its current state, the crisis 
could have happened but at a less severe level. Paradoxically, Islamic banking 
reputation has benefited from the crisis. 
 
 
Table 9.33 – Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 10 
The crisis served as a wake-up call for Islamic banks 
Interview 1 Allowed Islamic banking some time for reflection 
Interview 3 In a way the crisis is a blessing in disguise for Islamic banking because 
IFIs so far have been following a close mimicry of western products 
Interview 32 The shake-out resulting from the crisis has been good for the Islamic 
finance market 
 
 
Table 9.34 – Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 10 
The crisis had less severe impact on Islamic banking 
Interview 16 Although IFIs have been more resilient, the shift in the environment 
did negatively affect some of them 
Interview 20 The crisis highlighted additional risks that IFIs need to carefully 
understand and mitigate 
Interview 24 Islamic banking can also face systemic failure 
Interview 27 Islamic banks do not operate in isolation 
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Table 9.35 – Focused Coding Number 3 for Question 10 
Crisis provides opportunity for IFIs 
Interview 2 Perceived now as more stable as it has an anti-speculation bent to it 
Interview 7 The industry has come out stronger from the global crisis and learnt 
good lessons 
Interview 11 Will emerge stronger from the crisis, provided some conditions are met 
Interview 14 IFIs‟ reputation has benefited from the current crisis 
Interview 17 IFIs have been lucky so far, and they will be winners after the crisis 
Interview 23 Despite flaws in the industry, the crisis has strengthened Islamic 
banking 
Interview 29 The ideals of Islamic finance are receiving more attention in the 
current crisis 
 
As depicted in Table 9.33, respondents agreed that the credit crisis has allowed the 
Islamic banking industry some time for reflection. They gave examples of a number of 
renowned players in the management of Islamic funds, such as The Investment Dar (TID) 
and Global Investment House (GIH) that suffered major losses during the crisis and have 
become technically insolvent. Some IFIs had to undertake a painful restructuring process, 
and the legal battles are still to be fought. The global sukuk market is seeing smaller 
issuance and increasing defaults, led by the bankruptcy of the US-based sukuk issuer East 
Cameron Gas, followed by the Al Gosaibi and Saad Groups of Saudi Arabia. 
 
Most interviewees agree that IFIs should, therefore, ensure that they do not overlook the 
lessons to be learnt from the financial crisis. As shown in Table 9.35, respondents believe 
that since the global economy is still recovering and growth rate is much slower, IFIs 
should take this opportunity to clean up the house and tighten up the loose ends.  
 
Interviewees argued that when the financial crisis erupted in mid-2007, the Islamic 
finance industry remained relatively healthy and insulated, and recorded robust 
performance. Some commentators wrongly labelled Islamic finance as a „risk-free‟ 
sector. However, the significant defaults of TID and GFH since early 2009 and the 
growing difficulties of the rest of the Islamic investment banking community makes this 
assessment dubious, as the structural weaknesses of the Islamic financial industry started 
to become more obvious. Responses depicted in Table 9.35 reflect that the crisis was a 
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unique opportunity for the industry to prove that it had the capacity and ability to react 
and absorb shocks, but not for all its sub-segments. Some interviewees from rating 
agencies explained that, while the commercial banking sector seems to have emerged 
from the crisis relatively unscathed, the investment banking sector could not have been 
more different, as it suffered a very sudden and sharp dip in performance as losses 
mounted. And yet, until 2007, IFIs were portrayed by market participants as having 
significant potential, benefiting from cheap funding, high liquidity, exceptional profits 
and robust capitalisation. At the time, the combination of these four factors led them to 
pursue investments in riskier markets and asset classes – such as private equity, 
infrastructure or real estate, mostly in emerging markets ranging from the Maghreb to 
Southeast Asia. Some business was also booked in the private equity markets in Europe 
and the US. While GFH focused more on infrastructure, Arcapita invested heavily in 
private equity, and both were eager to improve their asset-management capabilities. 
Moreover, some other Shari’ah-compliant investment banks were beginning to discover 
the merits of unfunded business lines. Respondents gave the examples of Liquidity 
Management House (LMH, the investment banking subsidiary of leading Kuwait Finance 
House) and Al Rajhi Capital further enhanced their advisory and structuring services, 
until they eventually became significant players in the GCC‟s debt and capital markets. 
However, when the region‟s economy started to fracture under the stresses of the global 
liquidity drought, the pro-cyclical nature of IFIs became more pronounced. The illiquid 
nature of their investments contributed to rapid asset-value decreases at a time when their 
wholesale and short-term funding features were rapidly damaging their liquidity profile. 
This structural feature of IFIs‟ asset-liability management – which was once a benefit 
when ample liquidity was chasing too few assets – started to turn negative when too 
many impaired assets were available to serve massive liquidity withdrawals.  
 
Some interviewees explained that lower volumes, shrinking margins and deteriorating 
asset quality will all weigh on IFIs‟ profitability and ultimately their capitalisation. 
However, the impact is more manageable than for conventional ones. Fortunately, IFIs 
have been very profitable in the past and had therefore accumulated large amounts of 
capital, making them capable of absorbing these sorts of shocks. Strangely enough, IFIs‟ 
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reputation has generally benefited from the current crisis as it has exposed the weakness 
of a debt-based financial system. It is, therefore, the most fortunate time for Islamic 
banking to re-emphasise on its equity-based approach. Interviewees think that this will 
help the industry to expand not only in the Muslim world but also in the West. 
 
Some researchers interviewed stated that this is not the first time IFIs are tested with a 
systemic crisis, although previous crises were all on a regional scale. However, the recent 
crisis, with its unprecedented scale and scope, is the first global crisis to hit Islamic 
finance. The experiences of Kuwait Finance House in surviving the Kuwait Souq al-
Manakh crisis in 1982, of Bank Islam in navigating through the Asian financial crisis in 
1997-1998, and of a Turkish participation (Islamic) bank in coming out of the economic 
crisis (2000-2001), should all convey a clear message that Islamic finance does have 
some inherent qualities that contribute to its resilience. Most interviewees, including non-
Islamic bankers, actually see the Islamic financial industry emerging stronger from the 
crisis, provided some conditions are met as shown in Table 9.35. 
 
In general, most interviewees opined that IFIs will probably be the big winners when the 
crisis ends. As a sub-set of ethical finance, IFIs are now considered not so much niche 
businesses standing at the margins, but rather as representative of a credible, viable and 
sustainable alternative business model for sound, ethical and socially responsible 
banking. Many interviewees believe that mainstream finance has moved too far into 
excess leverage, meaningless innovation and value-destroying investments and therefore, 
IFIs will undoubtedly find their reputations strengthened.  
 
9.5.4 Risk Mitigation in Islamic Banking 
 
Risk mitigation is currently one of the most contentious issues in Islamic banking. The 
unique nature of risks faced by Islamic banks, combined with the restrictions added by 
Shari’ah, makes risk mitigation for Islamic banks a difficult and complex process. There 
are risks that Islamic banks, like their conventional counterparts, can manage and control 
through appropriate risk policies and controls that do not conflict with the Shari’ah 
principles. However, there are other risks that banks cannot eliminate and can only be 
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reduced by transferring to or selling those risk in well-defined markets. These risks can 
generate unexpected losses that need capital insulation, and hedging can help to restrict 
the impact of unexpected loss. In this section of the interview analysis, the participants‟ 
opinions and perceptions were sought regarding the risk mitigation in Islamic banking. 
Looking at the theme in Table 9.36 and the respondents‟ answers in Tables 9.37 and 9.38 
shows that risk mitigation has become a must in Islamic banking, provided that it is used 
merely for hedging and not for speculation. 
 
Table 9.36 – Results for Question 11 
Question 11 What do you think about risk mitigation in Islamic banking? Is it 
Shari’ah-compliant? How important is risk mitigation to the industry? 
Focused Coding 
1 Could be used for hedging purposes only and not for speculative 
trading activities 
2 Hedging is urgently needed by IFIs 
Theme: Risk mitigation tools highly demanded among IFIs but still there is a long 
way to go. 
 
Table 9.37 – Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 11 
Could be used for hedging purposes only and not for speculative trading activities 
Interview 1 Should be used solely for hedging and not speculation 
Interview 2 Necessities permit forbiddance, but also Necessities is determined 
based on its degree 
Interview 22 Many IFIs already use Islamic derivatives but they call them 
something else because Shari’ah scholars don't like the word 
„derivatives‟ 
Interview 33 IFIs have a limited range of Shari’ah-compliant instruments for risk 
transferring 
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Table 9.38 – Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 11 
Hedging is urgently needed by IFIs 
Interview 8 Not having hedging tools puts Islamic banks at competitive 
disadvantage 
Interview 14 Without proper hedging approaches at our disposal, it feels like trying 
to clap with one hand 
Interview 20 Islamic banking is still in its infancy in terms of hedging solutions 
Interview 25 Islamic banking is not mature enough to apply existing conventional 
market risk mitigation and hedging techniques 
Interview 27 Today lack of risk transferring techniques is described as Islamic 
finance‟s Achilles heel 
Interview 29 Islamic banks need to move quickly towards Shari’ah-complaint 
hedging solutions 
Interview 30 There is growing demand for Shari’ah-compliant hedging products 
 
Respondents almost unanimously agreed that the unique nature of risks faced by IFIs, 
combined with the restrictions added by Shari’ah, make risk mitigation for IFIs a difficult 
and complex process. However, there was clear disparity among respondents regarding 
the applicability of Shari’ah-compliant hedging solutions. Although derivatives were 
originally designed to manage or mitigate risks, they have been mutated to trade risks. 
Some respondents did not have a clear demarcation between the two. They stated that 
before the crisis, Islamic finance has been criticized because it could not freely hedge its 
risks using derivatives instruments. Today, this feature has been proven to be truly a 
blessing in disguise. In addition, the bankers interviewed asserted that even with the 
Shari’ah approved structures, Islamic hedging currently costs much more than it normal 
costs conventional hedging; it is documentation intensive and banks have to do dual 
murabahahs, rather than a single standardized transaction. Shari’ah-compliant tools are 
available, they need to be signed and accepted quicker and cheaper. 
 
In general, most interviews reveals that there is growing demand for hedging and 
Shari’ah-compliant derivatives, which should be used merely for hedging and not 
speculation. Risk mitigation within Islamic banking is still to a large extent a grey area 
and work-in-progress. 
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9.5.5 The Dichotomy Between the Theory and Practice of Islamic Banking  
 
This section examines the proposition that Islamic banking has been diverting from its 
roots by mimicking conventional banks. The theme in Table 9.39 indicates that although, 
in theory, the Islamic financial system is more resilient to economic shocks than the 
debunked Wall Street model, unfortunately the theory is a long way from fact in its 
current financial practice. The findings from the analysis through focus coding are 
presented in the following tables. 
 
Table 9.39 – Results for Question 12 
Question 12 How Shari’ah-compliant is Islamic banking within its current 
practice? Do you believe that Islamic banks need to reform in 
order to be successful? 
Focused Coding 
1 Mimicking conventional became the norm 
2 IFIs are in a constant struggle to reconcile faith and finance 
Theme: Islamic banking have been long deviating from true Shari’ah principles 
 
Table 9.40 – Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 12 
Mimicking conventional became the norm 
Interview 2 With sorrow there is a tendency of mimicking everything that is 
offered by traditional banks 
Interview 13 They are still heading the same direction as conventional banks 
Interview 21 Customers are fed up with the market imitating conventional banking 
Interview 27 There is lots of form over substance compliance in Islamic banking 
Interview 33 Big difference between practice and principles 
 
Table 9.41 – Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 12 
IFIs are in a constant struggle to reconcile faith and finance 
Interview 5 It is not fair to claim that current Islamic banking is merely a disguised 
version of the conventional substance 
Interview 10 IFIs must resolve inner tensions 
Interview 16 Everything that is not forbidden in the Holy Quran is ok 
Interview 31 You can create and invest in very risky assets and still be Shari’ah-
compliant 
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As Tables 9.40 and 9.41 show, most interviewees criticized Islamic banking for trying to 
„shoe-horn‟ Shari’ah principles into conventional product structures, where Islamic 
products replicate conventional products they are being exposed to the same risks. IFIs 
are also shying away from being sufficiently socially responsible. A number of 
respondents are of the view that some IFIs deviated to a great extent from the 
fundamental basis of Islamic finance; they have succumbed to the influence of 
conventional banking. Shari’ah scholars interviewed, therefore, emphasised that there is 
an internal logic to Shari’ah principles, which IFIs will only see if they stop trying to 
duplicate conventional structures. 
 
9.5.6 The Next Chapter in Islamic Banking 
 
In this last part of the interview analysis, the participants‟ opinions and perceptions were 
sought for on the future of Islamic banking and finance with a particular focus on risk 
management related issues. The theme in Table 9.42 indicates that various strategies have 
been suggested by interviewees in order to achieve profitable growth and to enhance 
IFIs‟ competitiveness. However, participants asserted that while asset growth is 
important, addressing risk issues need to be in place to support sustainable growth. 
Therefore, strategic focus needs to be timed, with risk management being implemented 
first, followed by growth. The findings from the analysis through focus coding are 
presented in the following tables.  
 
Table 9.42 – Results for Question 13 
Question 13 What strategies should Islamic banks focus on over the coming 
decade? What do you believe are the catalysts for the growth of 
Islamic banking? 
Focused Coding 
1 Enhanced Risk management and mitigation 
2 Diversification 
3 Back to roots 
4 Consolidation 
Theme: Various strategies suggested. One thing most sides agreed on is the need 
for enhanced risk management and return to Shari’ah principles 
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Table 9.43 – Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 13 
Enhanced risk management & mitigation 
Interview 9 The industry urgently needs more advanced risk management 
architecture 
Interview 11 Think capital, think risk ... the risk culture must change and must be 
embedded institutionally 
Interview 13 Enhance risk management practices and culture 
Interview 20 Without proper risk mitigation, I can‟t see how Islamic banking will go 
be able to compete in a global competitive environment 
Interview 28 Clearly there is substantial room for improvement in risk management 
Interview 29 IFIs must manage the funding gap carefully 
 
Table 9.44 – Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 13 
Diversification 
Interview 25 Concentration kills, IFIs must diversify 
Interview 27 Diversification: geographically and operationally 
 
Table 9.45 – Focused Coding Number 3 for Question 13 
Back to roots 
Interview 4 Back to basics and core values 
Interview 19 Innovate do not replicate 
 
Table 9.46 – Focused Coding Number 4 for Question 13 
Consolidation 
Interview 18 Cross-border consolidation 
Interview 21 Mergers and acquisitions, there are far too many small Islamic banks 
 
As the findings in Tables 9.42 depict, recommendations given in terms of strategies that  
Islamic banks should focus on over the coming decade for being catalysts for the growth 
of Islamic banking are numerous and diversified. Many challenges still lie ahead, as is 
clear from the interviews. However, the on-going improvements in banks‟ risk 
management and mitigation techniques and prudential frameworks for Shari’ah-
compliant banking give reasonable hope that the Islamic banking industry‟s growth will 
contribute positively to broader financial and economic stability, especially after the 
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financial crisis has proved Islamic finance to be a more ethical and sustainable banking 
alternative than the debunked Wall Street model. 
 
In particular, IFIs need to improve their liquidity management and diversify their 
activities from what is mostly a real estate and „vanilla‟ lending play, to offer a 
comprehensive service suite including advanced treasury services, innovative asset 
management, and securitisation services. This will allow them to address the needs of 
underserved market segments such as sovereign wealth funds and private wealth clients. 
The bankers interviewed recommended that there is also a lot to be done in trade finance, 
which used to bet the staple of Islamic finance but for many years has been 
unfashionable. The corporate finance, liability management areas are also open for huge 
expansion. IFIs should also exploit consolidation in order to benefit from economies of 
scale as well as enhancement of scope. Both approaches offer diversification benefits. 
 
9.6 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the semi-structured interviews conducted with 
Islamic banking professionals. First, the responses of the interviewees were individually 
recorded and later coded presenting the results of the coded answers in a table. The 
interview was then organized into various topics to simplify the analysis of the responses 
given by the interviewees.  
 
As regards to regards to the findings, interviewees indicated that the IFI‟s unsound risk-
management architecture is reflected by their concentration risks, poor sector allocation, 
imprudent liquidity management and imbalanced ALM. In addition, the interviews 
revealed that Shari’ah-non-compliance risk is a significant risk facing IFIs. It is also 
noticeable that both Islamic and non-Islamic bankers had similar risk perceptions about 
risk management in Islamic banking.  
 
In addition, the interview findings indicate that Islamic banking in its current state can be 
riskier than conventional banking because of the additional risk management and 
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mitigation challenges and constraints the industry faces. As the participants stated, there 
are several risk management areas where improvement can be made to promote and to 
enhance the functioning of IFIs. Empirical evidence also indicates that many of Islamic 
banking products aim to essentially replicate the products and processes of the 
conventional system. Most IFIs prefer mark-up based contracts and shy away from profit 
sharing contracts that they perceive as more risky.  
 
Interviewees had varying views about the suitability of Basel II and potentially Basel III 
to Islamic banking and whether IFIs should keep higher or lower capital requirements 
than their conventional peers. In general, respondents, particularly bankers and rating 
agencies‟ analysts agree that with a few amendments, Basel II becomes applicable to 
IFIs, and that IFIs should hold higher capital levels than their conventional counterparts 
because the Islamic banking business model at its current state carries more risks. It is 
interesting to note that, despite a general lack of absolute clarity about Basel III and its 
potential impact on IFIs, most interviewees agreed that Basel III is a fact that is here to 
stay. 
 
Furthermore, most interviewees believe that although IFIs have been more resilient to the 
on-going crisis than their conventional counterparts, the shift in the environment did 
negatively affect some of them. Since Islamic finance is not an island, it has suffered 
from the liquidity drought, to the point where a few IFIs have defaulted, but as an 
industry it now has a track record of resilience, which had not been tested before. While 
the global crisis gave Islamic banking an opportunity to prove its resilience, it also 
highlighted the need to address important challenges. The crisis has led to greater 
recognition of the importance of liquidity risks, and the need for more advanced risk 
management and mitigation.    
 
Interviewees are in the view also that IFIs will not achieve their objectives by simply 
mimicking conventional products. While the ideals of Islamic finance offer some 
compelling ideas, the reality is that much of Islamic finance today is focussed on 
replicating the conventional system.  
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Finally, the interviewees almost unanimously agree that there is now an opportunity for 
Islamic banking to thrive as it has the potential to contribute to a more stable economy. 
However as it stands in its current form, Islamic banking has little to offer in terms of 
long-lasting solutions and sustainable financing, as the solution ultimately has to be a 
moral, not a material one. Islamic banking needs to aim for a truly alternative vision 
based on the ethical and moral safeguards within authentic Islamic concepts, together 
with improving risk management and mitigation techniques, enhancing liquidity 
management, and reducing concentrations.  
 
The empirical findings in this chapter provide efficient response to the research questions 
and objectives. Having presented the findings of the interview analysis, the following 
chapter combines these findings with the quantitative findings from the questionnaire 
data analysis in an integrated manner within the context of the existing literature in order 
to provide a basis of overall conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONTEXTUALISING THE FINDINGS: AN INTERPRETATIVE 
DISCUSSION 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
The discussion in this chapter is based on the results of the conceptual aspects of the 
research that were gained from the literature review and from data collected and analysed 
in order to investigate risk management issues in Islamic banking. The available studies 
on similar subjects are mostly theoretical in nature, considering primary data research 
only. The results of the current study will therefore fill a significant gap in current 
scholarship by providing vital empirical information about risk management in Islamic 
banking. 
 
In the last three chapters, namely 7, 8, and 9, the findings of the quantitative and 
qualitative data analysis were presented. This chapter discusses the implications of the 
findings in relation to the existing body of knowledge in the field. It aims to achieve the 
objective of giving greater meaning to the results through an interpretative method. The 
aim of this chapter, hence, is to combine the main results of the empirical chapters so as 
to conduct an integrated discussion of the hypotheses identified earlier, whereby it will be 
possible to highlight the contribution of this study.  
 
For the purpose of clarity and to provide a more clearly structured approach to discussion, 
the flow of this chapter corresponds to the research hypotheses and to the thematic 
structure used in the questionnaire and interviews. Thus, the main discussion of the 
chapter is divided into ten main sections: Section 10.2: Risk perception in Islamic 
banking; Section 10.3: Islamic Finance Contracts; Section 10.4: Additional Risk Issues 
Facing IFIs; Section10.5: Capital Adequacy for Islamic Banks; Section 10.6: Credit 
Crisis and Islamic banks, Section 10.7: Risk Management and Reporting; Section 10.8: 
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Risk Measurement; Section 10.9: Risk Mitigation; Section 10.10: Islamic Banking in 
Practice; and, finally, Section 10.11: The Next Chapter in Islamic Banking.  
 
10.2 RISK PERCEPTION IN ISLAMIC BANKING 
This section aims to provide a discussion through further interpretation of the results on 
the overall risks faced by Islamic banks by responding to the hypotheses set in advance. 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
The main risks facing Islamic banks are reputational risk, Shari’ah-non-compliance 
risk, asset-liability management risk, liquidity risk, and concentration risk. 
 
In order to identify the main risk facing IFIs, the findings from the questionnaire and 
interview analyses were examined side by side, in addition to searching the existing 
literature review.    
 
The null hypothesis is accepted and the alternative hypothesis is rejected by both 
quantitative and qualitative analyses.  
 
The descriptive statistics for the entire sample, as in Table 7.5, show that the top 5 risks 
facing IFIs according to mean ranking are: liquidity, ALM, reputational, concentration, 
and credit risks. Shari’ah-non-compliance risk followed with a close mean rank of 3.71, 
while market risk was considered as the least risky (2.72). Of note is the proximity of 
mean values among the top risks.     
 
These findings are no surprise, as liquidity management is far from being an easy task for 
IFIs; it is structurally more challenging at IFIs because there is still a significant shortage 
of liquid instruments, despite the efforts of the various central banks to provide a variety 
in which Islamic banks can place their surplus cash. In fact, Tamweel and Amlak would 
have gone insolvent if not for government help. As discussed in Chapter 3, there have 
been some efforts to improve liquidity management and to develop an Islamic capital 
market and tradable Islamic financial instruments, but to date these have been limited.  
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ALM and liquidity risks are closely correlated, as the earlier is basically the practice of 
managing risks that arise due to mismatches between the assets and liabilities of a bank. 
For IFIs, the limited range of possible funding sources leads to concentrated liabilities, 
imbalanced funding mixes, and stretched capital management strategies. Therefore, IFIs‟ 
funding bands usually remain imbalanced and IFIs tend to fill the gaps by capital. 
However, capital is a very expensive way of funding. This is why Islamic banks, 
particularly in the GCC, engage in higher risk/high yield transactions to make up for the 
expensive funding via capital and consequently keep shareholders satisfied with high 
returns. Those IFIs forced themselves, unintentionally, up the risk curve instead of 
diversifying their risks. This makes the balance sheet of Islamic banks quite polarised, 
with high real estate assets, which led Islamic banks to a high Concentration Risk, on 
both sides of the balance sheet. A typical balance sheet structure of many IFIs displays 
high exposure to properties on the assets side and limited funding sources with high 
reliance on short-term liabilities and capital on the other side. This is a very unfavourable 
funding continuum that led IFIs to a vicious circle of risks.  
 
Moreover, IFIs tend to have a concentration base of assets and/or deposits; they face high 
concentration by name and sector, as well as high geographical concentration. The 
limited scope of eligible asset classes creates asset concentration risk. Focus on tangibles 
had led to increased property-related financings at IFIs, affected by relatively 
undiversified nature of the economies. As the real estate markets are highly volatile in the 
GCC, the concentration risk is magnified because concentrations are even more 
problematic when they are biased towards high-risk sectors. High lending concentrations 
to construction and real-estate companies are common for many IFIs. Moreover, the 
construction and real-estate sectors are highly cyclical, require high capital-intensity, and 
typically have a long production cycle, rendering the IFIs with high exposures to this 
sector vulnerable to shifts in the market environment. According to Smith (2010), the 
combined exposure to the real-estate and construction sector is in some cases higher than 
100% of Tier 1 capital for Islamic banks, particularly in the GCC. 
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Respondents also identified credit risk as being among the top risks that face IFIs. 
Traditionally, a large part of a bank‟s profit came from lending businesses. Also, the 
majority of bank losses were related to this aspect of risk management; hence the focus 
was primarily on credit risk. Credit risk management for IFIs is further complicated by a 
number of factors like contractual complications with Islamic banking products creating 
additional credit risks, difficulty of foreclosure, lack of credit assessment models, track 
records, robust ratings, mitigation techniques, etc. 
 
Furthermore, reputational risk is critically important for Islamic banks as a growing 
industry that is built on trust and transparency. Finally, Shari’ah compliance is inherently 
and systemically significant to Islamic banking. Any divergence from Shari’ah principles 
exposes the IFI to a wide range of risks at different levels as discussed in previous 
chapters.   
 
Of note is the political risk. Under Question 8 of the questionnaire, only two respondents 
added political and country risks as extra risks facing IFIs. However, the lesson from the 
recent political unrest and revolutions in the Middle East is that political risk – which was 
previously largely ignored – does matter. Political risks are hard to predict and are not 
recurring. The nature of political risk is that it can strike suddenly and have unpredictable 
consequences as has already been witnessed this in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, 
and Yemen. Political risk has been latent for many years in the Middle East, but has now 
erupted across most countries in the region. Events just the past few months show that the 
structural landscape of the region‟s politics is changing fundamentally. Under these 
circumstances, long-standing assumptions concerning political risk and its potential 
economic impact are being challenged. There is no doubt that political change in the 
Middle East could ultimately be positive as governments that enjoy greater legitimacy 
tend to be more resilient to economic shocks, which require governments to take tough 
economic measures. In the short term, however, the process of political change has 
brought negative economic pressures on the economies of these countries, hence 
affecting IFIs‟ operating directly or indirectly through the region. On 15 May 2011, 
Zawya reported that close to USD 1.6-trillion worth of projects are cancelled or are on 
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hold in the Middle East and East North African market, where most IFIs reside and/or 
operate, because of the recent events. 
 
If the questionnaire was to be re-distributed now, after the eruption of the Middle Eastern 
revolutions, political risk is most likely to attract much higher scores given that most 
Islamic banks are located in, or directly affected by, the Middle East.  
 
Interviewees also indicated that the IFI‟s unsound risk-management architecture is 
reflected by their concentration risks, poor sector allocation, imprudent liquidity 
management and imbalanced ALM. In addition, interviews revealed that Shari’ah-non-
compliance risk is a significant risk facing IFIs. It is also noticeable that both Islamic and 
non-Islamic bankers had similar risk perceptions about risk management in Islamic 
banking. This supports Research Hypothesis 1. 
 
This further confirms the findings from the research conducted by Al-Omar and Abdel-
Haq (1996), who identified credit and liquidity risks for Islamic banks to be higher than 
for conventional banks. Also, Khan and Ahmed (2001) found that IFIs face some risks 
that are different from those faced by conventional financial institutions. They revealed 
that some of these risks are considered more serious than the conventional risks. While 
Moody‟s (2009c) highlighted that IFIs suffer from liquidity management and stated that 
“liquidity tends to be a financial crutch for Islamic banks”, the report indicated that the 
handling of asset-liability mismatches is not a new problem in Islamic banking; it is as 
old as Islamic banking itself.   
 
Furthermore, breaking down the descriptive statistics among different groups provided 
significant findings, as summarized in Table 7.6. Three out of the top 4 risks identified by 
Islamic bankers are also listed by conventional bankers among the top 4 risks. In general, 
risk perceptions among bankers, whether Islamic or non-Islamic, reflected similar 
patterns. This was emphasised by the frequency distribution and the K-W test of 
significance in Chapter 8. 
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Subsequently, further sub-hypotheses were formulated in order to further investigate the 
impact of various categories of respondents on the risk perception. This was done with 
the objective of exploring if there are trends and correlations among the different control 
variables.  
 
The sub-hypotheses are as follows: 
H1-1:  There is no statistically significant difference among the respondents in relation 
to their perception of the various risks facing IFIs according to Region. 
 
As can be seen in Table 8.1, at α = 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted, since the tested p-value is lower than the critical p-value for 
corporate governance risk (p=0.002), implying that there are statistically significant 
differences in the risk perception of corporate governance risk among different regions. 
 
The mean rankings for credit, liquidity, corporate governance, and concentration risks 
remain very similar between fully-fledged Islamic banks and Islamic subsidiaries, and 
slightly change when conventional banks are added to the sample; however, the pattern is 
still obvious. The findings indicate that there is an observed pattern, which can be 
generalized to most of the risk categories. This can only be explained by market realities. 
In line with this, Noraini et al. (2009) found no evidence that Islamic bankers in different 
countries perceived risks differently; that research focused solely on Islamic bankers. 
 
Moreover, the K-W test with „region‟ as the control variable for different samples of data, 
in terms of the institutional nature of respondents consistently show that there is a 
significant difference between regions in risk perception about corporate governance risk. 
A bank‟s corporate governance practices can have a material impact on its risk profile, 
particularly where governance practices are weak.  
 
This was re-emphasised by the K-W test results for statement 10 in questionnaire 11 of 
the questionnaire. When asked how strongly they agree or disagree with ‘Corporate 
governance is generally weak in Islamic banks’, the majority of respondents agreed, and 
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the K-W test had very significant results across various control variables as summarised 
in Table 8.19. 
 
According to a recent study by Safieddine (2009), there is a need to give special attention 
to corporate governance issues in IFIs due to the importance of corporate governance for 
economic development, the growth of Islamic finance, the critical role of governance in 
financial institutions, and the unique agency issues faced by these institutions. Most of 
the surveyed Islamic banks surveyed by Safieddine (2009) recognize the importance of 
incorporating governance mechanisms. Some governance instruments, including the 
board of directors, Shari’ah Supervisory Boards, and internal control departments, appear 
to have the qualifications and composition that would equip them to mitigate agency 
issues; however, deficiencies in the actual practices of governance are still observed, 
leaving agency issues unresolved. The establishment of a governance committee or an 
audit committee is not common among the banks surveyed, and clear internal audit 
functions are not properly established. Therefore, the financial reporting process does not 
appear to be tightly monitored, and this could potentially result in agency problems. Most 
importantly, IAHs and other investors still lack access to relevant information, and they 
continue to lack influence on management decisions, which expands the divergence 
between their cash flow and monitoring rights.  
 
Khandelwal (2008) also argues that transparency and corporate governance in the Islamic 
financial services industry should always be developed and adjusted to meet the specific 
needs of Islamic banks.   
 
As explained in Chapter 3, IFIs do not generally have robust corporate governance 
frameworks in place. However, in this they are no different from some of their local 
conventional peers. For instance, family ownership/majority ownership by a core 
shareholder group is seen in both segments of an Islamic country‟s banking system. Their 
prevalence weakens the rights of minority shareholders, could lead to unmerited 
appointments or promotion of family members, and could give rise to conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and bondholders. The lack of genuinely independent directors is a 
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shortcoming of emerging markets in general and impairs a board‟s ability to maintain 
accountability and provide strategic guidance. As discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.6.6), 
the two cases of Ahmad Hamad Algosaibi & Brothers and Saad Group in Saudi Arabia 
had raised questions about corporate governance in the Middle East as the two 
conglomerates were, to a certain degree, a family affair. 
 
In fact, weak corporate governance structures are a general feature of Islamic banking. 
For a number of IFIs, corporate governance systems are opaque, unaccountable and often 
heavily „relationship-based‟, as opposed to the predominantly rule-based corporate 
governance systems of conventional banks in developed markets. Often, Islamic banks‟ 
ownership structures are complex and not transparent; in addition, developed corporate 
governance structures comprising qualified independent board members, effective 
committee structures, minority shareholders interest etc., are absent. In many cases, the 
owners or shareholders hold key management positions and dominate the board of 
directors, thus making it difficult for the board to manage the conflicts of interest between 
the controlling shareholder‟s interests and those of the minority shareholders. 
 
Banks in the Middle East in general have traditionally enjoyed a cozy relationship with 
prominent family-owned businesses. The practice of so-called name lending – extending 
credit based on the reputation and standing of the company‟s owners rather than on 
rigorous examination of its financial health – is prevalent. 
 
According to Zawya, most family businesses in the Middle East are less than 65 years 
old. Many of them began as trading houses and have now become diversified 
conglomerates. However, a host of challenges facing many family businesses in the Gulf 
are worth considering: 
 
(i) Succession issues and transferring effective control and knowledge from one 
generation to the next is a challenge and, as shareholders (family members) 
become numerous, they impact on efficiency of decision making; 
 
413 
(ii) Attracting outside talent and relinquishing control when necessary are always 
important. Over the years, family groups have grown into multi-billion-dollar 
conglomerates, sometimes without commensurate skill resource; 
(iii) Family businesses need to shift from being purely operational to thinking in 
more strategic terms; 
(iv) Separation of management and ownership; 
(v) Diversification into multiple businesses can lead to over-extension beyond the 
group‟s core knowledge and competences. 
 
The GCC Board Directors Institute, a Dubai-based non-profit that seeks to improve 
corporate governance standards, issued a report in 2009 highlighting the need for reform 
in the six GCC member states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates. The report, “Building Better Boards,” notes that only 55 percent 
of GCC companies disclose the main executive positions of board members, compared 
with 100 percent in Europe, and only 32 percent of companies disclose other positions 
held by board members, compared with 97 percent in Europe. It urges a reduction in the 
number of boards on which directors serve; the appointment of strong audit, nomination 
and remuneration committees; efforts to attract more international directors to the boards 
of Gulf companies; and the promotion of greater corporate transparency (Townsend, 
2009).  
 
Corporate governance risk in the GCC, where most Islamic banks reside, has become 
publicly exposed. Poor corporate governance imposes heavy costs. The need for 
additional efforts toward improved corporate transparency is paramount. As long as Gulf 
companies and banks restricted their activities largely within the region, there was little 
pressure to change those opaque practices. But growing links with international markets 
and financial institutions are generating greater demands for reform. Changing corporate 
practices, however, would not be easy. Governance reform needs to be addressed against 
the cultural backdrop in the Gulf, which places great emphasis on reputation and 
discretion. 
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The same trend could be established when different K-W tests were conducted with 
different institutional settings. As discussed in the following hypotheses, it was concluded 
that three control variables (region, country, and nature of FI) demonstrate some 
significant differences about risk perception among respondents, but not for all risks.  
 
Furthermore, although, statistically, corporate governance risk is the sole significant risk 
identified by respondents, examining the mean ranking of other risks like concentration, 
credit, and liquidity risks reveal a structural pattern determined by market realities. Also, 
as depicted by Tables 8.4 to 8.6, the differences between the mean rankings is noticeable 
among different regions for these risks and when conducting the K-W test for different 
samples using different institutional settings, which confirms that there is significant 
difference between regions.  
 
H1-2:  There is no statistically significant difference among the respondents in relation 
to their perception of the various risks facing IFIs according to the country in which 
they operate. 
 
At α = 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted. The 
K-W test was conducted in a similar manner according to „country‟ as control variable; 
the results confirm those produced by the test conducted according to the „region‟. 
 
H1-3:  There is no statistically significant difference among the respondents in relation 
to their perception of the various risks facing IFIs according to the Respondent’s 
Position. 
 
At α = 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted and the alternative hypothesis is rejected, 
since the tested p-value is higher than the critical p-value. Therefore, the results suggest 
that statistically there are no differences in the risk perception among respondents 
according to their position. 
 
H1-4:  There is no statistically significant difference among the respondents in relation 
to their perception of the various risks facing IFIs according to Accounting Standards. 
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At α = 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted and the alternative hypothesis is rejected, 
since the tested p-value is higher than the critical p-value. The results of the K-W test in 
Table 8.7 show that there are no significant differences among different respondents‟ 
categories. 
 
H1-5:  There is no statistically significant difference among the respondents in relation 
to their perception of the various risks facing IFIs according to Nature of the FI. 
 
For this hypothesis, the results from the K-W test provided dispersed data. At α = 0.05 
liquidity, ALM, Shari’ah non-compliance, concentration, reputation, and displaced 
commercial risks had significant p-values, while the remaining risks did not. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis is accepted and the alternative hypothesis is rejected, since the tested 
p-value is lower than the critical p-value for most risks. Further examination of the mean 
rankings for risks with significant p-value, as summarised in Table 8.9, confirms the 
dispersion of data as no trend could be established. In general, fully-fledged Islamic 
banks and conventional banks with Islamic activities have higher mean values than 
conventional banks alone and „Others‟, particularly for liquidity, ALM, and displaced 
commercial risks. This trend, nonetheless, slightly changes for concentration and 
reputation risks. Of note is also the proximity of mean value among fully-fledged Islamic 
banks and Islamic subsidiaries, which reflects the similar perception about risks in 
Islamic banking. One possible reason for this can be the similar knowledge and 
awareness about Islamic banking products and structures among those professionals with 
hands-on experience in Islamic banking. This confirms the findings of the descriptive 
statistics in Section 7.2.2.  
 
Moreover, this coincides with the findings of the qualitative analysis as on the basis of 
the interview findings, there is high degree of correlation between the responses of the 
two groups. However, differences generally existed between the responses of bankers and 
non-bankers. 
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Based on the above hypotheses and the findings from both quantitative and qualitative 
analyses, it can be concluded that three control variables (region, country, and nature of 
FI) contribute to some significant differences about risk perception among respondents, 
but not for all risks. In addition, this can also be supported by the fact that there is no 
significant difference in perception levels between respondents from stand-alone Islamic 
banks and Islamic subsidiaries. Initially, it was expected that respondents from stand-
alone Islamic banks have stronger perception compared to those from Islamic subsidiaries 
for two reasons: firstly, stand-alone Islamic banks have been in existence much longer 
than Islamic subsidiaries, and, secondly, the respondents from stand-alone Islamic banks 
have the advantage of dealing with only Islamic banking products and services whereas 
Islamic subsidiaries still need to operate side-by-side with their respective conventional 
counterpart in sharing the same operating platforms and buildings. Nevertheless, the 
results have indicated otherwise. Differences could be spotted between perceptions of 
conventional banks and stand-alone Islamic banks, and more noticeably between the 
perceptions of bankers and non-bankers, represented by „Others‟. This could be because 
bankers, whether Islamic or non-Islamic, have hands-on experience and better 
understanding about the Islamic banking model and its risk architecture than non-bankers 
who tend to be more theoretical in their approach. 
 
10.3 ISLAMIC FINANCE CONTRACTS 
 
This section aims to provide a discussion through further interpretation of the results on 
the usage and risk perception of Islamic finance contracts by responding to the 
hypotheses set in advance. 
 
10.3.1 Intensity of Use of Different Islamic Finance Contracts 
Hypothesis 2: 
Islamic bankers prefer mark-up based contracts (murabahah, salaam, istisna’a, and 
ijarah) and shy away from profit sharing contracts (musharakah and mudarabah).  
 
Descriptive statistics as depicted by Table 7.8 demonstrate that murabahah contracts are 
by far the most used contracts. This “murabahah syndrome” has been under criticism 
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from many Shari’ah scholars but unfortunately still remains the backbone of Islamic 
banking and finance; it has been intensively used by IFIs for money market transactions, 
investment and retail activities. Recently, more banks have been using walaka for money 
market transactions to replace the commodity murabahah, which involves more 
complications and raises Shari’ah concerns. The low mean for musharakah and 
mudarabah reflects Islamic banks‟ reluctance to hold risk-sharing assets. Moreover, the 
questionnaire revealed that salaam has a long way to go before becoming commonly used 
by IFIs. It is evident from the responses that the banks‟ first preference is for financial 
instruments that are generated through debt creating, sale contracts and leasing 
instruments. This is enhanced by the responses about risk perception in different modes 
of financing. These findings are supported by the results of the Chi-square test which 
indicated that the Chi-square values of the contracts are very significant (p<1%).  
 
Moreover, evidence from interview analysis indicates that many of Islamic banking 
products aim to essentially replicate the products and processes of the conventional 
system. Most IFIs prefer mark-up based contracts and shy away from profit sharing 
contracts that they perceive as more risky as explained under Hypothesis 3. 
 
Therefore, the hypothesis stating that Islamic bankers prefer mark-up based contracts and 
shy away from profit sharing contracts is accepted by both quantitative and qualitative 
analyses.  
 
Subsequently, the following sub-hypotheses were tested to identify whether there is any 
statistically significant difference in the level of understanding across various groups of 
respondents based on the selected control variables. 
 
H2-1: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ use of 
Islamic finance contracts according to Region. 
 
At α = 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected, since the significant p-value is for mudarabah 
is lower than the critical 0.05 p-value, hence the alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
Inferential statistics in Table 8.11 show that „Other Middle East‟ and „Southeast Asia‟ use 
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mudarabah the most with means values of 32.5 and 27.13 respectively, while Europe 
(17.71) and the GCC (16.74) rank less on the use of mudarabah, as FIs in these regions 
tend to rely more on murabahah, wakala, and ijarah. This should be explained by the 
economies of the regions in question.  
 
H2-2: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ use of 
Islamic finance contracts according to the Respondents’ Position. 
 
As can be seen in Table 8.10, the results suggest that the null hypothesis is accepted as p-
value for all contracts is higher than the critical 0.05 p-value, and hence it can be 
concluded that the Respondents‟ Position does not play a statistically significant 
determining role. 
 
H2-3: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ use of 
Islamic finance contracts according to the Nature of the FI. 
 
At α = 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected, since the significant P-values for wakala and 
salaam are lower than the critical 0.05 p-value, hence the alternative hypothesis is 
accepted. This is also emphasised by the findings of the qualitative data analysis which 
reflects that fully-fledged Islamic banks have some appetite for risk-sharing contracts, 
although not enough, unlike Islamic subsidiaries and conventional banks which wish to 
share rewards without sharing risks, and prefer the use of mark-up based contracts. 
 
H2-4: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ use of 
Islamic finance contracts according to the Nature of Activities. 
 
The results shown in Table 8.10 indicate that the null hypothesis is accepted, which 
suggest that Nature of Activities plays no statistically significant determining role.  
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10.3.2 Risk Perception in Different Islamic Finance Contracts 
Hypothesis 3: 
Profit-sharing contracts are perceived as more risky than mark-up based contracts in 
the Islamic finance industry. 
 
The risk perceptions of the respondents in different modes of financing are summarized 
in Table 7.9, which shows that respondents perceive mudarabah and musharakah (mean 
value of 6.21 and 5.89 respectively) to be riskier than wakala and murabahah (mean 
value of 2.26 and 1.90 respectively). The manipulation of the contracts by Islamic finance 
practitioners in order to mimic conventional products made the risk perception of equity 
and risk sharing contracts, for instance wakala, similar to risk perception of fixed-income 
contracts like murabahah. This created a gap in risk perceptions of different contracts 
among different groups of respondents. These findings are supported by the results of the 
Chi-square test which indicated that the Chi-square values of the items are very 
significant (p <1%). In addition, the Friedman test of significance in Table 8.13 shows 
that there is a significant difference with regard to the risk in each mode of financing at 
1% significance level. This explains why IFIs shy away from such instruments due to 
their lack of appetite for risky assets, which in turn is due to IFIs trying to emulate the 
conventional model.  
 
Qualitative analysis confirmed those findings as most interviewees indicated that in 
general IFIs prefer mark-up based contracts and shy away from profit sharing contracts 
that they perceive as more risky. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
 
Although Islamic banking offers a combination of both equity and non-equity based 
instruments, the system‟s preference for equity contracts – in theory – makes it more 
efficient and stable than debt-based conventional systems. Sadr and Iqbal (2002) 
presented empirical evidence based on the data gathered over 15 years from the 
Agricultural Bank of Iran which demonstrated that equity based financing increase 
transparency, monitoring, and supervision, and thus improve efficiency and stability of 
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the financial system. Unfortunately, IFIs tend to shy away from equity and partnership 
based instruments for several reasons, such as the inherit riskiness and additional costs of 
monitoring such investments, low appetite for risk, and lack of transparency in the 
markets. 
 
“It may be seen that greater reliance on equity financing has to be an 
indispensable part of the strategy of any system, which wishes to actualize the 
humanitarian goals of need fulfilment, full employment, equitable distribution 
of income and wealth, and economic stability. And hence the ideals of Islamic 
economics and finance.” (Asutay, 2009a) 
 
The result is as per the expectation of the researcher and further confirms the findings 
from the research conducted by Noraini et al. (2009), who found that that Islamic bankers 
perceive salaam and istisna’a to be riskier than murabahah and ijarah, and that profit 
sharing assets (mudarabah and musharakah) are perceived to be more risky than mark-up 
based assets particularly murabahah and ijarah, in the exception of Salam. Also, Khan 
and Ahmed (2001) found that profit-sharing modes of financing are perceived to have 
higher risk by bankers, while murabahah was ranked as having the least risks followed 
by and ijarah. This is because Islamic debt contracts (like murabahah) give the banks a 
relatively certain income and the ownership of the leased asset remains with the bank. 
Nagaoka (2007) reflected on the dichotomy in Islamic debt securities and concluded that 
Islamic finance strongly adheres to the financial transactions that involve real assets or 
those that can be retrieved from the assets while the accumulation of wealth by money-
chained transactions is considered highly unacceptable in Islamic finance. 
 
The following sub-hypotheses were developed to see if there is any significant difference 
in the level of knowledge across the groups of respondents for each category. The 
statistical tests for all the relevant questions in relation to the hypotheses are presented in 
Tables 8.13 to 8.17. 
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H3-1: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ risk 
perceptions about Islamic finance contracts according to Region. 
 
As depicted in Table 8.13, at α = 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected, since the K-W test 
results for murabahah recorded a lower significant value than the critical p-value. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis suggests that, statistically, there is a significant difference 
in the level of risk perception about murabahah across different regions. This is expected 
because murabahah is extensively used globally. Moreover, mean rankings for 
murabahah, in Table 8.14, show that „Other‟ regions, like Turkey and Pakistan, have a 
higher ranking (54.0) than the GCC (43.13) and Europe (38.63), while the remaining 
regions follow. This can be attributed to two main reasons. First, the European and GCC 
markets are more sophisticated in their financial awareness about risk management, 
products‟ structures, and the use of risk hedging techniques than Turkey and Pakistan, 
which has a direct impact on the risk perception among those markets. Second, at the 
time of conducting this questionnaire, European and GCC markets enjoyed stable 
political environment and „relatively‟ less volatile business cycles compared to „Others‟. 
 
This trend was confirmed when K-W test was repeated for different institutional data. 
There is a general pattern in terms of perception about murabahah-related issues. Such 
regional and institutional differences can be attributed to market conditions prevailing in 
each region. 
 
However, interview data analysis did not reveal such regional differences among 
respondents when it comes to risk perception about different Islamic finance contracts. 
Most interviewees, regardless of the region, agreed that risk sharing among Islamic banks 
is still the exception rather than the rule.  
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H3-2: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ risk 
perceptions about Islamic finance contracts according to the Respondent’s Position. 
 
For this hypothesis, the results from the K-W test accept the null hypothesis and reject the 
alternative hypothesis, since all the Islamic finance modes of finance registered an 
insignificant p-value of more than the critical p-value of 0.05 as can be seen in Table 
8.17. Therefore, it can be concluded that, statistically, there is no significant difference in 
the level of risk perception about Islamic finance contracts according to the Respondent‟s 
Position. 
 
Qualitative analysis in Chapter 9 reveals that Shari’ah scholars and consultants in a 
particular encourage the use musharakah and mudarabah contracts more than bankers do. 
Also, the earlier group considers risk sharing modes of finances to be less risky, while the 
latter perceives the mark-up based modes of finance to be less risky.  
 
H3-3: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ risk 
perceptions about Islamic finance contracts according to Nature of FI. 
 
As depicted in Table 8.17, at α = 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted, since the p-value for murabahah (0.03) is lower than the critical 
p-value of 0.05.   
 
This is also emphasised by the findings of the qualitative data analysis which reflects that 
fully fledged Islamic banks believe that mushrakah and mudarabah are not as risky as 
perceived by Islamic subsidiaries and conventional banks, which tend to find comfort in 
using murabahah and wakala products. 
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H3-4: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ risk 
perceptions about Islamic finance contracts according to Accounting Standards used. 
 
Table 8.17 depicts that at α = 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected, since the K-W-test 
results for murabahah recorded a lower significant value (0.028) than the critical p-value. 
Therefore, the alternative hypothesis suggests that Accounting Standards plays a 
statistically significant determining role.  
 
Qualitative data analysis did not test responses against accounting standards used by the 
FI. 
 
H3-5: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ risk 
perceptions about Islamic finance contracts according to Nature of Activities. 
 
At α = 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted, since the K-W-test results for all contracts 
recorded a higher p-value than the critical p-value as can be seen in Table 8.17. 
 
10.4 ADDITIONAL RISK ISSUES FACING IFIS 
This section aims to provide a discussion through further interpretation of the results on 
additional risk issues facing IFIs by responding to the hypothesis set in advance. 
 
Hypothesis 4: 
There is no substantial difference between risk management in Islamic banking and 
conventional banking. 
 
Descriptive statistics in Chapter 7 indicate that risk management for IFIs is more 
challenging than it is for conventional banks. Not only do IFIs face some risks that are 
different from their conventional peers, but these risks are also more serious and not well 
understood. Displaced commercial risk and Shari’ah standardisation are obvious 
examples of additional challenges facing IFIs. The findings also highlighted that 
corporate governance is generally weak in Islamic banks, which re-emphasises the 
findings of sub-hypothesis H1-1. 
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In addition, risk management functions in IFIs in many cases lack influence in the bank‟s 
decision making process. They may in some cases appear strong on paper, although the 
de facto governance behind this is not robust. This could include, for example, a lack of 
sufficiently senior risk-management representation at the board level, insufficient powers 
delegated to risk management, or the presence of strong shareholders or political 
influences that are able to override or influence risk-management‟s decision making. 
Engel (2010) argues that risk-managers in IFIs generally lack independence. Rarely can 
risk managers veto or influence strategy in Islamic banks and they are mostly tasked with 
managing existing exposures and monitoring disbursed loans, alongside other back-office 
functions.  
 
Furthermore, factor analysis was used in responding to Hypothesis 4. The final outcomes 
and a detailed discussion of the factor analysis are available in Section 8.2.1.3. The factor 
analysis results suggest that all eleven variables of risk perception are reduced to three 
components, namely „Risk Perception‟, „Shari’ah Compliance‟, and finally „Rate of 
Return‟.   
 
The findings from the quantitative analysis echo the interview findings which indicate 
that Islamic banking in its current state can be riskier than conventional banking. There 
are several risk management areas where improvement can be made to promote and to 
enhance the functioning of IFIs. Risks in IFIs must be assessed in an integrated manner 
and risks for IFIs should not be managed using same techniques used in conventional 
banking. 
 
The following sub-hypotheses were formulated in order to identify whether there is any 
significant differences across various groups in the respective control variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
425 
H4-1: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ perceptions 
about additional risk management issues in Islamic banking according to the Nature 
the of FI. 
 
The results in Table 8.18 suggest that the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the 
alternative hypothesis, indicating that there are significant differences according to 
Nature of FI. In addition, in order to respond to this hypothesis after conducting factor 
analysis, further analysis was carried out using a one way between groups MANOVA test 
in order to investigate if there is any significant difference between the three component 
groups identified under factor analysis in relation to same control variables. This helped 
to locate the impact or significance of each control variable on the established 
distribution. The results in Table 8.30 signify 30.1% and 33.6% of the variances in „Risk 
Perception‟ and „Shari’ah Compliance‟ scores are explained respectively by the nature of 
FI. 
 
H4-2: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ perceptions 
about additional risk management issues in Islamic banking according to Region. 
 
As can be seen in Table 8.19, similar conclusions can be derived from this category 
analysis, where the statistical results reject the null hypothesis. Similarly, after 
conducting factor analysis further analysis was carried out using a one way between 
groups MANOVA test in order to investigate if there is any significant difference 
between the three component groups in relation to same control variables. This helped to 
locate the impact or significance of each control variable on the established distribution. 
The results in Table 8.26 signify 45.9% and 34.4% of the variances in „Risk Perception‟ 
and „Shari’ah Compliance‟ scores are explained respectively by the region. 
 
Conducting the MANOVA test according to „region‟ and „nature of FI‟ as independent 
variables provided consistent results. It can be concluded that „Risk Perception‟ and 
„Shari’ah Compliance‟ are significant dependent variables and have strong explanatory 
power, while „Rate of Return‟ does not follow the pattern.  
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H4-3: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ perceptions 
about additional risk management issues in Islamic banking according to the 
Respondent’s Position. 
 
Similarly for this sub-hypothesis, the results reject the null hypothesis as Table 8.19 
depicts. The p-value for statements 2, 3, 4, 7, and 10 are lower than the critical p-value of 
0.05. It can be concluded that the Respondent‟s Position play a statistically significant 
determining role.  
 
H4-4: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ perceptions 
about additional risk management issues in Islamic banking according to the Nature of 
Activities. 
 
The inferential statistical results in Table 8.19 reject null hypothesis and accept the 
alternative hypothesis as the p-value for statements 2, 4, 7, 8, 10 and 11 are significantly 
lower than the critical p-value of 0.05. 
 
H4-5: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ perceptions 
about additional risk management issues in Islamic banking according to the 
Accounting Standards used. 
 
Similarly, for the Accounting Standards control variable, the null hypothesis is rejected in 
favour of the alternative hypothesis, since the p-value recorded for some statements in the 
Table 8.19 is lower than the critical p-value limit. 
 
10.5 CAPITAL ADEQUACY FOR ISLAMIC BANKS 
This section aims to provide a discussion through further interpretation of the results on 
capital adequacy issues facing IFIs by responding to the hypothesis set in advance. 
 
Hypothesis 5: 
Capital requirements levels should be lower in IFIs than in conventional banks. 
 
The frequency distribution in Figure 7.5 shows that 65.3% of respondents believe that 
IFIs should hold higher capital levels than their conventional peers. Only 8.3% of 
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respondents indicated that IFIs should hold lower capital levels, 18.1% indicate the same 
level, while 6.9% indicated they do not know the answer.  
 
In addition, most interviewees believe that IFIs should hold higher capital levels than 
their conventional counterparts because the Islamic banking business model at its current 
state carries more risks. 
 
Therefore, the hypothesis stating that capital requirements levels should be lower in IFIs 
than in conventional banks is rejected by both quantitative and qualitative analyses, 
which implies that capital requirement levels should be higher in IFIs than in 
conventional banks.  
 
The responses are against the researcher‟s expectations, as most literature reviews 
suggest that IFIs should have lower capital requirements than their conventional peers. 
Archer and Abdel Karim (2007), for instance, argue that the risk-sharing characteristic of 
PSIAs in Islamic banking could greatly enhance risk management and mitigation is IFIs 
provided that proper pricing, reserving, and disclosure are maintained. Therefore, IFIs 
should be subject to lower capital requirements because according to the IFSB 
supervisory discretion formula, α represents the extent of total risk assumed by the PSIA, 
with the remainder absorbed by the shareholders on account of displaced commercial 
risk. In line with this, Farook (2008) argues that, if IFIs practically apply the PLS 
principle, losses will be shared with PSIAs and hence the Islamic bank will be prone to 
lower risks leading to lower required minimum capital. The IFSB supervisory discretion 
formula is a step in the right direction, with α representing the extent of total risk 
assumed by the PSIA, with the remainder absorbed by the shareholders on account of 
displaced commercial risk. IFIs that practically implement the risk-sharing technique will 
be keen on proper disclosure to enjoy a higher capital relief. 
 
While the researcher agrees with the concepts discussed in the literature review from an 
academic point of view, the practice remains to be different (as depicted by the primary 
research findings). In order to practically apply the risk-sharing principle, the IFSB 
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standards should be made mandatory for Islamic banks to allow for wider 
implementation, consistency, and standardisation of risk management principles across 
the Islamic financial industry. This requires collaboration between regulators, IFSB, 
AAOIFI, Islamic banks, and industry practitioners. 
 
Hypothesis 6: 
Basel II was drafted with conventional banking very much in mind. IFIs should follow 
their own standards, e.g. IFSB Principles on capital adequacy. 
 
The frequency distribution in Figure 7.6 shows that the majority of respondents believe 
that Basel II could be applied to IFIs but with a few amendments. In fact, most IFIs use 
Basel II capital adequacy standards, with greater use of basic and standardised 
approaches rather than advanced models. This is due to the relative simplicity of their 
capital requirements. Moreover, 87.5% of respondents believe that Basel II standards 
should be reviewed after failing to prevent the current crisis. As depicted in Figure 7.6, 
there is an obvious lack of clarity on the applicability of the proposed Basel III standards 
to Islamic banking, as 65.3% of respondents were „neutral‟ when asked about the issue, 
27.8% either „disagree‟ or „strongly disagree‟ that the proposed Basel III rules would be 
easily applicable to Islamic banks. Around one third of respondents do not believe that 
the new standards, with its stricter capital, leverage, and liquidity rules, are likely to 
prevent another financial crisis. The break down between Islamic and non-Islamic 
bankers reveals the same pattern as shown in Table 7.15. 
 
Interviewees had varying views about the suitability of Basel II and potentially Basel III 
to Islamic banking. In general, respondents, particularly bankers and rating agencies‟ 
analysts agree that with a few amendments, Basel II becomes applicable to IFIs in order 
to ensure a level playing field for all banks. It is interesting to note that despite a general 
lack of absolute clarity about Basel III and its potential impact on IFIs, most interviewees 
agreed that Basel III is a fact that is here to stay. There is also a general belief among 
respondents that although Basel III is more demanding than Basel II with regard to 
addressing systemic risk, it may not be the last of the Basel series. This is mainly because 
risk is inherent in the complex global financial markets of increasing sophistication. Basel 
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III cannot work on its own. As the regulators recognize, financial stability is about far 
more than capital and liquidity ratio. Banks will still fail even if higher ratios are 
implemented. Regulators need to work on other steps to reduce systemic risk including 
enhanced transparency, risk sharing, and value creation. All these concepts are rooted in 
Islamic finance, but unfortunately tend to be neglected.     
 
Therefore, hypothesis 6 is rejected by both quantitative and qualitative analyses.  
 
Although the result is not as per the expectations of the researcher, it confirms the 
findings from the research conducted by Noraini et al. (2009), who concluded that that 
Basel II could be applied to Islamic banks but with some adaptations and the IFSB could 
play an important role in this context. In addition, consideration of the implications of 
Basel III is at an early stage for most IFIs. While Akkizidis and Khandelwal (2007) argue 
that Basel II is primarily for conventional banks and thus does not offer a great help to 
IFIs. They believe that Pillars I and II of Basel II have limited applicability for Islamic 
banking, while the third Pillar of Basel II on market disclosure is largely applicable to 
IFIs because social responsibility and transparency are of utmost importance in Islamic 
finance. 
 
Fitch Ratings (2011) expects Basel III to have little impact on IFIs‟ capital adequacy, as 
capital ratios are generally sound and consist largely of core Tier 1 capital. Hybrid capital 
is negligible in the region. However, new liquidity requirements may be significant, as 
IFIs have a substantial maturity mismatch: customer deposits are contractually short term 
(albeit very stable), while IFIs are financing increasingly longer-term assets. This may 
require some adjustment to their liquidity management. 
 
Subsequently, the following sub-hypotheses were developed to see if there is any 
significant difference in the perception across different groups of respondents for each 
control variable. 
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H6-1: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ views 
about capital adequacy for Islamic banks according to Region. 
At α = 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected, since the K-W test results for four statements 
(out of five) recorded a lower significant value than the critical p-Value as depicted in 
Table 8.31 . 
 
H6-2: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ views 
about capital adequacy for Islamic banks according to Nature of FI. 
 
As Table 8.32 shows, at α = 0.05 the null hypothesis is accepted and the alternative 
hypothesis is rejected for all statements except Statement 5. All statements are 
statistically insignificant except Statement 5 which shows different views between 
bankers (whether Islamic or conventional) and non-bankers (p-Value = 0.02), which is 
also evident from the mean ranking. This implies that the nature of FI is not a statistically 
determining factor; and that the opinions of the respondents are rather similar. This 
coincides with the results of descriptive statistics, in Figure 7.4, as more than 59% of 
respondents use Basel II standards.    
 
H6-3: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ views 
about capital adequacy for Islamic banks according to the Nature of Activities. 
 
Similarly, for the „Nature of Activities‟ control variable, the null hypothesis is rejected 
since the p-value recorded in the testing is lower than the critical p-value limit for three 
statements as depicted in Table 8.33. 
 
H6-4: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ views 
about capital adequacy for Islamic banks according to Respondent’s Position. 
 
Similar results also can be found for the „Respondent‟s Position‟ control variable in Table 
8.34.  At α = 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected and suggest that alternative hypothesis 
is accepted since the p-value recorded in the testing is significantly lower than the critical 
p-value limit for Statement 5 (0.008). Therefore it can be concluded that, statistically, 
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there is a significant difference in the respondents‟ perceptions according to their 
position. 
 
10.6 ISLAMIC BANKING AND THE GLOBAL CREDIT CRISIS 
 
This section aims to provide a discussion through further interpretation of the results on 
the global credit crisis and Islamic banking by responding to the hypothesis set in 
advance. 
 
Hypothesis 7: 
Islamic banking is more resilient to economic shocks than conventional banking but 
not recession proof. 
 
It is interesting to note that both Islamic and non-Islamic bankers in the questionnaire 
share the view that Islamic banking is less risky than conventional banking, in theory, due 
to the naturally inherent conservatism in the Shari’ah principles; however, the theory is a 
long way from fact in its current financial practice. Participants asserted that reform is 
needed within Islamic banking in order to be successful and capable of providing an 
ethical alternative to the debunked Wall Street banking model. Most respondents also 
support the view that the recent crisis could have been avoided under a genuine Islamic 
banking system. Although IFIs were by no means unscathed by the crisis, it had a less 
severe impact than elsewhere and allowed prominent issues to be brought to the forefront. 
This supports Hypothesis 7.  
 
Factor analysis was used in responding to Hypothesis 7. The final outcomes and a 
detailed discussion of the factor analysis are available in Section 8.2.3. The factor 
analysis results suggest that all nine variables of perception about the credit crisis and 
Islamic banking are reduced to two components, namely „Resilience of IFIs‟ and „Risk 
management must be embedded institutionally‟.   
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Furthermore, most interviewees believe that although IFIs have been more resilient to the 
on-going crisis than their conventional counterparts, the shift in the environment did 
negatively affect some of them. Islamic finance is not an island; it has suffered from the 
liquidity drought, to the point where a few IFIs have defaulted, but as an industry it now 
has a track record of resilience (which had not been tested before). While the global crisis 
gave Islamic banking an opportunity to prove its resilience, it also highlighted the need to 
address important challenges.  
 
Therefore, Hypothesis 7 is supported by both quantitative and qualitative analyses.  
 
The results are further confirm the findings revealed by Moody‟s (2011a) that while the 
Islamic financial industry seems to have been resilient to the current crisis relative to their 
conventional counterparts, it is far from being a risk-free segment. The most affected line 
of business within the industry was undoubtedly that of investment banking. And yet, 
until 2007, Shari’ah-compliant investment banks were portrayed by market participants 
as having significant potential, benefiting from cheap funding, high liquidity, exceptional 
profits and robust capitalisation. At the time, the combination of these four factors led 
them to pursue investments in riskier markets and asset classes such as private equity, 
infrastructure or real estate, mostly in emerging markets ranging from the Maghreb to 
Southeast Asia. 
 
When the financial crisis erupted in mid-2007, the Islamic finance industry remained 
relatively healthy and insulated, and recorded robust performance. Some commentators 
wrongly labelled Islamic finance as a „risk-free‟ sector. However, the significant defaults 
of TID and GFH since early 2009 and the growing difficulties of the rest of the Islamic 
investment banking community makes this assessment dubious, as the structural 
weaknesses of the Islamic financial industry started to become more obvious. The crisis 
was a unique opportunity for the industry to prove that it had the capacity and ability to 
react and absorb shocks, but not for all its sub-segments. While the commercial banking 
sector seems to have emerged from the crisis relatively unscathed, the investment 
banking sector could not have been more different, as it suffered a very sudden and sharp 
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dip in performance as losses mounted (Moody‟s, 2011a). One of the interviewees for this 
research, Engel (2010), adds that the structural feature of IFIs‟ ALM – which was once a 
benefit when ample liquidity was chasing too few assets – started to turn negative when 
too many impaired assets were available to serve massive liquidity withdrawals. In 
addition, the crisis revealed that IFIs also had heavy concentrations across the board, by 
name, sector, geography and business lines. 
 
In fact, until 2007, IFIs benefited from a very favourable economic and liquidity 
environment, especially due to the boom in the real-estate and infrastructure sectors, and 
supported by massive government spending within these sectors. Meanwhile, an 
increasing number of regional investors were attracted by the high yields that IFIs were 
offering through their recycling of a growing amount of oil wealth into investments that 
fell outside the remit of their plain-vanilla banking activities. The perception of sound 
capitalisation was largely artificial in the sense that it underestimated the profound impact 
of sector-wide concentration risks and inadequate liquidity management. Above all, IFIs 
registered impressive performance for one main reason: available and cheap liquidity, 
explains Thun (2010), one of the interviewees for this research. This element was at the 
heart of their business model, consisting of borrowing short to invest long on behalf of 
their investment constituencies, while keeping on the balance sheet a portion of their 
illiquid investment portfolio that was incommensurate with their liquidity and capital 
profile.  
 
The interviews also indicated that by the beginning of 2009, operating revenues started to 
shrink for IFIs reflecting their struggle to book new transactions (negative volume effect) 
and declining asset valuations (negative price effect). At the same time, their fixed 
charges remained stable, while funding costs and expenses escalated. This P&L scissors 
effect worsened in the second half of 2009, leaving the IFIs with very limited room for 
manoeuvre. This highlights the very weak diversification of their revenue base, their 
dependence on a very uncertain transaction flow rather than on an existing stock of cash-
flow-generating assets, and the cyclical cost of their funding profiles. Only a few IFIs 
banks managed to mitigate this issue. 
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Above all, the crisis revealed weak risk-management architectures among most IFIs. It 
had the constructive effect of focusing the minds of Islamic practitioners on their core 
business strategies and operating models, highlighting corporate governance and asset 
and liability management specifically. According to Moody‟s (2011a), TID for instance 
(which defaulted in May 2009) did not disclose proper risk-management information. 
Furthermore, in 2007, most IFIs only applied Basel I, which did not make it mandatory 
for them to adhere to Basel II‟s Pillar 3 disclosure requirements. Only in the 2008 
financial reporting data (released during Q1 2009, i.e. quite late in the cycle given 
extreme circumstances at the time) did IFIs start to adopt more transparent approaches to 
risk management, Basel II guidelines and requirements. Even then, not all the information 
was clearly and consistently released by the IFIs. However, since 2009, disclosure 
practices have been improving significantly (Moody‟s, 2011a). 
 
Traditionally, IFIs have not been heavily leveraged. The primary reasons for conservative 
financial leverage maintenance are: (i) IFIs have limited incentives to grow debt-like 
liabilities because their assets tend to be highly profitable; (ii) they needed to set aside 
extra capital buffers to prepare for expansion; (iii) funding is usually cheap, thanks to 
easy access to non-remunerated qardh hasan current-account deposits; and (iv) the 
necessity to set aside capital charges for specific risks like DCR, reputation risks and 
concentration risks as per Basel II‟s Pillar 2 (Moody‟, 2009c). These capital and liquidity 
buffers, previously criticized by opponents of Islamic finance as a burden on profitability, 
have perhaps been one of the most important strengths of the IFIs amid this crisis because 
they provides a financial institution with surplus cash to use as a shock absorber. Under 
the recent difficult economic conditions, most IFIs have been able to seek out 
opportunities by using their surplus liquidity to aggressively boost deposit volumes and 
thus to increase their market shares by growing lending volumes, while maintaining their 
focus on the retail and corporate sectors. This is a strategy employed by GCC banks to 
de-couple their retail lending business from global markets by focusing on extending 
credit locally. According to another interviewee, Damak (2010), with very few 
exceptions (especially in Dubai), funding has been less of a constraint for IFIs because of 
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the market‟s perception that these players will be more resilient than their conventional 
peers to the global credit turmoil. 
 
Hasan and Dridi (2010) argue that IFIs have avoided the subprime exposure, but note that 
they are subject to the „second round effect‟ of the global crisis. They explain that, 
because the global financial crisis originated from sub-prime mortgage portfolios which 
were spun off into securitized instruments subsequently offered as investments, IFIs were 
not affected because Islamic finance is based on a close link between financial and 
productive flows. However, the protracted duration of the crisis affected IFIs as well, not 
because these institutions have a direct exposure to derivative instruments, but simply 
because Islamic banking contracts are based on asset-backed transactions. With the 
global economic downturn, property markets have seen a decline in a number of 
countries where IFIs have a significant presence. This carries negative implications for 
these banks as a large number of contracts are backed by real estate and property as 
collateral. They assert that the crisis highlighted a number of sector-specific challenges 
that need to be addressed in order for IFIs to continue growing at a sustainable pace. 
Specifically, the key challenges faced by the Islamic banking industry include (i) the 
infrastructure and tools for liquidity risk management, which remains underdeveloped in 
many jurisdictions; (ii) a legal framework, which is incomplete or untested; (iii) the lack 
of harmonized contracts; and (iv) insufficient expertise (at the supervisory and industry 
levels) relative to the industry„s growth. 
 
In addition, the lack of harmonized accounting and regulatory standards was a key 
challenge for regulators and market participants during the crisis. This is even more acute 
for IFIs given the lack of standard financial contracts and products across the various 
institutions within the same country, as well as across jurisdictions. Local accounting 
standards used in the Islamic banking sector often consist of a mixture of IFRS, IAS, 
AAOIFI and other specific standards, complicating the operations of IBs. While full 
harmonization might not be possible given the nature of the industry, mutual recognition 
of financial standards and products across jurisdictions would help limit this problem. It 
would also reduce transaction costs, help implement an efficient regulatory oversight, 
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enhance the process of compliance, and contribute to confidence and industry growth 
(Hasan and Dridi, 2010). Moreover, Ahmed (2009) identifies the issues and problems 
behind the crisis at three levels: regulatory level; organizational level; and at the product 
level. “There is a real role for regulators on the national level to make regulations a fair 
playing field for Islamic banks” adds Asaria (2011). 
 
In summary, Islamic banks, working within the business cycle of their respective 
countries, have suffered from the crisis, to the point where a few of the sector‟s banks 
have defaulted, but as an industry it now has a track record of resilience (which had not 
been tested before). Islamic banking is expected to emerge stronger from the crisis, 
provided some conditions are met: more innovation, enhanced transparency, more robust 
risk-management architecture and culture, and above all, enhanced Shari’ah compliance. 
In theory, Islamic financial principles contribute to the stability of the financial system. 
Islamic modes of finance, particularly the profit-sharing principle, provide a loss 
absorption feature to financial institutions. However, the practice is very different from 
the theory. All of these deviations between theory and practice mean that the system is 
not functioning at its full potential and has adapted itself to a limited functionality. Even 
if Islamic finance had been prevailing, at its current state, the crisis could have happened 
but at a less severe level. Islamic finance has not yet provided a more principled mode of 
finance than the debunked Wall Street model because the embedded ethical foundations 
have not been explored yet (Asutay, 2009b). 
 
Paradoxically, Islamic banks‟ reputation has generally benefited from the recent crisis. 
From a conceptual perspective, Islamic banks will probably be the big winners when the 
crisis ends. As a sub-set of ethical finance, Islamic banking is now considered not so 
much niche business standing at the margins, but rather as representative of a credible, 
viable and sustainable alternative business model for sound, ethical and socially 
responsible banking. Many now believe that mainstream finance has moved too far into 
excess leverage, meaningless innovation and value-destroying investments. The credit 
crunch has shaken confidence in the existing western regulations and created the need for 
a better more transparent system; this has opened the door for Islamic bankers to take up 
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the opportunity. Indeed at the 5th World Islamic Economic Forum (WIFE) in Jakarta on 2 
March 2009, Muslim leaders including Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
and Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, called on the Muslim world to leverage 
the global financial crisis by turning “adversity into opportunity” (Parker, 2009).  
 
According to proceedings of the Securities Commission Malaysia (SC) and the Oxford 
Centre for Islamic Studies (OCIS) Roundtable and Forum (2010), after the recent 
financial crisis, Islamic banks seem to be emerging stronger than the conventional banks. 
According to Ken Eglinton, Director - Banking and Capital Markets at Ernest & Young, 
and who was interviewed for this research, Ernest & Young did a comparison between 
the top conventional banks and top Islamic banks. It showed that the aggregate net profits 
of the commercial banks dropped by USD 42 billion in 2008 from USD 116 billion in 
2006. In contrast, the net profits of Islamic banks increased by 9% during the same 
period. 
  
The following sub-hypotheses were developed to see if there is any significant difference 
in the level of perception across the different categories of respondents. 
 
H7-1: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ 
perceptions about credit crisis and Islamic banking according to Region. 
 
At α = 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted, 
since 7 out of 9 statements had significant p-Values. Therefore, it is concluded that there 
are statistically different opinions among the respondents coming from different regions.     
 
In addition, in order to respond to this sub-hypothesis, after conducting factor analysis 
further analysis was carried out using a one way between groups MANOVA test in order 
to investigate if there is any significant difference between the two component groups 
identified under factor analysis in relation to Region as the control variables. This helped 
to locate the impact or significance of each control variable on the established 
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distribution. The results signify 32% of the variances in „Resilience of IFIs‟ scores are 
explained respectively by the Region. 
 
H7-2: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ 
perceptions about credit crisis and Islamic banking according to the Nature of the FI. 
 
At α = 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted and the alternative hypothesis is rejected for 
all statements except statement 3, which shows that, statistically, the Nature of FI does 
not play a significant role in the difference in perceptions among respondents. This is 
consistent with the descriptive statistics which show that most respondents share similar 
views regardless of the nature of FI. 
 
Statement 3 „Islamic finance could have solved the global crisis‟ produced differences 
among different categories of respondents. Mean rankings for statement 3, as depicted by 
Table 8.36, shows that fully-fledged Islamic Banks are far more aggressive in their belief 
that Islamic finance could have solved the global crisis than other categories (46.2), 
followed by Islamic Subsidiaries (40.25), then by Others and Conventional Banks.    
 
An attempt was also made to see the effect of „nature of FI‟ on the identified components 
in factor analysis through MANOVA. However, no significant results could be 
established. 
 
H7-3: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ 
perceptions about credit crisis and Islamic banking according to the Nature of 
Activities. 
 
As Table 8.37 depicts, at α = 0.05 the K-W test results suggest that the null hypothesis is 
rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted. Therefore, it can be concluded that, 
statistically, there are significant differences in the level of perception according to the 
institution‟s „Nature of Activities‟. 
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H7-4: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ 
perceptions about credit crisis and Islamic banking according to Accounting 
Standards. 
 
Similarly, for the Accounting Standards control variable, the null hypothesis is rejected in 
favour of the alternative hypothesis, since the p-value recorded in the testing is lower than 
the critical p-value limit as shown in Table 8.38. Therefore, it can be concluded that, 
statistically, there is a significant difference in the level of perception according to the 
accounting standards utilized by the institution. 
 
H7-5: There are no statistically significant differences among the respondents’ 
perceptions about credit crisis and Islamic banking according to the Respondent’s 
Position. 
 
At α = 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted and suggest that alternative hypothesis is 
rejected since the p-value recorded in the testing is higher lower than the critical p-value 
limit. Thus, it can be concluded that, statistically, there are no significant differences 
according to respondent‟s position. 
 
The findings from the above sub-hypotheses tests echo the findings from the descriptive 
statistics and from the qualitative interview analysis. However, the inferential statistical 
analysis provides a higher level of understanding and knowledge concerning the subject 
matter. Combining the results of the above five sub-hypotheses tests together provide an 
aggregate trend that can be attributed to prevailing market conditions: retail fully-fledged 
Islamic banks and Islamic subsidiaries, located mainly in the GCC and „Other‟, are more 
aggressive in their perceptions about the credit crisis and Islamic finance than other 
categories. These banks tend to use AAOIFI accounting standards or International and 
AAOIFI standards together. This trend could not be established by studying one control 
variable in isolation, the 5 control variables had to be examined together in order to see 
the bigger picture. This pattern is consistent with the findings of Table 7.16 that breaks 
down the descriptive statistics among Islamic Bankers and Non Islamic Bankers. 
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10.7 RISK MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING 
 
This section aims to provide a discussion through further interpretation of the results on 
risk management and reporting issues facing IFIs by responding to the hypothesis set in 
advance. 
 
Hypothesis 8: 
Not many Islamic banks use the more technically advanced risk measurement and 
reporting techniques. 
 
Findings from quantitative analyses indicate that although IFIs are doing comparatively 
well in terms of their general risk management and reporting, they are still perceived to 
use less advanced risk management approaches. Frequency distribution in Table 7.16 
shows that IFIs usually use the same risk management techniques as the conventional 
banks for managing the risks, in particular liquidity, credit, and market risks. 
Nevertheless, the spread and frequency of utilising these techniques is lower among 
Islamic banks than among their conventional peers. The most widely used report among 
IFIs on daily basis is liquidity risk report, followed by credit exposure report and profit 
rate risk report. Commodity risk and equity mark-to-market reports are the least used by 
IFIs in this survey. Improving risk management and reporting practices, represent a 
serious challenge to Islamic banking in order to lift itself to the next level. Interviewees 
also perceived IFIs to use less advanced risk management approaches. Risk management 
frameworks are not fully developed in IFIs yet. There is still lack of well-functioning 
system of controls and internal checks and balances. The findings support hypothesis 8. 
 
Some interviewees indicated that currently there are weaknesses and a serious lack of a 
robust risk culture among IFIs. However, the financial crisis has raised the profile of risk 
management within Islamic banks. In the current environment the painful cost of 
inadequate risk management is being demonstrated every day. Banks seeking to navigate 
through this recession must put a premium on effective risk management. Also, due to 
limited resources, IFIs are often unable to afford high-cost management information 
systems or the technology to assess and monitor risk in a timely fashion. Efforts should 
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be made to collaborate among IFIs to develop Islamic risk management systems that are 
customised to the industry needs. The changes required to institutionalize a strong risk 
culture are fundamental and far-reaching: risk must become “everyone‟s business” 
throughout the organization starting from the front line through to the functions. 
Responsibility and accountability for risk should be intertwined among all stakeholders, 
from board members to business unit heads and their teams, must be more actively 
committed to identifying and mitigating risks. There is a need to introduce risk 
management culture among Islamic banks. 
 
These findings contradict with those by Shaikh and Jalbani (2009) whose paper 
optimistically concluded that equity-based business of Islamic banks posing a slightly 
more risk than conventional banks is well mitigated by Islamic banks through their 
effective and adequate distinct risk management procedures. The researcher does not 
agree with the research methodology and the findings of this study by Shaikh and Jalbani. 
Rosman and Abdul Rahman (2010) surveyed the risk management practices of 28 Islamic 
banks from 16 different countries. Their findings indicate that Islamic banks are doing 
comparatively well in terms of their general risk management and operational risk 
management. In terms of risk reporting, the study found that majority of Islamic banks 
produced various types of risk reports and there is a significant improvement in their risk 
reporting over the last few years. Majority of Islamic banks they surveyed produced all 
the risk reports except for commodities and equities positions risk reports; and country 
risk reports. On the other hand, Ahmed and Khan (2007) argue that there is a need to 
introduce a better risk management culture in Islamic banks. Wilson (2002) also argues 
that IFIs can learn from conventional banks in the fields of technology and developing 
infrastructure, as much as conventional banks need to learn from IFIs about staff and 
client motivation and relationships.  
  
The following sub-hypothesis was developed to see if there is any significant difference 
in the level of use of risk reporting across different regions.  
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H8-1: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the 
frequency of producing risk management reports according to Region. 
 
 
The results from the K-W test reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative 
hypothesis, since there is a significant difference among various regions in the frequency 
of producing risk reports (p-value <0.05) except for Commodity Risk report (0.094), 
Industry Concentration Risk Report (0.129), Credit Exposure Report (0.091), and Large 
Exposure Report (0.071). Hence, for the rest of the reports there are significant 
differences in the perceptions of the participants. Thus, for most of the reports „region‟ is 
a significant factor. Repeating the K-W test with „Region‟ as the control variable for 
various institutional samples provided an obvious trend: conventional banks, 
concentrated in Europe and the Americas, produce risk reports more frequently than 
Islamic banks. In addition, the results reflect the risk management culture difference 
between Islamic and conventional banks. 
 
10.8 RISK MEASUREMENT 
 
This section aims to provide a discussion through further interpretation of the results on 
risk measurement in IFIs by responding to the hypothesis set in advance. 
 
Hypothesis 9: 
The use of risk measurement techniques is less advanced among Islamic banks than 
among their conventional peers. 
 
In addition to risk management reports, financial institutions use various techniques to 
measure and analyse risks. Similar to Hypothesis 8, Hypothesis 9 is supported by both 
quantitative and qualitative analyses. Frequency distribution in Table 7.17 shows that the 
most common technique used by IFIs as indicated by respondents is maturity matching 
analysis (22 respondents), followed by reliance on external ratings provided by rating 
agencies (21 responses), internal based rating and Gap analysis (19 responses each). Only 
14 respondents indicated they use VAR models, while Simulation techniques are used by 
just 6 IFIs in the sample. Interviewees also emphasised the fact that risk measurement 
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techniques in Islamic banking are not as sophisticated as in the conventional banking 
world.  
  
In line with this, Noraini et al. (2009) also found that more technically advanced risk 
measurement approaches are perceived not to be widely used by Islamic banks, except 
for Internal Based Rating System and Estimates of Worst Case. The study concluded that 
most IFIs did not use sophisticated risk measurement approaches as they are still new and 
do not have sufficient resources and systems to use more technically advanced 
techniques. Supporting this argument is the study by Rosman and Abdul Rahman (2010), 
who concluded that IFIs are using less technically advanced risk measurement 
approaches. 
 
Khan and Ahmed (2001), on the other hand, found that the overall risk management 
processes in Islamic financial institutions to be satisfactory. They apprehended, however, 
that this may be because the banks that have relatively better risk management systems 
have responded to the questionnaires. The results from risk management process showed 
that while Islamic banks have established a relatively good risk management 
environment, the measuring, mitigating and monitoring processes and internal controls 
needs to be further upgraded. Khan and Ahmed‟s study also identified the problems that 
Islamic financial institutions face in managing risks. These include lack of instruments 
(like short-term financial assets and derivatives) and money markets. At the regulatory 
level, the financial institutions apprehend that the legal system and regulatory framework 
is not supportive to them. Results from a survey of 17 Islamic institutions from 10 
different countries revealed that while Islamic banks have established a relatively good 
risk management environment, the measuring, mitigating and monitoring processes and 
internal controls needs to be further upgraded. The results indicated that the growth of 
Islamic financial industry will, to a large extent, depend on how bankers, regulators, and 
Shari’ah scholars understand the inherent risks arising in these institutions and take 
appropriate policies to cater to these needs. 
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Subsequently, the following sub-hypotheses were tested to identify whether there is any 
statistically significant difference in the frequency of producing risk measurement reports 
across various groups of respondents based on the selected control variables. 
 
H9-1: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk measurement techniques according to Region. 
 
H9-2: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk measurement techniques according to the Respondents’ Position. 
 
H9-3: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk measurement techniques according to the Nature of the FI. 
 
H9-4: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk measurement techniques according to the Nature of Activities. 
 
H9-5: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk measurement techniques according to Accounting Standards. 
 
AS Table 8.56 depicts, at α = 0.05 the 5 sub-hypotheses are declined. This means that 
statistically all the selected control variables play a role in the difference in utilizing risk 
measurement tools. However, „Region‟ and „Nature of FI‟ are the control variables with 
the most significant results and hence these two variables are most essential to the 
difference in risk management techniques among banks. Mean rankings show that 
conventional banks in relation to their regional location, concentrated outside of the GCC 
and Middle East, use more advanced risk management techniques than Islamic banks. 
„Americas‟ are the most advanced across all techniques, followed often by „Other‟ or 
„Europe‟. The rest of the regional samples include mostly Islamic banks, their use of 
sophisticated risk measurements however is not as significant as in conventional banks in 
Americas and Europe. 
 
10.9 RISK MITIGATION 
 
This section aims to provide a discussion through further interpretation of the results on 
risk mitigation issues facing IFIs by responding to the hypothesis set in advance. 
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Hypothesis 10: 
Islamic banks use a number of risk mitigation tools that are intended to be Shari’ah 
Compliant and that are less advanced from those utilised by conventional banks. 
 
Both the descriptive statistics and the qualitative interview analyses clearly reflect that 
risk mitigation techniques in Islamic banking are less advanced than conventional 
banking. This supports Hypothesis 10. 
 
Risk mitigation is currently one of the most contentious issues in Islamic banking. The 
unique nature of risks faced by Islamic banks, combined with the restrictions added by 
Shari’ah, makes risk mitigation for Islamic banks a difficult and complex process. There 
are risks that Islamic banks, like their conventional counterparts, can manage and control 
through appropriate risk policies and controls that do not conflict with the Shari’ah 
principles. However, there are other risks that banks cannot eliminate and can only be 
reduced by transferring to or selling those risk in well-defined markets. These risks can 
generate unexpected losses that need capital insulation, and hedging can help to restrict 
the impact of unexpected loss. Traditionally in the conventional world risk transferring 
techniques include the use of derivatives for hedging, selling or buying of financial 
claims, and changing borrowing terms. The challenge is, however, that most of the 
conventional hedging tools do not so far comply with the Shari’ah requirements. This 
makes IFIs face additional array of risks particularly market and credit risks. As 
explained in Chapter 3, there have been substantial efforts in developing Sharia’ah-
compliant hedging instruments; however, much of this progress remains localised with 
limited scope for cross-border application and further work is still needed. 
 
Until recently, it had been the opinion of most Shari’ah scholars that hedging would fall 
into the category of speculation and uncertainty. In the last few years, however, the 
increasing sophistication in Islamic banking products has led some scholars to take the 
view that Islamic banks could be able to enter into hedging arrangements provided that 
the hedging tool is in itself structured in a Shari’ah compliant manner. According to 
Khan (2010), “there is growing demand for hedging and Shari’ah-compliant derivatives, 
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which would be used merely for hedging and not speculation.” Khandelwal (2008) also 
asserts that there has been substantial development in finding ways to apply derivatives in 
Islamic finance to reduce certain risks such as currency and commodity risks. For 
example, some Shari’ah-compliant hedging instruments such as profit rate swaps, have 
been introduced in Malaysia. However, much of this progress remains localised with 
limited scope for cross-border application and further work is still needed. The empirical 
study conducted by Rosman and Abdul Rahman (2010) found that IFIs are still lacking 
on the application of unique Shari’ah-compliant risk mitigation techniques, while Ahmed 
and Khan (2007) believe that the potential of futures, currency forwards, options, and 
embedded options in risk management in Islamic finance is tremendous. 
 
One of the interviewees, Chowdhury (2010), argues that derivatives are sophisticated 
instruments that can, if employed with care, enhance efficiency in Islamic financial 
institutions through risk mitigation, thereby making them more competitive as well as 
appealing to customers. However, their application in Islamic finance is surrounded by 
religious dogma and is highly controversial for reasons of speculation and uncertainty, 
two practices banned under Shari’ah. There are varying scholarly opinions in the world 
of Fiqh and, due to this judicial fragmentation, the final verdict on the legitimacy of 
derivatives varies between a total ban in some countries and actual implementation 
(although on a limited scale) in others (Chowdhury, 2010). 
 
Another interviewee, Engel (2010), adds that the recent financial crisis, in the opinion of 
many, including Shari’ah scholars, is blamed on the „speculative‟ use of complex 
derivative instruments. The economic meltdown was in fact due to a combination of 
several factors, primarily a lack of proper risk monitoring and quantification mechanisms. 
The bubble in the derivatives industry was attributed to a copycat phenomenon, whereby 
banks took on more risk than they could possibly cope with, exceeding their liabilities 
many times over and building inverted pyramid structures on their balance sheets. The 
consequential seizure in the market has forced financial institutions to drastically scale 
back their proprietary risk-taking and to revamp models, which adds to the reluctance of 
Shari’ah scholars to permit the use of derivatives. Thun (2010), one of the interviewees 
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for this research, agrees that despite their pivotal function, the use of derivatives in 
emerging countries in general, and in the Islamic banking sector in particular, has been 
limited, in part due to the absence of legal provisions, insufficient technical frameworks, 
underdeveloped capital markets, and/or inadequate accounting, regulatory, and disclosure 
standards. Therefore, the use of derivatives in Islamic banking requires an understanding 
of the distinction between hedging and speculating. 
 
As risk management and corporate governance in IFIs are already below par relative to 
the rest of industry, the use of securitisation and derivatives offers considerable scope for 
reducing IFIs‟ risk exposures and thus improving their overall risk profile (Smith. 2010). 
  
Recently, highly skilled financial engineers in global conventional banks owning Islamic 
windows, more advanced Islamic banks, economists and a few Shari’ah scholars have 
combined efforts to develop Islamic derivative products. For this, jurists have 
increasingly been working on khiar, arbun and wa’ad concepts to turn them into 
contracts as explained in Chapter 3. Although wa’ad is still criticised from a conceptual 
perspective, in practice this instrument has become a contractual promise, as it offers 
great flexibility, explains Thun (2010), who was interviewed for this research. For 
instance, it allows for an FX forward profile to be emulated. The writer makes a unilateral 
promise to buy or sell a particular amount of currency against another currency on a 
predetermined date and at a predetermined rate. If the promise is contractually agreed not 
to be binding, then the buyer chooses whether to enforce the wa’ad or not in exchange for 
a non-refundable fee, which ends up becoming equivalent to a put or call option (Thun, 
2010).  
 
Far from having a complete derivative supply, the trend in the Islamic financial industry 
is therefore to develop explicit Islamic derivative products. Through Shari’ah-compliant 
engineering, currency forward, call options on sukuk, securities or commodities, profit 
rate swaps, cross currency rate swaps, forward rate swaps and even total return swaps can 
be copied, at least conceptually, adds Lowe (2010), one of the interviewees for this 
research. On the other hand, as previously discussed, if IFIs continue to mimic 
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conventional banking products, they will weaken the uniqueness of their value 
proposition and the powerful nature of their natural factors of differentiation. 
 
Risk mitigation techniques are inherently complex by nature and require a well thought-
out regulatory framework for their management and application. For instance, in order to 
promote and legalise the use of derivatives, large Islamic banks in Malaysia, are stepping 
forward in collaboration with the Malaysian Financial Market Association to establish 
standards in Shari’ah-compliant derivatives to enhance liquidity and improve balance 
sheet management (Moody‟s, 2011a). This is in addition to the progress made by 
supervisory bodies like IFSB, IIFM, AAOIFI, and others.  
 
It is interesting to investigate the findings further to determine whether there is any 
statistically significant difference in the use of mitigation techniques according to carious 
control variables. Therefore, the following sub-hypotheses were formulated. 
 
H10-1: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk mitigation techniques according to Region. 
 
H10-2: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk mitigation techniques according to the Respondent’s Position. 
 
H10-3: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk mitigation techniques according to the Nature of the FI. 
 
H10-4: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk mitigation techniques according to the Nature of Activities. 
 
H10-5: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents in the use of 
risk mitigation techniques according to Accounting Standards. 
 
Table 8.59 shows that at α = 0.05 the 5 sub-hypotheses are rejected in favour of the 
alternative hypotheses. This means that statistically all the selected control variables play 
a role in the difference in utilizing risk mitigation techniques among FIs. However 
„Nature of FI‟ is the control variable with the most significant p-values (0.00). Mean 
ranking in Table 8.60 shows that with the exception of Islamic swaps and Islamic 
currency forwards, fully-fledged Islamic banks fell behind Islamic subsidiaries in using 
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all other risk mitigation techniques. The latter group tends to benefit from the already 
developed risk mitigation platforms at their conventional parents. However, of notice is 
that the difference in the value of mean ranking between the two groups is small, which 
reflects that IFIs are progressing in the use risk mitigation but still the use of risk 
mitigation techniques in IFIs is not as developed as in conventional banking. 
 
10.10 ISLAMIC BANKING IN PRACTICE 
 
This section aims to provide a discussion through further interpretation of the results on 
practical issues in Islamic banking by responding to the hypothesis set in advance. 
 
Hypothesis 11: 
Most IFIs abandoned conservative risk management Shari’ah principles in favour of 
copying conventional structures. 
 
Descriptive statistics support hypothesis 11 as most respondents believe that IFIs should 
stop simply mimicking conventional finance, as the trend seemed to be towards trying to 
duplicate what conventional banks did. Everyone assumed there was a single model of 
banking and they were copying the Wall Street model; a model that had more or less 
collapsed. Before the current financial meltdown, The Islamic banking industry came 
under criticism that it has not been able to match all the existing conventional products 
with Islamic equivalents. From hindsight, if IFIs continued on the same track as 
conventional peers, they would have been prone to the same risks. Hence Islamic banks 
have been largely spared from the sub-prime crisis.   
 
Likewise, interviewees are of the view that IFIs will not achieve their objectives by 
simply mimicking conventional products. While the ideals of Islamic finance offer some 
compelling ideas, the reality is that much of Islamic finance today is focused on 
replicating the conventional system. This provides support for hypothesis 11. Chowdhury 
(2010) argues that this reminds us that IFIs will not achieve their objectives by simply 
mimicking conventional products. If scholars had allowed simple mimicking without 
checks, IFIs would have been as exposed to sub-prime as the conventional banks are. 
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In theory, the Islamic financial system is definitely more resilient to economic shocks 
than the debunked Wall Street model, but unfortunately the theory is a long way from 
fact in its current financial practice. Practitioners of Islamic finance to-date have been 
mimicking conventional products. This mimicking has resulted in a close correlation 
between the two systems. “People all over the world have been paying attention to 
Islamic finance, not necessarily because it would have solutions to all these problems; but 
because it is institutionalised and has embraced conservative principles” (Warde, 2009). 
Certainly, Islamic banks have partially ignored this conservatism by simply mimicking 
conventional banks, but still the fundamental principles of Islamic finance saved Islamic 
banks form many of the conventional financial woes. 
 
The crisis created a golden opportunity to Islamic finance to present itself to the world a 
better more sustainable financial system. Dr. Mohammed Mahmoud Awan, a leading 
scholar and Dean at Malaysia-based International Centre for Education in Islamic 
Finance (IINCEIF), thinks that the current global crisis has opened many windows of 
opportunities for Islamic finance as it has the capacity and capability to bring stability to 
the market (Awan, 2008). However, the defaults of sukuk in the Middle Eastern market, 
and the frauds that occurred in several Islamic financial institutions have downplayed this 
notion. According to the proceedings of the SC - OCIS Roundtable and Forum (2010), 
there were failures of credit risk assessment and over-concentration of risks in real estate 
assets; there was lack of transparency; there were family-owned businesses that were 
perceived to have government support (in some of the sukuk); in some areas, there was 
even inadequate regulation and in a recent case, there was also an inappropriate use of 
legal defence. The industry needs to work together to remove the negative perceptions 
that are seen to somewhat impact the industry. So, it is important to subscribe to the 
values of Shari’ah, to build robust risk management systems, IT systems, and to have 
greater transparency and greater practice of Shari’ah governance.    
 
The following sub-hypotheses were formulated in order to identify whether there is any 
significant differences across various selected groups in the respective control variables. 
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The results of the hypotheses testing can be referred to Tables 8.61 and 8.62 in Chapter 8. 
 
H11-1: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ perceptions 
about the current practices in Islamic banking according to the Nature of the FI. 
 
The results suggest that the null hypothesis is rejected, which implies that „Nature of FI‟ 
is a statistically significant determining factor. Mean rankings revealed that Islamic 
bankers are more critical of the current practices in the industry than their conventional 
peers. This could be explained by the fact that Islamic bankers are more educated about 
the underlying principles of Islamic finance and have a better understanding of current 
structures than conventional bankers.  
 
H11-2: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ perceptions 
about the current practices in Islamic banking according to Region. 
 
The results suggest that the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis is 
accepted. There are significant „regional‟ differences among respondents‟ views. 
 
H11-3: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ perceptions 
about the current practices in Islamic banking according to the Respondent’s Position. 
 
For this sub-hypothesis, the testing results were unable to reject the null hypothesis, 
meaning that the impact of Respondent‟s Position has no significant difference. 
 
10.11 THE FUTURE OF ISLAMIC BANKING 
 
This section aims to provide a discussion through further interpretation of the results on 
the future of Islamic banking by responding to the hypothesis set in advance. 
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Hypothesis 12: 
Islamic banking has a great potential to become a strong alternative financing system 
provided that it goes back to its roots.  
 
Evidence from questionnaire data analysis indicates that Hypothesis 12 is supported. 
Most respondents reckon that Islamic banking has benign potential provided that it goes 
back to its roots. Both Islamic and non-Islamic bankers (including Islamic subsidiaries, 
conventional banks, and others) also consider improved risk management and mitigation 
practices among the top priorities IFIs should focus on in their development plans. The 
future of Islamic banking will highly depend on risk architecture and how the industry 
will develop instruments that enhance liquidity; improve ALM and risk management; and 
develop Islamically acceptable risk hedging tools. This questionnaire identified the 
inadequacy of risk management practices by IFIs that may threaten their sustainability 
especially during financial crises. Adequate resources need to be devoted to risk 
identification and measurement, as well as risk management techniques so as to be able to 
develop innovative risk mitigation and hedging instruments suitable to IFIs. 
 
Interview findings similarly provide strong support to Hypothesis 12, as interviewees 
almost unanimously agree that there is now an opportunity for Islamic banking to thrive 
as it has the potential to contribute to a more stable economy. “We have all learnt a lot 
over the past few years about how to allow the Islamic finance market to mature. There‟s 
now an opportunity for Islamic finance to thrive”, says Chowdhury (2010), one of the 
interviewees. Many interviewees, particularly consultants, researchers, and Shari’ah 
scholars, revealed that as it stands in its current form, Islamic banking has little to offer in 
terms of long-lasting solutions. The solution ultimately has to be a moral, not a material 
one. Islamic banking needs to aim for a truly alternative vision based on the ethical and 
moral safeguards within authentic Islamic concepts, together with improving risk 
management and mitigation techniques, enhancing liquidity management, and reducing 
concentrations.  
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The recommendations for the future of Islamic banking provides by both survey 
respondents and  interviewees were numerous, however this section focus on the most 
important ones highlighted by most respondents and that scored high mean rankings. 
 
The continuing rapid growth of demand for Islamic financial services is clearly good 
news for Islamic banks. At the same time, it also presents some challenges, as the banks 
need to invest in upgrading their risk management capabilities in line with the more 
complex and larger projects into which they are entering. Given the unparalleled market 
conditions, the risk management process is going through fundamental and significant 
changes. Islamic banks need to ensure they are prepared for the constantly changing 
environment, and they also need to get involved in those changes to have they say.  
 
While the Islamic banking model limited the chances of surviving the crisis unscathed, 
there is still strong growth potential for the industry. “After enduring the recent financial 
shocks, some IFIs are now conducting internal reviews and looking more deeply into 
ways to improve and diversify their business model,” explains Engel (2010), one of the 
interviewees. For instance, efforts are being made to better organise professional off-
balance-sheet asset-management activities targeting high net-worth individuals and 
institutional investors who require Shari’ah-compliant placements, across a wider range 
of asset classes. Unicorn Investment Bank, for instance, typically focuses on general 
corporate finance, including advisory, M&A, debt and equity capital markets, structured 
finance and brokerage. First Energy Bank, an energy finance specialist, will likely follow 
the same path. The business evolution of Khaleeji Commercial Bank is also relevant as it 
is trying to consolidate its investment banking services with a more robust commercial 
banking platform. “Overall, I believe that the strategic move of some IFIs acquiring 
larger, more diversified and established Islamic banks offers the most promising 
potential” adds Lowe (2010), another interviewee for this research. 
 
Going forward, it is expected that lower volumes, shrinking margins and deteriorating 
asset quality will all weigh on IFIs‟ profitability and ultimately their capitalisation. 
However, the impact will be more manageable than for conventional peers. Fortunately, 
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Islamic banks have been very profitable in the past and have therefore accumulated large 
amounts of capital, making them capable of absorbing these sorts of shocks. As 
previously discussed, conventional banks have had a greater appetite for exotic asset 
classes than IFIs. In that sense, asset quality deterioration at conventional banks may be 
more pronounced. In addition, conventional peer banks used to be less well capitalised 
and less liquid, and therefore will find it more difficult to book new business in the 
current market conditions. “To grow today, a bank must have accumulated excess 
liquidity and capital in the past: most Islamic banks have, some conventional peer banks 
haven‟t”, says Damak (2010) during the interview for this research.  
 
According to the latest findings (Moody‟s, 2011a and Fitch Ratings, 2011), IFIs are 
already tightening their belts and are using their surplus liquidity deposits to meet their 
basic financing needs and to replace recent deposit withdrawals. Most IFIs have placed 
property-based projects on hold because of declining demand in the real estate sector and 
foreign direct investment. There have been financial stimulus packages supplied by the 
governments to assist IFIs with their liquidity constraints. Those banks that are on the 
brink of liquidity crunch and have been unsuccessful in attracting additional deposits will 
either have to issue more sukuk or merge with their financially stronger counterparts. 
 
Islamic banks, organisations, and regulators are working to address these challenges.  
The rapid developments are likely to continue. Financial institutions in countries such as 
Bahrain, the UAE and Malaysia have been gearing up for more Shari’ah-compliant 
financial instruments and structured finance – on both the asset and liability sides. At the 
same time, the leading financial centres, such as London, New York and Singapore, are 
making significant progress in establishing the legal and prudential foundations to 
accommodate Islamic finance side-by-side with the conventional financial system. Many 
of the largest western banks, through their Islamic windows, have become active and 
sometimes leading players in financial innovation, through new Shari’ah-compliant 
financial instruments that attempt to alleviate many of the current constraints such as a 
weak systemic liquidity infra-structure. More conventional banks are expected to offer 
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Islamic products, enticed by enormous profit opportunities and also ample liquidity, 
especially across the Middle East. 
 
New product innovation is also driven by domestic banks‟ interest in risk diversification. 
With a large number of new Islamic banks across the Middle East and Asia especially, 
diversification of products enables banks to offer the right product mix to more 
sophisticated clients. A few banks are already active across different jurisdictions, and 
this trend is certainly going to continue in the near future, possibly with some 
consolidation (Moody‟s, 2011a). 
 
Thun (2010), who was interviewed for this research, argues that just before the crisis 
Islamic banking was on the edge to enter a new era that would bring Islamic finance 
closer to the profit-and-loss sharing, asset-backed and real-economy financing ideals with 
the innovations introduced by Shari’ah-compliant investment banking. Sometime before 
the crisis, institutions like Gulf Finance House, Arcapita Bank, Unicorn Investment Bank 
or the Investment Dar started moving away from pure banking intermediation and into 
more sophisticated investment/merchant banking lines of business, like private equity, 
asset management, brokerage, infrastructure and structured real-estate finance, as well as 
advisory, corporate and project finance – thereby laying the groundwork for innovation 
within Islamic banking. The industry was on the edge of moving beyond the focus on 
raising cheap murabahah or wakala deposits (so as to recycle them into safe, stable and 
expensive retail and corporate loans) and to adopt a greater emphasis on risk-taking 
instead. However, the onset of the financial liquidity crisis prevented the dawning of this 
new era, adds Thun. 
 
On the regulatory front, whereas the growth history and forecasts are a source of 
optimism for the Islamic Finance industry, the growing regulation in the wake of current 
credit crisis offer a newer set of challenges. There will be material, substantive change to 
the regulatory environment under which banks and other financial institutions operate 
(PWC, 2009). Regulators across the world are all set to introduce a new era of tightened 
regulation for the financial sector in general. Central banks and financial regulatory 
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authorities around the world are under intense criticism for failure to predict and check 
the current global financial crisis. Issues are being framed (particularly under areas of risk 
management, liquidity, and capital requirements), consultation papers drafted, and 
stakeholders‟ opinions are being sought for introducing a new and tougher regime of 
banking and financial regulations. “Islamic banks should get involved and should be 
proactive,” asserts Lowe (2010). The IFSB has moved ahead with its efforts aimed at 
fostering of the soundness, risk management, capital standards, and stability of the 
Islamic financial services industry through more standardised regulation.  
 
According to Khan S. (2009), as it stands, Islamic banking regulations are currently 
framed from a conventional base and as long as the conventional yardstick is applied 
certain structures such as mudarabah and musharakah products will likely continue to be 
treated as higher risk. While, some of these products may actually have a higher risk 
profile, concepts of risk-sharing could be ingrained further through the development of 
more profit and risk-sharing mudarabah and musharakah products. This should be driven 
by both regulators and Islamic banking practitioners who, together, need to facilitate a 
transparent explanation of the risks to the customer as well as enable better risk allocation 
between Islamic banks and the customer. The current regulatory infrastructure for IFIs is 
more or less largely voluntary, such that very few penalties apply to institutions that do 
not follow the AAOIFI Standards, or any other set of Shari’ah-related rules or standards. 
Until a regulatory system is meaningfully enforced where penalties of non-compliance 
actually hurt, it is rather futile to expect IFIs to change any of their past patterns of 
behaviour. Such enforcement is largely dependent on both political will and vision (Khan 
S., 2009). 
 
Islamic banking will continue to grow at a faster rate than conventional banking both 
because of the inevitable de-leveraging of the global system, but also because the roots of 
Islamic banking are in the Gulf and South East Asia; these are regions with higher growth 
rates, expanding populations, and abundance of natural resources especially energy 
(Eedle, 2009). Several IFIs are therefore in a position to gain market shares at the expense 
of conventional peers, which have been weakened by toxic sub-prime assets. However, 
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for Islamic banking to become a true global alternative to the existing western system, 
there are a number of actions that must be considered as explained earlier. The main issue 
is the development of products that are more in line with the spirit of Shari’ah and not 
just replicating conventional equivalents.  
 
However, the political and social upheaval throughout the Middle East will undoubtedly 
have direct and indirect impacts on IFIs in general, and on those located in the Middle 
East in specific. The ability of local governments to support Islamic banking and to 
bailout financial institutions remains to be assessed after the scissor effect of rising oil 
prices and local geo-political unrest. 
 
Subsequently, the following sub-hypotheses were formulated in order identify whether 
there is any significant differences across various groups in the respective control 
variables. The results of the hypotheses testing are summarized in Table 8.63. 
 
H12-1: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ 
recommended growth strategies for Islamic banks according to Region. 
 
The K-W test results suggest that the null hypothesis is accepted and the alternative 
hypothesis is rejected, which implies that, statistically, there are no significant differences 
in the respondents‟ views across various regions. 
 
H12-2: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ 
recommended growth strategies for Islamic banks according to Respondent’s Position. 
 
Similarly, the results suggest that the null hypothesis is accepted indicating that, 
statistically, this control variable plays no significant role in impacting the respondents‟ 
opinions. 
 
H12-3: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ 
recommended growth strategies for Islamic banks according to the Nature of the FI. 
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For this hypothesis, the testing results decline the null hypothesis, meaning that, 
statistically, there are significant differences among respondent‟s views according to the 
Nature of FI. „Organic growth in home market‟ and „Standardization‟ had p value of 
0.036 and 0.015 respectively, which is lower than the critical p-value of 0.05. However, 
examining the mean rankings of these two strategies according to „Nature of FI‟, as 
summarized in Table 8.64, did not identify a particular pattern. 
 
H12-4: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ 
recommended growth strategies for Islamic banks according to the Nature of Activities. 
 
The K-W results were unable to reject the null hypothesis, indicating that, statistically, 
the Nature of Activities plays no significant role in impacting the respondents‟ opinions. 
 
H12-5: There are no statistically significant differences among respondents’ 
recommended growth strategies for Islamic banks according to Accounting Standards. 
 
The testing results accept the null hypothesis indicating that this control variable is, 
statistically, not significant in influencing the respondents‟ opinions. 
 
Hypothesis 13: 
Perceptions of Islamic and conventional bankers differ significantly. Islamic bankers 
are more biased towards their business model, and vice versa. 
 
Finally, Hypothesis 13 is a general hypothesis not linked to a specific part of the 
questionnaire. The researcher expected the perceptions of Islamic bankers to be biased in 
favour of their business model, and those of the conventional bankers to be biased against 
Islamic banking. Hypothesis 13 is declined as the findings from both the quantitative and 
qualitative analyses reflected high degree of correlation between the responses of the two 
groups. However, differences generally existed between the responses of bankers and 
non-bankers. Non-bankers have a different risk perception than bankers; this is because 
bankers, whether Islamic or non-Islamic, have hands-on experience and better 
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understanding about the Islamic banking model and its risk architecture than non-bankers 
who tend to be more academic in their approach.  
 
More specifically, the various K-W tests conducted in Chapter 8 generally show that 
there is no significant difference in perception levels between respondents from stand-
alone Islamic banks and Islamic subsidiaries. Initially, it was expected that respondents 
from stand-alone Islamic banks have a stronger perception compared to those from 
Islamic subsidiaries for two reasons: firstly, stand-alone Islamic banks have been in 
existence much longer than Islamic subsidiaries, and, secondly, the respondents from 
stand-alone Islamic banks have the advantage of dealing with only Islamic banking 
products and services whereas Islamic subsidiaries still need to operate side-by- side with 
their respective conventional counterpart in sharing the same operating platforms and 
buildings. Nevertheless, the results have indicated otherwise. Some differences could be 
spotted between perceptions of conventional banks and stand-alone Islamic banks, and 
more noticeably between the perceptions of bankers and non-bankers, represented by 
„Others‟. Examining the mean rankings for different questions confirmed that there is an 
observed pattern, which can be explained by market realities. 
 
10.12 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The current chapter is intended to combine, integrate and discuss the main results and 
findings from all the three empirical chapters, combined with knowledge developed from 
the literature review, and to provide a basis of overall conclusion.  
 
In an attempt to render the results in a more systematic manner, Table 10.1 attempts to 
bring the results of all the main hypotheses‟ testing together. 
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Table 10.1 – Summary of the Hypotheses Testing Decisions 
Hypothesis 
Questionnaires 
Decision 
Interviews 
Decision 
1- The main risks facing Islamic banks are 
reputational risk, Shari’ah- non-compliance 
risk, asset-liability management risk, 
liquidity risk, and concentration risk 
Accept H0 
Majority 
approve 
2- Islamic bankers prefer mark-up based 
contracts and shy away from profit sharing 
contracts. 
Accept H0 
Majority 
approve 
3- Profit-sharing contracts are perceived as 
more risky than mark-up based contracts in 
the Islamic finance industry  
Accept H0 
Majority 
approve 
4- There is no substantial difference between 
risk management in Islamic banking and 
conventional banking. 
Reject H0 
Majority 
disapprove 
5- Capital requirements levels should be lower 
in IFIs than in conventional banks.  Reject H0 
Majority 
disapprove 
6- Basel II was drafted with conventional 
banking very much in mind. IFIs should 
follow their own standards, e.g. IFSB 
Principles on capital adequacy. 
Reject H0 
Majority 
disapprove 
7- Islamic banking is more resilient to 
economic shocks than conventional banking 
but not recession proof. 
Accept H0 
Majority 
approve 
8- Not many Islamic banks use the more 
technically advanced risk measurement and 
reporting techniques. 
Accept H0 
Majority 
approve 
9- The use of risk measurement techniques is 
less advanced among Islamic banks than 
among their conventional peers. 
Accept H0 
Majority 
approve 
10- Islamic banks use a number of risk 
Accept H0 
Majority 
approve 
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mitigation tools that are intended to be 
Shari’ah-compliant and that are less 
advanced from those utilised by conventional 
banks. 
11- Most IFIs abandoned conservative risk 
management Shari’ah principles in favour of 
copying conventional structures. 
 
Accept H0 
Majority 
approve 
12- Islamic banking has a great potential to 
become a strong alternative financing system 
provided that it goes back to its roots.  
Accept H0 
Majority 
approve 
13- Perceptions of Islamic and conventional 
bankers differ significantly. Islamic bankers 
are more biased towards their business 
model, and vice versa. 
Reject H0 
Majority 
disapprove 
 
As can be seen in Table 10.1, in the case of 13 hypotheses, 9 null hypotheses were 
accepted leading; while the alternative null-hypotheses were accepted for the remaining 4 
hypotheses. 
 
Based on the decisions of the hypotheses testing, the main findings and implications of 
this study will be presented in the following chapter together with recommendations for 
areas in which future research appears to be desirable. It also discusses future directions 
of risk management in Islamic banking. 
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This final chapter summarises the main results and renders the conclusion of the thesis. It 
brings together all the findings and ideas discussed throughout this research. To reiterate, 
this study was undertaken with the objective of evaluating the contemporary risk 
management practices in Islamic banking. In meeting this broad objective, the views and 
opinions from the sampled Islamic banking professionals were obtained through a survey 
questionnaire and by conducting in-depth interviews. The results of the survey and 
interviews were analysed and compared with the theoretical framework and the related 
literature.  
 
This chapter briefly recapitulates the salient conclusions derived from the findings of this 
research. In addition, it also presents the main policy and practical recommendations for 
enhancing risk culture and architecture in Islamic banking. Finally, the research 
limitations and suggested future research topics will be presented.  
 
11.2 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH  
 
As laid down in the introduction chapter (Chapter 1), the main aim of this research was to 
investigate the perceptions and views of professional bankers and financiers one way or 
another involved in the provision of Islamic financial and banking products across 
different regions about risk management in Islamic banking, with the objective of 
mapping out the various issues related to risk through the perceptions of the participants, 
namely bankers, financiers, and scholars.  
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This study, hence, consists of two major sections, namely background and empirical 
work. The first five chapters are the foundational chapters for the next six chapters, which 
form the empirical part of the thesis. The first chapter introduces the main research 
questions and states the research aim and objectives as well as explaining the rationale of 
choosing the research topic. It also briefly discusses the research hypotheses, and the 
selected research methodology. Chapter 2 covers, among others, the systemic importance 
of the Islamic banking industry and its potential growth. An overview of the various 
concepts of risks and the industry standards of risk management techniques are discussed 
in Chapter 3 along with the discussion of the unique risks facing IFIs. This chapter 
represents the main chapter in the literature review part of the paper. Chapter 4 looks at 
capital adequacy rules for IFIs in a financial world dominated by Basel standards, while 
Chapter 5 analyses the roots of the recent finical crisis and its implications to Islamic 
banking by making reference to the risk management nature of the financial crisis.    
 
The second part of the thesis is concerned with the empirical work and the findings 
thereof. Chapter 6, which is the first chapter of this part, deals with the research design 
and methodology. In essence, it is about the primary data collection and administration 
process, covering different phases of that process and dwelling on its important aspects, 
such as the research questions, hypotheses, and the relevance of the selected research 
methodologies to the research questions. For the empirical part of the thesis, the primary 
data assembled through the use of questionnaire surveys and in-depth interviews as the 
research methods are utilised. Chapter 7 is the beginning of the statistical analysis of the 
survey questionnaire employing mainly descriptive analyses and Chi-square tests as well 
as the more basic frequency and percentage tables. Chapter 8 is the main primary 
quantitative data analysis, presenting the findings from inferential statistical tests such as 
Kruskall-Wallis, factor analysis, MANOVA multivariate analysis of variance, and Chi-
square tests. This chapter, to a certain extent, answers the main research hypotheses and 
their sub- hypotheses as the information presented in various sections of the chapter 
suggests. Chapter 9 is the qualitative analysis part in which the responses given by the 
interviewees are analysed through a coding analysis. However, more detailed discussion 
of the findings of both quantitative and qualitative analyses is handled in Chapter 10 
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which combines, integrates, and discusses the main findings from all the empirical 
chapters, within the context of the existing literature, to provide a basis of overall 
conclusion. 
 
Finally, this chapter contains the conclusion and recommendations as already explained 
and also summarises the research findings and the proposed policy implications as well as 
the research limitations and further research topics. 
 
11.3 REFLECTING ON THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, risk management in Islamic banking is one of the major prime 
as well as controversial issues. Although progress has been made across the industry over 
the past few years, still Islamic banks are facing significant challenges when measuring 
and managing risks. At the same time, risk management is getting more attention all over 
the world due to the recent financial crisis. Within this context, it goes without saying 
that, for most Islamic financial institutions, risk management presents specific challenges. 
The study, therefore, investigates the controversial question of whether Islamic banks are 
more or less risky than conventional banks. This research answers the identified research 
questions, not only based on conceptual research but more importantly using empirical 
evidence from the market place by focusing on the practical side of risk management in 
Islamic banking.  
 
It should be noted that this research is a practical PhD research that fills the gap in 
research about risk management in Islamic banking by investigating the perceptions and 
attitudes of different categories of Islamic banking practitioners towards the unique 
characteristics of risk management in Islamic banking from empirical evidence. 
Therefore, this paper fills the gap by taking the research one step further by integrating 
theoretical concepts with the practical reality in a socially constructed manner through the 
opinions and perceptions of the participants. 
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Based on the findings in this study, it is obvious that Islamic banks face a number of 
challenges in terms of risk management. The entanglement of credit, market and 
operational risk in each contract type used by Islamic banks in their daily operations, as 
well as displaced commercial risks attached to the incentive to serve PSIA-holders with 
returns at least comparable to similar conventional deposits, are two of the main 
constraints IFIs need to cope with. In addition, as indicated by the findings in this 
research, in the absence of a wide pool of Shari’ah-compliant, sufficiently liquid 
investment vehicles (especially in fixed income), Islamic banks find it difficult to manage 
their balance sheet from an ALM perspective, especially liquidity and margin-rate risk.  
 
As the findings depicts, Islamic banks’ funding mix tends to be imbalanced, with the 
dominance of deposits, PSIAs and equity making their funding profile predominantly 
short-term at a time when the maturity of their asset classes is widening. To mitigate 
nascent maturity mismatches, some IFIs have started issuing medium-term sukuk to 
lengthen the maturity profile of their funding, but sukuk still account for only a small 
portion of IFIs’ total liabilities as discussed in Chapter 3. Subordinated sukuk and hybrid 
instruments have not been used yet; these are more expensive funding sources and 
incentives to issue them are limited given the abundance of capital among most IFIs. The 
lack of liquidity and viable alternatives, combined with the competitive disadvantage, 
hamper IFIs and can even create a liquidity crisis. To overcome the shortcomings of the 
Islamic money market, many investment banks are currently designing new complex 
products, compliant with Shari’ah requirements. It remains to be seen whether these new 
solutions will obtain widespread Shari’ah-compliant status in the Islamic finance 
community, and generate enough demand for a functional Islamic money market to 
develop. To help manage their liquidity, IFIs will have to develop creative funding 
strategies and improve their internal capabilities to understand and forecast their liquidity 
needs. 
 
In addition, the research findings identifies that IFIs face other challenges from weak 
corporate governance practices, lack of standardisation in accounting and Shari’ah 
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standards, and high concentration risk. In fact, IFIs show heavy concentrations across the 
board, by name, sector, geography and business lines. 
 
Political risk was ignored by both questionnaire respondents and interviewees in this 
study; only a few respondents recognised it as a major risk affecting Islamic banking. 
However, the lesson from the recent political unrest and revolutions in the Middle East is 
that political risk matters. There is no doubt that the political and social upheaval 
throughout the Middle East will undoubtedly have direct and indirect impacts on IFIs in 
general, and on those located in the Middle East in specific as discussed in Chapter 10. 
The escape of foreign investors and lack of ability of governments to support Islamic 
banking and to bailout financial institutions remains to be assessed after the scissor effect 
of rising oil prices and local geo-political unrest. 
 
Literature review reveals that Basel II was drafted with conventional banking so much in 
mind. Previous researchers also argue that Basel II is primarily for conventional banks 
and has limited applicability for Islamic banking. However, empirical evidence from this 
study found that market practitioners believe that with some adaptations Basel II could be 
applied to Islamic banks and that the IFSB could play an important role in this context. 
 
In brief, empirical findings from this study identified weaknesses and vulnerabilities 
among IFIs in the area of risk management and governance. The risk management, 
monitoring, reporting, and mitigation need to be upgraded across the whole Islamic 
banking industry. This study shows that the difficulties IFIs are currently faced with 
mostly stem from risk-management failures, characterised by a very low degree of 
diversification, preference for illiquidity, and an absence of financial flexibility and 
imbalanced funding strategies. This highlights the significance of risk management for 
the growth of whole Islamic banking industry. 
 
The findings in this research also show that although IFIs have shown resilience, they are 
not immune from economic shocks. Empirical evidence shows that Islamic banking is 
expected to emerge stronger from the crisis, provided some conditions are met, such as 
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‘further innovation’, ‘enhanced transparency’, ‘more robust risk-management architecture 
and culture’, and, above all, ‘enhanced Shari’ah compliance’. Broadly speaking, Islamic 
banking had a relatively ‘mild crisis’ in that it suffered less damage as a result of the 
global economic and financial turmoil of the past few years than conventional banking. 
Of course there were exceptions: Dubai, with its high debt and open economy, was the 
main regional casualty as well as the private sectors of some other Gulf countries which 
were bruised as their credit bubbles popped. In general IFIs have relatively maintained 
stability despite the global financial crisis thanks to ample liquidity, safe debts, and high 
profit margins. However, this situation will not continue for long. Islamic banks need to 
reform in different levels – product, operational, and institutional - to be successful. They 
have been lucky so far, and perhaps they will learn from the difficulties faced by 
conventional banks.  
 
Many studies including this study indicate that IFIs tend to shy away from equity and 
partnership based instruments for several reasons, such as the inherit riskiness and 
additional costs of monitoring such investments, low appetite for risk, and lack of 
innovation. This unwillingness to take on risk reflects the lack of transparency in the 
Islamic banking system, which dampens confidence and trust among investors and 
market participants. The result is that depositors and investors become more risk averse, 
and so banks become even more risk averse, thus creating a vicious circle which results 
in severe financial and economic crises.  
 
The original concept of Islamic financing is undoubtedly in favour of equity participation 
rather than creation of debt, because it is only equity that brings an equitable and 
balanced distribution of wealth in the society. However, the practice is very different 
from the theory. Practitioners of Islamic finance to-date have been mimicking 
conventional products. This mimicking has resulted in a close correlation between the 
two systems. These deviations between theory and practice mean that the system is not 
functioning at its full potential and has adapted itself to a limited functionality. In fact, 
due to these deviations, the Islamic banking system is exposed to additional risks that it is 
not supposed to be exposed to as explained in the previous chapters. This dichotomy 
  
468 
between the ideals of Islamic banking moral and the realities, combined with the lack of 
advanced risk management and mitigation techniques, renders Islamic banking more 
risky than the debunked conventional banking model instead of being a safe haven. There 
is a growing realisation that the long-term sustainable growth of Islamic banking will 
depend largely on the development of proper risk management architecture. Islamic 
banking could only be a safe haven when its broader principles on a macro-level are 
entirely followed by all participants. In other words, when the short-terms risks and the 
longer-term stability are put together and optimised, the outlook for the Islamic banking 
industry looks less risky than its critics claim. 
 
Islamic banking, so far, as it is being practiced does not appear to be a genuine reflection 
of the aspirational expectations of fiqh requirement for Islamic finance. Islamic banking 
benefits, when measured by conventional yardsticks, do not amount to much. Therefore, 
IFIs and all participants in Islamic finance should strictly follow the rules of Shari’ah, 
regardless of whether the benefits of such rules are apparent or measurable. There is a 
particular logic and morality to Shari’ah principles, which Islamic banking practitioners 
will only see if they stop trying to shoe-horn them into conventional product structures. 
 
Market discipline and transparency rules have been the pride of Western financial 
systems for decades. The irony is that those rules have consistently failed whenever 
tested by severe financial stress. On the other hand, more resilient and ethical rules have 
long existed in the roots of Shari’ah finance. Some of the previously criticised inherent 
constraints – imposed on Islamic banks by Shari’ah – have proved to be conservative risk 
management tools that enabled most Islamic banks to navigate through the current crisis. 
Limited available hedging tools, prohibition of derivatives and speculation, linking risks 
to assets, and extra liquidity and capital buffers are all examples of built-in principles that 
have been criticised by opponents of Islamic banking as burdens on profitability prior to 
the crisis; with hindsight they proved to be the most important strengths that ensure 
stability as explained in Chapter 5. From a risk management perspective, Shari’ah can 
provide a moral compass that guides risk takers which risks are acceptable and which are 
not. 
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11.4 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the present study is motivated by an observation that there is 
a gap between the theoretical aspects of risk management in Islamic banking and the 
practical behaviour of the industry practitioners – a fact that has been articulated by many 
in different formats. Therefore, the results of this study provide positive implications and 
recommendations for various stakeholders in pursuing the desired ultimate objectives of 
the Islamic banking system.  
 
It should, furthermore, be stated that this research also contributes to the body of existing 
academic research in terms of opening up new areas of study; in addition, it renders 
valuable input to industry practitioners for improving current regulations and practice 
related to risk management, reporting, mitigation, capital adequacy, and development 
strategies. The findings in this study may also prove very useful for promoting financial 
stability from a risk management perspective.  
 
11.4.1 Policy Implications 
 
The results have some policy implications for regulators, policy makers, Shari’ah 
scholars, practitioners, academics, and institutional stakeholders. In addition, regulative 
bodies such as central banks, AAOIFI, IIFM, and IFSB may find the results useful for 
assessing the level of adequacy of risk reporting in Islamic banks and for developing new 
guidelines for risk management and mitigation. The findings provide evidence which 
enables the IFSB and regulators to pursue policies that promote transparency with regard 
to risk management. The general findings in this study, if combined with other studies, 
will have important implications for setting up risk reporting standards for IFIs.  
 
In addition, the risk perception trends identified by this study across different countries, 
regions, and other categories of respondents could be beneficial for marketing and growth 
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strategies of IFIs across borders. These findings could therefore be of greatest help to 
regulators in understanding regional and institutional differences among banks. 
 
The findings also show that IFIs are still far behind the current best practice in terms of 
risk management methods, transparency, and disclosure. This has implications, 
particularly for PSIA holders because, as mentioned earlier, they require adequate risk 
information to monitor their investment due to profit-sharing arrangements.  
 
Furthermore, the perceptions of Islamic banking professionals about Basel I and III and 
their applicability to Islamic banking could be useful to regional regulators and the BCBS 
in drafting and applying Basel III standards, which tend to neglect the unique 
characteristics of Islamic banks. The failings of Basel II and the market expectations 
resulting from Basel III were thoroughly discussed in this study with wide implications to 
banks, regulators, consultants, and researchers. 
 
IFIs also need to make use of the findings in this research to improve their risk 
management architectures and culture. By doing so, they would be able to improve their 
funding structures, reduce their inherent risks, and hence improve their ratings, market 
transactions pricing, and overall profitability. Moreover, from a risk management 
perspective, the recommended growth strategies discussed in this paper could be of great 
help to Islamic banks particularly during the current turbulent economic climate.  
 
It is impossible to lay out one best strategy but various strategies can be adopted to 
achieve profitable growth and to enhance IFIs’ competitiveness. It is worthwhile to point 
out that, while asset growth is important, appropriate systems and infrastructures to 
address risk issues need to be in place to support sustainable growth. Therefore, strategic 
focus needs to be timed, with risk management being implemented first, followed by 
growth. Finally, regulators, shareholders, management and employees, and customers all 
have roles in shaping an organization’s strategies.  
 
The main recommendations of the thesis can be summarised as follows: 
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(i) Consolidation:  
There are far too many IFIs to serve this growing market, but none has the size necessary 
to compete on a global stage. 
 
(ii) Diversification:  
Consolidation will also help IFIs to gain from the benefits of diversification across 
different geographical territories, sectors, and industries. Currently, Islamic banks are not 
fully exploiting the benefits that come from both geographic and product diversification. 
On the asset side, diversification can reduce credit, concentration, and market risks, in 
addition to reducing the variance in the returns that accrue to the claimholders. 
Diversification on the liabilities side can reduce the displaced commercial risk and 
withdrawal risk and will help to improve liquidity gaps and assets-liabilities management. 
 
In addition, most IFIs need to diversify their activities from what is mostly a real estate 
and standard lending play, to offer a comprehensive service suite, including advanced 
treasury services, innovative asset management, balance sheet management, and 
securitisation services. 
 
(iii) Liquidity enhancement: 
There is a growing realisation that the sustainable growth of Islamic banking will depend 
largely on the development of well-functioning secondary markets and the introduction of 
liquidity-enhancing products.  
 
(iv) Investing in risk management infrastructure:  
The establishment of risk assessment and measurement systems often becomes an 
expensive proposition as it requires sophisticated models, software, packages 
technologies, and skilled human resources who can understand the nature of the risks and 
prepare models accordingly. Given the small size of the IFIs, establishing such 
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frameworks at the organisation level may not be possible. IFIs and supervisory authorities 
should work together to find a reasonable solution to the problem. Risk management 
solutions should not be considered as an extra cost but should be viewed as an investment 
to build a knowledge base of superior quality entrepreneurs and projects. As Islamic 
banks should have learnt from the crisis, the painful cost of inadequate risk management 
is being demonstrated every day. 
 
(v) Innovation:   
Islamic banking might find it difficult to innovate because it exists in a deeply-rooted 
conventional system. However, if the industry is not innovating authentic products 
according to genuine Shari’ah principles, it might end up with the same failures as 
conventional banking. At this point in time, there is no real value proposition offered by 
Islamic banks. While Islamic banking is considered to have a bright future, mimicking 
conventional banking is mostly considered as making Islamic banking lose many 
opportunities to serve the markets and communities around the world. 
 
(vi) Back to roots: a Shari’ah-based approach vs. Shari’ah compliancy 
Shari’ah compliance is inherently and systemically significant to Islamic banking.  
However, developments indicate that Shari’ah based solutions should be better placed in 
appreciating opportunities available. It is clear through experience that any divergence 
from Shari’ah principles exposes the IFI to a wide range of additional risks at different 
levels as discussed in this paper, thus rendering Islamic banking to be more risky than the 
conventional model. Considering that the current practice is very much shaped by 
Shari’ah compliancy, which hence exposed Islamic banks and finance to further risks, it 
is hoped that with Shari’ah based approach such unnecessary risk areas can be avoided. 
 
11.4.2 Theoretical and Empirical Implications: Significance of the Research 
 
This research is expected to fill a gap in the critically investigating risk management in 
Islamic banking form a practical perspective, and as a tool to boost growth and 
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profitability of IFIs. It is, however, not merely another addition to the available literature. 
It has distinguished itself for a number of reasons: 
 
First, it focuses on the risk management aspect of Islamic banking, a highly under-
researched area in Islamic finance. Second, it places theory and practice in one place by 
taking analysis one step further from literature review to the market place. As explained 
earlier, there is a clear difference between theory and reality in Islamic banking, which 
subsequently leads to a distinction between conceptual formulations and actual practices 
of risk management in Islamic banking. The differences are discussed and analysed in 
depth in this study. To relate this research to the realities of the banking and finance 
practice, the focus of this research is on the everyday aspects of risk management in 
Islamic banking. Moreover, this study relies on a larger sample size within the Islamic 
banking wider population than previous studies, and the sample is well diversified for 
both the questionnaire and interviews in order to enable the researcher to obtain better 
findings by conducting significance tests on the differences among the various groups. 
Finally, while a few have researched the practical implementation of risk management in 
Islamic banking, this research is the first of its kind to do so after the recent credit crisis. 
Thus, this research extracts empirical evidence from the perceptions of Islamic banking 
professionals and from the current crisis to support its own views and conclusions.  
 
11.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
There is no perfect study and the current one is no exception. There are four limitations 
that need to be acknowledged and addressed regarding the present study. Firstly, the 
cultural aspects of risk management and the impact of regional cultural differences on the 
risk perception of respondents should have been examined. Each region has its unique 
culture which shapes its risk management and therefore Islamic finance related studies 
should also endogenize the cultural and cultural-religious dimension of risk in 
considering risk and risk management practices. It is hoped that such a study could be 
conducted in the coming future, perhaps as part of post-doctoral studies.  
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Similarly, the impact of macroeconomic factors and business cycles on risk management 
perceptions across different regions could be investigated. Considering that each country 
has a particular dynamism related to macroeconomy with specific implication for various 
risk dimensions in that particular framework, such economic realities should be 
considered as part of risk management related studies.  
 
The third limitation has to do with the approach to the research process. In addition to 
qualitative research methodology, as this study utilized, a quantitative methodology based 
on secondary data with econometric analysis to measure the ‘actual’ findings in literature 
against the ‘perceptions’ as studied in this research could have been also considered.  
 
It should be noted that time and costs limitations were, no doubt, restricting factors for 
the research to address the first three limitations.  
 
Finally, the fourth limitation has to do with literature review. The literature on risk 
management in Islamic banking was limited and thus the references were seriously 
affected.  
 
11.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
There is still wide scope for improvement and for further research. Having mentioned the 
limitations that were identified and discovered throughout the research process, the 
researcher would like to make suggestions and recommendations which may be taken 
from this study for future research either to enhance the study or as a basis for new 
studies in the same field. 
 
Future studies may expand the scope of the sample enlarging the coverage to include 
respondents from more countries and with more diversified backgrounds. 
 
This study accessed the perception of Islamic banking professionals about risks facing 
IFIs. It is also possible to seek the views and perceptions of Islamic banking customers 
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themselves. Expanding the sample in this way would enable the researcher to use 
probability sampling techniques. The outcome of random sampling may enable the 
researcher to obtain data that are more representative and would assist the researcher to 
make more conclusive analyses by using robust statistical tools such as parametric 
statistical tools. 
 
Although the research sample for this study comprised a wide range of respondents with 
different backgrounds within the industry, no regulators were included. It would be useful 
to obtain the regulators’ views on the issues discussed in this thesis. Including regulators 
in the research sample would give additional insights on their roles to improve the risk 
management standards in Islamic banking. 
 
Furthermore, the cultural aspects of risk management and the impact of regional cultural 
differences on the risk perception of respondents should have been examined as each 
region has its unique culture which shapes its risk management. 
 
This study focused on risk management within Islamic banking. Further research may 
attempt to extend the attempt of this study to analyse risk management among takaful 
companies, Islamic brokers and Islamic funds, and to expand the research about risk 
management across the whole wider Islamic finance industry.  
 
Finally, as mentioned in the previous section, secondary data based econometric analysis 
should be considered also in future research to observe and model the articulation and 
practice of risk and risk management in Islamic banking and finance. As mentioned, this 
can help to measure the ‘actual’ against the ‘perceptions’ as studied in the research. 
 
11.7 EPILOGUE 
 
This research set out to explore and analyse the perceptions and attitudes of Islamic 
banking professionals towards contemporary risk management issues within Islamic 
banking. The efforts and dedications put into this research especially during the data 
  
476 
collection and analysis duration yielded highly significant and meaningful results, which 
is a critical success factor. As the foundational and empirical chapters indicate, this study 
is considered as having fulfilled its research aims and objectives. It is hoped and expected 
that at least some, if not all parts of this research, will be applied by the stakeholders of 
Islamic banking. 
 
A number of ideas have been discussed and analysed in this research, which can be 
considered to constitute an agenda for further research and deliberations by researchers, 
practitioners, regulators, and Shari’ah scholars. As is acknowledged by many, the Islamic 
banking industry is at the crossroad. The right direction can provide the required impetus 
for the sustained growth in the long run. The only alternative is through efficient and 
effective risk management practices and systems within the authentic worldview of 
Islamic moral economy. Integrated Islamic risk management and building risk-sensitive 
culture are needed now and for the future. Investment in better risk management systems 
and tools should be viewed as strategic developments rather than a situational necessity. 
Risk management for Islamic banking is not a destination or a project; it is rather a 
journey and a process – an on-going process.    
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Appendix 1 
Questionnaire 
 
Risk Management in Islamic Banks 
 
Dear Respondent, 
 
My name is Wael Eid, Associate Director - Risk Management at a leading Islamic Bank. I am also 
pursuing my Phd. research at Durham University under the joint supervision of Professor 
Rodney Wilson and Dr. Mehmet Asutay.  My goal is to combine my practical experience with my 
academic background in a pioneering research that Shari’ah scholars, policy makers, 
practitioners, academia and researchers may find relevant and motivating to conduct more 
research in this important but under researched area.  
 
My supervisors at Durham University feel that this is a promising thesis and a fruitful topic. 
 
My research is about "Mapping the Risks and Risk Management Practices in Islamic Banking", 
which aims to explore the unique risks of the Islamic financial services industry and the 
perceptions of participants about these risks. This is in addition to analysing the Shari’ah 
related challenges concerning risk management in Islamic banking. 
 
Please find attached a questionnaire that is highly relevant to every Islamic banker. I would be 
grateful if you complete this questionnaire at your convenience and return to me. This is purely 
for my studies and not for work-related purposes. 
 
If you have any questions, suggestions or comments – please contact me on 
waelkamal77@gmail.com 
 
Most of the survey is ticking the boxes or writing a number at the most, so it will not take more 
than 5 minutes out of your precious time.  
 
Of course your responses will be treated with strict confidentiality. 
 
Many thanks in advance. 
 
 
Kind regards 
Wael Eid 
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Questionnaire 
 
PhD. Research on “Risk Management in Islamic Banking” 
 
Part One: General and Background Information 
 
1. Name and location of the Financial Institution:      
 
2. Respondent’s Name:            3. Position:              
    Department:                
 
4. Nature of the Financial Institution:  
(Please mark the appropriate boxes) 
 
 Fully-fledged Islamic Bank    Conventional Bank with Islamic 
activities/windows 
 Conventional Bank   Other, please specify      
 
5. Nature of Activities: (Please mark the appropriate boxes) 
  
 Commercial Banking   Investment Banking 
 Retail banking   Other, please specify      
 
6. The accounting standards used by your institution comply with: 
 
 International standards     AAOIFI standards 
 Other, please specify        Don’t know    
 
Part Two: Risk Perception 
 
Section I- Risk issues in Islamic banks 
  
7. Severity of risks facing Islamic Banks. 
 
Below are the main inherent risks in Islamic banking. Could you please identify the 
seriousness/importance of the following risks to Islamic Banks according to your own personal 
view? 
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Please mark the appropriate box. 
 
Risk Very 
Important 
Important Neutral Unimportant 
Very 
Unimportant 
Credit Risk      
Market Risk*      
Operational Risk      
Equity Investment Risk      
Liquidity Risk       
Asset-Liability Management Risk      
Displaced Commercial Risk **      
Shari’ah non-compliance Risk      
Concentration Risk      
Reputation Risk       
Fiduciary Risk      
Corporate Governance Risk      
Legal Risk      
 
*Market Risk encompasses Rate of Return Risk, Currency Risk, Commodity Risk, Benchmark Risk, and 
Mark-up; but excludes Equity Investment Risk.    
 
** Displaced Commercial Risk is the risk of liquidity suddenly drying up as a consequence of massive 
withdrawals should the Islamic bank assets yield returns for Investment account Holders lower than 
expected, or worse, negative rates of profits.  
 
8. Please list below any other risks (if applicable) that you think might affect Islamic Banks, in 
order of their seriousness/ importance. 
 
a.       
b.       
c.       
d.       
e.       
9. For institutions that use Islamic finance contracts, please rank the following Islamic finance 
contracts according to the intensity of use by your institution (the most used first): 
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Please use a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 as the most used and 7 as the least used.  
 
Contract Rank 
Murabahah       
Mudarabah       
Wakala       
Ijarah       
Musharakah       
Istisna’a       
Salam       
 
10. According to your own view, please rank the following Islamic finance contracts according 
to their risk seriousness, starting by the most risky: 
 
Please use a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 as the most risky and 7 as the least risky.  
 
Contract Rank 
Murabahah       
Mudarabah       
Wakala       
Ijarah       
Musharaka       
Istisna’a       
Salam       
 
11. Please mark the appropriate boxes below 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1. Risks for Islamic banks should be 
managed using same techniques used in 
conventional banking. 
     
2. Islamic banking is more risky by 
nature than conventional banking. 
     
3. Risk management for Islamic banks is 
more challenging than it is for 
conventional banks. 
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4. There is naturally inherent 
conservatism in the principles of Islamic 
finance. 
     
5. In an Islamic bank, a low rate of return 
on deposits will lead to withdrawal of 
funds. 
     
6. Depositors would hold the bank 
responsible for a lower rate of return on 
their deposits. 
     
7. Variation among Shari’ah scholars’ 
opinions represents a major risk to 
Islamic banking. 
     
8. Non-Shari’ah compliance could 
severely damage the reputation of an 
Islamic bank. 
     
9. AAOIFI and IFSB standards should be 
made mandatory for Islamic banks. 
     
10. Corporate governance is generally 
weak in Islamic banks. 
     
11. Islamic banking in its current state is 
a safer option than conventional banking 
     
 
Section II- Capital Adequacy  
 
12. Which of the following does your bank use in calculating its minimum capital requirements? 
 
 Basel II standards  IFSB standards 
 Other, please specify       Don’t know 
 
13. If your institution is using Basel II standards, please indicate the methodology used to 
calculate the minimum capital requirement for: 
 
 
 
Credit Risk  
 
 Standardised approach      Foundation  IRB   Advanced IRB  
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Market Risk 
 
 Standardised approach       Internal models approach 
 
Operational Risk  
 
 Basic indicator approach       Advanced measurement approach 
 
14. Do you think that the capital requirements for Islamic banks as compared to conventional 
banks should be: 
 
 Higher   Same    Lower   Don’t know 
 
 
 
15. Please mark the appropriate boxes in the table below  
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
1. Basel II standards should be equally 
applied to Islamic banks without 
modification. 
     
2. IFSB standard on Capital Adequacy 
should be used by Islamic banks rather 
than Basel II. 
     
3. Basel II standards should be reviewed 
after failing to prevent the current crisis. 
     
4. The proposed Basel III rules would be 
easily applicable to Islamic banks 
     
5. Stricter capital, leverage, and liquidity 
rules, as proposed under Basel III, are 
likely to prevent another financial crisis.  
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Section III- Credit Crisis and Islamic Finance 
 
16. Please mark the appropriate boxes in the table below   
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
1. Islamic banks are more resilient to 
economic shocks than their conventional 
peers. 
     
2. The recent crisis would not have 
happened under a true Islamic banking 
system. 
     
3. Islamic finance could have solved the 
global crisis. 
     
4. Risk management must be embedded 
institutionally. 
     
5. Banks in general used to rely heavily 
on rating agencies. 
     
6. Islamic banks rely less on rating 
agencies than conventional banks. 
     
7. Islamic finance industry should 
develop its own rating agencies. 
     
8. Islamic banks will emerge stronger 
from the current crisis. 
     
9. Consolidation is needed among 
smaller Islamic banks. 
     
 
Part Three: Risk Management and Mitigation 
 
17. How often does your bank produce the following reports, if applicable? 
 
 Daily  Weekly Monthly Yearly Never Don’t 
know 
Capital requirement report       
Operational risk report       
Profit rate  risk report        
Foreign exchange risk report       
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Liquidity risk report       
Commodity risk report       
Country risk report       
Equity mark-to-market report       
Classified accounts report       
Industry concentration risk report       
Credit exposure report       
Large exposure report       
Other risk reports (please specify)                                               
      
      
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18. Which of the following techniques does your organisation use to analyze risks, if applicable? 
 
Internal based ratings  
Credit ratings by rating agencies  
Gap analysis  
Duration analysis  
Maturity matching analysis  
Earnings at risk  
Value at risk  
Stress testing  
Simulation techniques  
Risk Adjusted Rate of Return on Capital (RAROC) 
 
 
Other (Please Specify)                                         
      
      
      
 
 
 
19. Risk mitigation techniques in Islamic banking compared to conventional banking are: 
 
 More Advanced     Less advanced 
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 Similar  Don’t know    
 
20. For institutions that use Islamic finance contracts, which of the following techniques does 
your organisation use to mitigate risks? 
 
On-balance sheet netting  
Islamic options   
Islamic swaps  
Guarantees  
Islamic currency forwards  
Parallel contracts  
Collateral arrangements  
Other (Please Specify)                                         
                           
           
           
 
 
 
Part Four: Islamic Banking in Practice  
 
21. Please mark the appropriate boxes in the table below   
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
1. Islamic banks have been mimicking 
conventional models. 
     
2. Islamic finance provides an ethical 
banking alternative.  
     
3. There is difference between the 
current practice and principles of Islamic 
banking.  
     
4. Islamic banks need to reform to be 
successful. 
     
 
Part Five: The Next Chapter in Islamic Banking 
 
22. According to your own view, which of the following strategies should Islamic banks focus 
on in order to thrive? Please rank the following strategies according to their importance, 
starting by the most important. 
 499 
 
Please use a scale from 1 to 8, with 1 as the most important and 8 as the least important.  
 
Strategy Rank 
Improved risk management       
Enhanced morality – Back to roots       
Mergers and Acquisitions       
Organic growth in home market       
Better risk mitigation       
Innovation       
Diversification – reduce concentration       
Standardization       
Other (Please Specify)                                         
           
                           
           
 
Thank you for your cooperation 
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Appendix 2 
 
Interview Participants  
 
Interview 
Number 
Name Organisation Position Country 
1 Sheikh Nizam Yaccubi Not Applicable Shari’ah Scholar UAE 
2 
Dr Abdul Latif Mahmood Al 
Mahmood 
Not Applicable Shari’ah Scholar Bahrain 
3 Dr Abdul Sattar Abu Ghuddah Not Applicable Shari’ah Scholar Syria 
4 Mohaimin Chowdhury European Islamic Investment Bank Plc 
Head of Legal, Shari’ah and 
Compliance 
UK 
5 Osaid Kailani Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank Head of Shari’ah Compliance UAE 
6 Rokaya Riad Al Baraka Bank - Egypt Head of Legal Egypt 
7 Adnan Yousif Al Baraka Banking Group CEO Bahrain 
8 Ashraf Al-Ghamrawy Al Baraka Bank - Egypt Managing Director Egypt 
9 Sameer Abdulaziz Qaedi Bahrain Islamic Bank 
Senior Dealer, Treasury and 
Investment 
Bahrain 
10 Dato' Wan Ismail Wan Yusoh Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad General Manager Malaysia 
11 Sami Fathi Al Baraka Bank - Egypt Head of Investments Egypt 
12 Danie Marx European Islamic Investment Bank Plc 
Head of Treasury and Capital 
Markets 
UK 
13 Chris Engel European Islamic Investment Bank Plc Head of Risk Management UK 
14 Grant Lowe Qatar Isalmic Bank (UK) Plc Head of Risk Management UK 
15 Abdullah Al Raisi Qatar Commercial Bank Deputy CEO Qatar 
16 Peter Knott Standard Chartered Bank Group Head, Operational Risk UK 
17 Ximena Jaramillo Rabo Bank Credit Risk Manager UK 
18 Hussien Abaza Commercial International Bank Head of Credit Risk Egypt 
19 Ahmed Masri KPMG Consultant UAE 
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20 Hassan Afifi Beltone Financial Consultant Egypt 
21 Mohammad Farrukh Raza 
IFAAS UK Limited (Islamic Finance 
Advisory & Assurance Services) 
Managing Director UK 
22 Ken Eglinton Ernest & Young 
Director - Banking and Capital 
Markets 
UK 
23 Abdulkader Thomas SHAPE Financial Corp. Consultant Kuwait 
24 Mahmoud ElSayed University of Alexandria Researcher Egypt 
25 Nawel Turki Cass Business School Researcher UK 
26 Mohamed Al Khan University of Bahrain  Researcher Bahrain 
27 Dr. Christian Thun Moody's Senior Director UK 
28 Mohamed Fayek Standard & Poor’s Senior Analyst UK 
29 Paul Smith Standard & Poor’s Senior Analyst UK 
30 Oliver Fochler Moody's Director France 
31 Oliver Putz Fitch Ratings Senior Director UAE 
32 Mohamed Damak Standard & Poor’s Senior Analyst UK 
33 Sunil Rajan Standard & Poor’s Director, Business Development UK 
 
 
 
 
